06/27/2008 - By Thomas Renard (from Terrorism Monitor, June 26) - Two very different forms of Kurdish activism oppose each other in Europe. The largely unnoticed development of opposing forces could be exploited by European diplomats to terminate terrorist activities carried out by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and soften Europe’s relationship with Turkey. The “old” form of Kurdish activism consists of terrorist attacks, training and fundraising in Europe by PKK members. The “new” form of activism relies on legal and democratic means. While the former takes advantage of the lack of European counter-terrorism cooperation, the latter finds its force in the new powers implemented by the European Union (EU). The reinforcement of the “new” Kurdish activism, and the weakening of the “old” terrorism, could facilitate the process of Turkish adhesion to the EU. The latest illustration of the new Kurdish activism occurred earlier this month, when the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) filed a lawsuit against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in pursuit of compensation for repeated Turkish bombings and attacks in northern Iraq. The ECHR, based in Strasbourg, France, enforces the European Convention of Human Rights, established in 1950. The KHRP claim was introduced on behalf of Muslim and Chaldean Christian villagers in northern Iraq who say they lost their homes during Turkish air raids last December (The Guardian, June 9). Ankara approved cross-border raids in northern Iraq in October 2007, arguing that the Iraqi government and U.S. troops were not doing enough to crack down on Kurdish terrorists. Occasional bombings started in November and intensified in December, followed by a ground incursion on December 16 and a major raid on PKK bases last February. More recently, Turkey launched another raid on June 9, according to Iraqi security officials (Reuters, June 10). In total, Turkish troops have allegedly killed hundreds of Kurdish rebels from the PKK and the Iranian-Kurdish Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK).

06/24/2008 - By Emrullah Uslu (from Terrorism Focus, June 24) - Turkish Land Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug surprised some by announcing a partnership between Turkey and Iran in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization (Cumhuriyet, June 6). In fact, the debate on choosing Iran as a close partner is not new. In 2002, the then secretary of the National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinc, suggested that “Turkey should be in search of new partnerships with Iran and Russia because the European Union does not help us at all” (Turkish Daily News, March 9, 2002; Sabah, March 3). The general’s remarks received harsh criticism from the Turkish press and other political observers at the time (Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, May 8, 2002). This begs the question: What forms the common ground for Turco-Iranian relations? Is it a strategic partnership to smash the PKK, or is it a fundamental policy shift as Gen. Kilinc suggested back in 2002? The answers to these questions lie in the future U.S. position on the issue of northern Iraq in general and the status of Kirkuk in particular. Prof. Umit Ozdag, who maintains close ties with the military, argues that Turkey and Iran grew closer because the United States ignored Turkey’s vital interests in northern Iraq and used the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK—Iranian Kurdish militants closely allied to the PKK) as its proxy against Iran, which eventually forced Iran to target both the PKK and PJAK. In other words, the dynamics of U.S.-Iranian relations have produced cooperation between Iran and Turkey based on “mutual interests.”

06/18/2008 - By Chris Zambelis (from Terrorism Focus, June 18) - A recent upsurge of violence in northwestern Iran between ethnic Kurdish rebels and Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) forces represents the latest chapter in the ongoing tensions between the nationalist dissidents and Tehran. Iranian and Kurdish sources report that the armed wing of the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) mounted a series of attacks against Iranian security forces in northwestern Iran between late May and early June. PJAK forces are reported to have set a series of explosive traps targeting Iranian patrols in the predominantly Kurdish town of Sardasht, located near the Iran-Iraq border in West Azerbaijan province, setting off armed skirmishes between the rebels and retaliatory strikes by the Pasdaran across northwestern Iran. In addition, the armed wing of Komeleh, another ethnic Kurdish nationalist group operating in Iran, claimed responsibility for attacks against Iranian security forces in the region. The Kurdish towns of Kamyaran and Baneh in Kurdistan province and Kermanshah in Kermanshah province also experienced fighting between insurgents and Iranian security forces (Rooz, June 5; Fars, June 7). Iranian Kurdish rebels have been engaged in an insurgency to assert ethnic Kurdish rights in what they see as an ethnic Persian-dominated Shia Islamist order that stifles their cultural identity. Iran is home to a sizeable ethnic Kurdish minority numbering between four and seven million. Fighting between the rebels and the authorities is generally contained within Iran’s mountainous northwestern provinces where the frontiers of Iran, Iraq and Turkey meet. Kurdish nationalists advocating the establishment of a Kurdish homeland in the Middle East refer to this region as Eastern Kurdistan. In an apparent escalation in its insurgency, however, PJAK forces are reported to have attacked the Command Headquarters of the Iranian Air Force in the capital of Tehran. This attack represents the first time Kurdish insurgents have used violence in the capital (Rooz, June 5). This move may signify a strategic escalation of PJAK’s campaign to include striking at targets outside of Iranian Kurdistan. Kurdish and Iranian assessments of casualties sustained by both sides differ dramatically. PJAK sources claim to have killed over 90 members of the Iranian security forces [1]. Official Iranian sources, however, report far fewer casualties (Fars, June 5).

06/10/2008 - By Gareth Jenkins (from Terrorism Focus, June 10) - On June 6, General Ilker Basbug, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, confirmed that Turkey and Iran were sharing intelligence and coordinating military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—which is primarily composed of Turkish Kurds—and its Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Both rebel groups have their headquarters and main training camps in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. Although it has long been assumed that security cooperation between Turkey and Iran has included both intelligence-sharing and the coordination of military operations against the PKK and PJAK, Basbug’s statement is the first public confirmation by a high-ranking Turkish military official. Turkey and Iran first signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security cooperation on July 29, 2004, three months after PJAK’s inaugural congress in April 2004 and two months after the May 2004 decision by the PKK to return to violence following a five-year unilateral ceasefire. This agreement was reinforced on April 17, 2008, by a new MOU which foresaw a broadening and deepening of security cooperation between the two countries (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 18). Speaking with journalists on the sidelines of an international conference in Istanbul organized by the Strategic Research and Study Center (SAREM), a think-tank established by the Turkish General Staff (TGS), Basbug dismissed suggestions that the two countries’ militaries had conducted any joint operations: “Iran and Turkey have been conducting coordinated, simultaneous operations on their respective borders,” said Basbug. “We are sharing intelligence with Iran. We are talking and making plans” (Milliyet, Hurriyet, June 6).

06/06/2008 - By Willy Lam (from China Brief, June 4) - Beijing’s quick response to the Sichuan earthquake, including allowing foreign experts to take part in the rescue effort, has earned the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership relatively high marks for openness—and for its apparent readiness to live up to the “putting people first” credo. Yet more than three weeks after disaster struck on May 12, the attention of the public—as well as China observers worldwide—has turned to the CCP’s glaring failings in areas ranging from governance and transparency to the quality and rectitude of officials. Moreover, the Politburo under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao has yet to demonstrate sufficient resolve to penalize cadres whose dereliction of duty, corruption and malfeasance have exacerbated the damage of this “natural disaster of the century.” Survivors of the quake, which killed some 70,000 people and left at least 12 million homeless, have asked central and local authorities to account for large numbers of so-called “tofu buildings”—particularly jerry-built schools and dormitories—which collapsed like jigsaw-puzzle even as more sturdy government and office edifices have remained virtually undamaged. According to structural engineer Guo Xun, a National Seismological Bureau researcher who conducted surveys right after the quake, a high percentage of school buildings in the affected zone had flouted government construction criteria by using “minimal amounts” of steel and concrete. In late May a few thousand aggrieved parents—whose children perished under the debris of tofu structures—staged protests throughout the worst-hit counties of Beichuan and Wenchuan and the city of Dujiangyan. This was despite an early pledge by the Education Ministry that all Sichuan school buildings would be re-examined, and that cadres found cutting corners in construction materials would be “severely punished.” Angry parents in the Mianzhu District of Dujiangyan—where 127 students were killed upon the collapse of Fuxin School Primary School—became so agitated that local Party Secretary Jiang Guohua fell to his knees and begged them not to take the case to the provincial government (New York Times, May 27; Cable News, Hong Kong, May 28; Ming Pao, May 27).

05/29/2008 - By Muhammad Tahir (from Terrorism Monitor, May 29) - The Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan, or HIA), sidelined from Afghan politics since the fall of the mujahideen regime to the Taliban in the mid-1990s, has recently reemerged as an aggressive militant group, claiming responsibility for many bloody attacks against Coalition forces and the administration of President Hamid Karzai. Led by 61-year-old Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—a charismatic engineer, former premier and mujahideen commander once favored by Washington—the HIA most recently claimed responsibility for the April 27 attack on a military parade in Kabul from which President Karzai escaped unharmed, but took the lives of three Afghan citizens, including a member of parliament (Quqnoos, May 25). The Taliban, however, has also claimed responsibility for this attack, leading some to suggest that the attack was a joint operation between the Taliban—which has a weak presence in the north—and Hekmatyar’s followers. Though an apparent attempt to kill President Karzai might appear counterproductive to proposed negotiations between Karzai’s government and Hekmatyar, these proposals, including the possibility of joining the government, have so far all come from the government side (Tolo TV, September 27, 2007). In this sense Hekmatyar’s attack may be viewed as a display of force intended to soften the government position before talks commence. These offers of talks by the central government indicate the strengthening power of Hekmatyar. Though his name has been largely absent from the Afghan political scene over the last few years, Hekmatyar is now in a position to bargain with the government, conditioning his cooperation on the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan, the establishment of an interim government followed by general elections (Ariana TV, February 14, May 8; Pakistan Observer, May 10).

05/23/2008 - By William Ratliff (from China Brief, May 21) - The explosive growth of China’s links to Latin America in recent years are but the latest developments in a history that reaches back to the Spanish colonial empire in the early-16th century. In some ways the perceived benefits and liabilities have not changed much over the centuries, though they are now on a far grander scale. A Spanish padre wrote in 1669 that “one cannot imagine any exquisite article for the equipment of a house which does not come from China.” At the same time, however, Spanish barbers in Mexico City petitioned the government to relocate Chinese barbers to the outskirts of the city because they worked too much and that constituted “unfair business practice” [1]. Only during the militant Maoist decade of the early-1960s to mid-1970s was China’s primary interest in Latin America, which was marginal, to overthrow existing governments. Some in the United States and Latin America worry that this rapidly rising China poses or will pose a security threat to the United States and the region. Many also worry that the influx of Chinese, with their different culture and institutions, will reduce the prospects for Latin reforms that promote open markets, political democracy, and greater respect for human and civil rights, including the rule of law. Responses to these concerns depend on what the Chinese and Latin Americans want and get from their contacts and on a realistic analysis of Latin America and broader Sino-U.S. relations.

05/20/2008 - By Emrullah Uslu (from Terrorism Focus, May 20) - On May 10, the Turkish General Staff posted a press release on its web site which stated: “As a result of the Turkish air strike on the Qandil Mountains, a senior PKK commander, Cemil Bayik, fled into a neighboring country together with a large group of PKK members, engaging in clashes with local security forces” (tsk.mil.tr). The release did not name the neighboring country, but it appears to be Iran. Cemil Bayik’s decision to flee into Iran has significant implications for the PKK’s leadership as well as Turkey’s efforts to eliminate the PKK from northern Iraq. Cemil Bayik was born in 1951 in Hazar in the province of Elazig. He attended the Faculty of Language and Literature at the University of Ankara, where he met Abdullah Ocalan, the currently imprisoned leader of the PKK. Bayik is one of the five founders of the PKK who are still alive and is noted for his loyalty to Ocalan. To prove his fidelity to Ocalan he relentlessly executed PKK members who broke the rules of the organization. A former high-ranking PKK member, Hidir Sarikaya, thinks that approximately 300 PKK members have been executed by Cemil Bayik since the 1980s (Cumhuriyet, November 24, 2007). Despite this apparent loyalty, Abdullah Ocalan’s opinion of Cemil Bayik is not overly positive. Ocalan has criticized Bayik’s military leadership and ability to direct a guerrilla movement. According to Ocalan, Bayik prefers to stay behind the frontlines and has become involved in several controversial cases. For instance in 1992, fearing capture by the Turkish security forces, Bayik killed 17 wounded PKK militants in a cave (Abdullah Ocalan’s testimony before the State Security Court, 1999; belgenet.com).

05/15/2008 - By Brian O'Neill (from Terrorism Monitor, May 15) - Politics in Yemen has always been a violent affair. Two of its four presidents have died unnaturally—one in a hotel room surrounded by drugs and prostitutes; his successor, suddenly and absurdly, by an exploding briefcase. The next man to take office, a young tank commander named Ali Abdullah Saleh, was not expected to fare much better. He did, though, and is approaching his thirtieth year in power. He survived and, through his intimate knowledge of Yemen’s tribal politics, consolidated his rule. He oversaw the unification of his country with the formerly socialist South Yemen, and then crushed the south in a civil war. He never fully expanded his government’s writ over the chaotic, tribal north, but he stayed in power and kept his country together better than anyone could have predicted. Until now. President Saleh faces three separate rebellions: A tribal, sectarian battle in the north, economic and social riots in the south, and a pervasive enemy in a younger and more brutal generation of al-Qaeda. These are happening while Yemen faces crushing demographic and natural pressures, from its exploding population to its dwindling water supplies to its aging leadership. Saleh has held his country together, but the fragile, violent quilt-work that makes Yemen is now threatening to come quickly apart.

05/13/2008 - By David Romano (from Terrorism Focus, May 13) - In a significant change of policy, Turkey recently initiated high-level official dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. A columnist for the Turkish mass circulation daily Zaman commented that such an official dialogue “was not an ordinary step. It was a turning point in the approach to the Kurdish issue and broke a taboo” (Zaman, May 5). The talks—which focused on a wide range of political, economic and security issues—are the first to occur on such a high official level. The May 2 talks in Baghdad involved a delegation led by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, the senior advisor to the Turkish prime minister; Murat Ozcelik, the special coordinator for Iraqi affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and Derya Kanbay, Turkey’s ambassador in Baghdad. The KRG official media described the meetings as cordial, open and focused on a convergence of common interests of both parties. According to the KRG, “Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani expressed the Kurdistan Region’s desire to develop good neighborly relations with Turkey. He recognized Turkey’s legitimate concerns and highlighted the importance of solving common problems through cooperation, political negotiation and dialogue” (KRG Statement, May 2).

05/06/2008 - By Sunguta West (from Terrorism Focus, May 6) - Anti-terrorism officials in the Horn of Africa are on high alert following the killing of Shaykh Aden Hashi Ayro, the military leader of al-Shabaab, the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, in a May 1 strike by U.S. ship-launched Tomahawk missiles (SomaliNet, May 2; Daily Nation [Nairobi], May 2). Shaykh Ayro, trained in terrorist and insurgency methods in Afghanistan and believed to have been in his 30s, was killed in a house together with another five insurgents in the small central Somalia town of Dusamareb, 250 miles north of Mogadishu (al-Jazeera, May 2). Those killed included Ayro’s brother, another commander, Muhiyadin Muhammad Umar, and several other insurgents. At least a dozen civilians in neighboring houses were also killed by the missiles. Soon after the attack, Shaykh Muqtar Robow Adumansur, the group’s spokesman, vowed the group would retaliate, setting off an alert in the Horn of Africa: “This does not deter us from continuing our holy war against Allah’s enemy; we will be on the right way, that is why we are targeted” (The Standard [Nairobi], May 2). Thousands of people took to the streets of Dusamareb on May 4 to protest the attack (AFP, May 4).

05/01/2008 - By Antonio Giustozzi (from Terrorism Monitor, May 1) - Over the last few years the Afghan National Army (ANA) has often been presented as a success story. This certainly holds some truth, at least in comparison with Afghanistan’s national police, which is widely seen as a complete failure. The ANA is reasonably well behaved and quite popular throughout most of Afghanistan. Its initial difficulties in retaining troops within the ranks seem to have been addressed to some extent and both the desertion and absence-without-leave (AWOL) rates are down from the high levels of 2002-2006. AWOL rates in particular have declined dramatically over the last 18 months, to a relatively low 8 percent, from about 33 percent in 2006 [1]. This appears to be the combined result of a presidential decree turning absence-without-leave into a crime, a widespread media campaign, rising unemployment and rising food prices, which force even less than enthusiastic recruits to stick to the ANA. The number of infantry battalions now stands at 36, while the army as a whole numbers 37,000 men: Still substantially short of its personnel projections, but way above the 22,000 which it numbered at the end of summer 2007 [2]. These relative successes have turned the ANA into one of the pillars of the much touted “Afghanization” strategy. The term “Afghanization” itself is used with some ambiguity within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), sometimes implying a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops; at other times it implies the gradual shift of the weight of the fighting from the international contingents to the Afghans. A number of European countries seem to lean toward the first interpretation, while Washington clearly opts for the second [3].

04/23/2008 - By Rahimullah Yusufzai (from Terrorism Focus, April 22) - Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the aged leader of the banned Islamic group, Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), was released in Peshawar on April 21 after more than six years of imprisonment as part of the reconciliation efforts undertaken by the newly-elected coalition government of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (The News International [Islamabad], April 22). His release is part of an effort to tackle the conflict in the militancy-hit Swat district and restore order in the once peaceful valley. It coincided with the signing of an agreement between the TNSM and the government. Under the six-point agreement, the TNSM renounced the use of force in achieving its goal of enforcing Shari’a (Islamic law) in Swat and other parts of Malakand region (Dawn [Islamabad], April 22). It pledged to respect the institutions of the state and accept the government’s right to establish its writ. The TNSM also distanced itself from elements involved in attacks on security forces in Swat and elsewhere. In return, the government withdrew all pending cases against Sufi Mohammad, commuted his remaining prison term and set him free unconditionally.

04/17/2008 - By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (from Terrorism Monitor, April 17) - Concurrent with Pakistan’s often tumultuous military relationship with the United States is a growing and highly amicable economic and military relationship with China that poses vital questions regarding Pakistan’s future approach to the War on Terrorism. While suspicion of American motives runs high in Pakistan, China has made major inroads in the South Asian country, including a free-trade deal, assistance in power development, the implementation of a five-year trade and development plan and a strategic partnership meant to address deficiencies in Pakistan’s military technology and increase cooperation against Islamist terrorist cells (Xinhua, April 3; Associated Press of Pakistan [APP], April 17). Discussions on defense and security issues were an important part of this week’s state visit to China by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (APP, April 14). Pakistan and China are involved in major co-production projects involving the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft—similar to American F-16s, which Pakistan continues to purchase from the United States—and F22P naval frigates. The latter project involves the construction of four frigates, three in China and the last in the Karachi shipyards. The project involves important technology transfers—unavailable from the United States—that will allow Pakistan to build major warships on its own (Dawn [Karachi], April 5; China Daily, April 5).

04/16/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Focus, April 16) - For two decades Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has plunged northern Uganda into a nightmare of atrocities, sadistic mutilations, child-kidnappings and sexual slavery, all in the name of establishing a Ugandan government based on the Bible and the Ten Commandments. After years of fighting and recent internal dissension, the elusive LRA consists today of little more than 800 individuals, including kidnapped children and young women abducted and given as rewards to loyal LRA commanders. At least half its fighters are believed to be children kidnapped from north Uganda, though many older fighters appear to be drawn by opportunities for looting or even commitment to the cause of Acholi rights. The Acholi-based LRA has its roots in the 1986 overthrow of Uganda’s Acholi ruler, General Tito Okello, by Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA). The Acholi are a sub-group of the Luo people of South Sudan’s Bahr al-Ghazal region who migrated to northern Uganda several centuries ago. Traditionally a dominant force in the Ugandan army, Acholi who feared a loss of influence in the new regime started a host of insurgent groups in north Uganda, many with religious and millennial overtones, such as Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement. Infused with religious zeal, these movements initially adopted bizarre and frequently suicidal military methods such as using holy water to deflect bullets and attacking in cross-shaped formations.

04/09/2008 - By Reidar Visser (from Terrorism Focus, April 9) - One week after the upsurge of violence in Basra, questions about the motives and implications of the fighting still linger. The issue of Iran’s involvement remains especially obscure. A recurrent explanation suggests that the operations were an attempt by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim to weaken the followers of fellow Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr ahead of October’s provincial elections, and perhaps to also further Hakim’s scheme of a single Shiite federal entity, which many Sadrists have resisted. On the surface this seems plausible. This has clearly been a political operation and not a purely security-guided one: Many militia forces in Basra unaffiliated with the Sadrists were left untouched. Also, the Maliki-Hakim axis is the sole remnant of the United Iraqi Alliance; to them it would be prudent to stick together and guard against encroachments on their local power bases. As for the United States, as long as its policy remains tied to Hakim’s SIIC it perhaps makes sense to give the green light to operations against the Sadrists, even if the timing and the scale of the latest attacks may not have been of its own choosing.

04/03/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Monitor, April 3) - Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Bradar Muhammad Akhand announced “a new series of operations” under the code name “Operation Ebrat” (Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban’s spring offensive is “aimed at giving the enemy a lesson through directing powerful strikes at it, which it can never expect, until it is forced to end the occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the occupier soldiers… We will add to the tactics and experiences of the past years new types of operations. The operations will also be expanded to cover all locations of the country, in order for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere” (Sawt al-Jihad, March 28). There are indications that a main target of the offensive will be the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass. Citing an improvement in the skills and capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the announcement as “a psychological campaign and not a reality which could be implemented on the ground" (AFP, March 25). In reality the situation along the border is extremely precarious and threatens the ability of Coalition forces to operate within Afghanistan.

04/01/2008 - By Babak Rahimi (from Terrorism Focus, April 1) - As Moqtada al-Sadr orders his Mahdi Army militia to lay down their arms in return for an exchange of prisoners and cessation of government raids against his followers, the six-day Iraqi-U.S. military offensive in Basra has reached its final stage (Al-Arabiyah, March 30). For the most part, the violence sparked by military operations against the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich city of Basra marked the most potent armed offensive to rid southern Iraq of Moqtada’s influence since 2004. The operations appear to have forced the Mahdi Army to relinquish control over territories in Baghdad, Kut and, most importantly, Basra, where a number of Shiite militias compete for domination over the oil industry. In military terms, the offensive has been decisive and consistent, with raids ranging from Basra to the impoverished Sadr City where Moqtada maintains a popular base (Aftab, March 28). Even in the face of harsh reaction from the political wing of the movement in the Iraqi parliament, which publicly denounced the Nuri al-Maliki government for its aggressive policy in the south (Al-Arabiya TV, March 26) and a call from Moqtada for Arabs to rally behind his militia (Al-Jazeera TV, March 28), the Iraqi forces continued to crack down on the Mahdi Army by means of various urban-combat operations, aimed at driving the militia out of key Shiite regions in the south. Moqtada’s movement appears to have suffered a major military defeat, similar to what happened in 2004 when his followers unsuccessfully clashed with U.S. forces and lost many men.

03/24/2008 - By Imtiaz Ali (from Terrorism Monitor, March 24) - There has been an increase recently in alleged missile strikes inside Pakistani territory by U.S. forces operating across the border in Afghanistan. The attacks come at a time when there is a growing call in the United States for strikes on Pakistani territory to take out al-Qaeda safe havens believed to exist in the tribal agencies along the Afghan border. NATO military commanders in Kabul have time and again expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of Pakistani security agencies in stopping the infiltration of armed Taliban groups like the “Haqqani Network” from Pakistan’s tribal areas into Afghanistan. Despite the fact that U.S. authorities have consistently expressed their respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty, they are simultaneously growing impatient with the growing strength of the militants on the Pakistani side of the border. According to U.S. officials, the cross-border activities of these militants have a direct impact on U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

03/17/2008 - By Willy Lam (from China Brief, March 14) - The Chinese leadership at the ongoing National People’s Congress (NPC) has announced tough measures to rein in inflation and to promote government efficiency. In their talk to deputies in the two-week-long parliamentary session, however, Premier Wen Jiabao and his senior colleagues appeared to have made significant compromises to myriad vested interests and power blocs. Relatively vague commitments to liberalization have been made in this “Year of the Olympics,” when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is due to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policy. Yet the few economic—and particularly political—reforms that have been promised are overshadowed by the call to stifle dissent and to instill stability at all costs. In his inaugural address to the First Session of the 11th National People’s Congress last week, Wen pledged to forge ahead with the “scientific theory of development” in his second five-year term as head of government. Taming inflation—and lessening the financial hardship of “under-classes” such as peasants and migrant workers—has become the top priority of the new cabinet. In February, the consumer price index (CPI) surged by 8.7 percent, the worst in more than a decade (Financial Times, March 11). Independent economists reckon that the actual inflation rate is considerably higher because essential services such as housing, energy and health care are not taken into account by the index. Yet Wen and his State Council colleagues seem to have buckled under pressure from powerful interest groups by promising to adopt an “appropriately flexible” tight-money policy.

03/07/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Monitor, March 7) - It was only a few years ago when the African nation of Chad was being promoted as a groundbreaking example of a new model of transparent oil revenue distribution that would relieve poverty and initiate development. Tribalism and kleptocratic rule would no longer be part of the familiar equation of vanishing oil wealth in other parts of Africa. Instead, only a few weeks ago, the world witnessed blood running in the streets of the Chadian capital of N’Djamena as rival factions of the minority Zaghawa tribe battled for the right to empty Chad’s ever-growing coffers. This unwelcome instability only adds to a downward spiral of violence in a region already beset by political and ethnic violence in neighboring Darfur and the Central African Republic (CAR). Chad is host to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Darfur and the Central African Republic, as well as Chad’s own internally displaced peoples. Most Chadians live in grinding poverty overseen by a political and administrative structure routinely viewed as one of the most corrupt in the world. Despite this, the February 2-3 attack on N’Djamena by 300 armed pick-up trucks full of rebels had less to do with righting these glaring inequities than with replacing President Idris Déby’s Zaghawa faction with other Zaghawa factions eager to take control of Chad’s sudden oil wealth.

03/05/2008 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, March 4) - The old saying that “things can always get worse” has never been truer than for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his former colleagues in the country’s military. Faced with rampant terrorism, growing domestic instability, an increasingly hated U.S. ally and a NATO force in Afghanistan that appears to be staying forever, Musharraf, et al. must now cope with and contain two political leaders: Asif Zardari—husband of the late Benazir Bhutto—and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whose only discernable talent is looting the federal treasury (The Times [London], January 1; Dawn [Karachi], February 12; Daily Times [Lahore], February 23). Pakistan’s military establishment has long been the sole effectively functioning institution in the country. Although troubled by corruption and ethnic, sectarian and linguistic divisions, Pakistan’s military still reliably operates in the national interest. Its officer cadre cares not only for the defense of the county against India and internal threats, but it also administers—through serving and retired officers—much of the country’s infrastructure: roads, power plants, electricity distribution, irrigation systems, ports, railroads and heavy industry. Historically, the army and its sister services claim to have had no desire to run the government, but the consistent venality, corruption and incompetence of Pakistan’s civilian politicians have repeatedly left them no option but to periodically take power through a coup.

02/28/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Focus, February 27) - As Turkish troops and armor cross the border as part of Operation Gunes (Sun), the embattled nation of Iraq is once more host to a major military offensive, this time in its remote and sparsely populated northeastern region. Surprising many who expected Turkey to wait until spring before launching its expected drive to destroy bases of the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) appear to have taken the initiative in the decades-old struggle with a risky winter campaign. Despite the deep snow still covering this mountainous battleground, the TSK has taken advantage of optimal political conditions to preempt the PKK’s traditional spring offensive. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari described the raid as a “limited military incursion,” but one with the potential to “destabilize the region, because really one mistake could lead to further escalation" (BBC, February 23). The Turkish General Staff states TSK troops “will return home in the shortest time possible after its goals have been achieved” (Turkish Daily News, February 23). Those goals remain loosely defined as neutralizing “members of the terrorist organization PKK/ KONGRA-GEL stationed in the north of Iraq and to destroy organizational infrastructure in the region" (Hurriyet, February 23), but may also include an attack on the main PKK/Kongra Gel base in the Qandil Mountains, nearly 60 miles from the Turkish border. The Turkish press has been warned away from the area of operations.

02/20/2008 - By Thomas Renard (from Terrorism Focus, February 20) - Germany fears that it may have moved toward the top of al-Qaeda’s list of targets. An increasing number of messages on jihadi websites call for an attack on German soil. Simultaneously, there seems to be a “new quality” in the Islamic propaganda, in the words of Heinz Fromm, president of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, or BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. Messages and videos, including specific instructions for the building of bombs, are now directly posted to websites in German and in Arabic with German subtitles. According to Fromm, this strengthening of al-Qaeda’s internet offensive has been observed for the last year (Die Welt, February 8). There is a consensus among members of the government and the intelligence community that the domestic security situation has deteriorated. “There are indications that, apart from the Sauerland attackers' plans (see Terrorism Monitor, November 8, 2007), the odds are high that terrorists are working on several other plans,” declared Bernhard Falk, vice-president of the Federal Criminal Police (Die Welt, February 8). Last July, Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble warned: “We could be struck at any time” (Spiegel Online, July 9, 2007).

02/13/2008 - By Frank Hyland (from Terrorism Focus, February 13) - Relations between the United States and Turkey encountered a new obstacle in recent days. The latest disagreement comes, somewhat surprisingly, amid a period of overall warming and increased military and diplomatic cooperation between the two long-time NATO allies. The obstacle comes in the form of a request by the United States for an increase in the number of Turkish troops committed to the Afghan theater of operations. Most important is a request to change the mission of those troops from a presence only in and around Kabul to deployment in Afghanistan’s south and east, and from permission to fire only in self defense to a more active role in combat missions against al-Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban. The Turkish press has called the request a quid pro quo for U.S. real-time intelligence assistance in Turkey’s campaign against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases in northern Iraq (Hürriyet, February 8). Following cordial meetings between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Bush last November and additional sessions with other high-ranking Turkish figures such as President Abdullah Gül and General Ergin Saygun, deputy chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, the United States began providing real-time intelligence on PKK activities and positions to the Turkish military (Turkish Daily News, November 9, 2007). Subsequent pinpoint bombing missions by the Turkish Air Force were successful in reducing the PKK threat to Turkey (Today’s Zaman, February 7).

02/08/2008 - By Babak Rahimi (from Terrorism Monitor, February 7) - As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

02/05/2008 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, February 5) - Osama bin Laden has always had a very soft spot in his heart for Yemen, saying that it is “one of the best Arab and Muslim countries in terms of its adherence to tradition and the faith … [its] topography is mountainous, and its people are tribal and armed, and allow one to breathe clean air unblemished by humiliation.” Yemen is, of course, also the site of his family’s origin and he has often praised the Kindah tribe of which his family is part. The bin Ladens hail from the village of al-Rubat in the Hadramaut region, and Osama took his fourth wife from there. Bin Laden also has referred often to the religious importance of Yemen, noting the Prophet Muhammad’s high regard for Yemen because of its quick adoption of Islam after the faith’s founding and because he believed that from Yemen “would come 12,000 [fighters] who would support God and His Prophet, and they are among the best of us” (al-Islah, September 2, 1996).

01/31/2008 - By Willy Lam (from China Brief, January 31) - Since dumping former Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu in late 2006, President Hu Jintao has tightened his control over the East China metropolis—as well as the so-called Shanghai Faction in the tangled politics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At stake is more than the resolution of the longstanding slugfest between the two major CCP cliques—the Shanghai boys under ex-president Jiang Zemin versus the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction under Hu. In Hu's calculus, reining in Shanghai’s notorious centrifugalism will go a long way toward establishing the party-and-state headquarters’ authority over the nation’s “warlords,” a reference to recalcitrant regional cadres who refuse to heed Beijing’s edicts. This is despite that many outside the CYL camarilla are disturbed by the fact that Hu has planted his underlings in more than half of China’s 31 provinces and directly administered cities. President Hu, also CCP general secretary and chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), has entrusted the job of taming Shanghai to Politburo member Yu Zhengsheng, who took over from “Fifth-Generation” rising star Xi Jinping as party boss of the super-rich city three months ago (Xinhua, October 27). Hu and Yu are political allies despite that the latter never served in the CYL. Like President Hu, the 62-year-old Yu was a protégé of late patriarch Deng Xiaoping. Yu once worked for Kanghua Corporation, one of China’s first “Western-style enterprise” that was set up by Deng’s wheelchair-bound son, Deng Pufeng in the early 1980s (AFP, October 28, 2007; Shanghai Daily, October 27, 2007). Political sources close to the Hu Faction note that one of Yu’s key missions is to dismantle Shanghai’s “city-state within a state” status, which the mega city achieved with the blessing of Jiang, a former Shanghai party chief. Firstly, Yu must ensure that Shanghai will not contravene or water down Beijing’s directives. Perhaps more significantly, Yu is gradually ending the age-old practice of “Shanghai people running Shanghai,” which meant that top slots in the Shanghai party and government apparatus will be reserved for “native sons.”

01/30/2008 - By Pete Ajemian (from Terrorism Focus, January 29) - Recent terrorist attacks targeting the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and U.S. embassy personnel in Beirut come as security measures are heightened in response to a series of assassinations and a rapidly deteriorating political crisis in the country. While UNIFIL forces have been targeted previously since their deployment under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, the attempt to hit U.S. embassy personnel is the first attack on U.S. interests in 23 years. The targeting of foreign entities in Lebanon presents additional challenges for a country already facing a litany of threats to its own security. Although no one has yet claimed responsibility for either bombing, media statements issued by al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-inspired entities prior to these attacks suggest that these groups have been looking to undertake such action against foreign interests in Lebanon for some time. The wounding of Irish members of UNIFIL by a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) came less than two weeks after Osama Bin Laden issued an online audio statement condemning the international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Another recent online statement by an individual claiming to be Shaker al-Abbasi, the leader of Fatah al-Islam, renewed threats against the Lebanese Army (LA) and derided its leader and presidential compromise candidate, General Michel Suleiman for allegedly having political dealings with the United States (The Daily Star, January 9, 12; Reuters, January 7).

01/25/2008 - By Imtiaz Ali (from Terrorism Monitor, January 24) - The challenge of militancy in Pakistan's tribal region is no longer confined to the North and South Waziristan regions along the Afghan border. After establishing their strongholds in Waziristan, militants have recently made deeper inroads in the erstwhile peaceful Mohmand tribal agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region. Pro-Taliban militants, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, seem to have made a spectacular surge in Mohmand Agency, where they have tried to force people to pledge to obey Islamic law. Under the Taliban, barbers are threatened not to shave beards, music is banned and women are barred from receiving an education. Worse, like their mentors in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, these fundamentalist militants have also taken the law into their own hands by providing speedy and severe justice in the name of cleansing society from social evils (Dawn [Karachi], October 12, 2007). More importantly, militants have recently geared up a guerrilla-style war against Pakistani security forces by adopting hit-and-run tactics. Ambushes, remote-controlled bomb explosions and long-range rocket attacks on military checkpoints and government installations have become a routine matter (newsline.com [Pakistan], August 2007). Recent developments clearly indicate that Mohmand Agency is fast becoming another front in the country's war against terrorism. If not effectively and immediately tamed, there is a growing fear that Mohmand Agency could pose even more serious and dangerous challenges to the embattled Pakistani forces than Waziristan.

01/25/2008 - By Christopher Boucek (from Terrorism Monitor, January 24) - Saudi Arabia is nearing completion of new purpose-built prison facilities for its program of rehabilitation and counseling for Islamist militants. Under this program five new specialized prisons have been built in Riyadh, Qassim, Abha, Dammam, and Jiddah over the span of approximately nine months. These new facilities have been designed to facilitate the dialogue process while at the same time housing individuals assessed to be significant security risks. These five new prisons are each designed to hold up to 1,200 prisoners [1]. The decision to build specially-dedicated facilities in which to focus on the counseling program was based upon a number of considerations. First and foremost was the fact that the existing prison facilities were not designed to promote dialogue and it was determined that successful advancement of the rehabilitation program could best be done through new specially-designed facilities. Furthermore, these new facilities would make the classification and segregation of detainees easier [2]. The classification of detainees into those more predisposed to dialogue, and then separation of them from other more militant prisoners, would encourage and facilitate the work of the Advisory Committee, the Ministry of the Interior body that runs the rehabilitation program.

01/22/2008 - By Rahimullah Yusufzai (from Terrorism Focus, January 22) - On the night of January 15, the Sararogha Fort manned by Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) fell to Islamic militants in a remote part of the South Waziristan tribal region bordering Afghanistan (The News [Islamabad], January 17). It was the first time in the 60-year history of the country that a military fort was lost to a non-state group and had most of its defenders killed or captured. This was the second embarrassing defeat in recent months for Pakistan’s armed forces in South Waziristan, where military operations were launched in early 2004 to hunt down militants suspected of links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. On August 30 last year, some 300 besieged Pakistan Army soldiers surrendered without firing a shot to the same group of tribal militants led by Pakistani Taliban military commander Baitullah Mehsud (The News, August 31, 2007). They were held hostage for more than two months and were exchanged on November 4 for 25 of Mehsud’s men as a result of mediation by the 21-member jirga (council) of tribal elders and clerics belonging to the Mehsud Pashtun tribe.

01/15/2008 - By Abdul Hameed Bakier (from Terrorism Focus, January 15) - Since 9/11, the security and intelligence echelons of the United States have been preoccupied with the possibility of domestic al-Qaeda sleeper cells being activated to perpetrate additional terror attacks. In clandestine activities, a “sleeper” is an operative who establishes deep cover to evade security forces and accomplish his mission in hostile environments. To uncover such sleeper cells, the FBI has devised certain security measures throughout its field offices in the United States. Islamist militants, eager to again attack the United States, are posting instructions on jihadi websites as to how fellow militants could evade the security apparatus and carry out terror strikes on U.S. soil. Comparing the training instructions for jihadi sleepers with the security measures currently in place could shed light on other angles warranting consideration in the hunt for sole sleeper operatives and—to a lesser degree—sleeper cells. A 2005 FBI report stated that the agency had been unable to find conclusive evidence of the existence of such cells (ABC News, March 9, 2005), though comments on jihadi websites suggest that they exist. The militants are aware of the FBI’s concern about sleeper cells in the United States; each time pertinent information is released in U.S. media, jihadi posters write comments and prayers for the success of those cells. One website participant—who appears to be knowledgeable about clandestine activities—has posted a code of conduct for sleepers in the United States. Nicknamed al-Muhajr, the forum member claims “sleeper cells are walking around the infidels’ land using different cover methods and white names that don’t attract American internal security’s attention, but that is not what terrifies the FBI in particular and internal American security in general. It’s al-Qaeda’s lone wolves that disrupt their tranquility and sleep” (hanein.info, January 1).

01/11/2008 - By Ramzy Mardini (from Terrorism Monitor, January 11) - As the U.S. military “surge” and the activities of Iraq’s Awakening Councils drive al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups into northern Iraq, a new and largely overlooked accord between Kurds and Sunnis could have enormous implications for the security situation in the Ninawa governorate. On December 24, the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Though the agreement was grossly underreported in Western media, the event may presage a gradual but significant change in Iraqi politics with great importance for the political security of Ninawa and the rest of northern Iraq: the formation of a Kurdish-Sunni alliance. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President and KDP leader Massoud Barzani, Iraqi President and PUK leader Jalal Talabani and Sunni Vice President and IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi signed the Kurdish-Sunni tripartite agreement in Irbil (al-Jazeera, December 25, 2007). The talks were the latest in a series of political exchanges between Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Three weeks before the signing of the MoU, the Kurdish list in Kirkuk’s provincial council offered their Sunni counterpart a number of concessions, effectively ending a yearlong political boycott by the Sunni Arabs (PUK Online, December 5, 2007).

01/09/2008 - By Imtiaz Ali (from Terrorism Focus, January 8) - Baitullah Mehsud, the most feared and dangerous militant commander in Pakistan’s tribal region, has not only become the public face of militancy in the country, but is now also openly posing a serious threat to U.S. efforts to bring stability to neighboring war-torn Afghanistan. Mehsud leads the recently formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan), a joint group of various local Taliban outfits sharing the common objectives of implementing sharia (Islamic law) and waging jihad against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. Mehsud—who is suspected of having close ties with al-Qaeda—has been in the headlines of local newspapers for more than three years now because of his prominent role in spearheading the insurgency against Pakistan’s armed forces, who are currently hunting al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas. Lately Mehsud has become a menacing presence in Pakistan due to the widespread belief of his involvement in the deadly wave of suicide bombings—mostly targeted against security forces—that has shaken the whole nation. A UN report released in September last year blamed Mehsud for almost 80 percent of suicide bombings in Afghanistan (Daily Times [Lahore], September 30, 2007). According to some reports, Mehsud has compiled his own hit list of political leaders and high-profile government officials, and has formed special squads for carrying out such terrorist acts (Daily Times, May 31, 2007).

01/04/2008 - By Willy Lam (from China Brief, January 4) - While Western-style political reforms remain illusory, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership has pledged that it will improve governmental efficiency, boost central authority and eradicate corruption and other ills associated with maladministration. Major structural reforms within the State Council (or central government) are being worked out even as Premier Wen Jiabao is putting together his second cabinet. Foremost among the changes is the so-called “big ministries system” (dabuwei tizhi) meaning that a number of central-level ministries, commissions and departments will be merged to facilitate the formulation and execution of policy. Other measures are being taken to ensure that edicts passed by party and state authorities will be carried out without fail by local-level administrations, which are prone to water down Beijing’s instructions and act without proper authority. The State Council currently has 28 ministries and commissions, in addition to four dozen subsidiary offices and agencies that have ministerial or vice-ministerial status. Substantial streamlining will be achieved through the creation of a number of “super-ministries.” This structural reform is the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration’s response to widespread criticism that the party-and-government apparatus has been ineffective in pushing through difficult measures ranging from cooling down the overheated sectors of the economy to curbing corruption and administrative malaise. The concept of “big ministries” has come about after Hu, Wen and other leaders have studied bureaucratic systems in countries ranging from Singapore to the United States. At least three super-ministries are expected to be created when the new cabinet is endorsed by the First Plenary Session of the 11th National People’s Congress (China’s legislature), due to open on March 5 (Ming Pao, December 24; China Economic Weekly, December 11).

12/13/2007 - On Wednesday, December 5, The Jamestown Foundation and the Institute for Gulf Affairs co-hosted a conference entitled “The al-Qaeda Triangle: Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia,” featuring a keynote address by Ahmed Rashid. The event brought together some of the world’s preeminent terrorism analysts—including numerous best-selling authors and political advisors—for a discussion on al-Qaeda’s ideology, logistics and future as a threat vis-à-vis the West, and was attended by nearly 400 policymakers, intelligence officials, academics and other interested individuals. Speakers at the conference included Peter Bergen (pictured), Bruce Hoffman, Daniel Benjamin, Special Advisor to the Iraqi Vice President Zuhair Humadi, Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph, Laith Kubba, Hassan Abbas, Marc Sageman, Ali Ibrahim, Brynjar Lia, Ali al-Ahmed and Reidar Visser. Ahmed Rashid delivered the keynote address, entitled “The Crucial Nexus: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Tribal Areas,” which assessed the current situation on the ground as well as the viability of current Western policies there. Multiple media outlets—including Voice of America—were present at the event, and streaming video is now available under the “Events” tab of the Jamestown website.

12/10/2007 - By Gareth Jenkins (from Terrorism Monitor, December 10) - In November, Turkish journalist Fikret Bila published a book entitled Komutanlar Cephesi (“The Commanders’ Front”) based on interviews with eight retired Turkish military commanders (Detay Yayıncılık, 2007). Prior to its publication, extracts from the book were serialized in Turkish in Milliyet (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 7) and in English in the Turkish Daily News (see Terrorism Focus, November 20). Komutanlar Cephesi focuses primarily on the military campaign to suppress the insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). However, it also addresses the wider issue of the political and cultural rights of Turkey’s substantial Kurdish minority, who are currently estimated to account for around 20 percent of the country’s population of 75 million. The book also contains interesting insights on the way in which members of the military view the policies and intentions of the United States and EU. Bila enjoys good relations with the Turkish security establishment. In his interviews, he avoided questions about the impact of the more controversial aspects of Turkey’s struggle against the PKK, including: widespread human rights abuses, the well-documented campaign of assassination against suspected PKK sympathizers [1] and the forced evacuation of over 3,500 villages in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of the country by Turkish security forces.

12/06/2007 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, December 5) - Even before the full text of Osama bin Laden’s 29 November 2007 statement “To the European Peoples” [1] was available, Western officials and pundits were dismissing it as an “old tactic,” “ridiculous,” and as “Osama’s new nonsense” [2]. While such conclusions probably are comforting to those making them, they are wrong. Bin Laden’s message sounded a pitch-perfect note to the Europeans he addressed, was clearly and ominously threatening to those listeners and fortuitously coincided with a fresh reminder that Europe and America are vulnerable to radiological attacks by non-nation-state actors. As always, bin Laden’s statement cannot be understood and assessed unless examined in the light of earlier statements and their impact. In this case, bin Laden’s November 29 statement is part of the media-operations doctrine al-Qaeda put in place after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and augmented after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The doctrine has multiple goals, but the goal bin Laden was aiming for on November 29 is that of stripping away allies from the United States, particularly the nations involved in the occupations of Iraq or Afghanistan.

11/29/2007 - By Bernd Kaussler (from Terrorism Focus, November 27) - The November 15 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s nuclear program indicates that Tehran is still violating existing UN Security Council resolutions by continuing the construction of a heavy reactor and installing a total of 2,952 centrifuges needed for uranium enrichment. International pressure on the Iranian government to cease such work is likely to increase in the following months. The present stalemate on the nuclear negotiations coincides with a tougher U.S. strategy toward Iran, which includes designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization and implementing a new round of unilateral sanctions. While military action is still not seen as a viable option by the Department of Defense, there are certainly many within and without the White House who are growing increasingly restless about the seeming futility of sanctions. The most vocal advocate and perpetrator of violent regime change in Iran is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), an Iranian opposition group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States (Executive Order 13224, Department of State, 2003) and the EU. A 2007 German intelligence report from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution called the MKO a “repressive, sect-like and Stalinist authoritarian organization which centers around the personality cult of Maryam and Mas’ud Rajavi.”

11/26/2007 - By Hussain Mousavi (from Terrorism Monitor, November 26) - The recent move by the U.S. government to designate Iran’s most powerful military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as a terrorist organization reflects a tougher U.S. stance towards Tehran in response to its controversial nuclear program and military reach in the Middle East. Though largely aimed at weakening the IRGC’s global business operations and financial network, the new sanctions are the most aggressive form of U.S. policy in confronting Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, where U.S. military officials accuse the Guard of supplying weapons and military expertise to Shiite militias (AP, September 24). With the IRGC as the first national military organization sanctioned by the United States, Washington and Tehran have now moved another step closer to a possible military showdown. In light of the unfolding crisis, it remains unclear what could happen in a military conflict between Iran and the United States. A basic scenario involves a comprehensive U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, naval forces, information and technology support system (especially those linked to nuclear sites in Bushehr, Isfahan and Tehran) and finally the bombing of IRGC ground force units stationed near the strategic cities of Abadan, Ahvaz, Chah Bahar, Dezful, Hamadan, Khoramshahr and Mashahd. The United States, possibly with the help of Israel, could help stave off Iranian retaliation by destroying Iran’s command air base where Iranian fighter jets are kept on daily readiness against potential attacks by American forces.

11/20/2007 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, November 20) - Nearly a month since Osama bin Laden published his message to “our people in Iraq,” it is worth taking a look at what bin Laden really said versus what the media, Western leaders and some prematurely mirthful pundits claim he said (IntelCenter, October 23). In the most obvious sense, bin Laden’s October 23 statement is a post-Iraq war statement and a further development of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 2005 message to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (www.dni.gov, July 9, 2005). From al-Qaeda’s perspective the war is over and Islam has won; Washington’s announcement last week that it intends to begin the withdrawal of 3,000 troops, as well as Congress’s recess without renewing war funding, will bolster this perception. Bin Laden’s message is, however, a warning to all Iraqi mujahideen—Sunni and Shiite—that the hardest task is yet to come: namely, the creation of an Islamist state in Iraq. Bin Laden’s October 23 message builds on the July 2005 letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi. At that time, al-Zawahiri told al-Zarqawi that the mujahideen had beaten the U.S.-led coalition and urged him to prepare for U.S. withdrawal, which might, he added, be “precipitous.” Bin Laden’s October message mirrors al-Zawahiri’s in concluding that the U.S. coalition has been beaten, and in stating that the only unknown is the precise moment of its withdrawal. There is nothing in bin Laden’s statement that criticizes the mujahideen for not fighting well—indeed, he refers to “magnificent victories” that make Americans “prisoners of their bases and the Green Zone”—much less anything that suggests they are losing. “The world has stood stunned, amazed, delighted and wonder struck” over the Iraqi mujahideen’s effectiveness and perseverance, the al-Qaeda chief said.

11/16/2007 - By Christine Fair (from Terrorism Monitor, November 13) - In recent weeks large swathes of Pakistan’s idyllic mountainous region of Swat—a mere 90 miles from Islamabad—have fallen to militants purportedly led by Maulana Fazlullah, whose Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shari’at-e-Mohammad (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws, or TNSM) shaheen (fighters) may number as many as 4,500. Swat’s residents are fleeing to safer ground as the security forces, largely comprised of the poorly trained and under-equipped Frontier Corps, are no match for Fazlullah and his following of belligerents. With Swat and other areas increasingly in the hands of militants, Pakistanis must rise to the challenge of combating an ideology that is fast encroaching into more settled areas. Romanticized notions of Swat notwithstanding, several factors made this region—like Chitral—vulnerable to Talibanization. Swat has always been religiously conservative, with some parts of it influenced by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has many ideological commonalities with the Muslim Brotherhood. Other areas are inclined towards the Deobandi political party, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI). The TNSM group of militants, which originated in Malakand, has also entrenched itself within Swat over the last eight years.

11/14/2007 - By David Romano (from Terrorism Monitor, November 13) - Shortly after the Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish army to enter northern Iraq, President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) replied: “If they invade there will be war.” Barzani added: “We are not a threat to Turkey and I do not accept the language of threatening and blackmailing from the government of Turkey” (The Independent, October 29). Barzani was also unwilling to contemplate a Turkish demand that he send his own KRG troops to fight PKK militants operating out of the extremely mountainous terrain of northeastern Iraq, insisting that his “main mission would be not to allow a Kurdish-Kurdish fight to happen within the Kurdish liberation movement.” President Barzani’s statements, and particularly his implicit reference to the PKK as part of “the Kurdish liberation movement,” inflamed Turkish nationalist sentiment, but played well amongst Iraqi Kurds. Barzani also provoked fury in Turkey in April, when he stated that if Turkey has the right to involve itself in the Kirkuk issue, Iraqi Kurds have the right to involve themselves in Diyarbakir, the largest predominantly Kurdish city in Turkey (Hurriyet, April 8). Turkish media reacts quickly to any such statements, and Barzani’s name regularly makes the front page of mass circulation Turkish newspapers, although never preceded with honorific titles such as “Mr.” or “President.”

11/08/2007 - By Cerwyn Moore (from Terrorism Monitor, November 8) - Three months after the arrests of three men in Germany, little is known about the network involved or the reasons behind a plot to use “massive bomb attacks” against targets in Germany. Reports immediately after the arrests pointed toward a U.S. airbase, nightclubs and the airport at Frankfurt as targets the plotters had considered. More recently, reports have indicated that the men intended to strike at both the U.S. and Uzbek Embassies in Germany. Along with a statement by a group called the Islamic Jihad Union, the reports point to the re-emergence of a terror threat from post-Soviet Central Asia. Of course, the list of potential targets implies that the cell aimed to kill and maim civilians in a series of spectacular attacks, which have the hallmark of an al-Qaeda-inspired campaign. Two subsidiary aims may have been to damage transatlantic relations between Germany and the United States, and to undermine the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Germany continues to run a military base in Termez, on the Uzbek-Afghan border, as part of its role in NATO operations in Afghanistan, while the U.S. Ramstein airbase in Germany is a major military hub, providing support for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq while housing the largest U.S. military hospital outside of the United States.

11/05/2007 - By Michael S. Chase (from China Brief, October 31) - The true level of China’s current defense budget is difficult to calculate, but projecting future trends in Beijing’s military spending entails struggling with even greater uncertainties and complexities. Forecasts of Chinese military spending over the next 10-20 years vary widely depending on the methods employed, and underlying assumptions about factors such as China’s future economic performance and the tradeoffs the country’s leaders will face as they decide how to balance military modernization against other budgetary requirements [1]. In 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense predicted a possible three-fold or greater increase in China's defense spending over the next 20 years, which would place its military budget at $210-$315 billion (in constant 2005 U.S. dollars) or more in 2025 [2]. In contrast, a RAND Corporation report released at about the same time concluded that slowing economic growth and rising domestic pressures to increase social welfare spending would probably impose greater constraints on China’s future defense expenditures. The RAND study projected that in 2025 Chinese defense spending would reach about $185 billion (in constant 2005 U.S. dollars), still an impressive sum, but one that is considerably lower than the Department of Defense forecast [3].

10/31/2007 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Focus, October 30) - As Turkish troops mass along the border with Kurdish northern Iraq, chief of the Turkish General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt has promised to make the rebels of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) “grieve with an intensity they cannot imagine” (AP, October 27). While an attack on northern Iraq seems imminent, important questions are being raised in Ankara about the effectiveness of a cross-border operation. What meaningful objectives are obtainable? Can the PKK be crushed through unilateral military action? Should the campaign wait until spring? There is political pressure on the Turkish government to do something now, a sentiment reflected in the urgency of Turkish demands for Iraq and the United States to take action against the PKK. Large-scale PKK attacks, such as the October 21 ambush in Hakkari province (about four kilometers from the border) that killed 12 Turkish soldiers and involved over 200 Kurdish fighters, clearly seem designed to provoke a Turkish border crossing. The aim may be to cause a rift between Turkey and its allies while involving the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in a difficult and dangerous winter campaign in Iraq’s northern mountains. The PKK has also threatened to cut the oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan and even strike oil tankers heading for Turkey (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 21). Following the deadly attack on the 21st, 11 Turkish battalions were moved up to the border to prevent the movement of PKK fighters across it (Today’s Zaman, October 26).

10/29/2007 - By Babak Rahimi (from Terrorism Monitor, October 25) - The recent "pact of honor" made by two of Iraq's most influential Shiite clerics, Moqtada al-Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim—aimed at preventing violence and helping to maintain the "Islamic and national interest" of Iraq—appears to signal a significant shift toward stability in Iraq. The two leaders have pledged to enhance relations between their respective groups, merging media and cultural projects, and to refrain from launching negative propaganda against each other (Fars News Agency, October 6). Yet, more importantly, the pact calls for promotion of the legal-political order of post-Baathist Iraq, a major move that could give new life to Nuri al-Maliki's government and curtail potential violence in the south. As the first official agreement between these two prominent leaders, the forged pact can also be recognized as a huge step in improving intra-Shiite relations. Not since the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance, which brought together a number of Shiite political parties under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2003, has Shiite politics seen such a unified front. The struggle for domination between rival Shiite groups has caused huge problems in the south, especially after the December 2005 elections. Despite a number of attempts for reconciliation, the enmity between al-Hakim and al-Sadr and their militias has remained a major security problem, especially in the provinces of Basra and Maysan, where the two factions are vying for control over oil and territory.

10/24/2007 - By Gareth Jenkins (from Terrorism Focus, October 24) - Recent attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) suggest that the organization is adopting new battlefield tactics in order to increase the psychological pressure on Turkey in the hope of forcing the Turkish authorities to enter into peace negotiations. Since it resumed its armed struggle in June 2004, the PKK has been pursuing a two-front strategy: an urban bombing campaign in western Turkey and a rural insurgency in the mountainous southeast of the country. During its first armed campaign, which lasted from 1984 to 1999, the PKK initially sought to control large swathes of territory in southeast Turkey, particularly at night. During the early 1990s, it also staged several large-scale attacks on military outposts. However, the practice was abandoned after the Turkish military began to inflict heavy casualties through the use of Cobra attack helicopters in hot pursuit operations. Gradually, through a combination of a scorched earth policy, aggressive search-and-destroy patrols and the development of a cadre of battle-hardened NCOs, the Turkish security forces gained the initiative. By the time that the PKK announced it was abandoning the armed struggle in 1999, it had already effectively been defeated on the battlefield, while political pressure had forced Syria, its main state sponsor, to withdraw its support.

10/16/2007 - By Gareth Jenkins (from Terrorism Focus, October 16) - Following the decision by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to create the legal framework for an armed incursion into northern Iraq, the Turkish military has begun to weigh its options for a military strike against the camps of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey has had a small semi-permanent military base in Iraq since the mid-1990s, when a brigade was deployed in the northwest of the country to monitor a cease-fire agreement following a war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani. During the last 10 years, however, the base has been primarily used as a platform for surveillance and intelligence-gathering against PKK militants in the area. Although the base was recently upgraded, it is too small and situated too far from the PKK's main camps to be able to play a significant role in any offensive action. The PKK's military wing, the People's Defense Force (HPG), is currently believed to have a number of camps strung out through the mountains that straddle the border between Turkey and Iraq, including in Sinaht, Haftanin, Kanimasi and Zap (Milliyet, October 12). The camps, however, are mostly used as forward bases from which HPG militants infiltrate into Turkey. The units deployed there are highly mobile and the camps have only the minimum infrastructure.

10/10/2007 - By Gareth Jenkins (from Terrorism Focus, October 10) - A recent series of explosions suggest that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) may be stepping up its urban bombing campaign in western Turkey. On October 2, two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) exploded within approximately three-and-a-half hours of each other in the Mediterranean port of Izmir, killing one civilian and injuring eight others. On October 7, another IED exploded in Istanbul, injuring five people, none of them seriously (Doğan Haber Ajansı, October 2). Since its resumption of violence in June 2004 following a five year cease-fire, the PKK has conducted a two-front strategy: a rural insurgency in eastern Turkey and a bombing campaign in the western part of the country. The latter has focused primarily on economic targets, particularly Turkey's lucrative tourism industry. Since June 2004, around 30 civilians, seven of them foreign tourists, have been killed by PKK bombs and several hundred more have been injured. Although no organization has issued any claims of responsibility, the latest blasts in Izmir and Istanbul bear all the hallmarks of previous PKK bombings. Unlike in eastern Turkey, where the organization has sometimes used quite large devices, the IEDs in the PKK's urban bombing campaign in western Turkey have been mostly relatively small, based around A4 or C4 explosives and usually concealed in garbage bins or plastic bags. Intelligence reports and police interrogations indicate that the operatives are usually recruited by the PKK from Kurdish migrants from the countryside who are living in the shantytowns that now surround all the major metropolises in western Turkey, such as Istanbul, Izmir and Antalya. The militants are trained in the PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq and then sent back to the city in which they were recruited. The explosives are couriered separately to the theater of operations, often weeks or months later. The militants begin their bombing campaign as soon as they receive the explosives. Police interrogations suggest that in most cases they are not specifically told what to attack, but are given categories of targets. The militants are expected to make the final choice of targets themselves, depending on prevailing circumstances and using their local knowledge. The militants tend to operate alone or, if a woman is involved, in pairs. Once their explosives are exhausted, they usually return to the Qandil Mountains.

10/02/2007 - By Hassan Abbas (from Terrorism Monitor, September 27) - The government of President Pervez Musharraf is facing policy failure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province). A lethal combination of Musharraf's political predicament and declining public support, a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army and the reluctance of soldiers deputed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily further exacerbates this impasse. Observing this, many militants associated with local Pakistani jihadi groups have moved to FATA to help their "brothers in arms" and benefit from the sanctuary. In the midst of this, election season is descending upon Pakistan and Musharraf's survival prospects are diminishing. This dim scenario has consequences for Pakistan's policy in the FATA region. Pakistan will predictably revert to "peace deals" in the short-term, leading to a lowering of the number of military checkpoints in the area (Daily Times, September 23). If history is any indicator, this will help Talibanization in the region and provide more opportunities to the ISI to indirectly support some Taliban commanders sympathetic to Pakistan's objectives. Overall, this will likely reduce trouble in downtown Islamabad, but the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area will remain on fire.

09/25/2007 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, September 25) - More than six years after the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden remains free, healthy and safe enough to produce audio- and videotapes that dominate the international media at the times of his choosing (Terrorism Focus, September 11). Popular and some official attitudes in the United States and its NATO allies tend to denigrate the efforts made by their military and intelligence services to capture the al-Qaeda chief. The common question always is, "Why can't the U.S. superpower and its allies find one 6'5" Saudi with an extraordinarily well-known face?" The answers are several, each is compelling, and together they suggest that the U.S.-led coalition's military and intelligence forces are too over-tasked and spread far too thin to have more than a slim chance of capturing or killing bin Laden and his senior lieutenants. The first factor is the issue of topography. Few U.S. citizens or Europeans have any idea of what the terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border looks like (Terrorism Monitor, October 19, 2006). This shortcoming must be attributed to the failure of Western leaders to educate their electorates using the abundant and commercially available satellite photography that depicts the nightmarish mountains, forests and road-less terrain in which Western forces conduct their search. The border area is genuinely a frontier in the sense of the American Old West, but with mountains that dwarf even the Rockies. Such use of satellite photography would likewise show voters that the Western concept of a "border" as a well-defined and manageable demarcation between two nation-states is not remotely applicable regarding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

09/21/2007 - By Ian Storey (from Terrorism Monitor, September 13) - Government efforts to resolve the ongoing violence in Thailand's four southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla—which has claimed the lives of 2,400 people since January 2004—continue to emphasize a three-pronged strategy of reconciliation, improving socio-economic conditions and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Over the past three months, the COIN element has been the most pronounced, resulting in the detention of nearly 2,000 suspected separatists. At the same time, Malay-Muslim militants continue to achieve success in their campaign to polarize society and destroy the governmental and economic system of the deep south. Meanwhile, the authorities continue to send out confusing signals concerning the involvement of foreign elements. In mid-June, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, chairman of the Council for National Security (CNS), which ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on September 19, 2006, indicated that the armed forces would soon "adjust" existing security policies in the south to achieve "tangible results" before the interim government ended its tenure at the end of the year (Thai News Agency, June 12). Little was made of the comment at the time, but it is now clear that Sonthi's statement foreshadowed a major operation against militant networks. A week later, a series of large-scale combined army and police operations were launched in villages across southern Thailand suspected of harboring militant operatives. The operations, typically conducted by several hundred police and army personnel at dawn, were aimed at flushing out suspected insurgents and seizing weapons and bomb-making equipment. On July 2, for instance, the police and army raided the Islam Burapha School in Narathiwat, arrested seven suspected bomb-makers living in the school compound and collected DNA from teachers and students. The school's license was subsequently revoked by the authorities. According to the police, the seven suspects later admitted to carrying out bomb attacks in more than 20 locations (The Nation, August 24). On July 30, 50 suspected militants were detained in raids across Narathiwat, including alleged leaders of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), the armed wing of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C), the group credited with carrying out the majority of attacks in the south. By the end of July, the security forces had detained nearly 2,000 people, of which 360 were alleged to be wanted militants, with the rest labeled as collaborators and militant sympathizers destined for "re-education" camps. The raids also netted a large number of weapons, bomb-making equipment, maps, camouflaged jackets and lists of names.

09/19/2007 - By Geoff D. Porter (from Terrorism Monitor, September 13) - During an August 14 news conference organized by Algerian authorities for a select group of Algerian reporters, Benmessaoud Abdelkader, a former Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) regional commander, confirmed that there was deep disagreement within the former GSPC over national commander Abdelmalek Droudkel's decisions first to merge with al-Qaeda in September 2006 and then later to rename the group the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in January 2007 (Liberté, August 21). The split appears to have diminished the terrorist group's logistical capacity and reduced its overall size, but has also made the al-Qaeda affiliate more desperate and determined to demonstrate its continued effectiveness and relevancy. The rift in Algeria has also likely split GSPC/AQIM's numerous cells in Europe. While this means that there are probably fewer European cells supporting AQIM than previously thought, these cells have likely mutated to embrace a wider range of targets than their GSPC precursors and in that sense represent a heightened risk for European security. Similarly, possibly orphaned GSPC cells could eventually merge with other Islamist terrorist cells, such as the group behind the plot to attack the Frankfurt International Airport and the nearby U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany that was thwarted on September 4.

09/14/2007 - By Reidar Visser (from Terrorism Monitor, September 13) - For some time, analysts have been suggesting that the Bush administration's "surge" strategy may have achieved a measure of success in certain parts of Iraq. Many highlight the tendency on the part of local tribes in the Sunni-dominated areas to stand up against al-Qaeda, in that way emphasizing their own "Iraqiness" as well as their unwillingness to join in an all-out war against Western civilization. The number of attacks against U.S. forces has declined in many of these areas, and there are signs that al-Qaeda has been forced to relocate to new areas and to choose new targets. Perhaps the most convincing indicator of a degree of "surge" success is one that has gone largely unnoticed. Reports out of Baghdad suggest that the Sunni politicians who for the past two years or so have worked with the Americans through participating in government and parliament are now becoming increasingly nervous about internal Sunni competition from the newly emerged anti-jihadist tribal leaders of their "own" community, for example in places like the Anbar governorate [1]. In terms of Iraqi nation-building, this is a healthy sign. There was always a degree of doubt with regard to the true representativeness of the Sunni parties that emerged as "winners" in their fields in the heavily boycotted 2005 parliamentary elections. The fact that these parties are now worried about internal competition means that more Sunnis are interested in participating in the system, and that a group of politicians firmly attached to the vision of a unified Iraq but also enjoying solid popular backing in their core constituencies may be on the way up, assisted by the "surge." At the same time, foreign-sponsored groups, such as al-Qaeda, and office seekers whose popular legitimacy is in doubt (for instance, some members of the Tawafuq bloc) are coming under pressure or are even being weeded out.

09/11/2007 - By Michael Scheuer (from Terrorism Focus, September 11) - The September 7 release of a new video statement by Osama bin Laden puts to rest, at least for now, widespread speculation that he is dead, retired, or has been pushed aside by his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri [1]. With a newly trimmed and dyed beard, comfortable robes rather than a camouflage jacket, and a clear and patient speaking style, bin Laden achieved a major purpose of his speech before he said a word: he clearly showed Muslims and Americans that he was still alive, that he was healthy and not at death's door, that he spoke from secure surroundings unthreatened by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, and that he, al-Qaeda and their allies were ready to continue the war. As usual, this message was wrapped in an as-Sahab Productions video displaying high level production values [2]. Some of the substance of bin Laden's speech was partially new to him specifically, but the West's failure to analyze what he and his lieutenants have been talking about for the past few years was repeatedly displayed by such foreign policy experts as a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and New York Times journalist David Brooks, both of whom suggested that bin Laden sounded like a left-wing, 1960s Marxist blogger. The Islamist expert Walid Phares even described him as "Trotskyite" (Family Security Matters, September 10). Speeches by bin Laden and other senior al-Qaeda leaders are intended to have an accumulating impact; that is, most of their major speeches and statements build on those that have preceded them over the past decade. Bin Laden and his associates assume, perhaps