On June 19, the Moldovan Constitutional Court outlawed the Shor Party, led by fugitive tycoon Ilan Shor. The Justice Ministry had earlier requested the court to determine whether the party’s goals and operating methods were compatible with Moldova’s Constitution. The court ruled that they were... MORE

*Read Part One here. *Read Part Two here. Under the Council on Foreign Relations’ imprimatur, Washington and its allies should grant Ukraine a final chance to regain some Russian-occupied territory in one last “fighting season” this summer (Foreign Affairs, April 13). The authors expect this... MORE

*Read Part One here. Another proposal for an armistice-in-place cutting across Ukraine’s territory has been aired for discussion, this time, from the Council on Foreign Relations (Foreign Affairs, April 13). Politically, these proposals imply rehabilitating Russia as a partner in negotiations with the West (Moscow’s... MORE

Following a RAND Corporation analysis (see EDM, February 10, Part One and Part Two), it is the turn of the Council on Foreign Relations to prescribe consigning Ukraine to defeat in the war and bringing the aggressor Russia back into the European concert of powers... MORE

*Read Part One. Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s March 17 speech represents the official launch of Moldova’s reconstructed policy toward Russia. The lengthy address was delivered in Parliament but was explicitly intended for the country at large. Some of its line items had been voiced by... MORE

Moldovan President Maia Sandu and her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), in power since 2020 and 2021, respectively, are executing a full reversal of their erstwhile policy toward Russia. That policy had sought a modus vivendiwith Moscow and, by extension, to broaden the party’s... MORE

*Read Part One and Part Two Russia basically revised its strategic agenda regarding Ukraine midway through this war. Moscow’s initial agenda aimed to control the whole of Ukraine politically and economically, integrating Ukrainian territory and resources with those of Russia (alongside Belarus) into an anti-Western... MORE

*Read Part One. Russia’s war aims in Ukraine fall into two main categories: pre-programmed goals, which were announced from the start of the war (still being paid some lip service to date), and opportunity goals, which the Kremlin might have anticipated when planning the war... MORE

Russia’s political and military aims in Ukraine are continuously evolving throughout the course of the ongoing war. Its blitzkrieg in February and March 2022 failed to defeat and subdue Ukraine outright. Moscow accordingly reverted to the strategy and tactics of gradualism. From last March onward,... MORE

*Read Part One. Western governments have yet to define what would constitute Ukraine‘s victory—and, ipso facto, the West‘s victory—in reversing the results of Russia’s two invasions of Ukraine. Some of the most influential Western leaders are hinting that their military assistance to Ukraine is geared... MORE