Georgian Dream Not Expected to Demand Russia Pay ECHR Fine

Executive Summary:

• On October 14, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld Tbilisi’s claim in the case Georgia v. Russia (IV) and ordered Russia to pay 253 million euros ($295 million) as compensation to Georgian citizens who were affected by the “borderization” process following the 2008 Russo–Georgian war.
• Georgia previously won several cases against Russia in the ECHR, stemming from the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 that resulted in the occupation of 20 percent of Georgia’s territory, as well as the mass deportation of ethnic Georgians from Russia in 2006.
• In Tbilisi, opposition politicians and experts are convinced that Russia will not pay this fine, just as it has ignored other rulings in the past. Georgia’s current government, despite winning the case in Strasbourg, is not expected to demand compensation for its citizens’ losses to avoid straining relations with Moscow.

On October 14, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ordered Russia to pay 253 million euros ($295 million) in damages to Georgia and Georgian citizens for “borderization” following the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (ECHR, October 14). The ruling would have Russia pay compensation to more than 23,000 Georgians who Moscow denied access to their land and homes after Russia occupied Georgia’s former autonomous region of South Ossetia in August 2008 and restricted free movement across the so-called “occupation line.”

Within the total 253 million euros ($295 million) in damages, the ruling orders Moscow to pay 20 million euros ($23 million) to 4,000 ethnic Georgians who it deprived of the right to receive education in the Georgian language by the occupation regime and 5.17 million euros ($6.02 million) to at least 2,586 Georgians who were unlawfully detained on charges of “illegally crossing the border” (ECHR, October 14). If the Kremlin abided by the ruling, it would also pay 1.98 million euros ($2.31 million) to 76 ethnic Georgians for torture and inhuman treatment by the occupation regime following their detention, at least 20 ethnic Georgians would receive 1.3 million euros ($1.5 million) for Moscow’s unlawful and excessive use of force, and the Kremlin would pay 320,000 euros ($372,905) for the unlawful restriction of freedom of movement of at least 64 ethnic Georgians.

The case “Georgia v. Russia (IV),” as well as the court’s final judgment, charges Russia with crimes committed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as Moscow has exercised “effective control” over these territories since its aggression in 2008 (ECHR, October 14). Georgia filed the application with the ECHR on August 21, 2018, and its complaint cited “widespread persecution of the Georgian population,” as well as an “administrative practice of detentions, assaults, and killings” in territories beyond the control of Tbilisi and along the administrative boundary lines (ECHR, August 31, 2018). The case also concerned the killings of Georgian citizens Archil Tatunashvili, Giga Otkhozoria, and Davit Basharuli by representatives of the occupation regime (Netgazeti, October 14). Russia has not recognized the ECHR’s jurisdiction since 2022, which operates under the “auspices” of the Council of Europe (Gazeta.ru, April 9, 2024).

In March 2022, the Council of Europe expelled Russia because of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It did not surprise anyone in Tbilisi that immediately after the Strasbourg Court published its verdict, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, stated that Moscow “will not comply with this decision” (RIA Novosti, October 15). When asked whether paying the compensation could improve Russia–Georgia relations, Peskov asserted that Russia considers its relationship with Georgia separate from the ECHR ruling (Radio Tavisupleba, October 15).

In Tbilisi, experts and politicians are curious whether Georgian Dream will demand payment from Russia following the verdict. Given Russia’s predictable refusal, it is unclear whether the current Georgian government would dare to use international legal “instruments” to enforce the ruling. Tbilisi could seek the seizure of Russian state assets abroad or claim compensation from the hundreds of billions of dollars of assets frozen by the European Union following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the political likelihood of this move remains in question.

Paata Zakareishvili, the Georgian minister for reconciliation and civic equality from 2012 to 2016, believes that the Georgian government will not dare to demand compensation (Author’s interview, October 18). Zakareishvili additionally does not think Tbilisi will attempt to claim a share of Russia’s frozen assets (Author’s interview, October 18). In the future, however, the “historic decision” of the Strasbourg Court could help Georgia secure compensation from a new, democratic Russia. Zakareishvili argues that:

Today’s Russia under Putin, of course, will pay nothing. But if a democratic Russia ever emerges, it will have to complete the Strasbourg Court’s verdict … For now, the Court’s decision carries only symbolic significance. Yet that is not insignificant, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine (Author’s interview, October 18). 

Zakareishvili said that Georgia could theoretically claim compensation from Russian assets currently frozen in Europe. “However, first, our government will not want to provoke Moscow to that extent, and second, Europe currently has other priorities—namely, Ukraine,” he said (Author’s interview, October 18). 

The Georgian Ministry of Justice regards the October 14 decision of the ECHR as a “logical continuation of Georgia’s historic cases won against Russia” (1tv.ge, October 14). In 2019, In the case “Georgia v. Russia (I),” known as the “Deportees Case,” the Strasbourg Court held the Russian Federation liable to pay nearly 10 million euros ($11 million) for the 2006 mass deportation of ethnic Georgians from Russia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 31, 2019). The Georgian Ministry of Justice also cited the decision in Georgia v. Russia (II) in which the Russian Federation was charged to pay nearly 130 million euros ($151 million) for mass violations committed against Georgian citizens during and after the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (Info.imedi.ge, October 14). The ministry noted that “although the Russian Federation is no longer a member of the Council of Europe, it remains legally bound to comply with these rulings and is subject to fines for every day of non-compliance” (Info.imedi.ge, October 14). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is working to enforce the decisions with active involvement from Georgia (Radio Tavisupleba, October 14).

Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party continues legal disputes against Russia in international courts despite pursuing an entirely loyal course toward Moscow in general. Opposition and opposition-leaning experts point to statements made by the country’s top leadership. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has repeatedly stated that “the August 2008 war was started by [former] President [Mikheil] Saakashvili” (Civil Georgia, August 11). The parliamentary investigative commission established by Georgian Dream reached a similar conclusion. When journalists pointed out the contradiction to Kobakhidze, he alleged that though Saakashvili “started the war,” Russia later committed crimes in the occupied territories (Civil Georgia, August 11).

Independent experts believe that Georgia’s recourse to international courts “will not undermine” the current relationship between Georgian Dream and the Kremlin. David Avalishvili, a regular contributor to Nation.ge, asserts:

There was a time during President Saakashvili’s rule when Moscow responded very sharply to Tbilisi with economic embargoes, border closures, and the deportation of Georgians … but now Moscow understands that all of this is more of a ‘ritual,’ a ‘rule of the game’ that ‘Georgian Dream’ uses domestically to capitalize politically and improve its reputation. In reality, [Georgian Dream] does not confront Moscow and has no fear that these rituals will lead Russia to reimpose embargoes or punish Georgia by closing the borders (Author’s interview, October 17).

According to Avalishvili, under these “rules of the game,” the government takes no real risks, since it remains loyal to Moscow on important issues, such as refusing to condemn the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and declining to support Ukraine (Author’s interview, October 17). No one can say for certain what Moscow’s policy toward Georgia will be after its war against Ukraine ends, leaving Russia free to revisit territorial grievances against other post-Soviet States. As Georgian Dream turns away from the West, Tbilisi could eventually find itself facing Russian aggression without allies.