Russia Promotes Stronger Negotiating Position Than Reality

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 12

(Source: RIA Novosti)

Executive Summary:

  • Pro-Kremlin analysts look upon possible negotiations with the United States about the fate of Ukraine only from a position of strength. Moscow’s demands, however, clearly do not correspond with its real capabilities.
  • Russian military analysts push for negotiations by relying on Russia’s military strength to pressure the West despite its military limitations, including recruitment declines and stalled front-line progress.
  • Russia’s foreign policy struggles, including strained relations with allies such as Azerbaijan and unmet expectations from BRICS and Türkiye, reveal vulnerabilities that weaken Moscow’s stance in potential peace negotiations.

The subject of possible peace negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a point of increased attention in Russian information space, particularly since the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump in January. Russian civilian analysts, primarily those in the “Valdai” Discussion Club, a think-tank with close ties to the Kremlin, see the potential as relatively low. They claim this due to the numerous prerequisites Washington requires to reach an agreement with Moscow, while Russia is not interested in stopping the hostilities. Further, the role of Ukraine in such negotiations remains ambiguous in these discourses (Valdai Club, January 20). According to these commentators, “Moscow retains the possibility of continuing hostilities without excessive mobilization” (Ibid). Pro-Kremlin analysts again set forth unrealistic demands “for wider agreement on European security,” referring to the 2021 ultimatum that became the formal pretext for the invasion of Ukraine (Ibid). Simultaneously, they admit that the United States will not agree to their conditions, and therefore, any agreement should be viewed only as a “temporary respite” in the confrontation (Ibid).

Russian military analysts, on the contrary, are more optimistic. They insist that “Zelenskyy’s days are numbered,” Europe has finally lost all objectivity, and therefore, it makes sense to reach an agreement on the fate of Ukraine only with the United States (Topwar.ru, January 18). They note, however, that the success of negotiations can be guaranteed by “Russia’s military might” and its readiness to assist those countries that follow its example of external aggression (Topwar.ru, January 18). Military analysts further insist on a peace agreement only on Russian terms and try to frighten the West with images of its future defeat in the event of a direct military clash between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Topwar.ru, January 13, 16).

Russia’s negotiating position cannot be considered strong despite constant repetition in Russian media of Russia’s strength on the battlefield (Izvestiya, December 9, 2024). Even when taking into account Russian advances on the Ukrainian front. A year ago, retired Russian Colonel Andrey Zemtsev admitted that Moscow lacks sufficient advantages in military power to conquer Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities (VM.ru, January 21, 2024). This represents a clear discrepancy between the reality of Russian military capabilities and the narratives of strength presented to the Russian populace.

Independent experts note that the entry of contract soldiers into the Russian army has noticeably decreased over the past year (VoA–Russian Service, December 4, 2024). Today, Russian military analysts openly admit that “there is as yet no great possibility of the Russian army achieving a quick breakthrough on the front,” and therefore, “it makes no sense to seriously consider the unconditional surrender of the Kyiv regime” (Valdai Club, January 13).

Meanwhile, Russia’s foreign policy does not create a strong position for negotiations with either Ukraine or the West. A year ago, Russia’s formal allies were using its weakness to their advantage (see EDM, December 5, 2023). Contrary to Moscow’s expectations, BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has not become an anti-Western movement and has not created its currency, which the Kremlin had counted on to circumvent sanctions (see EDM, May 1, 2024). Additionally, Moscow is particularly displeased with the continued interaction with the West within the framework of the G20 (Group of 20) by states that Russian analysts deem to be part of the “Global Non-West” (Valdai Club, January 13). Kremlin analysts sharply criticize the G20, calling it an attempt to “emphasize a kind of class peace between the exploiters and the exploited”  (Valdai Club, January 13).

Even Azerbaijan, one of Russia’s closest partners in the region and a fellow member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, took an assertive stance toward Moscow after the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer jet on December 25, apparently shot down by Russian air defenses. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev blamed Moscow for the disaster, resisted attempts to hush up the incident, and demanded compensation from the Kremlin (see EDM, January 15). Although Aliyev received a phone call from Russian President Vladimir Putin expressing an apology for “the tragic incident,” Aliyev continues to denounce the “cover-up of this incident by Russian state agencies” and claim that “the blame for the deaths of Azerbaijani citizens in this disaster lies with the representatives of the Russian Federation” (President.az, December 28, 2024; Trend.az, January 6).

Some of the Russian opposition suggested that such an independent position of Baku was the product of the influence of Türkiye, Azerbaijan’s closest ally (Youtube/@khodorkovskyru, January 14). Regardless of how justified such assumptions are, foreign experts have long observed the growth of Ankara’s influence in the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijani politicians openly welcome it (Nedelia.az, July 25, 2024). Although Moscow traditionally considers the Caucasus to be within its zone of influence, Russian officials and propagandists have diligently attempted to ignore a rising conflict of interests with Türkiye. To the contrary, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye has been referred to exclusively as a partner or ally in official state media, as well as actively used by propaganda as an example of successful sovereign policy “aimed at protecting its interests” (Pnp.ru, November 1, 2022; Russiancouncil.ru, June 13, 2024). At the same time, the propagandists strive to conceal the real contradictions in Russo-Turkish relations and explain Azerbaijan’s hard position by saying that the European Union “set” Aliyev on Russia (Тsargrad.tv, January 18). Covering up the problem, however, does not change that Türkiye often pursues its own interests at the expense of Russia and, therefore, is not Moscow’s ally in the complete sense of the word.

Russian propaganda also places great hopes on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran signed on January 17, counting on not only economic but also military cooperation (Vzglyad, January 17). Even Yulia Yuzik, who in 2016 ran for the Russian State Duma and was detained by the Iranian government in 2019, however, notes that the document does not provide for any specific agreements (RFE/RL, October 14, 2019). Moreover, it establishes an obligation to jointly combat money laundering, while the Kremlin was counting on Iran’s help in this laundering (Telegram/Russica.RU, January 18). Even with the development of the trade corridor with Iran, which the Kremlin desperately needs, more and more problems are arising (see EDM, January 16). Moscow’s true position in the international arena is weaker than the Kremlin would like to reveal, and it is important to consider this in possible negotiations.