
Strategic Snapshot: Consequences of Russia’s War at Home
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue:

Russia’s domestic situation continues to deteriorate as it suffers the consequences of its war against Ukraine. Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to project an image of strength, Russia is no longer the superpower it once was. This is particularly evident in the state of the Russian economy. The Kremlin has prioritized bolstering its military-industrial complex at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Russian arms production, however, has experienced minimal growth despite reported increases. The war also has degraded Russian society as the regime attempts to militarize everyday life. School children are trained in patriotic education in an effort to instill pro-war values in Russian youth. Criminal violence is increasing as veterans return from the frontlines. Recruitment remains low as fewer Russians want to become cannon fodder. The Russian people’s support for the war continues to decline, and President Vladimir Putin is resorting to repressive tactics to maintain the facade of control. As the Kremlin prolongs the war, these issues will only worsen.
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Crumbling Economy and Military Industrial Complex:
- The Russian economy is grappling with serious structural issues, including labor shortages exacerbated by demographics, heavy war casualties, and mass emigration.
- Russia’s military-industrial complex is not modernizing at the rate of demand, meaning that Russia will not be capable of increasing arms production rates in the long term.
- Russian arms production has experienced minimal growth as government-reported increases construe data by masking it with inflation. Western sanctions hinder domestic production, forcing reliance on allies such as the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.
- Russia faces severe inflation exceeding official figures, with high interest rates slowing economic growth. Funding for the war takes priority, leading to the underfunding of sectors such as healthcare and infrastructure.
- Russia’s proposed national defense budget for 2025, 13.5 trillion rubles (almost $140 billion), demonstrated that Moscow must implement ever more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to avoid an economic contraction in real terms.
Selected Analysis:
- Russia Experiences Reverse Industrialization as Economy Deteriorates, March 4, 2025, Hlib Parfonov
- Rising Arctic Temperatures Threaten Russian Cities and Military Facilities in Far North, March 4, 2025, Paul Goble
- Russian Business Scheme to Circumvent Tariffs and Fund War, January 27, 2025, Ksenia Kirillova
- Russian Arms Exports Collapse by 92 Percent as Military-Industrial Complex Fails, January 15, 2025, John C. K. Daly
- Russia Faces Increasing Troubles Financing its War Against Ukraine, November 27, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- Russia’s Fiscal Dependence on China Grows, November 13, 2024, John C. K. Daly
- Arms Manufacturing in Russia in January–September 2024 Demonstrates No Growth, November 4, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russia Releases Proposed Military Budget for 2025, October 3, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russia’s War Economy Wilts Under Sanctions as Measures Become More Targeted, August 20, 2024, Sergey Sukhankin
- Rostec’s Updated 2023 Financial Data Shows Decline in Revenue, August 1, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russia’s Arms Manufacturing in January–June 2024, July 25, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Workforce Shortages Plague Russian Arms Manufacturing, June 27, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russian Economy Stagnates Amid Claims of Growing Global Influence, June 26, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- Kremlin Exaggerates Production of Russian Arms Manufacturing in 2023, February 5, 2024, Pavel Luzin
Domestic Effects:
- Russia faces a growing crime wave, worsened by the return of veterans from Ukraine. A severe police shortage has led to the formation of self-defense groups, which the Kremlin considers a potential, yet unmitigable, threat.
- New corruption schemes fund Russia’s war effort while lining the pockets of officials and incentivizing soldiers with financial rewards and legal immunity.
- The Kremlin relies on increasing repression and propaganda to maintain control as discontent with the war rises. Moscow’s failure to address social unrest and rising crime risks long-term stability.
Selected Analysis:
- Putin’s Police State Increasingly a State Without Enough Police, March 11, 2025, Paul Goble
- Russia Faces Upsurge in Crime as Veterans Return from Ukraine, February 25, 2024, Paul Goble
- Moscow’s War Intensifies Corruption in Russia, October 10, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- Level of Violence in Russia Reaches New High as Veterans Return From War, September 24, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- Public Opinion in Russia Falls as Citizens Experience Reality of War, September 10, 2024, Vadim Shtepa
- Putin’s Kremlin Struggles to Weather Storm as Russian Society Becomes More Disillusioned, July 10, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- The Kremlin Struggles to Maintain Public Support for ‘Long War’, April 1, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russian Society Disfigured and Degraded by the ‘Long War,’ February 26, 2024, Pavel K. Baev
Militarization and Recruitment Issues:
- Russia’s education system is being militarized to instill pro-war values in children, ensuring continued aggressive foreign policy against the West and Russia’s enemies even after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s departure.
- Moscow faces growing difficulties filling its ranks as financial incentives and pardons are proving ineffective. Many people evade service through desertion or activism despite increasing coercion and deception.
- Facing declining volunteer numbers, Russia is using espionage methods, financial incentives, and threats of fabricated charges to compel enlistment, highlighting its urgent need for soldiers.
Selected Analysis:
- Kremlin’s Militarization of Russia’s Youngest Has Far-Reaching Consequences, February 20, 2025, Paul Goble
- Moscow Facing Ever Greater Problems Getting Troops to Fight in Ukraine, November 19, 2024, Paul Goble
- Moscow Forced to Fill Ranks With Older Men, October 17, 2024, Paul Goble
- Russian Army Recruitment Hangs Between Coercion and Deception, October 10, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russia Faces Significant Future Deficit in Officers Corps, September 19, 2024, Pavel Luzin
- Russia Adopting Espionage Methods for Military Recruitment, August 7, 2024, Ksenia Kirillova
- Fragging, Desertions, and Other Problems Mounting for Russian Invaders, June 27, 2024, Paul Goble
- Youth Organization Signals Growing Russian Militarization, March 25, 2024, Richard Arnold
Previous Analysis:
See here for our Strategic Snapshot: Internal War – Russia Faces Consequences on Home Turf, compiled in February 2024
See here for our Strategic Snapshot: Three Years Since the Start of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine, February 24, 2025
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