Taiwan Exposes More PRC Military Infiltration Cases

Executive Summary:

• Recent infiltration cases indicate that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has significantly intensified non-military espionage operations targeting Taiwan’s military, demonstrating strategic diversification beyond traditional military threats.
• Data reveals a sharp rise in prosecuted espionage cases over 2021–2024, with military personnel (active and retired) comprising approximately 66 percent of indicted individuals.
• The CCP’s infiltration objectives encompass gathering sensitive military intelligence, psychological and cognitive warfare—including inducing military personnel to pledge surrender or create surrender videos—and recruiting senior military officials to form internal networks designed to undermine Taiwan’s security from within.
• Responding to these threats, President Lai Ching-te announced a comprehensive 17-point national security initiative in March 2025, explicitly addressing CCP infiltration methods, raising public awareness, and signaling to the international community Taiwan’s unwavering determination to counter China’s covert influence operations—measures as essential as traditional military preparedness.

An acute rise in espionage cases uncovered in the last two years led Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te (賴清德) to unveil a 17-point national security initiative in March this year. The initiative is aimed at countering the threat of infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which it defines as a “hostile external force” (境外敵對勢力) (President Office, March 13). The announcement follows a series of recent criminal cases that have exposed efforts by the CCP to subvert Taiwanese society in pursuit of its objective of national unification. These efforts are part of a spectrum of approaches the Party deploys, and are complementary to coercive military tactics that have also risen significantly in recent years (China Brief, January 17).

CCP infiltration operations still target the same kinds of people as they always have—mainly retired and active-duty military personnel—but their objectives have shifted from simply gatheing intelligence to engaging in cognitive warfare. By encouraging their targets to declare their support for the CCP, including in the event of a conflict, the Party seeks to undermine resilience in Taiwan. Responses from Taipei have been mixed. Despite an unusually harsh sentence for a former Air Force Colonel in late 2023, recent national security cases have either been dismissed or led to minimal punishment (China Brief, November 10, 2023). Lai’s initiative is crafted in part to counter the apparent rise in espionage cases and instil morale among the people.

The CCP’s Covert Front Targets the Military

The CCP’s espionage strategy is rooted in the strategic thinking of Mao Zedong (毛泽东). Mao once said that there are two types of warfare: open and covert (People’s Daily, September 5, 2015). For the latter, the fundamental goal is to create internal chaos within adversary states and weaken them from the inside, referred to as the “covert front” (隐蔽战线). Mao borrowed this thinking from the putative strategist Sunzi (aka Sun Tzu), who wrote in the Art of War—which includes a chapter dedicated to the use of spies—that “the best possible [strategy] is to subdue the enemy without fighting” (不戰而屈人之兵, 善之善者也) (Chinese Text Project/The Art of War, accessed May 5).

The CCP’s covert front involves dispatching agents to carry out various secret activities, including espionage, intelligence gathering, developing underground organizations, and conducting influence operations. [1] It has been active against Taiwan since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, when using intelligence agents to infiltrate Taiwan’s military became a significant part of the PRC’s covert operations (Macau Legal Paper, September 16, 2024). At that time, operations targeted high-ranking officers and collected intelligence to undermine the morale of Taiwan’s armed forces and support its strategy for unification. [2] These operations have continued to various degrees ever since (Focus Taiwan, March 13).

Since 2021, the number of espionage cases prosecuted in Taiwan has risen dramatically. From three in 2021 and five in 2022, they increased to 14 in 2023 and 15 in 2024. In the last two years, the number of indicted individuals was 48 and 64, respectively—a significant jump over the preceding two years (see Figure 1). Among the cases prosecuted in 2024, military personnel, including active and retired service members, accounted for two thirds (66 percent) of the defendants (see Figure 2). This indicates that Taiwan’s military systems have remained key targets for CCP infiltration efforts (National Security Bureau, January 12).

The CCP recruits agents through diverse channels. Its intelligence agencies make contacts through criminal gangs, underground banks, shell companies, temples, and civic groups. Despite this array of approaches, retired military personnel nevertheless continue to play a critical role (Kuma Academy, February 14).

Figure 1: Comparison of the Number of Indictments in Espionage Cases (2021-2024)

(Source: Kuma Academy, February 14)

Figure 2: Composition of PRC Infiltration Targets in Taiwan 2024

(Source: Created by author)

CCP Acquires Secrets, Secures Surrenders, Funds Armed Groups

Acquiring military secrets remains a key intelligence goal. For example, in March 2025, Taiwan’s judicial authorities prosecuted a retired Air Force Major for allegedly leaking information to PRC intelligence agencies about Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF)—jets that may be equipped with Hsiung Feng III (雄風三型) medium range supersonic missile—and about strategies to counter PLA operations (CNA, March 12). Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense emphasized during parliamentary inquiries that the leaked documents were merely intended for academic discussion and were produced before the formal development of the Hsiung Feng III missiles and, as a result, did not involve actual military operational data or pose a substantial threat to national security (CNA, March 13). Extensive media coverage sensationalized the incident, however, with headlines such as “Hsiung Feng III Missile Secrets Stolen” (雄三飛彈機密遭竊), “Pilot Betrays Taiwan” (飛官賣台), and “Serious Leak from the Air Force” (空軍爆嚴重洩密案) (BCC News, March 12; CTS, March 12; Upmedia, March 12). This inevitably led to considerable public concern about the potential impact on Taiwan’s national security. This second-order effect may have not been an intended outcome, but it aligns with another CCP intelligence goal.

CCP infiltration also focuses on cognitive warfare, with the intent to demoralize Taiwan’s population. One method used is exemplified by the case of a former colonel at Taiwan’s Infantry Training Command, surnamed Hsiang (向). Hsiang was recruited in 2019 by a retired military officer surnamed Shao (邵). According to prosecution documents, Colonel Hsiang signed “pledges of surrender to the CCP” (降共誓約書) on October 2, 2019, and January 12, 2020. In the pledges, he agreed to serve the CCP in the case of a cross-strait conflict (Liberty Times, April 9, 2024). Shao then delivered these pledges to personnel from the Fourth Office of the Xiamen Municipal People’s Government in the PRC. In late 2023, Taiwan’s Supreme Court sentenced Colonel Hsiang to seven years and six months in prison and, in early April 2024, a disciplinary court further ordered his dismissal (UDN, April 9, 2024). The Taiwan High Prosecutors Office also handed down verdicts on additional espionage cases in late August 2024. These implicated seven active-duty and three retired military personnel.

The most high-profile recent case involved an army pilot enticed to defect by helicopter to a PLA aircraft carrier, surrender military secrets, and persuade another active-duty officer to film propaganda videos publicly declaring their willingness to surrender if war broke out across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan High Court sentenced the two men to 13 years 9 years in prison, respectively (CNA, February 14). In a separate case, the Taiwan High Court in February sentenced a temple chairwoman with gang affiliations, surnamed Li (李), to 6 years and 8 months in prison. Her crime was the recruitment of active-duty and retired Taiwanese military personnel under CCP directives to film surrender videos and collect military secrets (RTI, February 25).

CCP intelligence has also targeted senior military leaders and cadres. In 2024, the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office indicted retired Army Lieutenant General Gao (高) and others for allegedly accepting CCP funding to establish armed groups in Taiwan. These groups would serve as internal CCP operatives during wartime, working to subvert Taiwan’s government. Gao, after retiring as an Army lieutenant general, served as the head of a pro-unification organization called the “Republic of China Taiwan Military Government” (中華民國台灣軍政府). He frequently traveled between Taiwan and the PRC with his girlfriend, surnamed Liu (劉), and an organization spokesman, surnamed Hou (侯) (CNA, Janaury 22; PTS, January 23). Prosecutors found that CCP intelligence had recruited Gao, who then developed armed groups that planned subversive operations and promised internal support for a CCP invasion. He also requested up to NTD 9,260,000 ($305,000) from CCP intelligence (CNA, February 7).

Mixed Legal Judgments Benefit CCP Objectives

High-ranking military officials implicated in infiltration-related cases do not always receive punishments that align with the crimes of which they are accused. For instance, a retired Navy rear admiral surnamed Hsia (夏), allegedly recruited in 2013, brought retired senior Taiwanese officers to the PRC for visits sponsored by united front-affiliated organizations. These visits included attending Huangpu Military Academy Alumni seminars (黃埔軍校同學會座談), commemorative events for Sun Yat-sen’s birthday (孫中山誕辰), and the Zhuhai Airshow (珠海航展), the PRC’s flagship biennial aerospace expo. Hsia was initially sentenced to five months convertible to a fine, but on appeal he was acquitted due to insufficient evidence (RTI, October 23, 2024).

In a separate case, another retired Navy rear admiral, surnamed Sun (孫), a retired colonel surnamed Liu (劉), and two civilians were accused of recruiting retired Taiwanese military officers on behalf of CCP (Liberty Times, March 15, 2024). The alleged conspirators arranged sponsored visits to PRC and the United States. Their actions violated Taiwan’s “National Security Act” (國家安全法), the “Anti-Infiltration Act”(反滲透法), and the “Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election and Recall Act” (正、副總統選舉罷免法), by allegedly organizing activities funded by the CCP to influence retired military personnel, encourage political interference, and bypass legal registration requirements for foreign influence.

The Kaohsiung Branch of Taiwan’s High Court, which heard the case, found all defendants not guilty (PTS, February 25), citing insufficient evidence to prove coordination with a foreign hostile force or intent to undermine national security. According to judicial officials familiar with espionage prosecutions, CCP operatives often exploit family visits as cover and conduct covert funding via complex financial routes, making it difficult to trace money trails. Additionally, organizations funded by the Taiwan Affairs Office are not consistently classified as foreign hostile entities in legal proceedings, which further complicates prosecution. These legal ambiguities raise the threshold for conviction, resulting in many cases being dropped despite credible suspicions (CNA, April 21). The ruling may still be appealed. In the meantim, it has already sparked widespread public debate (CNA, January 9).

These judicial actions impose only limited—if any—restrictions on the high-ranking retired officers accused of misconduct. Such outcomes impact morale within Taiwan, eroding people’s confidence in Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC coercion and in the strength of its institutions. This could also shape external views on and confidence in Taiwan’s capacity to effectively counter CCP infiltration.

Taiwan Moves to Strengthen Counterintelligence

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau argues that recent espionage breakthroughs are due to enhanced internal security awareness. The string of cases could be attributed to stronger counterespionage work, but it could also reflect an increase in CCP infiltration in Taiwan (UDN, January 12).

In response to concerns about the level of infiltration, Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense on March 13 confirmed plans to expand the military’s counterintelligence capacity, revise procedures governing access to classified information, and partially restore military tribunals targeting severe offenses such as treason and collaboration with enemies (Liberty Times, March 13; CNA, March 13). Authorities also plan to amend regulations governing veterans affairs, expanding restrictions and suspending benefits for those who are implicated with infiltration cases (Liberty Times, March 13).

On the same day, President Lai used a press conference to introduce a 17-point initiative specifically aimed at countering the CCP’s infiltration threats (President Office, March 13). Besides defining the CCP as a “hostile external force” (境外敵對勢力), the initiative included enhanced military counter-infiltration measures. Other ministries have also begun aligning policies with the broader national security strategy. For example, the Ministry of National Defense announced plans to restructure Taiwan’s military judicial system as part of the broader counter-infiltration strategy. Following President Lai’s 17-point initiative, the MND proposed reinstating military courts to prosecute service members accused of espionage or violating their constitutional duty of loyalty to the nation. These revisions to the Military Justice Law—which had previously been limited to wartime application—aim to address long-standing legal gaps and improve the prosecution of internal national security threats (MND, March 13).

In parallel, the Ministry of National Defense also introduced a comprehensive personnel vetting mechanism, which includes the review of digital file records and the establishment of a security clearance certification system. This framework is designed to proactively detect individuals who pose internal security risks and to use such data to guide personnel assignments and uphold national defense integrity (PTS, April 20).

The timing of the announcement was intended to carry additional political weight. Lai’s press conference took place on the 20th anniversary of Beijing’s passage of the “Anti-Secession Law” (反分裂國家法) in March 2005, which many analysts view as a legal foundation for the PRC’s potential use of force against Taiwan. (MFA, March 14, 2005). By framing its countermeasures within the concept of resisting “hostile external forces,” the Taiwanese government implicitly asserted a narrative of mutual non-subordination, preemptively responding to possible PRC efforts to reassert its “One China” framework. This rhetorical shift served as both a legal and political counter to the CCP’s increasingly aggressive posture and as a clear message to the world rejecting Beijing’s annexation plans while reaffirming its dedication to democratic prosperity (MAC, March 14). This was noticed by some commentators in the PRC, who reacted strongly in response. For instance, Bao Chengke (包承柯), assistant director of the Institute for East Asian Studies in Shanghai, argued that Lai’s statement could provoke Beijing into using legal, military, and economic measures to counter “Taiwan independence” (台独) activities (World Journal, March 14).

Conclusion

The CCP’s covert operations have successfully infiltrated Taiwan’s senior military ranks. They have gone beyond intelligence gathering, guiding and funding armed groups that are actively planning “wartime internal support” (戰時內應/武裝內應) operations. By deploying drones and other equipment, they also monitor Taiwanese military activities and help prepare for a potential invasion (China Brief, December 20, 2024).

President Lai’s 17-point national security initiative directly addresses the increasing threats CCP infiltration efforts pose. By responding to the CCP’s evolving operational methods, Taiwan is strengthening its counterespionage capabilities. These measures not only enhance public awareness of the security threats Taiwan faces but also signal to the international community that Taiwan is determined to counter those threats. It is currently too early to assess their impact, but future trends in the number of cases tried in court and the sentences that are delivered as a result will be critical indicators of the measures’ success.

Notes

[1] See Mattis, Peter, and Matthew Brazil. Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2019. Chapter 1.

[2] 林威杰 [Lin Weijie]. 战后中共在中国台湾的隐蔽战线——洪国式个案探微 [The Covert Front of the CCP in Taiwan region after the World War II: A Case Study of Hong Guoshi]. Taiwan History Studies 2 (2024): 65–76.