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An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq

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Abstract: This article outlines the history and genesis of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq. Based on fieldwork and personal interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, this study presents a significant amount of never-before published details about these movements.

Particular attention is paid to the links between various groups, their transformation or splintering into new organizations, and the role of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in spawning these movements. The conclusion to this study addresses possible strategies for containing radical Islamist movements, and the dilemmas inherent in constructing such strategies.



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Executive Summary

A great number of Iraqi Kurdish Islamist groups, including militant Islamist movements, have emerged in the last 20 years. Despite the fact that politicized Islam never seemed to enjoy as much broad popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan as it has amongst some neighboring Arab populations, a number of small Kurdish Islamist groups keep multiplying, splintering and occasionally reuniting.

This study pays particular attention to links between various Iraqi Kurdish Islamist movements, their history, their transformation or splintering into new organizations, and the role of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in spawning these movements in the first place. A historical “map-tree” of the movements is presented in order to better understand various groups’ roots and their relationships with other Islamist movements in Iraq. In some cases, the support of outside states and foreign Islamist organizations appears crucial to explaining what success political Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan has enjoyed.

Based on fieldwork and personal interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, this study presents a significant amount of never-before published details about these movements. The conclusion addresses possible strategies for containing radical Islamist movements, and the dilemmas inherent in constructing such strategies.

An Outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq

The history of and links between Sunni Islamist political groups in Iraq stands out as a remarkably poorly understood facet of the country. Despite the fact that Shiites account for approximately sixty percent of Iraq's population, Iraq produced many more Sunni Islamist organizations than Shiite ones, and until 2003, many more Kurdish Sunni Islamist groups than Arab Sunni ones. This study employs the term "Islamist" to refer to those who subscribe to "Islamism," defined as a "Group of ideologies in Islam that want to use the Sharia, Muslim Law, to its full extent, meaning that secular forms of governments and institutions are considered foreign to a true Muslim society" [1]. This study focuses specifically on Islamist groups engaging in political contestation by both institutional and extra-legal, violent means. For the purposes of this analysis, the label of "radical" or "extremist" refers to tactics (violence outside the legal, institutionalized political system and/or attacks on civilians) rather than ideology, meaning that a group holding a very puritan, strict interpretation of Islam but not advocating violent means would not be considered "radical."

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, political instability and the resurgence of political Islam in Iraqi politics makes understanding the background and associations of Iraqi Islamists an all the more pressing concern. This article attempts to describe and map out the different Kurdish Islamist groups that tried to play a major political role in Iraq since the 1920s. In cases where Sunni but non-Kurdish Islamist groups manifested an interesting association to Kurdish Islamist organizations (such as the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood), these groups are also described. Since unclassified information on especially Sunni Iraqi Islamist groups remains scarce in available secondary sources, most of the information presented here is based on fieldwork and interviews conducted in Iraq between October 2003 and May 2004. Interviews were conducted with former Islamists, Iraqi government and security officials, Coalition Forces and "average" Iraqis (especially in areas where Islamist organizations were very active). Some of the information gathered from these sources was unfortunately contradictory or incomplete, and therefore this paper cannot claim to offer a fully comprehensive or absolutely authoritative account of the issue. An attempt has been made to synthesize an extremely large amount of interviews into as accurate and informative an account as possible, and indicate where several questions about these movements remain unresolved. Readers should therefore approach this study as a preliminary, general description and analysis of the history of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq, with further details to be added (and possible errors rectified), as additional information becomes available.

The Hydra – Sunni Islamist Groups in Iraqi Politics

The included illustration (appendix 1) of "Sunni Groups" provides an outline of the major Sunni Islamist political organizations in Iraq. A disproportionately large majority of these groups appear to have been Kurdish Sunni Islamist groups –likely reasons for this phenomenon will be discussed later in this paper. The list of groups presented here must by nature also omit some groups, many of which had no more than a dozen active members and

about which very little is known. Nonetheless, the author would be grateful for any corrections to the text or additional information that readers may wish to provide.

The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood

Several of the Iraqi experts and former Islamists interviewed for this study described the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as the forerunner of all, or at least most, Islamist political groups in Iraq. One even went so far as to state that: “All the different [Sunni] Islamic groups [in Iraq] are descended from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is like a mother who isn’t concerned with what type of people her children become” [2]. The Iraqi MB emerged in the mid 1940s or early 1950s (different sources cite either 1946 or 1951 as the founding date in Iraq), modeled after the original MB of Egypt (founded in 1928). Sheikh Mohammed al-Sawaf, an Iraqi student studying in Egypt, met Egyptian MB founder Hassan al-Bannah there, who convinced him to found an Iraqi branch of the organization. The first MB cell in Iraq reflected the country’s sectarian mosaic – with Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen members [3]. One of the MB’s first actions in Iraq was to found the Society for the Salvation of Palestine, which sent three brigades of volunteers to fight in the 1948 Palestine war [4].

A small group of MB members did not agree with the organization’s peaceful approach and deference to the monarchy. They founded the Iraqi branch of the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) in 1954 (see graph). The first ILP was founded only one year earlier in Jerusalem, by Palestinian Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani. The organization eventually spread to several Muslim countries, from North Africa to Central Asia. It is considered quite radical, secretive and favorable towards violence and the conduct of jihad in the military sense of the term [5]. Immediately after its founding in Iraq, the ILP engaged in a few violent actions against the government and was quickly suppressed [6]. Its membership in Iraq appears to have remained quite negligible. Sheikh Abd al-Qadim Zallum led the group until his death in 2003.

In its early days, the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood was neither particularly radical nor powerful [7]. Crucially, the Iraqi MB never succeeded in attracting Shiites to its banner – when the organization approached the highest ranking Shiite authority around 1959, Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim, he refused to cooperate and even went so far as to bar Shiite clergymen from joining the group [8]. As with their seventy or so national branches in other countries, the Iraqi MB believed in a three-stage strategy: In stage one, they recruit core activists and educate people about their vision of Islam and society (the “establishment” or “indoctrination” stage). In stage two (“formation” or “expansion”), they focus more on broader recruitment drives, organizing their supporters, infiltrating important parts of society (such as universities, the public service, trade unions and the military), and establishing programs to endear themselves to the people – including charities, clinics, schools and other services for the poor. A greater Islamicization of society stands out as one of the major objectives of this stage of the MB’s strategy – as with other Islamist movements, MB doctrine holds that most or all problems and social ills in society are the result of Muslims having strayed from Islam, its proper observance, and Muslim culture in general. In stage three (“implementation” or “direct action”) the Brotherhood attempts a

takeover of the country (by legal means if possible, sometimes by extra-legal means) [9]. The Iraqi MB supported the monarchy for the most part, fearing that if the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy fell, the Iraqi Communist Party would take over.

After the Revolution of 1958, the monarchy's demise did indeed lead to a period of extreme instability and intense competition between Iraqi Islamists, communists, nationalists, Kurds and liberals. When nationalist President Qasim declared an opening of the political system in 1960, the MB decided to take the opportunity for legal status and create an official political party – the Islamic Party of Iraq –led by Doctor Mohsen Abdul Hamid (see appendix 1). Essentially, the Iraqi MB was moving from the first stage of its strategy (having recruited some core activists in the 1940s and 50s) directly to the third stage – political contestation and direct action. The manifesto of the Islamic Party suggested that the MB was willing to participate peacefully in institutional politics, and stated that non-Muslims should “enjoy the same political, public and individual rights as Muslims, except in matters of religion” [10].

In 1961, less than one year after the Islamic Party's formation, Qasim closed the Iraqi political system and banned the party. The MB then organized officers within the Iraqi army, with the intention of enacting a coup (see appendix 1 – Islamic Military Organization Within Iraqi Army). Lacking significant strength in society at large (probably as a result of moving too quickly past stage two), the MB viewed a military coup as holding out their best chances for taking power. Several other groups in Iraqi politics beat them to it, however, and in 1968 Ba'athist plotters took over the government, enacting the last in a long series of coups which plagued Iraqi politics throughout the 1960s. In 1971, the remnants of the Islamic Military Organization Within the Iraqi Army, together with new MB recruits and sympathizers, formed the Muslim Brotherhood Secret Group (see appendix 1) and attempted a coup against the governing Iraqi Ba'athist leadership. The plot failed and ninety-six members of the Secret Group were executed. Remaining MB members left the movement, went into exile (mostly London or the Gulf countries), “converted” to Ba'athism, or were executed [11]. The MB leadership decided to cease all activities in Iraq after more repression in 1979 further thinned its ranks.

In neighboring Iran MB cadres began in the 1980s to belatedly pursue stage two of their strategies (formation and expansion) more seriously by heavily recruiting and then indoctrinating Iraqi refugees located there. Iraq itself would not witness the return of the Brotherhood until 1991, when MB exiles returned to the newly-created Kurdistan Autonomous Zone (KAZ) to reestablish the Iraqi Islamic Party (see appendix 1 – still led by Mohsen Abdul Hamid). The Iraqi Islamic Party still strives to create an Islamic state in Iraq, although it has avoided adopting any specific school of Islamic law so as not to alienate potential Shi'ite supporters (of which there are still practically none) [12].

While we can describe the Iraqi Islamic Party as the continuation of, or the heir of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, the MB and its early activists also spawned a large number of what could be described as ‘illegitimate offspring.’ Many of these emerged in Iraqi Kurdistan, a subject to which this paper now turns [13].

Kurdish Nationalism versus the Umma – Islamist Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan

The religious pluralism of Iraqi Kurdistan, with its population of Christians, Jews (until the 1950s), Sunnis, Shiites, Yezidis, Ahl-al-Haq, Sarlus, Shakak and a plethora of Sufi orders, would seem to discourage the creation of Islamist groups in the area. Such religious pluralism led many Kurds and scholars to declare Iraqi Kurdistan infertile ground for conservative political Islam [14]. Sami Shourush, for instance, argues that “the Islamic fundamentalist movement among Iraq’s Kurds is not very influential as a political movement...” [15]. Many Kurdish nationalists are also extremely critical of Islamic politics, feeling that opponents of the Kurds used Islam to oppress them and stymie their national ambitions [16]. Indeed, Islamist politics never attracted nearly as much support in Iraqi Kurdistan as Kurdish nationalism did. In the contest that emerged between the Iraqi state and Kurdish nationalists, the state also frequently turned to cooperative imams to have Kurdish nationalist rebels branded as heretics and tools of the enemies of the Islamic world [17].

Nonetheless, a large number of Islamist groups eventually emerged in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly since the 1980s. Four different factors may provide some explanation for their emergence: 1) Saddam’s attempt to undercut Kurdish nationalists by supporting and using nascent Islamists; 2) Neighboring Iran’s influence in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly since it became autonomous in 1991; 3) The widespread despair in Kurdistan in the wake of the chemical attacks on towns such as Halabja and ethnic cleansing pursued by Baghdad, both of which Kurdish nationalist and leftist parties proved powerless to stop; and 4) Links with a generalized, global Islamist movement, particularly after the retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. One or several of these factors play a role in the formation of each of the Kurdish Islamist groups discussed below. One must remember that none of the Kurdish Islamist groups ever developed a huge following, however. This includes the two largest groups, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and the Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan, both of which ran in various Iraqi Kurdistan elections but placed well behind the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), despite being described as the main vehicle for protest votes against these two ruling nationalist parties.

The Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan

Founded in 1954 in Halabja, the Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan (UMSK), like its contemporary Arab Iraqi counterpart (the Union of Muslim Scholars), did not explicitly take on a political role for itself. This group is included here for two main reasons. First, several sources interviewed described the UMSK as the Kurdistan front organization for the Muslim Brotherhood [18]. Second, several of the UMSK’s members went on to found important Kurdish Islamist movements. Besides serving as the regional front for the Muslim Brotherhood, the UMSK appears to have functioned as a meeting, speaking and writing venue for Kurdish Islamists in the early days of the movement. Most noteworthy were the Aziz brothers, who went on to later found several of Iraqi Kurdistan’s main Islamist movements.

The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan

The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) was founded sometime around 1986-88, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian government played an important role in the organization's creation, financing and protection, seeking to create an Islamist force in Iraq and an ally against the Ba'athists in Baghdad. Iran apparently sought the participation of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in the IMK, but the MB refused [19]. The IMK's creation then fell to Osman Abdul Aziz, a former member of the Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan and originally responsible for the northern Iraq branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Osman Aziz had fallen out with the MB – individuals who all possess multiple and overlapping identities – and in the case of Iraqi Kurds, many were both Islamists and Kurdish nationalists at the same time. These two overlapping identities may have contained the seeds of disaffection from the Muslim Brotherhood, because the MB's leadership displayed a strong attachment to both Islam and Arab nationalism. 'Azami (unintentionally) describes this aspect of the Islamic Party's (and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood's) ideology:

On the home front, the Islamic Party upheld national unity on the basis of Iraqi citizenship irrespective of religion, ethnicity or sect. This was to serve as a nucleus of Pan-Arab unity, which would in turn be the nucleus of Islamic unity as advocated by the party. Unity should be achieved gradually, beginning with the unity of Iraq, then unity of the Arab nation and at some point in the future unity of the Islamic community [20].

For many Kurdish Islamists such as Osman Aziz, emphasizing the goal of Pan-Arabism was likely unacceptable. Some sources, however, state that the IMK had Egyptian members from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, which if true raises questions regarding the extent of Kurdish-Arab differences in the movement [21]. Additionally, Egyptian Islamist Sayid Qutb's books were translated into Kurdish and influenced the IMK into adopting a jihadist outlook [22]. Hence some observers' contention that the disagreement between Osman Aziz, his followers and the MB actually revolved around the means to attain an Islamic state in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan – with Aziz favoring 'armed struggle' over the MB's more peaceful means of the time [23]. Many of the IMK's most important members consisted of Islamist Kurds returning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which increased pressure within the organization to adopt jihadist tactics. Many of these returning Afghan veterans later broke off from the IMK to found more violent Islamist groups (see appendix 1 and discussion below).

The IMK first established itself in the forbidding eastern corner of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone:

The Howraman area that for centuries has been a centre of religious activity and home to both Sunnite Islam and various Sufi sects was especially hospitable. The Howraman region hugs the border with Iran south of Suleimaniyeh; its district centre is the sizeable town of Halabja. The region is largely self-contained, separated from the rest of Kurdistan by

towering mountains to the south and east, and the large Sirwan reservoir, also known as Darbandikhan Lake, to the north and west. Only one paved road connects Halabja with Suleimaniyeh [24].

Following the withdrawal of Saddam's forces from the region in late 1991, the IMK acted as part of the Kurdistan Front amalgamation of various secular, communist, nationalist and Islamist Kurdish organizations, and ran in the 1992 Kurdish elections. It only garnered around 5% of the popular vote, however, after which the group focused on consolidating its power in the mountainous Halabja region where it enjoyed the most popularity [25]. It fielded around 500 armed fighters.

In the summer of 1994, fighting broke out between the two main parties of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the KDP and PUK. During the next four years of armed civil conflict, the KDP and PUK tried to use Kurdish Islamists against each other. During the late 1990s, Islamists from Tawhid, Hamas and Jund al-Islam who engaged in attacks in the KDP and PUK regions of control (bombings, assassinations, attacks on unveiled women and Christians) often fled to IMK held territory and received shelter there [26]. The increasing power vacuum as the KDP and PUK fought each other to a standstill, along with continuing Iranian support, allowed the IMK to thrive. Under strong Iranian pressure, the PUK in 1996 withdrew from the Halabja-Howraman area (including villages along the Iranian border such as Biyara, Tawala, Khormal, Gool, Panjwin, Sargat and Said Sadiq) and effectively ceded it to the IMK. Although the IMK intermittently participated in the PUK-administered part of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the two groups also frequently clashed with each other. Each time the PUK appeared ready and able to destroy the IMK, Iran intervened and brokered an agreement [27]. The IMK likewise alternated between bellicose jihadist rhetoric and conciliatory statements about the organization's peaceful approach and willingness to function within the political system -- either a reflection of divisions and tensions within the IMK or simple opportunism.

Several splinter groups did break off from the IMK to found more radical Islamist movements, which would support the hypothesis of a seriously divided organization. Many Kurdish veterans of the Afghan war joined the IMK upon returning to Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s. At first some of the Afghan veterans and other charismatic IMK members founded various distinct movements within the IMK – these included Ali Bapir's Islamic Youth group and a kind of summer camp run by Mullah Krekar (who returned from Afghanistan and joined the IMK in 1992), which provided Islamic instruction and military training to Kurdish youth.

It was in 1997 and 1998, when the IMK decided to cooperate with the secular PUK and join the Kurdistan Regional Government, that important splinter movements opposed such cooperation with secularists and broke off from the group. These dissidents were also upset that the IMK had refrained from imposing *Sharia* law in the areas it controlled [28]. Some of the Afghan veterans (Hassan Sofi, Omar Barziani, and Mullah Krekar) broke off to form Hamas in 1997 (see appendix 1). Hamas based itself in the town of Khormal and promoted a literalist, Salafi interpretation of the Quran [29]. Hamas militants also staged attacks on book stores, clubs, beauty salons, and tourist areas, and threw acid at women who did not dress 'modestly' [30]. In

1998 the IMK assassinated Hamas leader Hassan Sofi, after which Omar Barziani took over the leadership of the group.

The IMK's largest military unit (350-400 fighters), the Second Soran Force (see appendix 1), broke off from the organization in 1998 as well and took control of Biyara (the village where they were based) as an independent force. The Second Soran Force was led by Aso Hawleri and included many Arab veterans of Afghanistan (including Hawleri himself) [31]. It too espoused a puritanical Wahabi interpretation of Islam.

Despite (or perhaps because of) the loss of several of its more committed and extremist militants, until the late 1990s the IMK was the third most popular political party in Iraqi Kurdistan (after the KDP and PUK) [32]. The IMK received financial support from the PUK while it was part of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and after 1998 the United States also provided assistance. Its leader Osman Abdul Aziz died in 1999, after which his brother Ali Abdul Aziz took over as head of the party.

Another Islamist group led by yet another Aziz brother also existed in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1993 – al-Nahda (the Islamic Renaissance Movement), led by Sadiq Abdul Aziz. Sadiq Aziz, like his brother and IMK founder Osman Aziz, had been active in the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan. Al-Nahda seems to have stayed closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and its strategic approach, remaining fairly low key and focusing on educating and organizing people around Islamic principles. In 1999, the two Aziz brothers (Ali and Sadiq) united al-Nahda and the IMK, and formed the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan (also known as the Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan – see graph). The Islamic Federation of Kurdistan also reconciled with Omar Barziani's Hamas and brought it into the federation (see appendix 1).

The union did not last long, however. Apparently as a result of both personal differences and divergent views regarding strategy and methods, the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan fell apart in 2001. Long-time IMK member Ali Bapir took most of the former Al-Nahda members and broke off to form the Islamic Group (see appendix 1) in June of 2001, based in the former Hamas stronghold of Khormal. Mullah Krekar broke away around the same time with a bunch of followers that came to be known as the Reformist Group (see appendix 1). Barziani and his Hamas militants also left in July 2001 (see appendix 1). By September of 2001 the Aziz brothers returned the former name of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (see appendix 1) to their organization, given that the constituent elements of the federation had all departed.

The IMK was disarmed in 2003 by order of the Kurdistan Regional Government. With the arrival of U.S. forces in the area, the IMK was no longer in a position to oppose such an edict. According to one PUK source, all the IMK ever really did in the areas it controlled was build mosques [33]. The mosques were built with money from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, and preached an austere Salafi-Wahabi interpretation of Islam. The IMK received 0.7% of the vote in the January 2005 Iraqi elections, giving it two seats in the Interim National Assembly.

The Islamic Group

Many of the sources interviewed described Ali Bapir and his Islamic Group as being just as radical as the most Wahabi and violent of his peers, but more practical, patient and cautious [34].

The Islamic Group describes itself as a non-violent Salafi movement, and strongly protested when Ali Bapir was arrested by U.S. Forces on July 10, 2003. Many prominent Kurdish personalities and groups, including the PUK, signed an Islamic Group statement demanding Ali Bapir's release [35]. U.S. officers, speaking off the record, insisted that Ali Bapir cooperated closely with and assisted Ansar al-Islam [36]. The Islamic Group is a legal, albeit closely watched, party in the PUK-run part of Iraqi Kurdistan. In the KDP region, the party is not legal but it is tolerated and allowed to meet inside the small office granted to the IMK [37]. After its founding in June 2001 (see graph), the Islamic Group controlled the market town of Khormal and a few other villages adjacent to Ansar al-Islam controlled territory. Ansar al-Islam militants had to pass through Islamic Group territory in order to travel deeper into Iraqi Kurdistan, which they did on many occasions. The two group's armed militias also clashed at times, however, making it difficult to evaluate the true nature of their relations.

Tawheed

Tawheed originated in the city of Erbil and was led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Bazazi. A radical Islamist movement in fierce opposition to the KDP, Tawheed assassinated prominent Christian KDP politician Franso Hariri, governor of Erbil, in February 2001. Like Hamas, Tawheed also engaged in a campaign of assassinations, targeting of non-Muslims and foreigners, bombings, and acid attacks on women [38]. Militants who fled into IMK territory around Halabja after the Hariri assassination and other actions received sanctuary there. Several Tawheed members also reportedly traveled to Afghanistan to initiate relations with Osama bin Laden and train in al-Qaeda camps [39].

In July 2001, Tawheed united with Hamas to form the Islamic Unity Front, led by Abu Bakr Hawleri (see appendix 1). A few months later, the Second Soran Force agreed to join them and they renamed the combined movement Jund al-Islam (see appendix 1):

According to a report in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, three Afghan-trained Arabs witnessed the agreement: Abu Abdul Rahman, who serves as bin Laden's representative for the supervision of unity and media in Kurdistan; Abu Wa'il, an expert and instructor in sabotage; and Abu Darda'a, an instructor in terrorism and assassination... Upon the signing, the three transferred to Jund al-Islam a \$300,000 grant supplied by bin Laden. In total, the report claimed that 60 of the approximately 400 fighters in Jund al-Islam received training in Afghanistan [40].

The merger occurred a few days before September 11, 2001. Kurdish Afghan veteran Abdullah Shafi became the leader of Jund al-Islam, using the village of Biyara as its base (the Second Soran Force controlled Biyara since around 1998). The joining of these three Islamist groups purportedly occurred at the urging of Osama bin Laden, who wanted a stronger, unified Jihad in northern Iraq. As it became increasingly evident that a U.S. attack on Afghanistan loomed, many Arab mujahadeen also began moving from Afghanistan to Iraq. Jund al-Islam clashed with IMK and Islamic Group fighters and took control of additional villages in the Howraman region along

the Iranian border. After this they agreed on a cease-fire with Ali Bapir's Islamic Group and the two organizations cooperated with each other.

Ansar al-Islam

A few months (December 2001) after Jund al-Islam's creation, a fourth group of radical Islamists joined the organization -- Mullah Krekar's Reformist Group, yet another splinter from the IMK/Islamic Federation of Kurdistan (see appendix 1). Mullah Krekar (whose real name is Najm al-Din Faraj Ahmad) lived in Pakistan in the 1980s and studied Islamic jurisprudence under Abdullah al-Zam (Osama bin Laden's mentor) [41]. Jund al-Islam took on Mullah Krekar as its spiritual leader and adopted the new name of Ansar al-Islam.

Villagers described the Ansar militants as extremely tough, motivated and experienced fighters who would even tie themselves together during battle, so that no one would be tempted to flee their positions. According to villagers in Biyara, only three men from the village actually joined Ansar al-Islam. They had heated arguments with their families for joining the group, and the villagers in general detested Ansar al-Islam and its strict rules [42]. Ansar took protection money from businesses in the villages they controlled, and failed to build any schools, clinics or other facilities for the population. They bought their food and supplies from the villagers, or had them brought in from Iran.

Ansar included Palestinians, Iranians, Jordanians, Afghans and Arabs from various countries, according to a PUK agent who lived in the area they controlled [43]. Ansar members were paid their salary in the currency of their home country. Most of them held Iranian passports (regardless of their actual nationality), and took a yearly vacation by first traveling to Iran and then generally on to another country.

Ansar al-Islam staged a number of attacks in the KRG zone between December 2001 and March 2003, including assassinations, attacks on PUK military positions and suicide bombings [44]. The group hoped to foment an Islamic revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan through a campaign of violence and destabilization of the ruling secular Kurdish nationalist parties.

In addition to Ansar al-Islam cells operating as far away as Italy, Germany and Britain, a significant degree of Iranian support was necessary for Ansar al-Islam to function, given that the group's military supplies came in from Iran (the mountainous region they controlled touches the Iranian border), veterans from Afghanistan joined them via Iran, and their cadres (including Mullah Krekar himself) entered and left the area via Iran [45]. The Shiite regime in Iran likely provided support to this radical Sunni group as a means of exercising leverage on the Kurdish secular parties ruling the KRG. Support for Ansar al-Islam could provide Iran with a particularly effective means of warning Iraqi Kurds not to allow Iranian Kurdish dissidents based in the KRG (the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and Komala) to make too much trouble for Iran. Additionally, Ansar al-Islam propaganda videos that were obtained in Iraq were all in Arabic (despite the group's majority Kurdish membership), which would seem to indicate that fund raising efforts of the group were directed at Arab donors (most probably in the Arabian Gulf

countries). Finally, at least one Ansar al-Islam militant being held by the PUK indicated that Saddam's government provided financial assistance to the group, and that one of Ansar al-Islam's leaders (Abu Wael) took his orders from Iraqi intelligence [46]. Apparently such cooperation occurred because "Ansar al-Islam and the Mukhabaraat [Iraqi intelligence] had different ideologies but the same goals" [47]. The goals in question revolved around weakening Kurdish nationalists in the KRG.

In March 2003, a joint U.S. Special Forces and PUK series of operations dislodged Ansar al-Islam from its territory along the Iranian border, killing and capturing many of the militants. A larger number of Ansar members apparently fled into Iran just before and during the U.S.-PUK attack on their territory, however [48]. Villagers in Biyara, Sargat and Gul (all former Ansar-controlled villages on the border) stated that Iran now allows Ansar al-Islam to operate from safe houses in adjacent Iranian towns such as Mariwan. In other cases, Iranian authorities held Ansar militants for a few days and then brought them back to the border, returned their weapons to them, and allowed them to reenter Iraq [49].

Kurdistan Islamic Union

After the 1991 uprising and the creation of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, high ranking Kurds in the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood returned to Iraqi Kurdistan. Many of them had spent several years during the 1980s in Iran, pursuing Phase Two of the MB's strategic program ('establishment and indoctrination') amongst Iraqi refugees there. When they returned to Iraq, they brought with them Gulf-financed charitable organizations with which they began assisting the poor (at the same time that they spread an ideological message based on a return to Islamic principles and the need to construct an Islamic state) [50]. In 1994, they entered Phase Three of their program and officially declared the establishment of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). Although KIU leaders claim that the KIU was never part of or tied to the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, they do admit to having been "inspired" by the Brotherhood and functioning as a secret organization in the 1950s [51]. Other sources interviewed contradicted this claim, however, insisting that the KIU serves as a Kurdish front of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood. KIU leaders also admit to having excellent relations with the Brotherhood's modern incarnation in the Arab parts of Iraq, the Islamic Party of Iraq [52].

The KIU insists that it pursues a moderate platform of peacefully working from within the Kurdish political system. The party receives support from the Gulf countries – most of the local workers and officials of aid organizations active in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as World Islamic Relief, are from the KIU, and the Islamic relief organizations provide the KIU with funds [53]. In the Spring of 2004, the KIU already owned ten local radio stations in Kurdistan (Erbil, Dohuk, Halabja, Kifri, Soran, Suli, Rania, Kalar, Debundihan, Kirkuk) and six television stations (Dohuk, Suli, Rania, Halabja, Erbil, Kirkuk and Garmyan) [54]. Party leaders state that:

We have a reformist message in every aspect, starting with politics. We believe in multi-party politics. We believe in the right of parties to alternate in power. We reject dictatorships, repression, monopoly of authority and torture. Instead of these

we believe in democracy, toleration and alternation of different parties. It is because of the Ba'ath party that we are against repression and torture. This still exists now but not to the same extent. There is still social injustice, meaning preference. No, it is not dictatorial but it gives too much preference (money, jobs, etc.) to party members [55].

The KIU in general stresses its moderate nature, and the fact that it has no militia or armed forces. On December 6, 2005 (shortly before the December 2005 Iraqi elections), the KIU offices in Dohuk (one of the three governorates that make up the KRG region) were attacked by a local mob, as KDP police looked on. Four KIU members were killed, including a high ranking official of the party [56]. The KIU had recently withdrawn from the Kurdistan Alliance, which combined all the major Kurdish political parties into one electoral list for the December 2005 legislative elections. Particularly after their withdrawal from the list, KIU officials complained of a general campaign of harassment and intimidation by the ruling Kurdish parties. Nonetheless, the KIU took 7.1% of the vote in Dohuk Governorate, 3.6% in Erbil, and 10.8% in Suleimaniya [57]. This gave the group four provincial seats and one seat in the Iraqi National Assembly.

Contemporary Arab Sunni Islamist Groups

Since the fall of Saddam's regime in April of 2003, a number of extremist and mainly Sunni Arab groups emerged in Iraq and placed themselves at the forefront of the insurgency there. Extremely secretive, these groups frequently changed names or announced the formation of a new organization. An undetermined number of foreign jihadists have also increased their ranks. Three of the most significant of these extremist groups are al-Qaeda in Iraq (formerly Tawhid and Jihad and until recently led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), Ansar al-Sunnah, and Jaysh Muhammad. Several of the sources interviewed thought that Ansar al-Islam militants assist Ansar al-Sunnah (by acting as guides in Iraqi Kurdistan, for instance) and that there may even exist overlapping membership between the groups. If the relationship between the primarily Arab Sunni Ansar al-Sunnah and Kurdish Ansar al-Islam was close, there also exists a possibility that Ansar al-Sunnah has subsumed the remnants of al-Islam into it, given that Ansar al-Islam largely disappeared from the radar screen by 2005.

Conclusion – The Brotherhood's Children

Mapping out the history and linkages of Sunni Islamist groups in Iraq leads to a striking observation: virtually all Islamist organizations in the country trace their roots back to the Muslim Brotherhood in one way or another. Organizations such as the Islamic Party of Iraq, the Union of Muslim Scholars of Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Islamic Union emerged as the official party of the MB, an organizational front of the MB, and the regional branch of the MB, respectively. In other cases, such as with the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and al-Nahda, key leaders of the group were active in the MB or one of its front organizations before breaking away to join or found a new group. Such new groups, especially the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, then experienced further splits which typically led to the emergence of the most radical, extremist and

violent Islamist groups in Iraq – such as Hamas, Tawhid, the Second Soran Force, Ansar al-Islam, and Ansar al-Sunnah. According to many local Iraqi observers I spoke to, organizations such as Ali Bapir's Islamic Group and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan also possessed a strong tendency towards jihadist extremism and violence, but presented a somewhat more moderate image for practical reasons. Other commentators went still further, stating that even the Islamic Party of Iraq and the Kurdistan Islamic Union would both display their 'true extremist nature' and resort to violence as soon as they felt strong enough to do so.

Even if one rejects the contention that non-violent Islamist groups such as the Islamic Party of Iraq and the Kurdistan Islamic Union plan to change their 'moderate tune' once they grow in power, the history and linkages between Islamist groups outlined above presents us with some troubling questions. According to both KDP Interior Minister Karim Sinjari and PUK Chief of Security Dana Majid, the moderate Islamist groups act like a 'kindergarten,' introducing people to the Islamist perspective and allowing them to make the first necessary steps towards becoming committed jihadists [58]. Minister Sinjari adds that "Ninety-five per cent of Ansar al-Islam members had been part of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, the Islamic Group, or the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The way to stop the radicals involves devising strategies to stop the 'kindergartens'" [59]. How can we stop the 'kindergartens,' however, if they play by the democratic rules of the game? Banning avowedly peaceful and moderate Islamist organizations does not appear to be an option for societies that value freedom and democracy. Such tactics might just as easily lead to the very extremist violence they seek to prevent.

Some strategies to inhibit Islamist radicalization in Iraq, without completely gutting democratic principles, have already been implemented in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government now 1) Closes mosques after prayers; 2) Supervises schools' curriculum; 3) Keeps close surveillance on Islamist parties and imams; and 4) Attempts to implement vigilant transparency rules for any money coming into the region from abroad [60]. Closing mosques after prayers reflects an attempt to discourage the indoctrination and recruitment that radical Islamist groups often engage in during the political discussions that frequently follow prayers. If as a result of the closures they move meetings to private homes, the authorities end up being in a better position to monitor those homes being used for this purpose and who is attending the meetings. The second policy, supervising schools' curriculum, simultaneously aims at preventing extremist interpretations of Islam from being taught to young people and promoting instead a pedagogy that extols tolerance, pluralism and moderation. The third policy of putting Islamist groups and certain imams under surveillance constitutes prudent security policies for any government threatened by Islamist radicalism. Finally, financial transparency aims to prevent the kind of outside assistance that provided seed money to groups such as Ansar al-Islam, the establishment of radical madrasses, or undue influence on and by various Islamist parties. This fourth item is of particular importance, given observations such as that of Graham Fuller: "Gulf states, as suggested by the news report on al-Kubaysi above, also seem interested in helping assert Sunni Islamic power. Saudi Arabia, which has much to fear from a recrudescence of Shiite power in Iraq, almost certainly will be active in trying to strengthen Wahhabi forces within Iraq, and to protect its own interests in Iraq" [61].

These four policies do not constitute a complete anti-Islamist radical program, naturally.

Reconstruction, provision of security, international development assistance and support for human rights organizations would also make the overall climate in which extremist movements thrive less favorable to them. The departure of foreign troops would likewise lessen the appeal of radical groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunnah, as long as this does not occur before Iraqi forces are able to provide some measure of security. This study would seem to indicate that too much weight is often attached to the role that Western occupying forces had in fomenting radical Islam in Iraq, given that at least in Iraqi Kurdistan, the majority of the groups examined here emerged before the 2003 Iraq war.

Notes

1. Islamism,” Encyclopedia of the Orient, <http://lexicorient.com/e.o/islamism.htm>.
2. Author’s interview with Niazi Said Ali, Director of the Institute for Training Specialists and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) intelligence official in charge of monitoring Islamist groups, March 11, 2004, Qalachwalan, Iraq.
3. Basim al-‘Azami, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Genesis and Development,” in Faleh Absul-Jabar, ed., *Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, religion and social movements in Iraq* (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 164.
4. *Ibid.*, 165.
5. “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation),” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm> (accessed July 18, 2005).
6. Author’s interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004, Qalachwalan, Iraq.
7. *Ibid.*
8. ‘Azami, 167. ‘Azami provides a list of leaders of the MB in the 1960s, all of whom were Sunni Arabs.
9. For more on the three stage strategy, see “Politics in God’s Name,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, No. 247, November 16-22, 1995, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives/parties/muslimb/polgod.htm> (accessed June 24, 2005); also Nachman Tal, *A Decade of Fundamentalism* (Tel Aviv: JCSS and Papyrus, 1999, Hebrew).
10. ‘Azami, 168. Article 6 of the manifesto addressed minorities. ‘Azami adds “The party program asserted that the Palestinian problem could only be solved by force. The MB viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as the central issue concerning the entire Islamic community.”
11. Author’s interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004, Qalachwalan, Iraq.
12. ‘Azami, 174.
13. The Iraqi Islamic Party does *not* describe itself as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, however.
14. For a discussion of the different religious tendencies in Iraqi Kurdistan, see Sami Shourush, “The Religious Composition of the Kurdish Society: Sufi Orders, Sects and Religions,” in Faleh Absul-Jabar, ed., *Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, religion and social movements in Iraq* (London: Saqi Books), 115-139.
15. *Ibid.*, 136.
16. For a discussion of the issue, see Helkot Hakim, “Kurds, Islam and State Nationalism,” in

- Absul-Jabar, *Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, religion and social movements in Iraq*, 45-58.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Author's interview with Hawji Mullah Amin (former leader of Suleimaniya branch of Islamic Renaissance Movement) and Fuad Majid Misri, April 12, 2004; author's interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004.
19. Author's interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004.
20. 'Azami, 170. 'Azami does not seem to recognize the contradiction inherent in simultaneously espousing no preference for one ethnic group as well as Pan-Arabist ambitions.
21. Author's interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Fathi, former Islamists now working at the Bureau of Democratic Organizations (Suleimaniya), February 1, 2004.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Alan Godlas, "Muslims, Islam and Iraq," University of Georgia, <http://www.uga.edu/islam/iraq.html#sects> (accessed July 20, 2005).
24. Author's interview with Fareid Assasad, President of the Institute for Strategic Studies (Suleimaniya), February 22, 2004.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Author's interview with KRG Interior Minister (KDP) Karim Sinjari, March 13, 2004.
27. Author's interview with Fareid Assasad, President of the Institute for Strategic Studies (Suleimaniya), February 22, 2004.
28. "Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse that Roared?" International Crisis Group, Iraq Briefing, February 7, 2003, 3.
29. Michael Rubin, "The Islamist Threat from Iraqi Kurdistan," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, December 2001.
30. "Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse that Roared?"
31. *Ibid.* The figure of 350-400 fighters is provided by Rubin, while the year 1998 comes from me. I have unfortunately had difficulty determining the exact date that the Second Soran Force completely split from the IMK – sources I interviewed were all unsure, and 1998 emerged as the most likely year this occurred.
32. Since then, the Kurdistan Islamic Union drew more support and took the number three position in the Kurdish political scene.
33. Author's interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Fathi, February 1, 2004, Suleimaniya.
34. Author's interview with Jamal Hussein, Omeid Qaradaghi, Bahman Tahir, Ali Mustafa, and Kara Fathi, February 1, 2004, Suleimaniya; author's interview with Hawji Mullah Amin (former leader of Suleimaniya branch of Islamic Renaissance Movement) and Fuad Majid Misri, April 12, 2004; author's interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004; author's interview with Dana Majid (PUK Chief of Security, Suleimaniya), April 12, 2004, Suleimaniya.
35. For the text of the statement, see the Islamic Group's website at <http://www.komall.org/b/statements.htm>.
36. Author's interview with a U.S. Army Major, December 20, 2004, Erbil.

37. KDP Interior Minister Karim Sinjari told the author that after reviewing their party platform and its Jihadist rhetoric, the Kurdistan Government could not in good conscience grant a license to the Islamic Group and its armed militia.
38. A Christian barber in Erbil told the author that the number of attacks by Tawheed, Hamas and later Jund al-Islam far exceeded what was reported in the news. He added that his own house had been burned down by Hamas militants, which forced him to relocate from his village near Erbil to the city itself (Author's personal interview, October 3, 2005, Erbil).
39. Michael Rubin, "The Islamist Threat from Iraqi Kurdistan," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, December 2001. Most of the sources interviewed for this study corroborated the Tawheed-al-Qaeda link (the others said they did not know for certain).
40. *Ibid.* This is also a good source for more detail on Jund al-Islam. For more on the purported al-Qaeda link, see Jonathan Schanzer, *Al-Qaeda's Armies* (New York: Specialist Press International), 2004, Chapter Six ("Northern Iraq").
41. Glen Rangwala, "Iraq's Major Political Groupings," Iraq Watch, October 1, 2002, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/rangwala-100102.htm> (accessed July 20, 2005).
42. Author's interview with Taleb Kader Rahman and three other Biyara villagers, December 19, 2003, Biyara.
43. Author's interview with Shaho Ali Aziz, Chief of PUK in Biyara, former PUK spy against Ansar, December 19, 2003.
44. For more on this, see Jonathan Schanzer, *Al-Qaeda's Armies* (New York: Specialist Press International), 2004, Chapter Six ("Northern Iraq").
45. Zachary Johnson, "Al-Qaeda's New Front," *Frontline* (PBS), January 25, 2005, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/cron.html>.
46. Philippe Gapet (French independent journalist) and the author's interview with Abdullah Rahman Shamani, April 27, 2004, Suleimaniya. Although PUK authorities insisted that Mr. Shamani was under no compulsion to answer interviewers' questions and had agreed to do so voluntarily, it is difficult to ascertain the reliability of this interview.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Author's interview with Taleb Kader Rahman and three other Biyara villagers, December 19, 2003, Biyara.
49. A number of sources on different occasions, including a former Ansar militant who was among those the Iranians released back into Iraq, related the same basic story to me. Although the information remains difficult to corroborate and was shared with me informally, I believe it to be accurate.
50. Author's interview with Niazi Said Ali, March 11, 2004.
51. Author's interview with Hamed Said and other members of the Suleimaniya leadership of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, March 7, 2004, Suleimaniya.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Author's interview with Hawji Mullah Amin and Fuad Majid Misri, April 12, 2004.
54. Author's interview with Hamed Said and other members of the Suleimaniya leadership of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, March 7, 2004, Suleimaniya.
55. *Ibid.*

56. "Iraq: Kurdistan Islamic Union Responds to Attacks," *Radio Free Europe*, December 9, 2005, <http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/9DFDF2B2-3D52-4B9B-A56A-38D835CBBB33.html>.
57. December 2005 election results, as released on 20 January 2006, <http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraq051215results.html>
58. Author's interview with Karim Sinjari, March 13, 2004, Erbil; author's interview with Dana Majid, April 12, 2004, Suleimaniya.
59. Author's interview with Karim Sinjari, March 13, 2004.
60. *Ibid.*
61. "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 108, August, 2003.

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