Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey

By Marlène Laruelle

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INTRODUCTION

n the 1990s, relations between Russia and Turkey were strained, due mostly to the geopolitical reorganization of Eurasia following the demise of the Soviet Union. Both countries entered into direct competition in strategic zones like the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. However, relations began to improve with the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Ankara in December 1997, followed by that of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to Moscow in November 1999 and that of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Ankara in October 2000. Public recognition of this strengthening of Russo-Turkish relations was consolidated during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004, which was immediately reciprocated by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Moscow in January 2005.

Economic cooperation is one of the engines of this rapprochement: Russia is now Turkey’s second-largest trade partner after Germany. Military cooperation is similarly progressing, and Ankara has ordered Russian military equipment. At a geopolitical level, the number of issues dividing the two countries has clearly diminished: Today, Moscow supports Turkey’s membership bid for the European Union (EU) and its position concerning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, while Ankara, for its part, approves of Moscow’s growing role in the Middle East. In addition, both countries have reduced cooperation with Israel and increased cooperation with Syria and Iran, thereby tracing the outline of a Russia-Turkey-Iran alliance—possibly also including Syria—that would undermine U.S. ambitions in the region. Lastly, there is the growth of nationalist and anti-Western movements in both Russian and Turkish political circles: The Kremlin insists on Russia’s status as a great power, while Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) adheres to the notion that Turkey belongs more to the Muslim world than to Europe.

In this context, it is important to analyze the Russian and Turkish figures seeking to concretize this rapprochement, and in particular to study the role played by neo-Eurasianist ideology and its adherents. Eurasianism is a Russian ideology born in the 1920s and 1930s and reformulated after the fall of the USSR, which proclaims that Russia’s mission is in Asia. It contends that Russian identity, as it were, straddles both Europe and Asia, and can only be realized by rejecting the European model and strengthening ties with Asia. Partisans of neo-Eurasianism seek to influence Russian political power and think of themselves as a sort of informal think tank. The most famous of them, Alexander Dugin, has formed some networks within Russian political and military milieus [1]. He has also been seeking to play a more and more visible role in Russo-Turkish relations. An analysis of his case will thus allow us to gain fresh insight into the networks nourishing the new alliance between Moscow and Ankara. Indeed, Eurasianism is a very relevant example of a prolonged “post-imperial trauma” that both Turkey and Russia have due to their historically geographical and cultural dilemma vis-à-vis the West.
THE PLACE OF TURKEY IN THE THOUGHT OF ALEXANDER DUGIN

In the 1990s, Dugin classed Turkey among the allied countries of the Atlanticist bloc—his manual on geopolitics, *The Foundations of Geopolitics*, states that the principal partners of the United States are in Europe, Great Britain; in Asia, China; and in the Muslim world, Turkey. Confronted with this alliance, he suggests that Russia ought to cooperate with Germany, Japan, and Iran. At the time Dugin justified his negative vision of Turkey with arguments that were as much geopolitical as cultural. He cited Turkey’s membership in NATO, its desire to become a member of the EU, its support for separatist movements in the Caucasus, its rejection of Russian hegemony in Central Asia, and its history throughout the 20th century, which was one of increasing Westernization under Kemalist inspiration. Nevertheless, Dugin’s strategy toward Turkey changed sometime around 2000 and has led to a major reversal in perspective. Though Iran is still portrayed as a major partner and Shiism as a symbol of “good Islam” that Dugin hopes to develop [2], Turkey has recently been integrated into the axis of Eurasian powers.

There are many reasons for this change, which concern Russia as much as Turkey and Islam. Vladimir Putin’s Russia corresponds more clearly with Dugin’s ideological expectations. Dugin is a strong advocate of reinforcing Russo-Turkish relations and of the development of an assertive Russian foreign policy toward all Muslim and Asian countries. Turkey, for its part, also changed tack around 2000: Its disillusionment with the EU, the tensions within NATO over its role in the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and the instances of destabilization in the Middle East have all reignited identitarian polemics. The idea that Europe is the natural and inevitable future of Turkey is no longer as widespread. Lastly, after September 11, Dugin felt compelled to moderate the positive vision of fundamentalist Islam he formulated in the 1990s and instead endorse a more moderate and secular version of Islam in which the Turkish model occupies a relatively important place.

These geopolitical shifts led Dugin to develop networks inside Turkey itself. In 2003, the creation of his International Eurasianist Movement (IEM) enabled him to give wider visibility to a Eurasianist movement that had until then been confined to Russia. He is trying to open branches in the countries of the former Soviet Union as well as in Europe and Turkey and is having some success in developing official relations with the Kazakh authorities, who are also interested in the idea of Eurasia. From 2003-2004, he began visiting Turkey regularly and in 2006 published several long articles devoted to what he has named the “Moscow-Ankara axis.”

TURKEY: FROM PAN-TURKISM TO AVRASYA IN THE 1990S

The idea of Eurasia (*Avrasya* in Turkish and *Evrazia* in Russian) did not arrive in Turkey uniquely through the efforts of Dugin. In Turkish intellectual and political milieus, the identity of Turkey vis-à-vis Europe and its role in Central Asia were always at the heart of debates throughout the 20th century. The disillusionment of the 1990s and the failed revival of pan-Turkism permitted the idea
of Avarsya to take root even before Dugin stepped onto the Turkish scene.

The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to rekindling Turkish interest in Central Asia beyond the restricted extreme-right pan-Turkic circles to which it had been confined since the age of Kemalism. Turkey’s role in NATO has noticeably declined since the end of the Cold War, and its relations with the EU are bumpy; hence it has perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union as a chance to enhance its regional role. The rediscovery of Central Asia enabled it to revive an assertive notion of Turkishness, but also to highlight Turkey’s role as a natural transit point for Central Asian oil and gas destined for the Mediterranean region. Although Ankara’s new infatuation with Central Asia developed among politicians with no links to the extreme right, they have, often involuntarily, adopted certain features of pan-Turkic logic in presenting “Turkishness” as the natural link between these countries. Thus the idea of Turkic unity “from the Great Wall to the Adriatic,” to use President Suleyman Demirel’s phrase, has become a recurrent cliché in Turkish public discourse. Moreover, the nationalist leader Alparslan Turkes accompanied Demirel on his first visit to Central Asia in April 1992; for external observers, this documented the ambiguity of Turkish policy toward the new states.

After the declarations of independence in the latter half of 1991, the Turkish authorities decided to place their policies toward the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan on a cultural footing. Turkey hoped to play an active role in Central Asian state-building and export the Turkish model of democracy, secularism and modernity that has ensured the country’s success. However, the naïve optimism of the first years led Turkey to commit strategic mistakes that went over very badly with the new Central Asian governments, which soon began to criticize the new “big brother.” But Ankara was not solely responsible for the profound deception that beset Turkish-Central Asian relations starting in the mid-1990s. The authoritarian backlash in the Central Asian states and their unwillingness to create effective regional bodies complicated matters a great deal. Pan-Turkism was relegated to dissident circles that were marginalized from the political and cultural scene [3]. Today, any reference to Pan-Turkism is perceived as a challenge to the new states’ legitimacy. The two most authoritarian countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have repeatedly cut back on their cooperation with Turkey, or even tried to end it altogether, accusing Ankara of welcoming political dissidents from their countries. Moreover, trade between Turkey and its Turcophone neighbors never reached the expected levels: Russia remains by far the most important trading partner for the Central Asian states, and also for Turkey.

The inter-Turkic congresses held since 1992 have all more or less failed to meet their objectives. The same goes for Ankara’s policies of linguistic integration—proposals to introduce a common alphabet have failed to garner any serious support. The Central Asian countries preferred to preserve the logic of linguistic differentiation inherited from the Soviet era and, in some cases, Romanize their alphabets in their own way. Efforts to translate works of literature between Turkic languages and to reinterpret common holidays such as Navruz have also had little impact in Central Asia. However, Turkey can be credited with several projects that have had a social and political impact.
For example, the country introduced large-scale exchange programs for Central Asian students and founded Turkish universities and schools in Central Asia. Ankara has also tried to participate in the modernization of telecommunications, using the Turksat satellite to launch two TV channels, Avrasya and TRT International—which actually have a limited audience in Central Asia—and sought to create a platform for the dissemination of the Turkish model and local cooperation through the *Zaman* newspaper, published in Turkish, Russian, and Central Asian languages. The demise of this Pan-Turkic dream will favor the development of the alternative and less ideological idea of Avrasya.

Many of these projects were managed by the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (Turkiye Isbirligi ve Kalkinma Ajansi), created in 1992 under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry and later subordinated directly to the prime minister. It was thus not until the end of the 1990s that the term Avrasya was used in an official Turkish institution. This ambitious project, albeit now scaled down, has greatly contributed to spreading the term “Eurasia” on the Turkish public scene, especially through its publications: *Eurasian Files*—*Avrasya dosyasi*, a bulletin created in 1994 which mainly offers economic information; *Eurasian Studies*—*Avrasya Etudleri*, a historical and geopolitical quarterly, and, since 2002, *Avrasya Bulteni* [4]. Thus the Turkish authorities have tried to link the new integrationist terminology with traditional Kemalist ideas on national identity, although this “return” to Central Asia—and especially to the Balkans—is in itself contrary to Ataturk’s view of Turkish history as constantly moving westward. This type of Eurasianism has been on the rise in state bodies since 1998, when the European Union refused to consider Turkey’s candidacy. Thus the political authorities’ insistence on Turkey’s role in Eurasia is two-pronged: In relations with Brussels, it serves to present Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia, but it may also be used to blackmail the EU or even take revenge if it definitively rejects Turkey’s membership bid.

Thus in the 1990s the parallels between Turkish *Avrasya* and Russian *Evrazia* were tenuous, and there was no direct relationship between them, although many articles in *Avrasya dosyasi* and *Avrasya Etudleri* commented on the existence of the rival Russian term. Russian Eurasianism was often criticized: Many authors presented it as a new imperialist attempt to negate the identity of the non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union. Dugin was denounced as an extreme-right author and the very idea of a Russian-controlled Eurasia was perceived as an improper form of competition with the Turkish model, presented as being more egalitarian. Nevertheless, while the term “pan-Turkism” still has a pejorative ring in Turkey, and authors who use it are automatically associated with the radical right, the idea of Eurasia has endowed certain pan-Turkic presuppositions with the status of “political correctness.” The idea of Eurasia, which does not clearly imply the political unification of the Turkic peoples under Turkish domination, makes it possible to sidestep excessively political connotations and clears those who use it from any suspicion of imperialism toward their “Turkic brothers” [5].

However, this transformation is not simply a harmless terminological change. On the contrary, it expresses Turkish politicians’ profound disillusionment with Central Asia. Ankara has failed in its
attempt to reclaim the idea of Turkic unity, having proven unable to provide a definition that would be pluralistic enough to spare Central Asian sensibilities in matters of national cultural heritages. But in the course of a decade, Turkey has managed to readjust its policies and objectives to more modest expectations. The term *Avrasya*, which is less ambitious than the ideas of classic pan-Turkism, stresses the fact that relations have become more pragmatic and therefore calmer. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the *Avrasya* terminology of official diplomacy was taken up by pragmatic private actors: Tourist and transportation firms, multi-nationals working with one or several former Soviet countries, etc.

**Dugin’s Personal Networks in Turkey**

In general, the Turkish idea of *Avrasya* seems less ideologically militant than its Russian equivalent *Evrazio*; yet, since the early 2000s, the term has evolved in two directions. On the one hand, attempts are made to turn the two “Eurasias” into allies rather than competitors; on the other hand, there has been a Dugin-style ideologization of the term in response to American ascendancy. The question is whether the concurrence of these two modes of “Russification” of the Turkish *Avrasya* is incidental, or whether they are two sides of the same coin. In the 1990s, articles on the Turkish variety of *Avrasya* systematically criticized Russian Eurasianism; in the early 2000s, the tone changed noticeably. Several Turkish advocates of a more militant Eurasianism called upon their fellow citizens to emulate Russia in developing a specifically Turkish interpretation of this concept [6]. In 2002, at the conference “How to Establish a Peace Belt around Turkey” held by the Military Academies Command, the secretary general of the National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinc singled out Russia as Turkey’s most strategic partner. In 2005, Turkish analyst Anar Somuncuoğlu from the Russia-Ukraine Research Department at the National Security Strategies Research Center (TUSAM) published an article in *Strateji Dergisi* proving the need of rapprochement with Russia [7].

The term *Avrasya* has also become popular with religious circles that were not previously linked to the pan-Turkic extreme right. Thus the modernizing Islamists around Prime Minister Erdogan have been publishing the newspaper *Avrasya kusagi* since 2000, and partisans of a Turko-Islamic synthesis edit *Yeni Avrasya* [8]. Fethullah Gulen’s movement publishes *DA Dıyalog Avrasya* in Russian and Turkish, which has already carried several interviews with Dugin [9]. Other proponents of this movement include the Ahmed Yasawi Foundation and the Marmara Group Foundation, directed by Akkan Suver, which regularly organizes “Eurasian economic summits.” In November 2006, this NGO was the first to be accorded an observer member status by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC). There are also two social-democratic newspapers—*Avrasya Etnografya Vakfı* and *Avrasya Dergisi*—as well as the above-mentioned *Zaman* [10].

Dugin participated in this reorientation in his own way, managing to have his book on geopolitics translated into Turkish (and Arabic). The translation was published in Ankara in 2003 as *Rus
Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım, and seems to have gone over well with part of the Turkish military. There have been several conferences on Eurasianism that called for cooperation with Russia, all of which included participants from the military. The first visit of the International Eurasianist Movement took place in December 2003. It received quite widespread media coverage in Turkey, due in particular to the presence of writer and journalist Atilla Ilhan (1925-2005). Over many decades, Ilhan consistently wrote on the subject of the Turkish-Russian alliance, even during the Cold War. Through his books, he popularized the idea of a Turkish-Russian alliance preordained by geopolitics and insisted on “Eurasianist” heroes such as Ismail Gasprinskii, Sultan Galiyev and Mulla Nur Vahidov [11]. This rapprochement between Dugin and Ilhan consequently helped Russian Eurasianism to reach some Turkish political and intellectual elites.

A second visit of the IEM leader to Turkey took place in December 2004, just days before Vladimir Putin’s official visit, a coincidence that received extensive comment in the Turkish press. The success of Eurasianist theories in some Turkish circles has enabled Dugin to organize a symposium featuring former President Suleyman Demirel and several high-ranking officers [12]. Demirel is known for his pan-Turkic leanings and his desire to forge closer relations with both Central Asia and Russia, and seems to welcome the spread of Turkish-style Eurasianism. This “Eurasian symposium” provided a platform for ambassadors from Russia, Iran and China, as well as many Turkish military officials known for being among the chief ideologues of military circles, such as General Sener Eruygur, director of the Turkish police, the aforementioned General Tuncer Kilinc, and General Suat Ilhan. Several other high-profile figures have declared themselves as being favorably disposed toward a Eurasianist definition of Turkey and a rapprochement with Russia. They include the rector of Gazi University, Kadri Yamas; a number of Turkish university figures, such as Isay Yuzsur and Semih Koray; the Russian ambassador in Ankara, P. V. Stergnii; the president of the parliamentary group of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP), Ali Topuz; the president of the Turkish business association TUSIAD, Kemal Ozden; the president of Turkish Unions Celtin Oltun, etc.

During this trip, Dugin also visited Northern Cyprus to defend the cause of this self-proclaimed state recognized only by Turkey. He was given a high-profile reception as if he were an official figure of the Russian state: After inaugurating a branch of the International Eurasianist Movement (IEM), he met with the then president of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktash, as well as Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, who has since succeeded Denktash as president.

Although Dugin has made highly critical statements about Turkey as an Atlanticist outpost in the East, he has been systematically looking for allies in Turkey and ended up finding a partner, the Turkish Workers’ Party (Turkiye Isci Partisi, or IP), led by Dogu Perincek [13]. This small communist-leaning party quickly became attracted to Eurasianism; Perincek took part in the founding congress of the International Eurasianist Movement in 2003 and was elected to its Supreme Council. The IP and its associated newspaper, Aydinlik, have been supporting rapprochement between Turkey and Russia.
on the basis of a Eurasianist alliance that would be opposed to the American unipolar model [14]. Both Dugin and Perincek believe that the Romanov and Ottoman Empires competed for several centuries precisely because they had so much in common: Both were situated on the “fault line” between Europe and Asia, between Orthodoxy and Islam. At the end of the 19th century, both countries experienced a rift between Westernized, European-oriented elites and traditional, Oriental masses, a division which they believe persists to this day. According to Perincek, only Eurasian conciliation can enable the two countries to overcome this internal and external cleavage and forge an alliance around the idea of the intrinsic unity of the Old Continent’s median space and the need to resist Western cultural standardization.

Dugin has been eager to profit as much as he can from these contacts with Turkey; in 2006, he published some very long articles specifically devoted to what he now calls “the Moscow-Ankara axis” [15]. The avowed aim of Dugin’s supporters and their Turkish allies is to create an inter-parliamentary Eurasian assembly, including not only Russians and Turks, but also representatives of Iran and the Arab states. This proposal was launched by the representative of the Turkish delegation to the OSCE, Abdulkadir Ates. In Moscow, it was endorsed by the Turkish ambassador, Kurtulus Taskent, who met with Dugin, as well as several officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federation Council [16]. For the time being, the project seems not to have succeeded.

The project was also supported by a Moscow-based think tank, the Society for the Development of Intellectual Contacts between Russia and Turkey. In 2005, this was institutionalized into a Center for Russo-Turkish Research (RUTAM) [17]. It is directed by the former Russian ambassador to Turkey, Albert Chernyshev, a member of the Supreme Council of the IEM, and by İlber Ortaylı, a leading Turkish historian, son of Crimean Tatars who fled Stalin’s Soviet Union, professor of history at the University of Galatasaray and at Bilkent University. It is co-directed by the director of the prestigious Institute of Asian and African Countries at Lomonossov University (MGU), M. S. Meier, also a member of the Eurasianist movement, and by the Turkish journalist Hakan Aksay, a specialist on Russia. The main mission of RUTAM is described as being “the rapprochement and the more efficient utilization of the intellectual potential of the two countries (academia, cultural milieus, political and economic circles, youth)” [18]. Once more, Dugin has used all the ingredients of his previous successes by combining the political networks of high-ranking officials at the main ministries—defense, interior, and foreign affairs—with the scientific legitimacy provided by academic circles, especially in Oriental Studies.

Turkey has developed a very pragmatic and instrumental interpretation of Eurasianism, one that is far less politicized than in Russia. Eurasianism lacks deep historical and theoretical roots in Turkey and cannot really compete with “Neo-Ottomanism,” according to Igor Torbakov’s description of the current ideological atmosphere in Turkey [19]. The Russian and Turkish Eurasianisms sketched here differ on several crucial points: On their view of Islam, of course, but also on their stance on potential EU membership and actual membership of NATO, the very symbol of Atlanticism. These
latter two issues are ones that Russia does not need to face. Five different uses of the term Avrasya can be identified in Turkey: A purely commercial one among companies working with the post-Soviet states; a pragmatic one at state institutions such as TIKA that want to promote the Turkish model of secular democracy in the post-communist countries; references to Turkic brotherhood both by extreme-right pan-Turkic movements and by advocates of a Turko-Islamic union (with the latter stressing the Muslim background of Turkic unity more than the former); and, as the latest reinterpretation of the idea of Eurasia, an alter-globalist left in search of new allies [20].

Pan-Turkism enjoyed a brief spell of popularity among Turkish politicians in the first half of the 1990s, but afterward withdrew to its traditional social niche, the Turkish nationalist milieu. Eurasianism has further growth potential because of its intrinsic polysemy, adapted and reformulated to serve specific nationalist objectives. Moreover, Eurasianism is understood as a symbol of a modern economy and identity—a cult of national diversity, differentialism, etc.—whereas pan-Turkism is criticized as being an outdated conception of the nation, one that has excessive religious implications and is out of tune with early 21st century economic and political realities. Finally, Eurasianism’s appeal to both the left and the right wing of the political spectrum, be it in Russia or Turkey, as well as its flexible stance on economics and its alter- or anti-globalism, might well ensure it a longer lifespan than pan-Turkism.

Thus Dugin is exporting to Turkey the strategy he applied, with some success, in Russia and Kazakhstan, which consists in bracketing out his Traditionalist views and publicly stressing a pragmatic conception of Eurasia, presented as the only plausible strategy of regional economic integration and resistance to the American model. Dugin presents himself as the leader of a respectable think tank serving the economic and political interests of his own country and Turkey. This definition of Eurasia enables him to attract a large spectrum of sympathizers who are unaware of the other ideological ingredients of Dugin’s movements: Businessmen seeking to improve conditions for trade between the former USSR and Turkey; army officers disillusioned by Turkey’s loss of clout in NATO and shocked by the Iraq war; politicians and intellectuals looking for a notion of Turkishness that would facilitate Ankara’s rapprochement with the new Central Asian countries and give cause to the humiliation being dealt out by Brussels; and, on the other side of the political spectrum, left-wingers intent on converting communism into alter-globalism. All the same, Russian and Turkish anti-Westernism does not constitute a sufficient basis on which to build solid strategic cooperation. The idea of a common destiny between Turkey and Russia vis-à-vis Western imperialism is founded on very different bases and objectives in each country. In addition, several questions remain rather contentious, such as the Russian military presence in the Caucasus, the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechen and Kurdish separatism, etc. Turkey and Russia will perhaps continue to cooperate, but they will also compete depending on their own geopolitical evolution.
It is, however, quite striking to note how the strategic reversal of Turkey in Dugin’s thinking is contemporary to the diplomatic rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara. Dugin closely follows the Kremlin’s political developments and has sometimes succeeded in anticipating them. Official Russian member figures of the IEM—such as, for example, Mikhail Margelov, head of the Committee for International Relations of the Federation Council; Viktor Kaliuzhny, vice minister of foreign affairs; Aleksey Zhaifarov, chief of the Department of Political Parties and Social Organizations in the Justice Ministry, etc.—enable him to keep up-to-date on discussions taking place in the organs of power and to gain entry into them. Indeed, the networks he has in Turkey intersect with those he has constructed in Russia: Military milieus, academic circles and political groupuscules located on the political spectrum from the extreme right to the extreme left. If the real degree of Dugin’s influence and that of his networks on the Kremlin is difficult to ascertain, it nonetheless appears certain that he has effective points of access to some official Turkish circles that happen also to serve the direct interests of Moscow. It is therefore likely that Dugin will continue to play the Turkophile card, since it allows him to present himself as a representative figure both in Russia and abroad. Whatever his real influence, the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, if pursued, is certain to change the basic situation in an important way: It will affect the very framework of relations of Moscow and of Ankara toward the European Union and NATO, as well as toward the Caucasus, where both countries might well seek to implement a logic of alliance and not one of competition.

NOTES

3. The journal Turkiston Torikhi and opposition circles in Erk and Birlik (Uzbekistan), Zheltoksan (Kazakhstan), Turkmen ili (Turkmenistan), etc.
4. For online access to these publications, see www.tika.gov.tr/avdos.asp and www.tika.gov.tr/turkdb.asp.
6. See e.g. the dossier on Russian identity, Rusya Ozel, in Avrasya Dosyasi, no. 4/2001, pp. 16–94.
8. Online at www.yeniavrasya.net/ara.asp.
15. Extracts are online at www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2093.
17. The RUTAM website is to be found on one of the main Russian patriotic sites, narod.ru, see http://allturkey.narod.ru.
About the Author

Dr. Marlène Laruelle is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program and is a Principal Investigator for the project “Coping with the Russo-Chinese Competition in Central Asia: Local Perspectives and Strategies,” granted by the Smith Richardson Foundation. She is the author or co-author of four books in French, the most recent being Central Asia, the Drift Towards Authoritarianism (2006). Dr. Laruelle is also author of the forthcoming English-language book The Quest for an Imperial Identity: Eurasianism in Contemporary Russia, which will be published by the Woodrow Wilson Press and John Hopkins University Press in 2008. She holds a Ph.D. in Slavic Studies from the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Cultures in Paris.