




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North Korean leader Kim Jong-il

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For comments or questions about *China Brief*, please contact us at pubs@jamestown.org

1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 483-8888
Fax: (202) 483-8337

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In a Fortnight

By L.C. Russell Hsiao

TAIWAN'S SUBMARINE PROGRAM: PIPE-DREAM OR NEXT BIG THING?

Several reports appeared in recent weeks in the Taiwanese media about the possibility that President Ma Ying-jeou's administration has restarted a program to build indigenously designed diesel submarines. According to various reports citing sources close to Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC), the "Project Diving Dragon," which is Taiwan's indigenous submarine program that was aborted five years ago under former President Chen Shui-bian's administration, may have been re-initiated three months ago under the directive of the NSC. According to a report in the *Liberty Times*, the NSC reportedly issued an order to the naval military command to conduct a feasibility study on Taiwan's capability to develop indigenously built submarines (*China Post*, April 7; *Liberty Times* [Taiwan], April 15).

The *China Post* also reported on April 7 that "[a]t least five top-level defense meetings have been held to evaluate the possibility that the eight underwater warships can be locally assembled." According to the report, the result of the meetings recommended local construction of the submarines, and a final report is being prepared for President Ma's approval, and "Ma is likely to give the green light for the local construction to stimulate the economy and help reduce unemployment" (*China Post*, April 7). The U.S.-based *Defense News* on April 13 cited sources in Taipei as saying that the decision was based on "U.S. reluctance to build diesel submarines and the need to create jobs in Taiwan's economically depressed shipbuilding industry." The report added that "[a]n announcement is expected in August" (*Defense News*, April 13). Presidential Office Spokesperson Wang Yu-chi and aids to top officials in the National Security Council (NSC), however, denied any knowledge of that order (*Apple Daily* [Taiwan], April 15).

Eight diesel submarines were originally included in a 2001 U.S. arms package offer to Taiwan during former President Bush's first term in office, and had been stalled in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan for the past eight years, which was dominated by a KMT-led coalition (*China Brief*, November 24, 2008).

The NSC is currently headed by Secretary General Su Chi, who is the former chairman of the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council. The decree from the NSC reportedly surprised some even in the Taiwanese military (*Liberty Times*, April 15). In an opinion-piece published in 2006, at the height of a heated debate in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (parliament) over the stalled allocation of funds toward Taiwan's purchase of eight diesel submarines from the Untied States, then-KMT Legislator Su Chi penned an article titled "New Thinking on Taiwan's Arms Procurement." In his article, Su argued that Taiwan should devote itself to developing a "defensive" military, rather than an "offensive" military. The previous pro-independence leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration has been accused by the now ruling-KMT (Nationalist Party) of building offensive capabilities that risks provoking China. "Taiwan should boost its defensive capabilities and aim to survive a 'first strike' during a Chinese military attack. It is not necessary to spend huge amounts of money on offensive submarines," Su concluded (*Taipei Times*, January 9, 2006). If the information about the Ma administration's decision turns out to be true, this may signal a major turning point in the long saga of Taiwan's quest for additional submarines.

Wang Keh-hsuan, vice general manager of the CSBC Corporation, the state-owned company formerly known as China Shipbuilding Corporation, confirmed that "[a] research plan is under way to build submarine hulls up to the international standard." Wang said that the CSBC Corporation is fully equipped to build submarines with 2,000 to 3,000 deadweight tons (*China Post*, April 7). The CSBC Corporation established the "Hidden Dragon Program" in July 2001 to demonstrate its technical expertise in building a pressure hull, and the "Indigenous Defense Submarine" program that focused on design options (*Jane's Defense Weekly*, June 30, 2004). "Of course, all weapons and communications systems will have to be purchased from abroad," Wang added. "We are all set to undertake the construction, if it is offered" (*China Post*, April 7).

Mr. L.C. Russell Hsiao is Associate Editor of The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

Beijing's Calculated Response to NK Missile Launch

By Willy Lam

China's soft and quiescent reaction to Pyongyang's Rocket gamesmanship seems to contradict the image of global statesmanship that President Hu Jintao projected at the G20 summit in London earlier this month. And Beijing's last-minute agreement to a UN Security Council chastisement of the Kim Jong-Il regime has hardly suppressed suspicions that for ideological and other reasons, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is still reluctant to handle its trouble-prone neighbor—and staunch ally—with the requisite level of toughness. There are also misgivings that the Hu administration has chosen to treat Pyongyang with kid gloves so that it can play the "North Korean card" in future dealings with United States, Japan and South Korea.

Last weekend, Beijing, together with Moscow, agreed to a watered-down Security Council "presidential statement"—which has less force than a resolution—condemning North Korea for launching the rocket. However, Beijing objected to wording characterizing the gambit as an intercontinental ballistic missile test; it also did not want additional punishments to be meted out to the rogue regime. As a result, the UN document merely called for the tightening of sanctions already applied to North Korea, meaning that the assets of more DPRK institutions would be frozen, and that more goods would be prohibited to be transferred to or from the pariah state. Late last week, China's UN Representative Zhang Yesui reiterated the Chinese Foreign Ministry's stance that world reaction to North Korea's shenanigans must be "cautious and proportionate." "We are now in a very sensitive moment," Ambassador Zhang Yesui said at the UN Headquarters. "All countries concerned should show restraint, and refrain from taking action that could lead to increased tension" (AFP, April 13; *New York Times*, April 12; CNN, April 12).

Within 24 hours of the Security Council statement, Pyongyang announced that it was pulling out of the Six-Party Talks on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a reaction to the UN statement. The Kim regime also said it would "actively consider" resuming its nuclear weapons program, including building a light-water reactor and reprocessing spent fuel rods at an atomic power plant. After Pyongyang's tantrum-throwing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry again appealed for "calm and restraint" from all sides. "We hope all sides will pay attention to the broader picture, exercise calm and restraint and protect progress in the six-party talks," said spokeswoman Jiang Yu (*New York Times*, April 15; Reuters, April 15). This was despite

the fact that Pyongyang's political poker, in addition to Beijing's vacillations over how to handle its problematic ally, has cast the future of the six-year-old Six-Party Talks into serious doubt.

Quite a number of Western analysts have sought to explain Beijing's tolerance for the Kim regime by citing the CCP leadership's declining clout with its neighbor. Moreover, the Chinese government is worried about a sudden influx of refugees into its three northeastern provinces, two of which share boundaries with the DPRK (Reuters, April 6; AFP, April 6). Yet there was evidence that just a little over two years ago, a tough Chinese reaction to North Korean brinkmanship did produce results. After the Kim regime detonated a small nuclear device in October 2006, the Hu-led Politburo departed from protocol by issuing a shrill condemnation of Pyongyang's "brazen" act. Beijing also seconded a no-holds-barred condemnation of Pyongyang issued by the U.N. Security Council. There were also reports that the Chinese leadership threatened to turn off fuel and other supplies to the DPRK. China is Pyongyang's primary source of foreign economic and technological aid, which amounts to an estimated \$200 million a year. Partly as a result of Beijing's hardball tactics, the Kim leadership promised in early 2007 to put a moratorium on its nuclear program. The reclusive 67-year-old Dear Leader also gave indications that North Korea would follow the "China model" of economic development.

There are signs that Beijing's North Korean policy has undergone a marked mutation as of late 2008, when both countries designated 2009 as "China-North Korean Friendship Year." During North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il's visit to China last month—when news about Pyongyang's imminent rocket blast had hit the headlines—Kim (not related to President Kim) was zealously feted by Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao, who affirmed Beijing's comradely ties with the Hermit Kingdom. There is heavy speculation that Dear Leader Kim would pay a visit to China later this year. Last weekend, Hu congratulated Kim's re-election by the North Korean Parliament as chairman of the all-powerful National Defense Commission (NDC) by highlighting China's "profound trust" in its neighbor. "It is the consistent policy of the party and government of China to consolidate and develop the Sino-DPRK good neighborly relations of friendship and cooperation," Hu reportedly said (Xinhua News Agency, April 10; AFP, April 11).

Western analysts on the DPRK have pointed out that a key reason behind Pyongyang's rocket gambit was to test the reaction of the new Obama administration. Yet Beijing has a similar interest in finding out whether a Washington that is preoccupied with financial woes is able to react with

resolve to a challenge in East Asia. In the first few years after 9/11, Hu worked out a kind of quid pro quo with former President Bush: Beijing would help "rein in" Pyongyang in return for Washington's assistance in preventing then-Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian from seeking *de juris* independence. Now that the situation in the Taiwan Strait has stabilized after the electoral defeat last year of Chen's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, Beijing may be demanding other American concessions in return for putting pressure on Pyongyang on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) front (CNN, April 9; *New York Times*, April 6; Xinhua News Agency, April 8).

Equally significantly, Beijing may want to play a kingmaker role in the forthcoming succession drama in the DPRK. Dear Leader Kim, who reportedly suffered a stroke late last year, is said to be anxious about securing Chinese backing for his third son, Kim Jong-un. Like his two older brothers, the Swiss-educated Kim, 26, does not enjoy the backing of Pyongyang's generals. Diplomatic sources in Beijing and Seoul said President Kim hoped to secure Chinese blessings for the continuation of the Kim dynasty. The sources said that at this stage, the Hu leadership was studying two options: supporting the younger Kim, or throwing its weight behind a possible "pro-China military strongman or faction." In the meantime, Beijing wants to improve its ability to influence North Korean politics by not interfering with Pyongyang's "missile diplomacy." That Kim is getting serious about the succession issue was evidenced by his appointment of brother-in-law Jang Song Thaek to the NDC last week. There is intense speculation that the role of Jang, who has been given extra powers the past two years, is to ensure sufficient support for one of Kim's son upon the dictator's demise (*Apple Daily* [Hong Kong], April 9; *Ming Pao* [Hong Kong] April 9; The Associated Press, April 11).

Another reason why the Hu leadership is willing to play ball with Kim is Beijing's apparent perception that the DPRK has finally decided to pursue a more rational and relatively market-oriented economic policy. Trade between China and North Korea jumped 41 percent to \$2.79 billion last year, with most of the surge being increased Chinese exports. Moreover, both state-held and private firms from China have significantly boosted their investments in the Hermit Kingdom. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the Kim team is seriously thinking of reviving plans to turn Sinuiju and the nearby island of Wi Hwa, which are just across the Yalu River to the Chinese city of Dandong, Liaoning Province, into a special economic zone. The Dear Leader discussed the scheme with the ministerial-level Director of the CCP Central Liaison Department Wang Jiarui during the latter's visit to Pyongyang three months ago. And Wang reportedly pledged special Chinese aid for infrastructure-

related projects in this and a couple other proposed zones, including the Chudan Do Island at the mouth of the Yalu River. Seen in this perspective, Beijing might not want heavy Western sanctions against Pyongyang to disrupt the DPRK's inchoate modernization efforts (*Wall Street Journal*, April 8; *Yazhou Zhoubang* (Hong Kong journal), February 22; Korea.net, January 19).

Irrespective of the outcome of Beijing's two-decades-long efforts to persuade its totalitarian neighbor to emulate China's reform and open-door policy, however, the Hu leadership is facing tremendous odds. To prove that the CCP leadership is right in obliging concerned countries to adopt a restrained if not conciliatory policy toward the DPRK, Beijing has to pull out all the stops to corral Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks framework. The Kim regime, however, has given no sign that it is winding down its ambitious WMD development programs. Nor is it likely that Pyongyang will abandon its time-tested, cynical game of extracting economic and other kinds of aid from the U.S., Japan and South Korea by alternating between postures of thuggishness and relative rationality. Niu Jun, an international relations professor at Peking University agrees that Beijing faces a tall order trying to make the DPRK deliver. "China has been working very hard" in dealings with Pyongyang, Niu said. "I hope China doesn't [always] need to work that hard in the future," he said, adding that "China should not make too many promises" to the global community regarding North Korea (*Ming Pao*, April 6; UPI, April 4).

If, as is likely, the Kim regime perseveres with its long-standing stalling tactics at the Six Party Talks, Beijing stands to be accused of backing the pariah state out of considerations that it can brandish the "North Korean card" to wrangle concessions from countries including the United States and Japan. Even more significantly, the exacerbation of the North Korean threat could give Tokyo a good excuse to beef up its military arsenal, in addition to boosting cooperation with the United States in improving their joint missile defense system. A North Korean faux pas will detract from attempts that Beijing has made to bolster its reputation as a responsible stakeholder on the world stage. Worse, Beijing's apparent decision to revive its "lips-and-teeth comradely ties" with its roguish ally could make China suffer guilt by association. This, coupled with the quasi-superpower's enhanced sovereignty disputes with Japan over the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu in China)—and with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal (called the Huang Yan Islet by Beijing)—could threaten Hu's reputation as a peacemaker and a respected elder statesman in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The

Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including *Asiaweek* newsmagazine, *South China Morning Post*, and the *Asia-Pacific Headquarters of CNN*. He is the author of five books on China, including the recently published "Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges." Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Turkey Trot: Military Cooperation between Beijing and Ankara

By Yitzhak Shichor

In the last week of March 2009, Ankara and Beijing may have taken another step toward upgrading their military cooperation. This has become evident during a visit from General Hasan Aksay, commander of the Turkish military academies, who spent three days in China, starting March 24. To be sure, this was not the first Turkish military visit. Since 1985, Turkey has sent 18 military delegations consisting of some 200 members while 14 Chinese military missions with about 330 representatives visited Turkey at the same time (*Today's Zaman*, March 25). These are official figures; the real figures are most likely higher, though confidential. These numbers, however, do not tell the whole story of Sino-Turkish military relations.

Ostensibly, one should not have expected any significant breakthrough in the military relations between China and Turkey since the visitor, commander of military academies, does not rank high enough to initiate such a change or even to deliver such a message. Similarly, General Aksay was hosted by lower ranking Chinese military figures, the Deputy Chief of Staff General Ge Zhengfeng and the President (Commander) of the National Defense University, General Wang Xibing. Still, the visit may be significant, less because of the persons involved and much more because of the circumstances of the developing Sino-Turkish defense relations. Unlike some assertions, these relations by no mean "remain limited to the realm of military personnel exchanges" (*China Brief*, February 21, 2007). Mostly concealed from the public and the media, Beijing-Ankara military collaboration has been substantially expanded over the last fifteen years.

THE LEGACY OF THE KOREAN WAR

This is a significant change considering the fact that the two countries clashed in the Korean War in the early 1950s. Joining the U.N.-led alliance initiated by the United

States, by late November 1950, over 5,000 Turkish troops had already engaged the Chinese “volunteer” forces in violent encounters several times. These clashes inflicted heavy casualties—on both sides. In the battle of Kunu Ri, one of the bloodiest of the entire war, Turkish troops bayoneted 900 Chinese. These initial clashes were followed by repeated violent confrontations up to the armistice on July 27, 1953. Throughout the war, Turkish brigades were pulled out and sent home, only to be replaced by fresh ones. Altogether, over 25,000 Turkish troops fought along U.N. forces in Korea. They suffered 3,277 casualties: 721 dead, 2,147 wounded, 175 missing and 234 captured [1]. General Tahsin Yazıcı, commander of the First Turkish brigade in Korea, referred to the Chinese as “red dwarfs,” cruel and barbaric (*Hürriyet*, December 9, 1951).

As anticipated, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War expedited and consolidated its integration into the Western security system and on October 22, 1951, Turkey was admitted into NATO, becoming an official member on February 18, 1952, while the Korean War was still going on. This confrontation, and Turkey’s admission to NATO, delayed Sino-Turkish relations by nearly twenty years, leaving sediments of mutual hostility for a long time, perhaps to this very day. “In contemporary Turkey, China is still portrayed much less favorably than other countries of East Asia. [...] The Korean War was critical in shaping the long-term relations of China and Turkey” [2]. It had taken another twenty years, from the early 1970s (when diplomatic relations were at long last established) to the early 1990s, until Sino-Turkish relations started to improve.

THE DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY RELATIONS

Sino-Turkish military explorations began in the first half of the 1990s after Ankara’s negotiations with Washington for the joint production and technology transfer of the M-270 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) failed. Washington criticized Ankara for using U.S.-supplied weapons for human rights abuses, subsequently restricting arms and military technology transfers to Turkey, and cutting off grants and loans earlier offered to Turkey for arms acquisitions from the United States. Occasionally, arms embargos and sanctions tend to be counter-productive as they encourage and force the affected countries to develop their military industry independently as well as to look elsewhere for arms and military technology. Turkey was no exception and China was ready [3].

In 1997, Turkey for the first time signed an arms deal with China for the acquisition of 24 WS-1 302mm unguided rockets as well as 144 rockets for assembly in Turkey, to be supplied between 1998 and 2000. Based on Chinese

technology, Turkey began to produce the TR-300 rockets (or T-302, upgraded from to the Chinese four-barrel WS-1B MLRS) under license, Turkish designation *Kasırga* (tornado). It is considered to be more advanced than the Chinese rocket. In late 1998, based on a similar contract signed with CPMIEC (China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation), the Turkish Army ordered some 15 of China’s most advanced short-range SSMs (surface-to-surface missiles), the B-611 and began to license the production of over 200 missiles for over \$300 million. The first missiles were probably deployed as early as 2001. Covered by heavy secrecy and disinformation, the project was called J-600T and the missile, Turkish designation *Yıldırım* (thunderbolt), was reported by Turkey to the *UN Register of Conventional Arms* in March 2007 and was first displayed during a Victory Day parade in Ankara on August 30, 2007. The B-611 had been designed as a replacement of the Chinese DF-11 (M-7 or CSS-7) SRBM. Allegedly developed jointly by Turkey’s TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey), MKEK (Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation) and CASIC (China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation), it is a short-range, ground-based, solid-fuelled ballistic missile system. Its production is undertaken by the Turkish firm Roketsan (Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret, or Missiles [Rockets] Industries and Trade).

Nevertheless, the PRC is a marginal military supplier to Turkey. Excluding the B-611 yet unconfirmed \$300 million deal, the value of the PRC arms transfers to Turkey between 1998 and 2007 is estimated at a meager \$39 million, less than one percent of Turkey’s total arms acquisitions in that period, or about seven percent *including* the deal (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database). In addition, China’s HQ-9 air defense system is among the competitors in the Turkish bid for the supply of advanced surface-to-air missile systems, with potential capabilities against ballistic missiles [4]. It is possible that Roketsan may have received Chinese support in developing its air-to-surface missile *Cirit* (pronounced Jereed: javelin, spear), which derives from the NORINCO-made missile TY-90 (*Tianyan*: Heavenly Swallow) [5]. Yet, Beijing-Ankara military cooperation has not been limited to missiles. Another dimension of it emerged in 2005 when the two countries reportedly upgraded the FNSS ACV (Armored Combat Vehicle)-SW chassis by incorporating a BMP3 turret to it. The Turkish army operates a total of 2,500 upgraded Infantry Fighting Vehicles (or IFVs), which the FNSS firm intended to export (primarily to the United Arab Emirates) [6]. Needless to say, none of these transactions was ever reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which does not indicate *any* military relations between Turkey and China.

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS

In addition, Beijing has been urging Ankara to cooperate in the so-called fight against “terrorism,” namely to restrict, monitor and prevent the activities of Uyghur national organizations and leaders in Turkey. Initially defying China’s pressure, Turkey began to submit to Beijing’s demands in the latter half of the 1990s. A first step in this direction was taken when the Turkish Army Deputy Chief of Staff signed a Sino-Turkish military training and cooperation protocol on May 28, 1999, during his visit to the PRC (*Jane’s Defense Weekly*, June 9, 1999, p. 13). Occasional Uyghur demonstrations and acts of violence against Chinese staying in Turkey had allegedly paved the ground for the first Sino-Turkish security co-operation agreement, signed on February 14, 2000. Among other things, it facilitated public security coordination between the two countries, stressing that hard measures would be taken against separatist activities targeting the territorial integrity of both Turkey (i.e. the Kurds and Cyprus) and the PRC (i.e. Xinjiang and Tibet).

The PRC has been watching its interests closely in Turkey through both military and “diplomatic” channels. The Third Bureau (military attachés) of the PLA General Staff Second Department (dealing with military intelligence) has been operating in Turkey as one of its most important, and presumably one of the most active, stations [7]. Beijing has been engaged not only in collecting political and military intelligence in Turkey, but also in infiltrating Uyghur organizations through moles and sleepers. One of the most serious problems Uyghur organizations face (and not just in Turkey) is how to expose collaborators with China. Uncertainty and suspicions about Uyghur activists—some high-ranking—often cause Eastern Turkestan organizations paralysis and passivity, exactly what Beijing wants.

Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur (and others’) activities abroad have been undertaken not only by its intelligence services but also by the Foreign Ministry in much the same way it monitors the overseas activities of Falun Gong—a spiritual-religious movement that Beijing has targeted since the late 1990s. This has been done through the 610 Office (an arm of the Ministry of State Security) that had operated under the Foreign Ministry’s General Office. Established on June 10, 1999 (hence its name), 610 Offices are an extra-legal police force formed to suppress Falun Gong practitioners not only at home but also abroad. Reacting to human rights critics, on July 6, 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 610 Office was renamed The Department of External Security Affairs (*Shewai anquan shiwu si*, or *guanli si*, literally the Department of Managing Foreign-Related Security). It “aimed at coping with increasing non-traditional security factors” (primarily terrorism) and the

safety of Chinese abroad, as well as “dealing with Eastern Turkistan groups” [8].

The Chinese are also concerned about emerging manifestations (either real or virtual) of Pan-Turkism, a vision recently resuscitated not only in Beijing’s perceptions but also by some Turkish military and political figures. Paradoxically, some of those who promote Pan-Turkism—including a number of Turkish generals—consider China a possible substitute to the United States and the European Union and urge increased collaboration with the East. They represent the so-called “Eurasianist” faction in the armed forces and proclaim ultra-rightists views as well as anti-Islamic attitudes. Erdoğan’s religious government has forced some of them to retire [9]. While enjoying the support and backing of some politicians (among them ex-Maoists), it is nevertheless a marginal group. It seems highly unlikely that Turkey will turn to the PRC as a primary ally. Still, the Turkish “Eurasianists” presumably approve of, or are even instrumental in, forging defense collaboration with China.

Thus, General Hasan Aksay’s recent visit to China should be interpreted within the context of an already existing elaborate military and security cooperation. It is during this visit that China and Turkey agreed to intensify military cooperation that would enable joint military exercises and training and would underwrite defense industrial projects. Meeting his visitor, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, Ge Zhenfeng hailed the smooth development of bilateral Sino-Turkish military relations and friendly exchanges and the “pragmatic cooperation” between the two militaries (*PLA Daily*, March 25).

Yitzhak Shichor, Ph.D., is Professor of East Asian Studies and Political Science at the University of Haifa, and Senior Fellow, the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

NOTES

1. Füsün Türkmen, “Turkey and the Korean War,” *Turkish Studies*, 3:2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 161-180. See also: John M. Vander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36:1 (January 2000), pp. 92-101.
2. Ça da Üngör, “Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives,” *Turkish Studies*, 7:5 (September 2006), pp. 406, 416.
3. The following is based on: *Turkish Armed Forces* (Land Forces Equipment), <http://www.turkishworld.multiservers.com/equipment.html>; *Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems*, <http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jsws/jswsa002>.

html. See also: Utku Çakırözer, “J’ Booster for the Army,” *Milliyet* (Istanbul), January 14, 2002, in *FBIS-CHI*, March 14, 2002; “Chinese Missiles for Turkey,” *Milliyet*, June 2, 2005; “China to Help Turkey Produce Missiles,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), December 21, 1996, in BBC, *SWB*, FE/2802, G/1 (December 23, 1996); “Secret Cooperation with China,” *Star* (Istanbul), April 6, 2005.

4. Anatolia News Agency, August 10, 2008; *Turkish Daily News*, April 29, 2008; John C.K. Daly, “Turkey Ponders Russian Missile Offer,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 5, Issue 140 (July 23, 2008); Andrew McGregor, *Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century* (The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008), p. 17.

5. Prasun K. Sengupta, “Eastern Showcase,” *Force* (New Delhi), May 16, 2008; *Today’s Zaman*, July 16, 2008.

6. “A New Birth of Chinese Version BMP3,” *Kanwa Defense Review* (Hong Kong), May 12, 2005.

7. Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 81. See also *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), October 7, 1998, in *Global Intelligence Update*, October 8, 1998.

8. *People’s Daily*, July 6, 2004; See also the testimony of Chen Yonglin, former diplomat in China’s Consulate in Sydney, in: *Falun Gong and China’s Continuing War on Human Rights*, Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, July 21, 2005 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), pp. 34-36.

9. Ihsan Dagi, “Are the Eurasianists Being Purged?,” *Zaman*, July 21, 2008. See also: Hoonman Peimani, “Turkey Hints at Shifting Alliance,” *Asia Times*, June 19, 2002; Dr. Sait Ba er, “The Strategic Importance of the Ascending East,” *East and West Studies*, August 6, 2007. Most of the “Eurasianists”, including the generals, have been implicated in the Ergenekon group, accused for trying to subvert the Muslim AKP government. On the Ergenekon affair, see: Daniel Steinvorth, “Erkenekon Plot: Massive Trial in Turkey Provides Look into ‘Deep State’.” *Spiegel Online*, January 26, 2009.

Military Parades Demonstrate Chinese Concept of Deterrence

By Dennis J. Blasko

On April 23rd the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy will conduct a “naval parade” in the waters off of Qingdao. This naval review will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PLA Navy and honor in advance the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, which itself will be feted in Beijing on October 1st by another military parade primarily

composed of ground and air units. For those impressed by military hardware, April 23rd should be a memorable day.

Like the Beijing parade, the event in Qingdao aims to promote Chinese national pride in its armed forces. It is intended to display the progress made by the PLA Navy in its on-going modernization. Surely the most advanced ships and aircraft in the Chinese Navy will participate in front of an audience comprised of both Chinese and foreign observers. The two destroyers that took part in the PLA Navy’s first long-distance, extended operational deployment to combat piracy off the Somali coast may be part of the review. Naval units from other countries, as well as senior foreign officers, have been invited to attend and participate.

Unspoken by Beijing during the build up to this event, however, is the parade’s contribution to China’s military strategy. The role of military reviews and foreign visits is openly identified in PLA doctrine as an important component of China’s strategic deterrence posture. Contrary to the notion that China’s strategic intentions are not transparent, the PLA’s multi-level deterrence strategy has been enumerated in numerous military newspaper or journal articles, official publications such as White Papers, and, in particular, in the PLA Academy of Military Science’s textbook, *The Science of Military Strategy*, first published in Chinese in 2001 and then translated into English in 2005 [1].

WHAT IS CHINA’S CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE? [2]

The most recent foreign analysis that mentions China’s deterrence posture focuses on its nuclear deterrence policy (*China Brief*, March 4). In fact, while nuclear deterrence is an important element of China’s deterrence strategy, the PLA’s concept of deterrence is much more expansive.

The Science of Military Strategy defines deterrence as “the military conduct of a state or political group in (1) displaying force or showing the determination to use force (2) to compel the enemy to submit to one’s volition and (3) to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility” (p. 213). Strategic deterrence also “is a major means for attaining the objective of military strategy” (p. 224). By its nature, deterrence seeks to change “the pattern of the opponent’s psychology” (p. 227).

According to *The Science of Military Strategy*, “Warfighting and deterrence are two major functions of the armed forces” (p. 213). Therefore, the mission of the Chinese armed forces is not only to be prepared to fight wars, but also to deter or prevent their outbreak. Specifically, the role of China’s strategic deterrence is “to deter foreign

invasion, defend the sovereignty, rights and interests, and to deter the conspiracies of internal and external rivals for separating and subverting China, so as to protect the stability of national political situation, defend territorial integrity and national unification” (p. 217).

In addition to the military component, non-military factors such as territory size, population, economic strength, political and diplomatic efforts, all of which make up “comprehensive national power,” contribute to strategic deterrence strength.

These concepts have also been explained in Beijing’s series of White Papers on National Defense. For example, the 2008 edition of the White Paper states:

“[China’s military strategic guideline of active defense] lays stress on deterring crises and wars. It works for close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors, strives to foster a favorable security environment, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises, and deter conflicts and wars. It strictly adheres to a position of self-defense, exercises prudence in the use of force, seeks to effectively control war situations, and strives to reduce the risks and costs of war. It calls for the building of a lean and effective deterrent force and the flexible use of different means of deterrence” [3].

Deterrence can be adopted by those in a strategically offensive posture or those on the strategic defensive. The former pursue deterrence for the purpose of compelling the opponent to submit to their demands without going to war, while the latter seek to make the “opponent feel his attack may fail or lead to the loss outweighing the gain” (p. 216-217). China officially adopts a strategic defensive posture in the international arena; concurrently, it is arguable that the Chinese government pursues a strategically offensive form of deterrence toward perceived threats to domestic stability or national unification.

While China’s strategic posture is defensive in nature and seeks to deter conflict, *The Science of Military Strategy* acknowledges the objective of strategic deterrence “is attained by non-fighting means or fighting a small war” to prevent a larger one (p. 213). China’s military doctrine is not passive at the tactical and operational levels of war and the PLA fully understands the decisive nature of the offensive. Even in a strategically defensive posture,

“[t]he strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting

for enemy’s strike passively ... [Striking only after the enemy has struck] doesn’t mean to give up the ‘advantageous chances’ in campaign [operational] or tactical operations, for ‘the first shot’ on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from ‘the first shot’ on the plane of tactics ... if any country or organization violates the other country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the first shot’ on the plane of tactics” (p. 426).

These precepts, which are part of the PLA’s strategic guidelines, are consistent with the “active defense” principles described by Mao Zedong in 1936: “the only real defence is active defence, defence [*sic*] for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive. As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics” [4].

THE ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE

The Science of Military Strategy describes three components necessary for deterrence:

- Possession of “an adequate deterrent force,” a force that is both capable and credible;
- The determination to use that force;
- Communication “between the deterrer and the deterred” to assure that the opponent perceives and believes in the credibility of that force and the will to use it (p. 213-215).

A capable force is the foundation of deterrence. The PLA’s modernization program, particularly the developments over the past 10 years, has resulted in a much more capable force than its predecessor of previous decades. Today, the PLA sees its “core military capability” to be “winning local wars in conditions of informationization” with the secondary goal of conducting military operations other than war [5]. As stated in *The Science of Military Strategy*, “Strategic deterrence is based on warfighting ... The more powerful the warfighting capability, the more effective the deterrence ... those making purely bluffing threats and intimidations hardly can afford deterrence ...” (p. 228).

New equipment is a major part of the PLA’s modernization, but even more important is the quality of its personnel, organization and force structure, training, and logistics. While many improvements in capabilities have been achieved, the PLA recognizes numerous challenges as it continues its modernization process (*China Brief*, July 3).

The willingness to use military capabilities must be communicated and the opponent must comprehend China's capabilities and determination. The deterring side seeks to build "momentum" to convince others of its seriousness: "Demonstrating momentum by showing the disposition of the strength to the enemy is to display clearly one's deterrent force for bringing about psychological pressure on and fear to the opponent and thus force him to submit. Such deterrent forms as large-scale military review, joint military exercise, and military visit, etc., are usually adopted" (p.223).

The naval review in Qingdao and the military parade in Beijing can be seen as demonstrations of momentum attained from military modernization and thus a contribution to China's deterrence strategy. While potentially impressive from a hardware point of view, these activities reveal little about the degree of competence the force has attained to actually employ these weapons according to the PLA's new warfighting doctrine or to sustain them in austere locations far from their home bases.

CHINA'S "INTEGRATED STRATEGIC DETERRENCE" POSTURE

The conventional military weapons and strategic nuclear delivery systems on display off Qingdao and in Beijing in part are directed toward foreign audiences to assert China's ability to defend its borders and protect its sovereignty (including territories in dispute with others). They also are aimed at China's own population to illustrate the fruits of Beijing's investment in the military and at the same time remind "terrorist, separatist and extremist forces" that the Chinese Communist Party and China's armed forces seek to maintain stability and protect the population from chaos.

The Science of Military Strategy states, "China currently has a limited but effective nuclear deterrence and a relatively powerful capability of conventional deterrence and a massive capacity of deterrence of People's War" (p. 222). While its nuclear force seeks to deter nuclear attacks (or blackmail) against China, conventional capabilities are designed to deter, and if necessary defeat, threats to China's "national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity" and safeguard "the interests of national development" [6]. These missions include defense from aggression against the mainland and increasingly are concerned with missions beyond China's borders to protect a wide range of China's development interests.

Article 1 of China's Anti-secession Law extends the deterrence strategy to "the question of Taiwan" by "opposing and checking [i.e. deterrence of] Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of

"Taiwan independence," promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation." Beijing consistently opposes any form of "outside interference" in regard to its objective of peaceful reunification and specifically disputes arms sales or military alliances with the island (p. 445). Numerous warfighting capabilities developed over the past decade are aimed at deterring foreign (i.e. United States) intervention by air or at sea in the vicinity of Taiwan—some of which may be on display in Qingdao and Beijing.

At the same time, the People's Armed Police (a component of the Chinese armed forces, but not part of the PLA) is tasked "to deter and deal with emergencies which endanger public security" [8]. According to the National Defense Law of 1997, both the PLA and militia "may assist in maintaining public order in accordance with the law" [9]. The People's Armed Police routinely works with the civilian Ministry of Public Security police force as the first line of defense in domestic stability.

Finally, *The Science of Military Strategy* predicts "the day of employing deterrence of space force is not far off ..." (p. 217). Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the Academy of Military Science, wrote in 2007 after the Chinese anti-satellite test: "Currently, China does not have a clear space deterrence theory ... China's nuclear deterrence theory and its perspective on the use of nuclear weapons offer important and relevant guidelines The basic necessity to preserve stability through the development of deterrent forces as propounded by Mao and Deng remain valid in the context of space" [10]. Bao acknowledges the "technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill" and concludes "if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries" [11].

Chinese military writings present both a professional and realistic evaluation of their strategic intentions, strategy and general capabilities. A multi-level deterrence posture is an integral element of PLA doctrine. It is likely much of the PLA's new equipment entering the force will be on display in the coming months for both Chinese and foreign eyes to see. What will be less visible is the degree to which the Chinese armed forces have been trained to operate and maintain its new weapons in accordance with a new joint doctrine that it has never executed against a hostile enemy.

Near the end of *The Science of Military Strategy* caution is

recommended: “Therefore, imprudent decision to use force is never permitted.... The reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war.... We may not launch a war in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day” (p. 468). The weapons featured in the parades in Beijing and off of Qingdao need to be assessed in the context of the PLA’s modernization process, its strategy and doctrine, and threat environment.

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006).

NOTES

1. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), *The Science of Military Strategy*, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005. All quotes and page numbers are from the English-language text.

2. Complicating the discussion of deterrence is the use of multiple terms in both English and Chinese to express the same idea. The 2008 White Paper uses three different word combinations for the noun “deterrence” or, as a verb, “to deter” (*ezhi*), to contain, restrain (*weishe*), to intimidate militarily (or terrorize with military force), deter (*shezhi*), a relatively new term that suggests “to stop because of fear.” Other documents use the term *zhizhi*: to check, curb, prevent, stop. English translations may use any or all of these words and often, especially with the word “contain,” the concept of deterrence may be confused or be lost altogether.

3. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” January 2009, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/20/content_10688124.htm.

4. Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936, found at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.

5. “China’s National Defense in 2008.”

6. “China’s National Defense in 2008.”

7. “Full text of Anti-Secession Law,” March 14, 2005, found at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005-03/14/content_158070.htm.

8. “China’s National Defense in 2008.”

9. “PRC Law on National Defense,” March 1997, found at <http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/deflaw97.htm>.

10. Bao Shixiu, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,” *China Security*, Winter 2007, p. 6.

11. Bao, p. 10.

An Assessment of Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review

By Michael M. Tsai

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) of Taiwan released its maiden “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) on March 16. The report was warranted under provision Article 31 in Taiwan’s *National Defense Act*—which was passed in 2008—and conducted by the Integrated Assessment Office of the MND. The report has to be submitted to the Taiwanese parliament (Legislative Yuan) for review within 10 months of each presidential inauguration. The purpose of the QDR is to outline the country’s strategic defense vision for the four-year term of the Taiwanese presidency.

The first publication of the QDR has three major implications for the future of Taiwan’s defense and civil-military relations: Firstly, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s guidance on national defense has been embodied in MND policy planning, thereby solidifying civilian control over the Taiwanese military. Secondly, the QDR consolidates the country’s strategic planning system, since the QDR follows the president’s guidance and provides directions for its defense strategy and military buildup. Finally, the first QDR establishes a four-year periodic review mechanism and institutionalized comprehensive review of major policies by the MND that articulate the vision for future development and reforms of Taiwan’s armed forces.

According to this author’s observation, who served as the former defense minister of Taiwan, the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people’s views toward the country’s national defense strategy rests on the following three principles: First of all, to maintain the peace and security across the Taiwan Strait; two, to safeguard the sovereignty of Taiwan and territorial defense; and three, to protect people’s life and property in Taiwan.

The QDR is based on the core vision of building a professional armed force and maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait—with sound strategic logic for future strategic environment analysis, strategic examination, organizational re-engineering, force planning and resource utilization. The QDR is composed of four chapters: core defense challenges, strategic guidance, defense transformation and joint war-fighting capabilities development.

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The QDR outlines the Ma administration’s plan to institute an all-volunteer force (AVF) by 2014 (based on Chapter

3). China, however, continues to refuse renouncing the use of force to resolve the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan and China. Absent is the assurance from Beijing over the intent of its rapid military modernization, Taiwan's defense planners need to exercise more caution, retain sufficient and effective force capability to insure Taiwan's national security. Taking into consideration the systematic reduction of compulsory military service undertaken by the previous Taiwanese administration, mandatory military service, which has been in place since 1944, is a means for Taiwan to ensure an active force for its defense capability and a level of national alert for contingency planning.

In addition, the QDR's proposal to move toward an AVF warrants further scrutiny on the basis that it requires a massive budget. The transformation may increase Taiwan's defense budget by more than 20 billion NT-dollars (approximately \$600 million), an estimate by a former senior advisor of Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC). If the current administration in Taipei rushes through this proposal to move toward an AVF system, it will put an enormous financial strain on Taiwan's national security structure.

In order to follow the QDR's strategic guidance "*Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence*" (*fangwei gushou, yousiao sizhu*), Taiwan has to strengthen its defense capacity to resist any enemy's attack. In terms of the enforcement of "Effective Deterrence," the QDR indicates that strategic defense is in actual planning and concrete measure for the realization of a "Hard ROC (Republic of China)" defense. The specific strategic objectives are "war prevention," "homeland defense," "contingency response," "conflicts avoidance," and "regional stability" (based on Chapter 2).

In view of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) massive military build-up along its coastal areas across the strait, the author believes that Taiwan needs to set up an effective defense-guided missile system in order to deter the enemy's belligerence, and minimize damages caused by an enemy's attack. In addition, Taiwan has to reorganize its military strength, and improve its systematic fighting capacity of joint operation so as to defend national security and stability in the region.

It is important to point out that Taiwan's QDR is influenced by the main argument of the "Murray Report," which stated, "Taipei can no longer expect to counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy, emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny the People's Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its weapons systems." The

"Murray Report" recommends that Taiwan should forego naval and air superiority, digging in and relying on passive defense by ground forces. Nevertheless, air and maritime forces still play critical roles in the defense of Taiwan. Given the substantial imbalances in the defensive and offensive strengths between Taiwan and China, respectively, effective air and maritime defense capabilities are still a critical deterrent for the self-defense of Taiwan. Accordingly, the "Murray Report" should not be taken as the blueprint of instructing Taiwan's national defense strategy. The government needs to show determination in strengthening Taiwan's overall defense capabilities so that the Taiwanese people can be reassured that a Chinese invasion would be met with an effective Taiwanese counterforce.

MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

The proposal for a military "Confidence Building Mechanism" (CBM) can positively affect cross-strait relations. Yet, for the sake of defending Taiwan's national security, there are several significant conditions to iron out before the two sides sit at the negotiation table.

First of all, China ought to respect the status quo on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, meaning Taiwan's independent sovereignty. In order for meaningful negotiations to take place, China must first dismantle the ballistic missiles deployed along the southeastern coast of China, reducing the possibility of war or any conflicts. The most important gesture is for Beijing to vow not to use military force to solve the Taiwan Strait issue. Only if China is willing to give up its coercive tactics is it possible for the two sides to negotiate with each other on an equal footing.

Secondly, Beijing should be patient while both sides make efforts toward sustainable peace. For example, China should refrain from claiming highly controversial issues related to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan under its so-called "one China" policy, and using coercive means to intimidate Taiwan, such as launching its missiles into Taiwan's coastal seas like during the 1996 and 2000 Taiwan presidential elections. In addition, the increasing overtone of Chinese nationalism and military expansionism is also a cause of great unrest and concern for Taiwan's national security. These are the main current obstacles for developing cross-strait CBMs.

Thirdly, any sort of military CBM across the Taiwan Strait should be supervised by international collective institutions such as the United Nations or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. CBM may include aerial and maritime free passages or a non-military zone over the Taiwan Strait, which requires international collective actions and joint participations by a third party or international organization

to safeguard the enforcement of the agreement resulting from CBM. Relative to the military power of China, Taiwan should be given more assurances to protect national and regional security. Undoubtedly, China may frown upon this proposal, but these reassurances are essential for the sake of maintaining long-term military peaceful coexistence between China and Taiwan.

Last but not least, China should enhance transparency of its national defense policy, including national defense budgets and military exercises. Military transparency plays a crucial role in improving the lack of trust across the Taiwan Strait.

CONCLUSION

The world has changed considerably and the trend toward collective cooperation in international security offers new inspiration for a new way forward in cross-Strait dialogue. Yet the most difficult problem remains ahead in dealing with the growing imbalances between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, especially as China is rising as both a global economic and military power.

The first ever published QDR by Taiwan's MND may be considered by many scholars and military experts as progressive and innovative in its strategic and military planning and build-up. These estimates, however, tend to underestimate the PLA's rapid military modernization and intention, and fail to consider possible military actions against Taiwan if political negotiations are unable to reach an agreement for peaceful coexistence across the Taiwan Strait. Although military CBM's may help to bring China and Taiwan into better, friendlier relations, any military CBMs or political negotiations should be based on Taiwan's strengths and international collective participation so as to ensure peace and security for Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region.

Michael M. Tsai, Ph.D., served in the government of Taiwan as the minister of national defense, deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council and deputy representative to the United States. Dr. Tsai is currently the chairman of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies.

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