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Chinese soldier in front of Mao statue

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For comments or questions about *China Brief*, please contact us at pubs@jamestown.org

1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 483-8888
Fax: (202) 483-8337

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In a Fortnight

By L.C. Russell Hsiao

CHINA'S FIFTH-GENERATION FIGHTERS AND THE CHANGING STRATEGIC BALANCE

On November 9, General He Weirong, deputy commander of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), confirmed long-standing speculations that the PLAAF is developing fifth-generation fighters (fourth-generation in Chinese standard), which may be in service within 8 to 10 years, and certainly by 2020. During an interview with state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) two days ahead of the 60th anniversary of the PLAAF on November 11, Deputy Commander He announced that the next-generation fighter would soon undergo its first flight, closely followed by flight trials (Xinhua News Agency, November 9). The senior military officer's disclosure reflects the considerable progress that the PLAAF has made in force modernization, which has exceeded Western expectations in terms of the pace of development and the capabilities of its defense industrial base. While China remains several steps behind the United States in operationalizing its advanced fighter jets, the PLA's rapid military modernization has raised concerns among U.S. allies in the region that the military balance is beginning to tilt toward China's favor.

In an interview with *Global Times*, PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang stated, "superiority in space and in air would mean, to a certain extent, superiority over the land and the oceans" (*Global Times*, November 2), thereby highlighting the PLAAF's position in Chinese military planning. At an event commemorating the PLAAF's 60th anniversary, President Hu Jintao heralded a "new chapter" in the development of the PLAAF (*Global Times*, November 10).

China's fifth-generation fighters will reportedly have 4S capabilities: stealth, super cruise, super maneuverability and short take-off. According to Air Force Colonel Dai Xu, "its most striking characteristic is the capability of invisibility, which also could be called low detectability" (*Global Times*, November 10). The U.S. F-22 Raptor serves as the gold standard of fifth-generation fighters, which is currently the only fifth-generation fighter in service among all the world's armed forces. According to General He's interview, Chengdu Aircraft, the country's leading fighter manufacturer, is reportedly developing the fighter with Shenyang Aircraft (Xinhua News Agency, November 9).

General He's startling revelation that the next-generation fighter may be in service by 2020 stands in stark contrast to the Chinese habit of closely guarding its military capabilities, yet consistent with a recent trend that reflects the Chinese Armed Force's growing confidence in its military strength. During an interview with the official Xinhua News Agency back in September, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie proclaimed that, "Our [China's] capabilities in waging defensive combat under modern conditions have taken a quantum leap ... It could be said that China has basically all the kinds of equipment possessed by Western countries, much of which reaches or approaches advanced world standards" (Xinhua News Agency, September 21),

Indeed, an ongoing survey conducted by *Global Times* among its Chinese users revealed some telling observations about how they perceive China's security environment and PLA airpower. The short four-question survey asks the respondents questions ranging from where they think the biggest security threat to China in the future will come from to how they rate China's airpower and what type of air force should be developed in the future. The first question, which asks how respondents view China's security environment, 46 percent of the 9,335 who answered said that they think the biggest security threat to China comes from the sea, while 43 percent responded that it is airborne. The second question asked respondents to rate China's air force, and 50.8 percent rated the Chinese Air Force as average, while 44.9 percent rated it as weak. The third question asked respondents what kind of airforce China should develop, and an overwhelming majority, 75.3 percent, responded that China ought to develop a strategic air force capable of covering the entire globe. The final question asks respondents where China should place its emphasis with regard to air force development, and the majority—47.6 percent—responded that China's air force should develop a space-based combat unit (satellites, space weapons, etc.), while 21.3 percent responded that China's emphasis should be placed on developing large airlift platforms (strategic bombers and cargo aircraft, etc.) (Survey.huanqiu.com, November 17).

In light of China's rapid air force modernization, Japan is increasingly concerned about Chinese regional air superiority. A Kyodo News report cited by the *Global Times* quoted Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canada-based *Kanwa Defense Review Monthly*, as saying that the PLAAF currently has 280 J-11s, whose combat performance is comparable to Japan's Air Self Defense Forces' 200 F-15s, and 140 J-10s, which are a match for the F-16s. According to a Japanese military source, "even though [Japan] has a disadvantage in numbers at the moment, but combined with its airborne early warning and control system Japan can win in terms of quality." Yet, the source cautioned that, "once China deploys its AEWC [KJ-2000, which were on display at the October 1 National Day Parade] ... Japan's air superiority will gradually diminish" (*China Daily*, November 11; *Global Times*, November 12).

Mr. L.C. Russell Hsiao is Associate Editor of The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

The CCP's Disturbing Revival of Maoism

By Willy Lam

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership tries to convince President Barack Obama and other world leaders that China is eagerly integrating itself with the global marketplace, the ultra-conservative norms and worldview of Chairman Mao Zedong are making a big comeback in public life. In provinces and cities that foreign dignitaries are unlikely to visit, vintage Cultural Revolution-era totems are proliferating. In Chongqing, a mega-city of 32 million people in western China, Mao sculptures—which were feverishly demolished soon after the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping catalyzed the reform era in 1978—are being erected throughout government offices, factories and universities. A newly constructed seven-story statue of the demigod in Chongqing's college district dwarfed nearby halls, libraries and classroom buildings. Not far from the Helmsman's birthplace in Juzhizhou village, Hunan Province, the latest tourist attraction is a sky-scraping, 32-meter torso of the young Mao. Moreover, the long-forgotten slogan "Long Live Mao Zedong Thought" has been resuscitated after banners bearing this battle cry were held high by college students and nationalistic Beijing residents during parades in Tiananmen Square that marked the 60th birthday of the People's Republic (*Globaltimes.com* [Beijing], November 2; China News Service, October 30; *People's Daily*, October 2).

There are at least three dimensions to Maoism's resurgence

in China. One is simply a celebration of national pride. Given the fact that the Helmsman's successors ranging from Deng to President Hu Jintao have imposed a blackout on public discussion about the great famine and other atrocities of the Mao era, most Chinese remember Mao as the larger-than-life founder of the Republic and the "pride of the Chinese race." The contributions of Mao were played up in this year's blockbuster movie *Lofty Ambitions of Founding a Republic*, which was specially commissioned by party authorities. Thus, Central Party School theorist Li Junru, who gained fame for his exposition of Deng's reform programs, recently characterized Mao as a titan who "led the Chinese people in their struggle against the reactionary rule of imperialism and feudalism, so that the Chinese race [could] stand tall among the people of the world." Moreover, according to conservative theoretician Peng Xiaoguang, the enduring enthusiasm for Mao Zedong Thought particularly among the young testified to the intelligentsia's search for an "ultimate faith" that could speed up China's rise particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis (*People's Daily*, October 23; Wyzsxs.com [Beijing], November 4).

The other two dimensions of the Maoist revival portend struggles and changes within the CCP; it is emblematic of the CCP's shift to the left, as well as the intensification of political infighting among the party's disparate factions (in China, "leftism" denotes doctrinaire socialist values, emphasis on the party's monopoly on power, and a move away from the free-market precepts). It is well known that since the Tibet riots in March 2008, the CCP leadership has tightened the noose around the nation's dissidents as well as NGO activists. Yet in the wake of the international financial meltdown, economic policy has also displayed anti-market tendencies, if not also a re-assumption of values such as state guidance of the economy, which were observed during the long reign of the revered chairman. This is evidenced by the phenomenon called *guojin mintui*, or state-controlled enterprises advancing at the expense of the private sector. In areas ranging from coal and steel to transportation, state-controlled firms are swallowing up private companies. Moreover, government-run outfits are the major beneficiaries of the \$585 billion stimulus package announced late last year, as well as the \$1.1 trillion worth of loans extended by Chinese banks in the first three quarters of the year (Xinhua News Agency, November 12; *Washington Times*, October 29; Maoflag.net [Beijing], November 15).

Even more significant is the fact that a number of party cadres are invoking Maoist values including radical egalitarianism when formulating public policies. While Mao was said to have ushered in the new China by pulling down the "three big mountains" of feudalism, bureaucratic

capitalism and imperialism, his latter-day followers are engaged in an equally epic struggle against the "three new mountains," a reference to runaway prices in the medical, education and housing sectors. Nowhere is this ethos more pronounced than in Chongqing, whose leadership has vowed to develop so-called "red GDP" (*Yazhou Zhoukan* [Hong Kong], November 15; *The Age* [Melbourne], October 17). This is a codeword for economic development that is geared toward the needs of the masses—and not dictated by the greed of privileged classes such as the country's estimated 30 million millionaires. For example, while real estate prices in cities ranging from Shanghai and Shenzhen are sharply increasing, Chongqing cadres have pledged to ensure that at least one third of all apartments in the metropolis are affordable to workers and farmers (*Chongqing Daily*, November 8; House.focus.cn [Beijing], November 9). Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai has indicated that the key to the CCP maintaining its perennial ruling-party status is "whether it is tightly linked with the people and the masses." "Chairman Mao put it best: we must serve the people with all our hearts and minds," Bo noted. "The party will become impregnable if cadres from top to bottom are tightly bonded with the masses" (*People's Daily*, November 10).

As with most political trends in China, the resuscitation of Maoist norms is related to factional intrigue. Jockeying for position between two major CCP cliques—the so-called Gang of Princelings and the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction—has intensified in the run-up to the 18th CCP Congress. At this critical conclave slated for 2012, the Fourth-Generation leadership under President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao is due to yield power to the Fifth-Generation, or cadres born in the 1950s. Bo and Vice-President Xi Jinping, two prominent Politburo members who also happen to be "princelings," or the offspring of party elders, are among the most high-profile architects of the Maoist revival. Implicit in the princelings' re-hoisting of the Maoist flag is a veiled critique of the policies undertaken by Hu and his CYL Faction, which have exacerbated the polarization of rich and poor and even led to the betrayal of socialist China's spiritual heirlooms (*Apple Daily* [Hong Kong], November 12; *Ming Pao* [Hong Kong], October 26).

Bo is the son of party elder Bo Yibo, who was dubbed one of the CCP's "eight immortals." As former minister of commerce and governor of the northeastern Liaoning Province, Bo was often praised by multinational executives for his generally progressive views on globalization. Yet after moving to Chongqing in late 2007, the charismatic regional "warlord" has launched numerous campaigns to popularize Maoist quotations, doctrines and even Cultural Revolution-style "revolutionary operas." In less than two

years, Bo cited the Helmsman's instructions in at least 30 public speeches. The 60-year-old princeling has also asked his assistants to text message sayings by Mao to the city's Netizens. Bo's favorite Mao quotations include: "The world is ours; we must all take part in running [public] affairs"; "Human beings need to have [a revolutionary] spirit"; "The world belongs to young people. They are like the sun at eight or nine in the morning"; and "Once the political line has been settled, [the quality of] cadres is the deciding factor" (*People's Daily*, October 28; *Chongqing Daily*, July 19).

Vice-President Xi Jinping, the son of the late vice-premier Xi Zhongxun, is also a keen follower of the Great Helmsman. The 56-year-old Xi, who doubles as president of the Central Party School, likes to sprinkle his homilies to students of the elite cadre-training institution with Mao's words of wisdom. Xi's repeated emphasis on grooming neophytes who are "both politically upright and professionally competent" echoes Mao's dictum on picking officials who are "both red and expert". While talking about "party construction," or ways to ensure the ideological purity of CCP cells, Xi noted that the leadership must learn from the "great party-construction engineering project that was successfully pioneered by the First-Generation leadership with comrade Mao Zedong as its core" (Xinhua News Agency, September 8; *People's Daily*, September 10). When he is touring the provinces, Xi likes to celebrate "proletariat paragons" first lionized by Chairman Mao. While inspecting the Daqing Oilfield in Heilongjiang Province last September, the vice-president eulogized the "spirit of the Iron Man of Daqing," a reference to the well-nigh super-human exploits of Wang Jinxi, the legendary oilfield worker. Xi has also heaped praise on "heroes of the masses" such as the self-sacrificing fireman Lei Feng and the altruistic county party secretary Jiao Yulu (*People's Daily*, September 23; *Henan Daily*, July 4).

It is easy to see why princelings should take full advantage of their illustrious lineage. As the famous Chinese proverb goes: "He who has won heaven and earth has the right to be their rulers." This was the basis of the "revolutionary legitimacy" of the First- and Second-Generation leadership under Mao and Deng respectively. As the sons and daughters of Long March veterans, princelings regard their "revolutionary bloodline" as a prime political resource. Thus, while visiting the "revolutionary mecca" of Jinggangshan in Jiangxi Province last year, Xi paid homage to the "countless martyrs of the revolution who used their blood and lives to win over this country." "They laid a strong foundation for the good livelihood [we are enjoying]," he said. "Under no circumstances can we forsake this tradition." Similarly, while marking the October 1 National Day last year, Bo urged Chongqing's cadres "to

forever bear in mind the ideals and hot-blooded [devotion] of our elders." "Forsaking [their revolutionary tradition] is tantamount to betrayal," Bo instructed. (*People's Daily*, October 16, 2008; *Chongqing Daily*, October 2).

By contrast, affiliates of President Hu's CYL Faction—most of whom are career party apparatchiks from relatively humble backgrounds—cannot aspire to the kind of halo effect that the likes of Bo or Xi appear to have inherited from their renowned forebears. Even as China's global prestige has been substantially enhanced by its "economic miracle," party authorities have repeatedly called upon all members to *ju'an siwei*, that is, to "be wary of risks and emergencies at a time of stability and plenty." In addition, princelings, who are deemed to have benefited from the revolutionary—and politically correct—genes of the Long March generation, seem to be the safest choices to shepherd the party and country down the road of Chinese-style socialism under new historical circumstances. Moreover, while the Hu-Wen team has staked its reputation on goals such as "putting people first" and extending the social security net to the great majority of Chinese, it cannot be denied that negative phenomena such as social injustice and exploitation of disadvantaged classes have increased since the turn of the century.

The reinvigoration of Maoist standards, then, could prove to be the biggest challenge to unity within the Hu-Wen administration. Steering the ship of state to the left might temporarily enable the Hu leadership to garner the support of advocates of 1950s-style egalitarianism—and blunt the putsch for power spearheaded by Bo, Xi and other princelings. Yet, turning back the clock could deal a body blow to economic as well as political reform—and render China less qualified than ever for a place at the head table of the global community.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China Morning Post, and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the recently published "Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges." Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity

By Lyle J. Goldstein

Issues related to so-called non-traditional security have been inadequately explored in the context of rapid Chinese maritime development. If Chinese perceptions toward coastal management, port security, narco-trafficking, coastal environmental protection, response to hazardous spills at sea, typhoon preparation, as well as search and rescue are poorly understood outside of China, then cooperation among the maritime powers of East Asia will likely remain underdeveloped, which may have negative consequences for regional security [1]. This report briefly surveys the accelerating development of China's maritime enforcement and management capabilities, and also examines the attendant strategic implications for U.S. interests, including the importance of continuing and even accelerating nascent coast guard cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The manifold challenges confronting China's maritime enforcement and management capabilities are amply evident to Chinese maritime analysts themselves. These capacities are viewed as being disproportionately small given the scale of China's maritime development. Faculty at the Ningbo China Coast Guard Academy wrote in a 2006 study (hereafter referred to as the "Ningbo Academy Study"): "Our current maritime law enforcement forces ... are not commensurate with our status and image as a great power." These authors elaborate as follows: "Currently, among maritime enforcement ships, the vast majority consists of small patrol boats of less than 500 tons, and the number of ship-borne helicopters is such that these forces cannot meet the requirements of comprehensive maritime law enforcement" [2].

By contrast, other Pacific powers, and especially the United States and Japan, wield strong and efficient coast guards. This unfavorable comparison is well documented and understood among Chinese maritime analysts [3]. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is equipped with 250 aircraft of different types, while the Japanese Coast Guard has about 75. With much less developed aviation forces, Chinese coast guard entities probably field fewer than three dozen aircraft of all types [4]. Aircraft are crucial for both long-range patrol, on the one hand, and complicated rescues, on the other. These numbers are reflective of the large gap that separates China from these other major Pacific coast guard forces.

FIVE DRAGONS STIRRING UP THE SEA

At least five major agencies currently have a hand in China's maritime enforcement policy. Of these, the "China Coast Guard" is neither the largest, nor the most prestigious of the "five dragons stirring up the sea." The China Coast Guard, known as the *Haijing* (Maritime Police), however, is at least for now the only maritime enforcement agency in China that operates ships that are visibly armed. In addition to fast patrol boats apparently capable of speeds up to 52 knots, the Maritime Police are also reportedly deploying small (type 218) and large (type 718) cutters (coast guard vessels). The latter design displaces 1,500 tons and is about 100 meters (328 feet) in length and has a 37mm deck gun. The Maritime Police also recently took over two reconfigured Jianghu-class frigates from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), but this service does not yet appear to wield aviation assets [5]. With the crime-fighting mission as its primary duty, the Maritime Police are also concerned with piracy and the threat of terrorism. During the 2008 Olympic Games, the Maritime Police apparently sortied 30 ships each day and stopped or detained over 1,000 vessels in support of security at the games [6].

Two additional agencies are at least as influential in maritime governance as the Maritime Police. These are the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of the Ministry of Transport and the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The relative prestige of these agencies is demonstrated by the faster pace at which these agencies have each been deploying new patrol cutters and the fact that each already wields nascent fixed wing and helicopter aviation forces [7]. In terms of manpower, MSA exceeds any of the other maritime enforcement agencies with over 20,000 personnel, reflecting both the power of China's commercial maritime interests generally, and the range of missions—from certifying seafarers to maintaining aids to navigation—that MSA oversees. Indeed, the transport ministry wields considerable influence in formulating China's maritime policies; for instance, this ministry rather than the defense ministry appears to have been the major impetus pushing for the recent and unprecedented naval deployments to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden [8].

Since the 1999 Dashun ferry disaster in which 304 passengers perished in daylight a few miles offshore in the Yellow Sea, dramatic improvements have been made in maritime search and rescue with the near term goal of reducing rescue time within 50 miles of the coast to under 150 minutes (Xinhua News Agency, February 12, 2003). With special assistance from Hong Kong's airborne patrol and rescue service, MSA has established numerous flying

bases along the coast and has begun to make heliborne rescues at sea beginning in 2006. A number of new large cutters have been added recently, including very large salvage vessels with advanced systems such as variable pitch propellers. The most recent large cutter (114 meters in length) to join the extensive MSA fleet was *Haixun 11*, commissioned at Weihai in September 2009.

The CMS has the primary mission of patrolling China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as defined by the Law of the Sea Convention—which extends 200 nautical miles from the state's coast—and preventing environmental abuse along China's extensive coastline. A 2008 report featured in the official *China Daily* revealed that CMS had a total of nine aircraft and more than 200 patrol vessels (*China Daily*, October 21). Of late, CMS has received at least three new large cutters including *Haijian 46*, *Haijian 51* and *Haijian 83* [9]. Since 2006, CMS has significantly stepped up patrols in both the East China Sea and also the southern part of the South China Sea. In October 2008, CMS Deputy Director Sun Shuxian declared that, "The [CMS] force will be upgraded to a reserve unit under the navy, a move which will make it better armed during patrols ... the current defensive strength of CMS is inadequate" (*China Daily*, October 20, 2008). Aside from CMS, SOA also undertakes considerable oceanographic research, overseeing China's arctic research program, for example (see Joseph Spears, "China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon," *China Brief* Volume: 9 Issue: 6, March 18).

While a number of other agencies are also involved in maritime management, an additional major actor is the anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, which among other missions works with the Public Security Ministry against the proliferating illegal drug trade. According to one report, maritime narco-trafficking may be a significant challenge in China, which only seems logical given the lengthy coastline and wide variety of entry ports [10]. Finally, there is the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), which has seen fewer investments over the last decade than the other aforementioned agencies, but has been promised more resources to remedy the difficult situation prevailing in China's coastal fisheries (See Lyle Goldstein, "Strategic Implications of Chinese Fisheries Development," *China Brief* Volume: 9 Issue: 16, August 5).

The aggregate force of these five maritime enforcement 'dragons' represents substantial Chinese capabilities, yet serious issues of coordination and rationalization in this balkanized bureaucratic structure remain. Among maritime enforcement entities, it is natural and proper to consider how roles, missions and resources are allocated

between coast guard forces, on the one hand, and navies on the other. Sea power theorist Geoffrey Till explains that overlap is inevitable and logical, but that there is a spectrum of coast guard models that all entail a different kind of relationship with national navies. Till additionally observes: "With the widening of the concept of security, accelerated perhaps by the events of September 11, the extent of potential overlap is increasing in ways which raise issues over who should be responsible for what." While bifurcation of coast guard and navy functions is a relatively new concept in the Chinese context, it is apparent that Chinese maritime strategists understand that many coast guards regularly undertake national security functions. Indeed, one Chinese expert from China's National Defense University suggested in June 2009 that large Chinese coast guard cutters could be easily converted for use in far seas combat, while small and medium-sized coast guard vessels could support *coastal defense, undertaking such missions as laying defensive minefields* (*Global Times* [China], June 21). Further evidence suggests that the PLA will support a strengthened Chinese coast guard, because of the high priority Beijing now places on effectively managing its EEZ, in addition to the perception that China has been disadvantaged by falling far behind other regional actors in this middle domain of maritime power [11].

Despite visible improvements over the last decade, China's maritime enforcement capacities remain relatively weak compared to the other major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Some notions to explain this condition are derived from variants of political modernization, economic development as well as bureaucratic politics theories. For example, research by Richard Suttmeier helps to shed light on how the Chinese are reappraising the issues of safety and risk in the present era. After appraising China's strong record in improving civil aviation safety, he concludes that "... the wealth and power expected from 'modernization' have long been seen in China—and elsewhere—as risk-reducing, safety-enhancing developments ...". Wealth and education can bring about China's "sixth modernization"—enabling Beijing "to manage environmental and technological risk." Suttmeier does ask the provocative question of whether the "sixth modernization" can proceed without further political liberalization that would support "transparency in China's risk management strategies" by empowering "activist civil organizations that have autonomy and ... resources" [12]. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that there are powerful corporate entities in China demanding the orderly management of ports and the safe, reliable passage of ships and the goods they carry. From this perspective, coast guard improvements may be seen as one form of new insurance for the massive investments made in China's maritime trade. Of course, another basic explanation for China's relative weakness in this area is

that it still lacks a single, powerful coast guard to oversee all maritime enforcement and management functions. Nevertheless, it should still be said that China has made very considerable progress over a short period, so that this period of weakness is rapidly receding into the past.

A PROVEN RECORD OF RESULTS IN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

Coast guards are uniquely positioned to lead in further developing a cooperative maritime security agenda. Indeed, while navy-to-navy contact regrettably remains quite limited, coast guard cooperation has blossomed between the United States and China. This has involved, for example, the regular exchange of inspectors and security specialists to one another's key ports—no doubt a step in the direction of transparency and building trust. The U.S. Coast Guard has developed an innovative solution to enforcing the U.N. prohibition against driftnet fishing by taking Chinese shipriders aboard USCG cutters to patrol the vast expanses of the North Pacific. These shipriders of the China FLEC have the authority to search and seize Chinese violators. The global environmental crisis demands more such examples of creative environmental cooperation between Washington and Beijing and this case should be studied carefully. Examples that are even more concrete include major, complex rescues requiring the collaboration of maritime forces from both the United States and China. This occurred in July 2007 when 13 Chinese sailors were pulled from the water after the merchant vessel *Haitong 7* sank in a typhoon 300 miles northwest of Guam. In addition, Chinese students have been attending summer courses at the USCG Academy for a few years. A vital reason for the success of the USCG in building relationships with several of China's maritime enforcement and management agencies has been the consistently high level of commitment from the USCG leadership, as demonstrated most recently by Commandant Thad Allen's visit to China during the summer of 2009. Most recently, a large USCG cutter visited Shanghai in early November for a joint search and rescue exercise, while during the same period a team of Chinese scientists embarked briefly on a USCG icebreaker off Alaska to retrieve scientific data. With limited resources, the USCG cannot devote much effort to international outreach and cooperation. Yet, the effort that has been extended to date is building a vital layer of the nascent foundation for maritime security cooperation in the Western Pacific and is therefore critically important to American strategy in the region.

China's coast guard entities are rapidly expanding their capabilities and proficiency. The results are amply evident in the many rescues of both Chinese and also foreign nationals now occurring in the crowded sea lanes

proximate to the Chinese coast. Whether or not Beijing opts to unify its many maritime agencies in a single powerful coast guard, the increasing strength of China's maritime enforcement capacities may well result in a more robust posture with respect to various maritime sovereignty and resources disputes. The role of some of these agencies in the March 2009 incident with the USNS *Impeccable* may hint at this new bearing and also to the certainty that many challenges still lie ahead for establishing enhanced regional maritime cooperation. A more subtle but no less significant implication will be China's much higher profile in oceans policy and maritime management issues in various significant regions, from Southeast Asia reaching across the Indian Ocean to Africa. Nevertheless, there are some rather encouraging signs that China's coast guard entities will take a sophisticated view of maritime security. The Ningbo Academy study authors, for example, reiterate this highly significant point: "Naturally, in the course of the struggle for national interests, contradictions are inevitable. The real question is what means are used to settle these disputes. Giving full play to the government's capabilities, deploying the navy cautiously and strenuously trying to limit the conflict's scope to among the civil maritime authorities, can avoid a resort to escalation of the crisis" [13]. Such reasoning among Chinese maritime strategists strongly suggests that China's emergence as a "responsible maritime stakeholder" in the 21st century is feasible if the current momentum for regional and global maritime security is adequately supported and even accelerated.

Lyle J. Goldstein, Ph.D., is Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI.

NOTES

1. A laudable effort to understand China's approach to nontraditional security issues is Susan L. Craig, *Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2007). Yet, this effort does not discuss the Chinese coast guard or maritime security issues generally.
2. He Zhonglong et al., *Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard*, pp. 69, 145. Original in Chinese.
3. See, for example, Bai Junfeng, *Conception Regarding the Building of China's Maritime Police*, *Maritime Management* (March 2006), p. 35.
4. Author's estimate drawn primarily from interviews in Beijing and Qingdao in 2006-07.
5. This information is mostly derived from Chen Guangwen, *China's Coast Guard Capabilities*, *Ordinance Knowledge* (May 2009), pp. 50-51.
6. Author's interviews in Beijing, April 2009.
7. See, for example, Sun Xuxian, *China Maritime*

Surveillance: Protecting the Nation's Oceanic Interests, China National Defense Report, May 5, 2008, p. 21.

8. "Head of International Cooperation Department of Ministry of Transportation Reveals Origins of Decision on Naval Escort," *Sanlian Life Weekly*, January 16, 2009. Prof. Nan Li of Naval War College has identified this source and noted the importance of this information.

9. Chen Guangwen, China's Coast Guard Capabilities, *Ordinance Knowledge*, May 2009, pp. 51-52.

10. Lu Wenhui and Ye Xinhui, Research on the Platforms Used in the Xiamen City Illegal Drug Problem, *Fujian Police Senior Academy Journal* (March 2007), p. 12.

11. Sun Jingping, Notes on Maritime Security Strategy in the New Period for the New Century, *China Military Science* (June 2008), pp. 77-78.

12. Richard Suttmeier, "China, Safety, and the Management of Risks," *Asia Policy* 6 (July 2008), p.131, 133, 143.

13. He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 15.

The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance

By York W. Chen

On October 19, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the *National Defense Report 2009*. This is the first *NDR* issued by President Ma Ying-jeou's administration since it won the March 2008 presidential election. Under the sanction of the *National Defense Act*, Taiwan's MND has published the *NDR* biannually since 1992 and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* since March 2009. The *NDR* and *QDR* are the most important policy documents published by the MND as they are the only open sources available for understanding Taiwan's evolving military strategy [1].

Neither President Ma's original vision of a "Hard ROC (Republic of China)," a military strategy that was first articulated during the 2008 presidential campaign, nor his predecessor's "Decisive Campaign Outside the Territory," were assimilated in the *NDR* without some resistance and modification. A careful reader of Taiwan's military strategy should pay attention to these implications. Even a slight alteration in the word order, as the author will deliberate in the following sections, such as *Fang Wei Gu Shou, You Siao He Zu* (resolute defense and effective deterrence, 1996-2000; 2008-present) and *You Siao He Zu, Fang Wei Gu Shou* (effective deterrence and resolute defense, 2000-2008) represent major conceptual differences in Taiwanese

military strategy.

Akin to the previous Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration under Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) administration came into office with the belief that their predecessor had made critical mistakes in military strategy with regard to the defense of Taiwan. The newcomers, eager to encode their new ideas into military strategy, set forth to change the directives of the previous administration within the *QDR* and the *NDR*. Thus, both documents provide a good point of reference for understanding different doctrinal preferences between the DPP and the KMT.

While the current civilian executives are pushing to change Taiwan's military strategy, the military establishment appears to be pushing back—preferring to maintain consistency in military strategy and reduce uncertainties over existing plans and programs. After all, the military views the business of military strategy as better left in the hands of professionals. The extensive internal edits and reviews that are built into the standard protocols for formulating these high-level policy documents reflect a consensus among the different services. As a result, the *NDR* and the *QDR* may be seen as the product of a political tug-of-war between civilian and military authorities.

FROM OFFENSIVE DEFENSE, FORWARD DEFENSE, TO DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH (1949-2000)

From 1949 to 2000, Taiwan's military strategy underwent three stages of evolution. In the beginning, the military's overall goal under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was to retake Mainland China by force; however, Chiang did not have the military capabilities to carry out such a military adventure nor complete U.S. support. As a result, Taiwan's military strategy at the time was an "Offensive Defense" strategy (1949-1966), which was executed by increasing military presence on Taiwan-controlled offshore islands and conducting frequent raids on China's coastal area.

In the mid-1960s, Chiang abandoned the plan to use military force in retaking the Mainland after the United States repeatedly rejected his proposal. The raids along China's coastline gradually ceased. No military engagement occurred between both sides since the naval battle off Wu Chiou Island in 1965. Instead, Taiwan concentrated on fortifying its offshore islands and, at its peak, increased the force level to 170,000 troops on the tiny outposts. This was the era of "Forward Defense" (1966-1979).

For Taiwanese military planners, the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan following the break of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United

States in 1979 implied that they would need to take over completely the responsibilities of rearguard (the defense of Taiwan). In so doing, the first division-level redeployment from Kimmen Island to Taiwan took place in 1983 and marked the beginning of a continuous troop reduction on its offshore islands. Taiwan's military strategy thus entered the stage of "Defense-in-Depth" (1979-2000), which was heavily influenced by Army General Hau Pei-tsun's (as Chief of the General Staff during 1981-1989) operational concept of "Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge."

The tactical depth that Hau proposed encompasses a three-layered defense:

- 1) to check the enemy on his shore,
- 2) to strike the enemy in transit, and
- 3) to destroy the enemy on Taiwan's beachhead.

Yet Hau argued that there was no hope for Taiwanese forces to sustain its command of air and sea power over the Taiwan Strait. In addition, according to Hau's concepts, China could not conquer Taiwan without first landing on Taiwan and in doing so would suffer great casualties when trying to defeat Taiwan's ground forces. That, according to Hau, would deter China from invading Taiwan or, at least, buy sufficient time for U.S. intervention. Thus, Hau argues that to maintain "strategic sustainability," Taiwan's air and naval assets should avoid being committed in full strength during the initial stages of the campaign. All forces should be preserved in order to concentrate on the decisive campaign of engaging the enemy at the water's edge [2].

All of Taiwan's *NDRs* prior to 2000 adopted Hau's concepts. In *NDR 1996*, the MND first introduced "resolute defense and effective deterrence" as the overarching principles of Taiwan's national military strategy. It stated:

Based upon the guidance of "strategic sustainability and tactical decisiveness," our strategy is to fight the enemy vehemently with coordinated manpower and firepower, to let the enemy pay the unbearable price as to deter the enemy from invasion and ensure our national security. Should the enemy dare to land, we will gradually annihilate the enemy in the prepared positions by destroying the enemy on the beachhead, firmly defending our strongholds, and striking the enemy via our mobile forces. We will also mobilize the reserves to wear down the enemy. The enemy's attrition will be so high as to contribute to our final victory [3].

The concept of "resolute defense and effective deterrence" was defined in *NDR 1998* as "a kind of defensive deterrence." Its purpose is "to dissuade the opponents that the cost of using military forces will outweigh the gain" [4]. In short, "resolute defense and effective deterrence" represents a model of "deterrence by denial" with "resolute defense" as the means to achieve effective deterrence.

ACTIVE DEFENSE (2000-2008)

Yet, the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995-96 exposed critical shortfalls in the "Defense-in-Depth" strategy. China's missile tests over Taiwan demonstrated that its ballistic missiles could penetrate Taiwan's layered defense without much difficulty and could inflict considerable damage on Taiwan. In the late 1990s, many civilians including then-Legislator Chen Shui-bian began questioning the validity of the "Defense-in-Depth" strategy. Meanwhile, Taiwan's military rushed to build up its missile defense capabilities and, under the instruction of then-President Lee Teng-hui, initiated several clandestine programs for developing indigenous cruise and ballistic missiles in order to check China's missiles at its source.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, Chen proposed the new operational concept of "Decisive Campaign outside the Territory" to replace Hau's "Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge," and called for radical changes in Taiwan's military strategy that could be labeled as the "Active Defense" strategy (2000-2008) [5]. Chen's original concept of "Decisive Campaign outside the Territory" inferred two operational options: First, when deterrence is about to fail and enemy attack is imminent, Taiwan should employ pre-emptive measures to neutralize enemy military targets. The capabilities of deep strike against the enemy at its source would be the key factor for success in defending Taiwan. Second, given that the Army was seen to have no significant role in the fulfillment of "Decisive Campaign outside the Territory," it was imperative to develop deep strike capabilities and strong air and naval forces [6].

After Chen was elected president in 2000, the first option was abandoned and the second option was refined [7]. Yet, what remained unchanged was the emphasis on checking the enemy on its shore and striking the enemy in transit rather than on destroying the enemy on Taiwan's beachhead. During Chen's first term, his ideas received considerable resistance from the Army, but the strategy of "Active Defense" gradually took shape [8]. In *NDR 2000*, though the term "Decisive Campaign outside the Territory" was omitted, some of Chen's ideas were clearly visible:

After our force modernization and the continuous upgrade of our weaponry,

we have already had active capabilities to conduct counter-measure operations and to achieve some deterrence effects. Therefore, traditional concept of “resolute defense and effective deterrence” is adjusted to “effective deterrence and resolute defense.” In addition to a compact, responsive, and efficient modernized force, [we are] to build an appropriate effective deterrent force [9].

It was not merely a change of word order. Implicit in *NDR 2000* was a redefining of the relationship between “effective deterrence” and “resolute defense.” Both effective deterrence and resolute defense are means to achieve the purpose of defending Taiwan. The latter refers to the traditional concepts of ground war while the former specifically refers to air, naval and information counter-measure capabilities in general, and Hsiung Feng 2E (HF-2E, 600 kilometers range) cruise missiles in particular. *NDR 2004* offered the most comprehensive description of the “Active Defense” strategy:

In order to fulfill the concepts of “effective deterrence and resolute defense,” ... [t]o cope with the changing strategic environment in the future and maintain our military superiority, [we will] actively develop, research and acquire the precision stand-off weapon systems and establish electronic counter-measure forces in order to augment our deep strike capabilities. Through the buildup of defensive counter-measure capabilities, [we hope to] deter the enemy from initiating hostility by complicating its probability of success [10].

Under the “Active Defense” strategy, the tactical significance of Taiwan’s outpost islands was reduced. The troops deployed on Kimmen, Mastu and other offshore islands were reduced to below 20,000 in 2008. Meanwhile, the first unit of HF-2E was operationalized and the MND programmed the budget for the mass production of HF-2E. The longer version HF-2E BLOCK II (estimated 1,000 kilometers in range) was also developed and tested (*United Daily News*, April 26, 2007) [11].

TOWARD FORTIFICATION DEFENSE? (2008-PRESENT)

Before 2008, most KMT politicians were not in disagreement with the “Active Defense” strategy or those

counter-measure weapons such as HF-2E. Rather, they were opposed to having them under Chen Shui-bian’s command on grounds that Chen might abuse them. Then-Legislator Su Chi (now Ma Ying-jeou’s Secretary General of the National Security Council), however, fundamentally rejected the “Active Defense” strategy and stated openly that the KMT would never consider developing any weapon that could strike Mainland China (China Radio International, September 12, 2007). Su believed that Chen’s “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” was irrelevant to defending Taiwan and a dangerous idea that might provoke military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, then-Legislator Su Chi boycotted the MND budget for the HF-2E production. As an alternative, Su proposed the idea of the “Hard ROC” during Ma’s 2008 presidential campaign, which has become the mantra of Ma’s military strategy. Under the “Hard ROC,” Su argued that the imperatives of defending Taiwan were “... the capabilities to sustain China’s surprise attack and maintain air superiority in order to deprive China from landing and occupying Taiwan. If China can not ensure its swift victory and create a *fait accompli* before the U.S. intervention, then China’s incentive of invasion is naturally decreased” (*United Daily News*, January 24, 2006).

By exclusively focusing on the defense of Taiwan Island, Su’s “Hard ROC” strategy ignored the tactical depth of Hau’s “Defense-in-Depth” strategy. Under the concept of a “Hard ROC,” Su argued that Taiwan’s arms procurement should be redirected to those items that could contribute to hardening the political or military assets on Taiwan Island. Rather than big ships and fast planes, Su preferred runway repair kits (for maintaining local air superiority), sea mines (to deny the enemy’s command of the sea), and troop transport helicopters (for rapid force redeployment within Taiwan Island) (*Liberty Times*, October 20, 2007). The concept of the “Hard ROC” appears to be no more than a strategy for fortification defense—and to some extent even a relegation of the traditional “Defense-in-Depth” strategy.

Thus, it is not surprising that the new idea of a “Hard ROC” encountered some resistance within the military. Moreover, the passivity of the KMT administration toward the MND’s existing procurement programs invited considerable criticism. As Chen’s case in 2000, despite the fact that the MND highlights Ma’s term of “Hard ROC” in *QDR 2009* and *NDR 2009*, many concepts of “Active Defense” strategy from the previous DPP administration in fact remain unchanged. For example, in *QDR 2009*, it suggests that Taiwan should “keep strengthening and developing the defensive counter-measure and asymmetric capabilities” in order to strike “against the enemy’s center of gravity and vital weak points ... as to utilize favorable

time and space, to paralyze and delay the enemy's offensive, and to defeat the enemy's invading forces" [12].

Also, while *QDR 2009* and *NDR 2009* reaffirm the return of Taiwan's military strategy to "resolute defense and effective deterrence" [13], the line of argument is not necessarily the same as before. Though responsible for different branches [14], both use nearly identical language to emphasize the importance of checking the enemy on its shore and striking the enemy in transit.

According to [our] defense plans, after the enemy commences its offensive, [we will] utilize favorable opportunities and use [our] defensive counter-measure capabilities to strike the enemy's vital military targets and the enemy's amphibious forces while assemble and upload at [the enemy's] ports. Later, depending on the situation development, [our military actions] will place emphasis on two critical phases of "joint [sea] interdiction operations" and "joint anchorage attack" as to destroy the enemy at its weakest when in transit across the Strait [15].

QDR 2009 makes the clear distinction that effective deterrence, comprised exclusively of those deep strike weapons such as HF-2E cruise missiles "is the means to achieve the goal of resolute defense" [16]. Thus, the positions expressed in *QDR 2009* and *NDR 2009* resemble the concept of "Active Defense" rather than "Defense-in-Depth" strategy.

In spite of the military's apparent concern about returning to the traditional concept of "Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge" under the "Hard ROC" strategy, there have been no indications from the Ma administration that it will compromise their views encapsulated in the term "Hard ROC." For instance, even though the KMT finally agreed to appropriate the budget for the production of HF-2E, which is already a mature and operational system, Ma ceased the development of the HF-2E BLOCK II, which has scored several successful records during the tests (*China Times*, September 1, 2008) [17]. *QDR 2009* and *NDR 2009* do not mark the end of this saga. Considering the widening gulf in threat perception presented by the civilian and military authorities, the publication of the two documents represents only the beginning.

York W. Chen, Ph.D., received his graduate degree from Lancaster University, United Kingdom. He was one of the Senior Advisors of Taiwan's National Security Council

from 2006-2008. He now teaches at Tamkang University, Taiwan.

NOTES

1. In Taiwan's military terminology, the definition of military strategy is slightly different from the American usage. The term of military strategy in this article was adopted the American usage which focused on the employment of the armed forces – an operational art oriented definition. In Taiwan, the equivalent term is field strategy (*Ye Jhan Jhan Lyue*).
2. `Hau Pei-tsun *Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff* (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 1, p. 238.
3. *National Defense Report (NDR)*, 1996, pp. 63.
4. *NDR*, 1998, p. 53.
5. In Chen's campaign pamphlet. It claimed that "The concept of "Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge" should be abandoned. The attrition style of warfare should be replaced by paralysis warfare. [We should] deprive the enemy's capabilities for waging war against us in order to prevent it from bringing war into our homeland and putting the lives and property of our population in danger." See Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian's Presidential Campaign, *Chen Shui-bian's Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security* (Taipei: Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian's Presidential Campaign, 1999), pp. 50-51.
6. *Chen Shui-bian's Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security*, pp. 37 and 51.
7. In June 2000, Chen first officially declared his ideas of "Decisive Campaign outside the Territory" in front of the military. The first argument referred to pre-emptive strike was totally deleted from his speech and the second one that exclusively highlighted the importance of air and naval forces was moderately modified.
8. Yet old ideas die hard. In Chen's first term, some notions embedded in the traditional "Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge" were still kept in the *NDR*. For example, in *NDR 2002*, in addition to sustaining information, air and naval superiority, it still highlighted that "based upon the principle of annihilation of invading enemy and safeguard the homeland, [we will] concentrate precision firepower of all our Services in combination with Air-Land mobile strike capabilities, through continual counter-offensive, destroy the enemy on the beachhead and at the air-drop zone." The "Active Defense" strategy was fully implemented only after Admiral Lee Jui assumed the position of defense minister in 2004. Quotation from *NDR*, 2002, p. 81.
9. *NDR*, 2000, p. 64.
10. *NDR*, 2004, p. 63,
11. In order to ease U.S. suspicion over Taiwan's indigenous development of cruise missiles, the MND affirmed in the *NDR 2004* that these missiles serve a defensive purpose

and will be used against China's military targets only. See *NDR, 2004*, p. 63.

12. *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, 2009, p. 42 and 49.

13. *QDR*, 2009, p. 47. *NDR*, 2009, p. 79.

14. The *NDR* and the *QDR* are responsible by the Strategic Planning Department and the Integrated Assessment Office of the MND respectively.

15. *QDR*, 2009, p. 48. The *NDR 2009* also makes an almost identical statement, see *NDR*, 2009, p. 80.

16. *QDR*, 2009, p. 42.

17. There are significant strategic and operational implications between HF-2E and HF-2E BLOCK II for the latter has the range of striking China's inland targets while the former can only reach China's coastal area.

Chinese Analyses of Soviet Failure: The Party

By Arthur Waldron

[The first of an occasional series on how China views the collapse of the Soviet Union.]

When Westerners examine the events of 20 years ago that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union—or even when they try to look at how China may change in the years ahead—their approach is very different from that officially followed in China today. Westerners almost without exception look instinctively for deep trends and deep causes—such things as rising literacy, increasing social complexity, or ethnic problems. Chinese officialdom approaches the dissolution of the Soviet Union in quite a different way.

Although much literature exists on the topic in China, not all of it is in accord with the *official* narrative that follows, and some of it at odds. What is addressed here is the most authoritative *official* analysis to date, which is interesting above all for the implications it has for future policy as China seeks to avoid the Soviet fate. It is an eight part television series called *Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety—Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism (Ju'an siwei)* [1].

As this essay will seek to make clear, today's official China believes that nothing deep or fundamental was wrong with the Soviet Union even in the late 1980s. According to the Chinese official narrative, the failure of the Soviet regime to continue is not attributable to a broad systemic phenomenon, but rather to a very specific failure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This viewpoint is becoming very clear as the first fruits of the nearly decade-long research program that examine the events mentioned are made public. The Chinese authorities distinguish clearly between two events that Westerners tend to merge: the first, as they see it, is a failure of the communist party of the Soviet Union and consequent loss of authority with the second, which is the result of the first, being the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

This negative evaluation of Soviet party policy is a post-1989 phenomenon. A perusal of *Beijing Review* for the Gorbachev years before that date will reveal much more positive and optimistic coverage, which began to diminish after Li Peng became premier in April 1988 [2].

After the collapse, the year 2000 saw the establishment in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences of research groups devoted to two topics: one to the strength and decline of the Soviet Communist Party and the other the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. The work of these groups was considered so important that it was subsequently designated a “fundamental national social science research topic” and other organizations were brought into the work, including the National Party Construction Committee and the Central Disciplinary Committee [3].

The result was what Westerners may consider the most authoritative official Chinese assessment of the end of the Soviet Union to date. This film focuses not on world events, or on general trends in the socialist world, but rather on the details of the history and policies of the Soviet communist party—presented with an orthodox purity one might have expected in the 1940s. The message is that the Soviet party failed because it gave up the dictatorship of the proletariat, ceased to practice democratic centralism, criticized Stalin, was beguiled by western concepts such as democracy, and also tripped up by Western propaganda and other operations.

The series begins by listing some possible causes for Soviet collapse such as “lack of flexibility within the Stalinist model” and the “betrayal of Gorbachev” but then asks:

[W]hat is the most fundamental cause? Comrade Mao Zedong once told us that ‘if there are multiple conflicts within any process, there must exist one major conflict that plays the leading and decisive role.’ In his famous 1992 talks in the South, Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out ‘If problems are to occur, they are bound to occur inside the CCP [Chinese Communist Party].’ In December 1991, Comrade Jiang Zemin

pointed out that the transformation of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is not due to the failure of Scientific Socialism [emphasis supplied] but to the abandonment of the Socialist path. In December 2000, Comrade Hu Jintao also pointed out that there are multiple factors contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, very important ones being Khrushchev throwing away Stalin's knife and Gorbachev's open betrayal of Marxism-Leninism' [3]. The Introductory segment concludes: "What went wrong? It is found in the CPSU" [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] [4].

What exactly went wrong in the CPSU? According to official interpretation, most importantly, the party ceased to insist that it was the sole ruling party, seeking instead to bring society in as its own ultimate governor.

To explain this historically, the film turns to the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Brussels and London) where 190 of Lenin's "Bolsheviks" insisted on party dictatorship [5]. Yet theirs was a view not shared by all socialists or communists. Marx and Engels were vague about the "dictatorship of the proletariat" seeing it as a transitional mechanism that would be unnecessary in a socialist society where contradictions had ceased to exist [6]. With the idea of a permanent ruling party went the idea that it would make its decisions according to the procedures of "democratic centralism" of which Lenin is the great exemplar.

At the center of the presentation is a most favorable presentation of Stalin. As the narrator states, while images of impressive industrial development and prosperous farmers fill the screen, "From April 1923 to March 1953 Stalin . . . held the country's top leadership positions . . . This was a thriving and prosperous period of time in the history of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. During this period, the speed of Soviet's social and economic development and growth of its overall national power greatly exceeded that of the capitalist countries . . . The Soviet Union during Stalin's time announced to the world the incomparable superiority and vitality of the new socialist system" [7].

Some lip service is paid to the idea that Stalin made errors, including "expansion of his purges, as well as the bitter fruits of his non-democratic working style and the mistakes caused by his abusive manner." But these are minor. As the narrative concludes, "[A]s time goes by, when we brush off

the dust of history, people feel more than ever that Stalin's errors should never tarnish his position as a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionist in history" [8].

In particular, the figures commonly given for deaths under Stalin are ridiculed and diminished: "Wild exaggeration" took place of "the number of people killed in Stalin's purges of counter-revolutionaries. The number was exaggerated several dozen times to reach 10 million or tens of millions" [9].

If Lenin and Stalin are the heroes of the piece, Khrushchev and later Gorbachev are most emphatically the villains.

At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 14, 1956 First Secretary Khrushchev made a presentation of a secret report called "On Personal Worship and its Consequences"—the "secret speech" which detailed Stalin's true record [10].

As bad as Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin was his attempt to change the nature of rule in the USSR. The platform that was passed by the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 stated, "The Proletarian Dictatorship is no longer necessary in the Soviet Union. At its new stage, or this stage, the country, born as a country of Proletarian Dictatorship, has become a State of the People" [11]. With this quasi-democratic idea taking the place of dictatorship, the rot set in, particularly in the younger generation.

Young people in the CPSU grew up under Khrushchev's influence at the 20th Congress's criticism of Stalin. They were unfamiliar with the party's revolutionary tradition, and lacked firm beliefs in socialism. They were later known as "the babies born at the 20th Congress." After the mid-80s of the 20th century, it was exactly these people who became the backbone that disintegrated the CPSU and buried the socialist system [12].

In 1964, Brezhnev and his associates ousted Khrushchev, which is presented as a positive development in the documentary. This is not least because in June 1967 the CPSU's Central Committee passed a resolution that restored some of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, stressing that the 'State of the People' still had a class character and would 'continue the cause of the Proletarian Dictatorship.'"

But after Brezhnev's death in 1982, "Andropov and Chernenko passed away in three years" and in March 1985 Gorbachev came in bringing slogans of "democratization," "openness," and "media diversity" [13].

Gorbachev's ideals are seen as a continuation of Khrushchev's quasi-democratic concept of the "state of the people." Gorbachev's memoirs are quoted as follows:

If you try to succinctly sum up the idea of political reform, then the thinking and implementation can be summarized as to transfer power from the monopoly of the Communist Party's hands to the hands of the people who are entitled to enjoy it through the Constitution, or to the hands of Soviets comprised of freely elected representatives [14].

Such ideas led to the amendment of the Soviet Constitution in 1991 to allow political freedom—and the collapse of any vestige of proletarian dictatorship or democratic centralism as "20 parties were formed in one year at the Union level and 500 at the Republic level" [15].

All of this is very different from the standard Western analyses of the Soviet failure. To be sure, the authors allow that between the time of Stalin and Brezhnev the Soviet Union began to lose its leading place among the nations of the world:

"In the 1960s, the capitalist world's electronic, information, biological, and other science and technologies had made great progress but the Soviet Union was lacking timely knowledge of the world's scientific and technological revolution" [16].

Yet the situation could have been salvaged, perhaps if the Soviets had adopted the path subsequently followed by China.

If the ruling Communist Party could have adhered to Marxist-Leninist theory and paths, timely and correctly solve the accumulated problems and conflicts, and correct the mistakes with courage, it would have been possible to pull the Soviet Union and the Communist Party out of danger, and to continue to push the socialist cause forward [17].

Such is the Chinese official—it must be stressed *official*—diagnosis of the Soviet failure, and from the diagnosis

will flow the policy solution. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that party discipline and unity are at the top of the list of issues being stressed publicly in China today, and simple repression is regularly employed as a means of dealing with tensions, while relatively less emphasis is placed on how to cope with the vast challenges posed to any authoritarian government by a dynamic, growing, and ever-differentiating society. [To be continued]

Arthur Waldron, Ph.D., is Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania (1997 to present) and a Board Member of The Jamestown Foundation. He is author of or contributor to over 20 books in English and Chinese.

NOTES

1. Ministry of Education, 2/20/2009. The Chinese text is now available on the internet at chinaelections.org, while a Chinese-English transcript, upon which this essay draws with modifications ["Transcript"], is available at chinascop.org. In addition, CDs of the entire series circulate unofficially; one is in the possession of the author.
2. See Arthur Waldron, "The Soviet Disease Spreads to China" *Far Eastern Economic Review* 172.8 (October 2009), pp. 24-27.
3. *Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety—Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism*. Ministry of Education, 2/20/2009.
3. Transcript, p. 1.
4. Transcript, p. 13.
5. Transcript, p. 5.
6. See "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" in Tom Bottomore, et al, eds. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983) pp. 129-131.
7. Transcript, p. 8.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Transcript, p. 28.
10. Transcript, p. 8.
11. Transcript, p. 18.
12. Transcript, p. 8.
13. Transcript, p. 19.
14. Transcript, p. 9.
15. Transcript, p. 22.
16. Transcript, p. 10.
17. Transcript, p. 20.
