




# Terrorism Monitor

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## WITH ELECTIONS OVER, KHARTOUM GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE IN DARFUR

The leader of Darfur's most effective rebel movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was recently in Cairo seeking greater Egyptian participation in negotiations between JEM and Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Dr. Khalil Ibrahim accuses the Qatar government of showing favoritism to Khartoum in its role as mediator in the on again, off again Doha negotiations.

While Khalil Ibrahim was in Cairo, the Sudan government sought to embarrass his hosts by making a public request for Interpol to arrest the Egyptian government's guest. Sudanese Justice Minister Abdul Bassit Sabdarat announced he had asked Interpol to "arrest" Ibrahim "wherever he is located," although the Justice Minister must have been aware that Interpol facilitates international law enforcement cooperation but does not make arrests (Sudanese Media Center, May 10). The statement was designed solely to express Khartoum's displeasure with Khalil's presence in Cairo; Khartoum had previously requested Interpol's assistance in detaining the JEM leader in 2006 and 2008 (*Sudan Tribune*, June 11, 2008). Khalil Ibrahim is also already on Interpol's list of fugitives wanted on charges of terrorism laid by the Sudan government. [1] The JEM leader mocked the arrest request in an interview with a pan-Arab daily, asking why Sudanese police don't arrest him while he is in Sudan (*Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 13).

In a Cairo interview, the JEM leader suggested that the latest rapprochement between Chad and Sudan would have little effect on his movement, which has used bases in Chad in the past but is now largely based in Darfur. He also recalled the May 2008 JEM raid on Omdurman, describing the operation as one “worthy of being taught in the military academies... We moved the war from Darfur to the heart of Khartoum and we asserted our power on the ground” (*Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 13; see also *Terrorism Monitor*, May 15, 2008).

Khalil described the recent elections as rigged, pointing to the results in Darfur as proof. “What is comic is that all those that won in Darfur are members of the [ruling] National Congress. We know that these were not elected by the Darfur masses; the fraud was shameless.” Nevertheless, he urged the leaders of South Sudan to postpone the upcoming referendum on independence in hope of a last minute deal to ensure the unity of Sudan. The JEM leader claimed his movement did not seek political power in Sudan, but was only “looking for a formula to solve Sudan’s problems in general” (*Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 13).

After the Egyptian Army invaded the region in 1916, Egypt co-ruled Darfur with Great Britain until Sudanese independence in 1956. In the interests of securing stability on its southern borders, Egypt has become more involved in seeking a solution to the Darfur crisis, including the return of Egyptian troops to Darfur as part of the UNAMID peacekeeping force. Two Egyptian peacekeepers were killed and three wounded earlier this month when a small Egyptian military convoy was ambushed in South Darfur by unidentified attackers (MENA Online, May 7; PANA Online, May 8; *al-Jumburiyah* [Cairo], May 11). The men were buried at a mass funeral in Lower Egypt’s al-Dakhalia governate (MENA Online, May 5).

In the wake of the Egyptian deaths, Rwanda’s Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamumba, the UNAMID land forces commander, promised a more vigorous response to attacks on peacekeepers. “Self defense is an inherent right that should be exercised without a doubt” (*New Times* [Kigali], May 13).

Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, is reported to have become angry over Khalil Ibrahim’s reception in Cairo during a meeting in Khartoum with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Ghayt and Intelligence Director Omar Sulayman. The president sent two of his closest aides to Cairo on May 15 to resolve what is being

described as a “silent crisis” over the JEM leader’s visit to Egypt (*al-Hayat*, May 14).

With the ceasefire between JEM and Khartoum in a near state of collapse, Khartoum went on the offensive on May 15, seizing the longtime JEM stronghold at Jabal Moun near the Chad border after several days of shelling. A Sudan Armed Forces spokesman claimed 108 JEM fighters had been killed and another 61 taken prisoner, though JEM claims to have carried out a successful withdrawal. There was also heavy fighting between JEM and the SAF reported near the South Darfur capital of Nyala, with both sides claiming victory (*Sudan Tribune*, May 16; AFP, May 15; Reuters, May 15).

1. See Interpol’s wanted list: [http://www.interpol.int/public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/2006/45/2006\\_37945.asp](http://www.interpol.int/public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/2006/45/2006_37945.asp)

#### NEW BOOK BY LATE AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ WAR LEADER ANALYZES MILITARY LESSONS OF THE PROPHET

Less than a month after his death in an attack by U.S. and Iraqi forces, a book by al-Qaeda in Iraq’s late War Minister, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (a.k.a. Abu Ayub al-Masri) has been released for publication on jihadi websites (al-Fajr Media Center, May 10). The work, entitled *The Prophet Leader*, examines the tactics and military lessons to be learned from the 7th century campaigns of the Prophet Muhammad. The lengthy 436 page book was published under the Egyptian al-Qaeda leader’s real name, Abd al-Mun’im bin Izz al-Din al-Badawi.

In the introduction to this work, the authenticity of which is uncertain given that the operational demands on al-Muhajir’s time may have interfered with the detailed research necessary to produce this lengthy work, the author provides his justification in returning to ground well covered by earlier scholars:

Why write about this topic when others before me wrote about it? I say: There are many reasons; most importantly, we in the Islamic State of Iraq assume that we are proceeding from the same starting point of the prophetic state, and that we lived and live in an environment that is almost identical to it, whether in its internal or external situation, or what is today called the regional situation.

Al-Muhajir says it is important to review the campaigns of the Prophet “so that it will not be stated that we innovated something strange.” Al-Muhajir refers here to charges from other Sunnis in Iraq that ISI/al-Qaeda had transgressed the Islamic prohibition on bid’ah (innovation) in their tactical methods, which are heavily reliant on assassinations, suicide attacks and the targeting of civilians in mass-casualty bombings. It was Sunni revulsion with these methods that led to the development of the anti-al-Qaeda Sahwah militias, a major setback for the ISI.

In recent days the Islamic State of Iraq [the political structure of al-Qaeda in Iraq] named its new War Minister as al-Nasser Lideen Illah Abu Sulayman. Though the name is almost certainly a pseudonym, the new War Minister announced the start of a new military campaign as a reminder that ISI is not finished as a jihadi movement after the death of its two top leaders. In the meantime, quotes from al-Muhajir’s speeches and statements have begun to appear on jihadist websites in an apparent attempt to posthumously shape al-Muhajir as a notable practitioner of jihad in both action and theory.

## The Asian Tigers – The New Face of the Punjabi Taliban

By Arif Jamal

**T**he emergence in North Waziristan of the Asian Tigers, a previously unknown jihadi group, has several messages for jihad watchers. Two of them are very important. First, the Punjabi Taliban are slowly but surely growing in strength and numbers. Second, their war is primarily against the state of Pakistan (read their former handlers) and may eventually surpass that of their Afghan comrades in intensity.

Although the exact identity of the Asian Tigers is not known, Pakistani intelligence agencies believe it is a front group for the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), headed by Ilyas Kashmiri (*The News* [Islamabad], May 1). The Asian Tigers’ first operation was to abduct Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan Air Force squadron leader who gained notoriety as a jihadist ideologue in the 1980s, and then execute him on April 30 in a dramatic manner, leaving his body with a note saying he

was a CIA agent and all such others would be treated likewise (*Dawn* [Karachi], April 30).

Some time in March, Khalid Khawaja traveled to North Waziristan on an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-sponsored mission to cleanse the Pakistani Taliban of “bad Taliban.” Khawaja was accompanied by Brigadier Amir Sultan Tarar (a.k.a. Colonel Imam), Shah Abdul Aziz, a former mujahideen commander who became a member of Parliament under General Musharraf, and Mehmud al-Samarai, described by the Taliban as a former Iraqi intelligence agent but now believed to be involved in Saudi peace efforts in Afghanistan. The three pleaded with Taliban leaders Sirajuddin Haqqani, Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rehman to convince them to change their targets. According to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, “They tried to convince Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rahman Mahsud to stop attacking the Pakistan army and discussed a mechanism to target NATO supply lines only. They offered to help Hakimullah set up pockets in different parts of the country from where they could attack NATO supplies going to Afghanistan” (*Asia Times*, April 28).

The trio also appealed to the TTP to expel 14 senior Taliban commanders who were suspected by the ISI of being on the payroll of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence agency. Most of these 14 commanders are Punjabis (see *The News*, May 1 for the full list of names). A four-wheel drive vehicle belonging to Waliur Rehman which Khawaja used during this visit was hit a few days after Khawaja’s departure by a U.S. drone, though the attack failed to kill Waliur Rehman (*Asia Times*, April 28; *Dawn*, April 30).

Although the drone attack and other suspicious behavior noted by the militants may have prompted the Punjabi Taliban to take his life, the real reasons are to be found elsewhere. Khalid Khawaja remained loyal to the ISI even after his retirement and shared its vision of liberating Kashmir by using jihad as an instrument of defense policy as well as using the Afghan Taliban to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan against India. For Khawaja, like his mentors in the ISI, all those who were out of the ISI’s control were Indian agents. The Punjabi Taliban are irked by this policy and fail to understand why jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir is good but jihad against the Pakistan army, allied with the same infidel forces that occupy Afghanistan, is bad. Mohammad Omar, a spokesman for the Punjabi

Taliban, told a Pakistani journalist that Khawaja was killed partly because he would call the Punjabi Taliban “terrorists” but refer to the Afghan Taliban as “mujahideen” (*The News*, May 2).

According to a TTP spokesman, during his visit to Waziristan Khawaja promised to return with others, and when he did, the Taliban were prepared to abduct and interrogate him. Khawaja returned on March 25 with Colonel Imam and Asad Qureshi, a Pakistani journalist with British citizenship whom the Asian Tigers accused of working for the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Before killing Khawaja and dumping his body on a roadside in Mir Ali, the Asian Tigers sent five video clips to selected media outlets which contained the “confessions” of the former ISI officers. The Urdu-language videos appear to have been heavily edited and include incomplete sentences. Khawaja in particular appears to be under duress and at times seems to be reading from notes on his lap.

In the videos, Khawaja confesses to having conspired with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F, a major Islamist political party) and Grand Mufti Maulana Rafi Usmani to bring down the radical Lal Masjid movement, named after the Islamabad mosque that acted as its headquarters. The military’s July 2007 siege of Lal Masjid marked the beginning of a new and especially violent wave of Islamist militancy in Pakistan. The second crime Khawaja confessed to was being an agent of both the ISI and the CIA. Khawaja also alleged in his “confession” that Harkat ul-Mujahideen commander Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Jaish-i-Mohammad founder Maulana Masood Azhar and Jaish-i-Mohammad commander Abdullah Shah Mazhar were ISI proxies. “Jihadi organizations like Laskhar-e-Taiba, al-Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat ul-Mujahideen etc. operate with the financial assistance of the Pakistani secret services and they are allowed to collect their funds inside Pakistan” (*Asia Times*, April 24).

The kidnapping operation of the Asian Tigers is shrouded in mystery. Only Colonel Imam and Asad Qureshi (who remain in their custody) may have the answer to the identity of the Asian Tigers. One report claimed senior Afghan commanders negotiating for the release of Colonel Imam (who is very close to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar) had suggested the Asian Tigers appeared to have the backing of someone powerful, as the group was moving freely through

the region despite its small numbers (*The News*, May 1). If true, this would show that part of the military establishment in Pakistan has become radical and is siding with those who have rejected the official policy.

*Arif Jamal is an independent security and terrorism expert and author of “Shadow War – The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir.”*

## Muqtada al-Sadr Calls for a New Role for the Jaysh al-Mahdi Militia in Iraq

*By Rafid Fadhil Ali*

Recent calls by the radical Iraqi Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) militia to become involved in protecting local Shi’a mosques have ignited fear of a new sectarian confrontation in Iraq. Al-Sadr has suggested that his followers join the national security forces to protect Shi’a residential areas and places of worship. The call came after the carnage that took place in Shi’a areas around Baghdad on April 23. Dozens of Muqtada’s followers were killed when bombs killed worshipers outside mosques after Friday prayer. The highest casualties were in Muqtada’s stronghold of Sadr City in East Baghdad, where two car bombs detonated at a local market and one of the local branches of the Sadrism movement. The attacks were seen as an act of revenge by the radical Sunni organization al-Qaeda in Iraq after the killing of its two top leaders a few days prior (*Asharq al-Awsat*, April 24).

Muqtada al-Sadr has curbed the activities of his militias for the last two years. According to his aides, the greatest part of the JaM militia has become a non-armed organization called al-Mumahhidun (“The Pavers,” who will pave the way for the return of the 12th Imam), while a small number of fighters, who report directly to Muqtada, kept their arms for the sole purpose of fighting U.S. forces (*Asharq al-Awsat*, May 8, 2009; see also *Terrorism Monitor*, September 4, 2008). According to Imad al-Sa’idi, a JaM commander in al-Sadr City, “The Imam’s army was not dissolved in the first place.

Rather, it was in a state of truce, which continues to be in force. However, we are concerned that the situation might deteriorate again, especially if the formation of a government is delayed.” (*al-Hayat*, May 18).

The followers of Muqtada have gained significant political momentum after the March 7 election. As no single party won an overall majority in the 325 seat Iraqi parliament, the Sadrists emerged as a considerable power with their 40 seats. In the current political equation it is almost undisputable that they will have cabinet posts. They will also have a say in who will be the next prime minister. The Sadrists do not have a single preference for the top post but they are clear that they will not support the incumbent, Nuri al-Maliki (*Tariq al-Sha'b* [Baghdad], May 16; *al-Alam* [Baghdad], May 16).

Relations between the prime minister and the Sadrists changed from a strong alliance in 2006—when al-Maliki took office—to one of severe enmity after the crackdown that al-Maliki launched against the JaM in 2008. The prime minister, who once said the Shi'a militia was worse than al-Qaeda, showed a surprisingly flexible reaction towards Muqtada's recent call. He accepted the principle of having armed Sadrists working in coordination with the security forces to secure the Shi'a mosques and Husayniyahs (places devoted to Shi'a religious and mourning rituals). “In order not to have crime of the [April 23] Friday prayer bombing happening again, I hope that a number of the Sadrist elements would volunteer to work with the security forces assigned to protect the mosques. The goal is to coordinate the efforts to secure those areas in the same way the Sahwa [anti-al-Qaeda Sunni fighters] secured their neighborhoods... However the power should be in the hands of the government.” The spokesman for Muqtada thought that this was not enough and clarified that his leader's call was to allow the Sadrist fighters to join the security forces. But the Sadrists also revealed that they want to have an independent intelligence service in order to anticipate such attacks and deal with them (*Al-Hayat*, April 28).

Muqtada's call and al-Maliki's response have raised the concerns of mainstream Sunnis but it also attracted attention to the pro-al-Qaeda websites where both Muqtada and al-Maliki were cursed and condemned (*hanein.info*, April 28).

Al-Maliki's popularity surged upwards after his crackdown on the Shi'a militias in 2008, yet his government could not stop the violence completely,

especially the massive attacks against civilian targets. The attacks on Shi'a mosques have not stopped. Those attacks in particular are especially dangerous in terms of the possibility of reigniting the Shi'a-Sunni conflict. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is usually not clear in claiming responsibility for every attack on civilian targets, but the extremist Sunni organization has never hidden its hatred towards the Shi'a. In his first public statement the new war minister of al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Nasser Lideen Ellah Abu Sulayman, vowed to continue the fight against the Shi'a. He promised that there will be more bloody days coming with no possibility other than fighting (*alfaloja.net*, May 14, 2010).

Senior aides of Muqtada ruled out the possibility of reviving the sectarian conflict with their leader's recent move, though this did not seem to pacify the worries of the Sunni community. The sectarian violence in Iraq significantly increased when the JaM became active after the bombing of the Shi'a al-Askariya Shrine in Samara'a on February 22, 2006. This was due to the rapid spread of the militia and the support it enjoyed in the impoverished Shi'a neighborhoods.

The political standstill after the election has not produced a new government, yet it is affecting the security situation. The consolidated political power of the Sadrists raises many questions regarding their relations with the current and coming governments. The recent developments have shown that the two main parties of the sectarian fight of 2006-2007 (i.e. JaM and al-Qaeda in Iraq) still exist, though they operate on different levels and employ different tactics.

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## Renegade Generals Threaten Unity of South Sudan's SPLA as Independence Referendum Approaches

*By Andrew McGregor*

As the January 2011 referendum on independence for oil-rich South Sudan approaches, ongoing mutinies and indiscipline within the South's military may create

conditions of insecurity that threaten to delay the long-awaited plebiscite. Khartoum has little interest in seeing its main source of revenue separate and the central government's hand is seen by many in the South as being behind the mutiny of General George Athor Deng in the road-less but resource-rich Jonglei Province.

The border region between North and South Sudan is extremely tense; recent Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) troop movements in Blue Nile Province and South Darfur provoked a letter of complaint to President Omar Bashir from the leader of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), Salva Kiir Mayardit (*al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 3; AFP, May 1). Both the SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have been steadily rearming with oil revenues since the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (see *Terrorism Focus*, October 30, 2008).

#### General Athor's Mutiny

In 2009, SPLA commander George Athor Deng (a Dinka tribesman) was promoted to Lieutenant General and placed in charge of SPLA political and moral orientation. Athor failed to receive the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM – the political wing of the SPLA) nomination for governor of Jonglei state in April's elections, which went instead to Lieutenant General Kuol Manyang. Like a number of would-be SPLM candidates who failed to get the nod from the party as its representative, Athor ran as an independent, finishing well behind Kuol Manyang. Unhappy with the results, Athor appears to have orchestrated a deadly attack on the Doleib Hills SPLA base (near Malakal) on April 30. The Doleib Hills area is contested between the Dinka Luac and the Shilluk of Upper Nile State. The night attack left twelve SPLA soldiers dead. Five prisoners from the attacking force claimed the order to attack had come from General Athor (*Sudan Tribune*, May 1). Athor appears to have been testing the waters at first, refusing to accept responsibility but admitting that the attackers "fought in my name." Athor suggested most of the casualties were the result of an ethnically-divided SPLA force shooting at each other (*Sudan Tribune*, May 2). It was later confirmed that anti-aircraft weapons, three anti-tank guns and a number of machine-guns were taken from the garrison's arsenal (Sudan Radio Service, May 3).

Further clashes between Athor's men and SPLA forces occurred on May 7 (Athor claimed 50 SPLA were killed to three of his men) and May 10 (Athor claimed 36 SPLA

dead to the loss of seven dead and three wounded on his side) in a skirmish 188 miles north of the Jonglei capital of Bor (Reuters, May 7; May 11). Athor's followers clashed with SPLA forces for the third time in a week on May 12. While Athor continued his improbable claims by saying his men killed 83 SPLA soldiers, an SPLA spokesman described the action as a skirmish that erupted when an 11 man SPLA reconnaissance team stumbled on Athor's hideout in the thick forests of northwestern Jonglei, with two killed from their side and none from Athor's group (Reuters, May 12). On the same day, General Athor announced that other armed groups were preparing to converge with his forces to attack the Jonglei capital of Bor (*Sudan Tribune*, May 12). Athor also boasted that he had sufficient forces to take the town of Malakal, capital of Wilayah (Unity) State (Reuters, May 3). On May 14, the mutineers mounted an unsuccessful ambush of a SPLA truck in northern Jonglei that left five attackers dead.

General Athor has since issued a number of demands, including the resignation of Kuol Manyang, cancellation of all election results, dissolution of the GoSS and an amnesty for his followers (Miraya FM [Juba], May 13). After the fourth attack, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum said their intelligence section had "credible information" that the NCP was behind General Athor's revolt, though Athor had already denied any connection to the ruling party in Khartoum (*Sudan Tribune*, May 17; *al-Hayat*, May 14). Though Athor has threatened to invade the provincial capitals of Bor and Malakal, SPLA authorities insist Athor is still south of al-Subat with a force of less than 100 men and only three vehicles, including Athor's personal car (*al-Hayat*, May 14). However, SPLA spokesman Kuol Diem Kuol said there were signs some police and a number of South Sudan's armed wildlife rangers (mostly former SPLA fighters) had joined Athor's mutineers (Reuters, May 14).

Salva Kiir, whose authority is being challenged soon after a dominant election victory, appears to be losing patience with his renegade general, making a negotiated settlement increasingly unlikely (*Sudan Tribune*, May 17). In the meantime, the continuing insecurity in Jonglei has resulted in a lack of cultivation, threatening famine in the area (Miraya FM [Juba], May 14; *Sudan Tribune*, May 4).

General Dau Aturjong Nyuol, who had similarly and unsuccessfully contested the election for governor of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state, was briefly the subject of reports tying him to General Athor's revolt through

an unnamed Brigadier working under his command (*Sudan Tribune*, May 5). The Brigadier later turned out to be John Jok Gai, who had passed close to Doleib Hills on his way to Malakal without an awareness of the events transpiring there. A political rival alleged that John Jok, an SPLA member since 1983, was on his way to defect to General Athor, a charge denied vigorously by the Brigadier (*Sudan Tribune*, May 3; May 4; May 5; May 9).

“New Sudan” vs. “South Sudan”

Despite growing support for the independence option, there are still a few flickers of life left in the “New Sudan” unity program that was official SPLM policy under the movement’s late leader, Dr. John Garang. On May 8, SPLM Secretary for North Sudan Yasir Sa’id Arman called on Northern opposition parties belonging to the anti-NCP Juba Alliance (including Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party, Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party, the Sudanese Communist Party and the Khatmiyya Sufi dominated Democratic Unionist Party) to join with the SPLM in creating “the New Sudan.” Garang’s vision of a federal system that would reform Sudan’s highly centralized power structure that maintains power in the hands of three small Arab tribes in North Sudan largely expired when he died in a controversial helicopter crash near the Ugandan border in 2005. Garang was willing to use force if necessary to keep his concept of a unified Sudan alive, but Salva Kiir, like most SPLM/A leaders, is believed to prefer the secession option.

American Interests in Jonglei and the South

While France’s Total holds the largest concessions in Jonglei, Malaysian, Moldovan and British companies have also been carrying out oil exploration operations in Jonglei. The American Marathon Oil Corporation was forced to withdraw from the region after the imposition of U.S. sanctions on the Sudan. Jonglei Governor Kuol Manyang Juuk visited oil company executives in Houston last July, where he urged investors to set up refineries in Jonglei (*Houston Chronicle*, July 25, 2009). With an exception now being made to the sanctions for South Sudan, American energy interests can now return to the southern provinces. The United States is providing assistance in preparing the referendum, though U.S. envoy to Sudan Scott Gration recently told a Senate committee that “we can’t waste another minute” in preparing for the vote (AFP, May 13).

A Sudanese daily recently reported that the SPLM had prepared a document for presentation to a visiting

American diplomat in which the SPLM/A offered to provide regional security and counterterrorism forces in cooperation with AFRICOM in return for logistical support, military training and funds for weapons purchases. The newspaper said the document was prepared by a committee of senior SPLA officers headed by the Minister of SPLA Affairs, Lt. General Nhial Deng Nhial (Dinka). The plan was endorsed at a meeting headed by General Salva Kiir in the presence of Deng Alor (Dinka), the second vice-president of South Sudan, and Yasir Sa’id Arman (Ja’aliyin Arab), the leader of the SPLM’s northern branch.

New Trouble on the Horizon?

Pan-Arab daily *al-Hayat* reported that an alliance was being formed in Khartoum between militia leader Gabriel Tanginya (or Tang), former Foreign Minister Lam Akol and General George Athor with the intention of challenging the authority of Salva Kiir Mayardit and derailing the 2011 independence referendum (*al-Hayat*, May 14). Dr. Lam Akol is the leader of SPLM for Democratic Change (SPLM – DC), an SPLM breakaway party created in June 2009. Lam Akol challenged for president of South Sudan in April’s elections as head of a broad coalition of opposition parties, but gathered only 7% of the vote compared to Salva Kiir’s 93%. The failed candidate maintains the voting was rigged and has the support of veteran Southern politicians such as Bona Malwal and General Joseph Lagu (*Sudan Tribune*, April 27). Major General Gabriel Tanginya (a.k.a. Gabriel Gatwech Chan) led a pro-government militia in the 1983-2005 North-South Civil War. After clashes with the SPLA in 2006, Tanginya withdrew his forces to Khartoum, where he and his forces were integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). A surprise return to the southern city of Malakal in February, 2009 resulted in further clashes with the SPLA before Tanginya withdrew once more (see *Terrorism Monitor*, March 13, 2009).

The existence of this alliance cannot yet be confirmed, but it is almost certain that General Athor’s mutiny will not be the last violent confrontation with the SPLM/A. SPLA spokesman Major General Kuol Dim Kuol claims great progress has been made in the professionalization of the SPLA. “The SPLA has formed a nucleus air force and navy. Our pilots and engineers have been trained and local support and administrative units will follow suit” (Afrik.com, May 18). Nevertheless, the transformation of the SPLA from a guerrilla force to a regular army has been beset by problems related to the integration or demobilization of rival Southern guerrilla

forces, incidents of indiscipline, delays in salaries and desertions. In April, three soldiers unwilling to transfer to Jonglei province were killed by SPLA military police after they looted and stole a supply truck in Bahr al-Ghazal. A month earlier, a large force of SPLA troops left for Wau rather than report to a training center near Bor (*Sudan Tribune*, April 19). Despite these problems, the SPLA continues to make progress in developing a trained and unified fighting force, though there seems little chance the transformation will be completed before next January's independence referendum.

### Conclusion

Though not all elements in the trend can be confirmed, it appears that the SPLM is considering adopting a role as a U.S. client state in Africa in exchange for U.S. military aid or protection in the event of a renewed civil war with the North following the independence referendum. The GoSS is nearly completely reliant on oil revenues, but Khartoum will be reluctant to allow the immense petroleum reserves of southern states like Jonglei to slip from its hands. Khartoum currently collects 50% of Southern oil revenues. There are many political and tribal elements in South Sudan that have little interest in reconciliation with the Dinka-dominated SPLM/A. In the past these have been assisted by the central government's intelligence agencies in the interest of disrupting the SPLM/A. Military mutinies are particularly unsettling in South Sudan, where they have a long history of marking the beginning of major conflicts.

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