In a Fortnight

China’s Cyber Command?
By L.C. Russell Hsiao

The development of China’s cyber warfare program has captured worldwide attention in recent years. While evolving doctrines and incidents of cyber intrusions with alleged links to the Chinese government have helped China watchers glean the development of China’s growing cyber warfare capabilities, far less certainty surrounds the command and control side of this enigmatic operation. This is partly because key tasks of China’s computer network operations and information warfare had been, until recently, decentralized in different departments in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Headquarters (i.e. the Third and Fourth Departments) and specialized bureaus located in the different military regions.

On July 19, the Peoples Liberation Army Daily (hereafter PLA Daily) reported that the PLA General Staff Department—the operational nerve center of the Chinese military supervised directly by the PLA’s Central Military Commission—held a ceremony to unveil what the Chinese-media called the country’s first “cyber base” (Global Times, July 22). The establishment of the “Information Security Base” (xinxi baozhang jidi), which is headquartered under the PLA General Staff Department, may serve as the PLA’s cyber command. The “base” is reportedly tasked with the mission to address potential cyber threats and to safeguard China’s national security. According to Chinese-media reports, the establishment of the cyber base was a strategic move ordered by President Hu Jintao to handle cyber threats as China enters the information age, and to strengthen the nation’s cyber-infrastructure (PLA Daily, July 20; China Times, July 20; Global Times, July 22).
According to a report in the Global Times, an offshoot of the party’s mouthpiece People’s Daily, an anonymous officer in the General Staff Department said that, “The setup of the base just means that our army is strengthening its capacity and is developing potential military officers to tackle information-based warfare.” Other tasks will include online information collection and the safeguarding of confidential military information by “build[ing] up walls.” The officer emphasized that, “It is a ‘defensive’ base for information security, not an offensive headquarters for cyber war” (Global Times, July 22).

The stated missions of the new cyber base appear to complement the PLA’s information warfare (IW) units, which the PLA has been developing since at least 2003. The PLA’s IW strategy was largely spearheaded by Major General Dai Qingmin, then-director of the PLA’s electronic warfare department (Fourth Department), who advocated a comprehensive information warfare effort (Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2009).

The high echelon of military officers from the General Staff Department represented at the unveiling ceremony seem to also reflect the importance that the leadership attaches to this newly minted program. Indeed, the launch ceremony, which was held in Beijing, was chaired by PLA Chief of General Staff General Chen Bingde and attended by other top brass of the PLA General Staff Department. The entourage included four deputy chief of staffs: General Zhang Qinsheng, General Ma Xiaotian, Vice-Admiral Sun Jianguo, General Hou Shusen; and two assistant chief of staffs: Major General Qi Jianguo, Major General Chen Yong; as well as leaders from the other three General Departments—General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department (PLA Daily, July 20).

One attendee worth pointing out is Deputy Chief of Staff General Zhang Qinsheng (1948 - ), who is a member of the 17th CCP Central Committee and currently the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region. General Zhang previously served as director of the military training department of the Beijing Military Region, and deputy director of the military training department of the General Staff Headquarters. While at the National Defense University, he served as director of the Campaign Teaching and Research Office, dean of studies, and director of the operations department of the General Staff Department. During his career, Zhang has built a reputation as being an expert on “informationized warfare” and conducted research on network command systems. In December 2004, then-Major General Zhang was elevated to chief of staff assistant of General Staff Department, and was promoted to vice chief of staff in December 2006. In 2007, he was appointed commander of Guangzhou Military Region. Zhang was recently elevated to the rank of general by President Hu in mid-July 2010 (Xinhua News Agency, July 20).

It is important, however, to note that the line between offensive and defensive capabilities in computer network operations is murky at best. Even Chinese experts acknowledge this gray area. In reference to the establishment of the U.S. cyber command, Professor Meng Xiangqing from the PLA’s National Defense University Institute for Strategic Studies stated:

“It is really hard to distinguish attacks and defenses in Internet war. In traditional wars, there was a definite boundary between attacks and defenses. However, in the war of internet, it was hard to define whether your action was an attack or a defense. If you claim to fight against hacker attack, it is hard to say that you are just defending yourself.” Meng added, “To fight against a hacker attack, you might attack other Internet nodes, which leads to the Internet paralysis in other countries and regions. Moreover, the Internet is a virtual world. It is hard to say that acquiring information from other countries is a defense” (People’s Daily Online, May 25).

At the very least, the establishment of the cyber base highlights the rise of China’s cyber warfare program. Moreover, the promotion of experts in informationized warfare to positions of prominence in China’s military ranks, namely General Zhang, who took over as deputy chief of staff with the portfolio for intelligence after General Xiong Guangkai retired, may signal the increasing influence of the cyber dimensions in Chinese decision-making on military strategy.

Furthermore, the establishment of a cyber base within China’s military complex shed light on the direction of China’s military modernization. More specifically, the establishment of the base indicates that the PLA’s commitment to cyber security is increasing and its role as a major cyber power will only continue to grow in the foreseeable future. With the emergence of a centralized, coordinated effort to strengthen its cyber networks, the presence of a command center in top decision-making bureaucracies focused on cyber security lends credence to the concerted push undertaken by the Chinese leadership to develop its cyber capabilities.

L.C. Russell Hsiao is Editor of The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief.

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The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean

By Daniel J. Kostecka

The ongoing debate in China over whether or not to formalize logistical support agreements for Chinese naval forces in the Indian Ocean is a natural outgrowth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) expanding presence in the region. As China continues to maintain a task group of warships off the Horn of Africa to conduct counter-piracy patrols, it is cultivating the commercial and diplomatic ties necessary to sustain its forces along these strategic sea-lanes. While Chinese government officials and academics debate the underlying issues, a supply network of “places” is quietly taking shape [1]. Regardless of whether or not the PLAN develops its support network through a series of formal agreements that guarantee access, or continues to supply its forces as it has been, that network is developing and will in all likelihood continue to grow in the foreseeable future.

Salalah, Oman – At this point, the PLAN ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden have utilized Salalah more than any other port by making a total of 16 port calls through June 2010. The PLAN counter-piracy patrollers began using Salalah during their second rotation, and from June 21 to July 1, 2009 the three ships on duty made individual port visits. According to the mission commander, Rear Admiral Yao Zhilou, the ships of Task Group 167 coordinated their port calls to ensure that five groups of 54 total merchant vessels were still escorted over the 11-day period in which the port visits took place. Since then, the ships of the third anti-piracy rotation called into Salalah in August 2009, the ships of the fourth rotation did the same in January 2010, and lastly, the ships of the fifth rotation called into Salalah in April and June 2010 (China Military Online, August 16, 2009; January 2; April 1; PRC Ministry of National Defense, June 10).

Overall, Oman and China have a stable and positive relationship and China has been the largest importer of Omani oil for several years, with oil accounting for over 90 percent of all bi-lateral trade between China and Oman (People’s Daily Online, April 14, 2008). Given the stable oil trade between Oman and China along with the economic benefits to the host nation of foreign sailors spending time ashore, there is no reason to believe that Oman will discontinue the use of Salalah by the PLAN. In fact, the PLAN’s success during its visits to Salalah is an indicator that its current system for sustaining its forces is sufficient (China Military Online, January 2). At the same time, it should not come as an unexpected development if current arrangements evolve into a formal agreement that guarantees access to Salalah for PLAN ships.

Aden, Yemen – Aden represents the first port utilized by PLAN ships during their deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The initial port call was from 21-23 February 2009 during the first counter piracy rotation when AOR-887 accepted diesel fuel, fresh water and food stores in order to replenish the task force’s destroyers, and AOR-887 made additional port calls in April and July of 2009 (China Military Online, February 25, 2009; April 27, 2009; July 30, 2009). According to additional press reports, AOR-886 called into Aden in October 2009 and March 2010 during the third and fourth rotations, while AOR-887 made a five-day port call in Aden beginning on 16 May 2010 during the fifth rotation (Xinhua News Agency, October 24, 2009; Chinagate, March 14; May 17).

At first glance, Aden should be an ideal place for the support of PLAN operations in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, as it is strategically located at the western end of the Gulf of Aden near the Bab-el-Mandeb. However, due to the active presence of al-Qaeda in the area, China likely prefers additional options for locations from which to support PLAN operations. While Senior Captain Yang Weijun, the commanding officer of AOR-887, stated the primary reason for the expansion of Chinese on shore support operations to Salalah was to further explore methods of in port replenishment based on the commercial model, it is likely that concerns over security in Yemen influenced the decision (China Military Online, June 24, 2009).

The editor of Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) Song Xiaojun has even stated that the Omani Port of Salalah and the Yemeni Port of Aden are both excellent supply points due to their locations and the fact that China and the host nations have formed relationships of mutual trust (International Herald Leader, January 8).

Djibouti – Unlike Salalah and Aden, it is difficult to call Djibouti an established place for the re-supply of PLAN forces operating in the Gulf of Aden. To date, only two PLAN ships have called into Djibouti, FF-525 on 25 January 2010 and DDG-168 on 3 May 2010 (Xinhua News Agency, January 25; May 4). However, in their public statements on the need for China to setup an overseas supply base to support PLAN forces, PLAN officers Senior Captain Li Jie and Rear Admiral Yin Zhou discussed the importance of Djibouti as a base for naval and air forces operating in the Gulf of Aden, with Senior Captain Li even calling for China to establish a facility somewhere in East Africa (China Review News, May 21, 2009; Beijing China Review, October 24, 2009; Chinagate, March 14; May 17).
Djibouti would make an excellent choice as a place for the PLAN and it should not come as a surprise if PLAN ships begin to make port calls to the East African nation on at least a semi-regular basis. Given Beijing’s sensitivities over appearing to be too forward-leaning with regard to its military operations in the Indian Ocean, establishing a presence in Djibouti would provide a useful foil to Beijing’s critics for the simple fact that other major powers have already secured access to Djibouti’s facilities. France and the United States both maintain substantial forces in the former French colony and in April 2009, Japan signed a status of forces agreement with Djibouti that provides for the support of Japanese warships deployed to the Gulf of Aden as well as permitting Japan to base P-3C patrol aircraft at Djibouti for the counter piracy mission (The Straits Times Online, March 15, 2009). Conversely, despite its advantages, it is possible Djibouti will not become a regular re-supply port for PLAN forces operating in the Gulf of Aden beyond the occasional port call. The large foreign naval presence in Djibouti could make the PLAN uncomfortable with one Chinese commentator stating, “They have built military bases with the existence of armed forces. A Chinese supply point would only be a hotel-style peaceful presence. There is no need to be grouped together with them” (International Herald Leader, January 8).

**KARACHI, PAKISTAN** – While China’s investment in the construction of the Port of Gwadar in Western Pakistan has for almost a decade fueled speculation that Beijing’s ultimate goal is to turn the port into a Chinese version of Gibraltar (The Newspaper Today, May 21, 2001), it is far more likely that Beijing would send its warships to Karachi if it were to seek a facility in Pakistan to support its forces. With seven port calls including three in the past three years, Karachi is the single most visited port by the PLAN during its 25 years of conducting overseas goodwill cruises and exercises with foreign navies. The PLAN is also now a regular participant in the Pakistani sponsored multi-lateral AMAN exercises, having sent warships to AMAN-07 and AMAN-09. Additionally, substantial ship construction and repair facilities are available at the Pakistan Naval Dockyard and the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works. Karachi is also where the Pakistani Navy is basing its three Chinese built F22P frigates, while the fourth, which will also be based at Karachi, is being built in Pakistan with Chinese assistance [2]. These warships, which most likely enjoy some level of parts-commonality with PLAN frigates, along with the extensive repair facilities available in Karachi, make Karachi a strong candidate for a friendly port where China could repair any ships damaged while operating in the Indian Ocean. The possibility of PLAN ships conducting repairs at Karachi was stated as fact by Senior Captain Xie Dongpei, a staff officer at PLAN Headquarters in June 2009 (The Straits Times Online, June 24, 2009).

**COLOMBO, SRI-LANKA** – China’s relationship with Sri-Lanka has received a great deal of attention recently due to Chinese financing of the construction of the Sri-Lankan port of Hambantota and Chinese military aid to Sri-Lanka during its fight against the Tamil Tigers, including the early 2008 delivery of six F-7G fighter aircraft (Times Online, May 2, 2009). While it is unlikely that Hambantota will be developed into a naval base, the PLAN is not a stranger to Sri-Lanka, and Sri-Lanka’s largest port and primary naval base at Colombo is becoming a popular mid-Indian Ocean refueling stop for PLAN warships (The Straits Times Online, June 24, 2009). In 1985, during the PLAN’s first foray into the Indian Ocean, Colombo was one of the first ports of call. More recently, in March 2007, the two PLAN frigates that sailed to Pakistan for AMAN-07, the first multilateral exercise the PLAN participated in, stopped in Colombo to refuel during the voyage to Karachi (China Military Online, 2 March 2007; People’s Daily Online, February 28, 2007). In March 2009, DDG-168 also stopped in Colombo to refuel during its voyage to Pakistan for the AMAN-09 exercise as well as on its return voyage to China (China Military Online, March 2, 2009; March 27, 2009). Finally, in January 2010, FFG-526 made a three-day port call in Colombo after escorting the merchant ship DEXINHAI, which had recently been freed from pirates off the coast of Somalia (China Military Online, January 11).

Overall, Beijing will probably not seek a formal agreement with Sri-Lanka for the use of Colombo as a place to replenish its naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean. It is more likely that PLAN ships transiting the Indian Ocean will leverage Beijing’s stable and friendly relationship with Sri-Lanka in order to continue using Colombo as a refueling location in order to establish a presence along key shipping lanes and helping to ensure positive relations with key regional ally. This approach would support PLAN operations without needlessly inflaming China’s already complicated relations with India.

**SINGAPORE** – In all of the speculation about future Chinese facilities in the Indian Ocean, Singapore has been largely ignored by pundits and military analysts. This is somewhat puzzling given Singapore’s friendly relations with Beijing and its strategic position in the Strait of Malacca, which Chinese strategists consider a critical gateway to the Indian Ocean. PLAN vessels have made four port calls to Changi Naval Base, including the May 2007 participation of a PLAN frigate in the multilateral exercise IMDEX-07 and a December 2009 visit by FFG-529 during its transit...
home from patrol duty in the Gulf of Aden (China Military Online, May 24, 2007; PRC Ministry of National Defense, December 8, 2009). Beijing also signed a defense agreement between China and Singapore in January 2008 that calls for increases in exchanges, educational opportunities and port calls and in July 2010, China’s defense minister pledged to further the development of military relations between China and Singapore (The Straits Times Online, January 8, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, July 14).

Yet, given Singapore’s close relations with both China and the United States, the island nation is in a delicate position. The littoral states of the Strait of Malacca — Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia — are also sensitive to foreign military operations in the vital waterways of the strait. Offers from the United States, Japan, India and most recently China to assist with naval patrols in the area have been rebuffed (The Straits Times Online, November 13, 2009). Thus, it is unlikely that there will be a formal agreement between Beijing and Singapore along the lines of the U.S.-Singapore Memorandum of Understanding that guarantees the use of Changi Naval Base, as such a move would alarm Washington. However, at the same time there is no reason for Singapore to deny increased use of its facilities to PLAN ships that are transiting the area either on their way to the Indian Ocean or while on patrol in the South China Sea, and it is likely PLAN will make increased port calls to Singapore through a combination of goodwill visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and refueling stops.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing debate in China and statements from public officials and academics regarding the need for shore based logistical support for PLAN forces have generated a great deal of attention as well as confusion. China’s investment in the construction of commercial port facilities in locations such as Gwadar and Hambantota is presented as evidence that it is seeking to build naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Yet, converting these facilities into the naval bases would require billions of dollars worth of military equipment and infrastructure in order to ensure their viability in wartime. Even then, the exposed position of these facilities makes their wartime utility dubious against an enemy equipped with long-range precision strike capability.

However, China is in the process of developing a network of what the U.S. military refers to as “places” in the Indian Ocean in order to support forces deployed for non-traditional security missions such as the counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. In most instances, these locations will be places on an informal basis where the PLAN relies on commercial methods to support its forces as it has been doing now for over a year. Arguably, any port along the Indian Ocean littoral where China enjoys stable and positive relations is a potential place, although factors such as location, internal stability and recreational opportunities for sailors on liberty will certainly influence decisions on where and how often PLAN ships visit. The recent visit to Abu Dhabi by FF-525 and AOR-886, the first visit by PLAN warships to the United Arab Emirates is evidence of this sort of approach (Xinhua News Agency, March 25).

Ports that are particularly important to the PLAN’s missions and overall posture in the Indian Ocean, such as Salalah, Aden, and possibly Karachi, could see the establishment of formal agreements that guarantee access and support to PLAN forces operating in and transiting the Indian Ocean in order to provide a secure and regular source of rest and supply. The development of a support network by China for its naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean represents a natural outgrowth of the ongoing counter-piracy mission and the PLAN’s tentative yet very real steps away from home waters into the global maritime domain (See “PLAN Shapes International Perception of Evolving Capabilities,” China Brief, February 4). Beijing’s official policy of non-interference is ostensibly an obstacle to the signing of any formal agreements providing for the logistics support to PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean. Yet, an appropriate level of legal nuance will likely be included in any agreement in order to ensure consistency with official policy as Beijing strives to achieve a balance between maintaining its policies and principles while adjusting to its growing place in the world.

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NOTES

1. The term “place” as opposed to a “base” was used by then Commander USPACOM, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo during a March 31, 2004 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml.

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Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 1

By Kenneth W. Allen

As China approaches the 18th Party Congress in late 2012, followed by the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) in early 2013, China watchers have begun to speculate about the next cadre of Chinese military leaders who will become members and vice chairmen of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) [1]. The premise of these analyses tend to focus on which officers either already have or might receive their third star (shangjiang) as a general or admiral between now and 2012. Unlike the U.S. military, whose generals and admirals wear four stars, PLA generals and admirals wear only three stars. While military rank is an important distinction in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hierarchy, a closer examination of the promotion path to becoming a CMC member reveals that it depends more on the PLA’s 15-grade (zhiwu dengji) structure than its 10-rank (junxian) structure [2].

This two-part series thoroughly examines the grade requirements for PLA officers to become the director of each of the four General Departments—General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD)—and the commander of the Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery. These articles also discuss their respective protocol order on the CMC, which is different for the four directors (based on position) and the three commanders (based on seniority). This is important because the protocol order and placement of the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery commanders on the CMC as a “policy promotion,” which is not an automatic promotion upon becoming the commander, implies that the eight members of the CMC may not be equal in terms of their authority.

Although the article does not speculate on potential CMC members in 2012, it does lay down an analytical framework, which leads to the speculation that the next Second Artillery commander may not immediately become a CMC member until he meets time-in-grade requirements. The article raises the question whether non-Army officers might serve as CMC vice chairmen.

PLA Grades vs. Ranks

The terms “grade” and “rank” are basically synonymous in the U.S. military, whereby each branch has 10 officer grades and their equivalent rank (e.g. an O-10 can be a four-star general or admiral). In the PLA, however, grades are based on an officer’s position and are more important than ranks. As a result, PLA writings usually refer to officer positions or grades and have few references to ranks.

Within the PLA, an officer’s grade, not rank, reflects authority and responsibility across service, branch, and organizational lines. While rank is a key indicator of position within the hierarchy of foreign militaries, grade is the key indicator of authority within the PLA. In the PLA commanders and political commissars (PC), who are collectively called “leaders” (lingdao or shouchang), are co-equals and hold the same grade, but they often do not wear the same rank.

For example, the current commanders of the Beijing Military Region (MR), Lanzhou MR and Nanjing MR each received their third star as a general on July 19, 2010, while each MR’s political commissar remains as a two-star lieutenant general. Meanwhile, the political commissars for the Guangzhou MR and Chengdu MR each received their third star, while the commanders remain as two stars (Xinhua News Agency, July 19).

Each PLA Organization Is Assigned a Grade

Another major difference between the U.S. military and the PLA is that the U.S. military assigns grades to officers and billets but not to organizations, whereas the PLA assigns grades to every officer and billet as well as every organization (e.g. operational and support unit headquarters, academic institutions, and research institutions). With only a few exceptions, the organization’s grade is the same as that of the commander and political commissar. For example:

- The Four General Departments are all CMC member-grade organizations, and each director is a CMC member-grade officer.
- The PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery are MR leader-grade organizations, and each political commissar is an MR leader-grade officer; however, each commander is currently a CMC member-grade officer (see discussion below).
- The Academy of Military Science (AMS) and National Defense University (NDU) are MR leader-grade organizations, and each commandant and political commissar is an MR leader-grade officer.
- The one exception is that the Ministry of National Defense (MND), which actually serves as the foreign affairs arm of the PLA, is not assigned a grade.

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CURRENT GRADE AND RANK STRUCTURE

In 1988, the PLA implemented its current grade and rank system, which has 15 grades and 10 ranks, as shown in Figure 1. The previous system, which had 17 grades, was implemented in 1979. The PLA implemented its first rank system in 1955 and abolished it at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1965. It did not re-institute a new system until 1988.

Most importantly, each grade from Platoon leader to MR leader has a primary and secondary rank. At the same time, however, certain ranks, such as a one-star (major general/rear admiral) can be assigned to one of four grades (MR deputy leader, corps leader, corps deputy leader, and division leader as noted in * underneath Figure 1). In addition, each grade has a mandatory retirement age. It is not clear, however, what the mandatory retirement age for CMC members is, but it may be either 68 or 70. The retirement age for CMC vice chairmen is also unclear, but may be 70 or above.

The PLA did not implement a mandatory retirement age of 65 for MR leader-grade officers until 1995. Based on interviews with PLA officers, the mandatory age for CMC Members following the 16th Party Congress was set at 70, but that may have changed following the 17th Party Congress.

GRADE AND RANK PROMOTION SCHEDULE

When discussing PLA promotions, one must clarify whether it is a promotion in grade or a promotion in rank, because they typically do not occur at the same time. In the PLA, officers must serve in a particular grade and rank for a minimum amount of time before being promoted to the next grade and rank. Furthermore, with only a few exceptions, PLA officers are not normally promoted in grade and rank at the same time. For example, regulations specify that officers from first lieutenant to colonel receive a rank promotion every four years, but receive their grade promotions from platoon leader to division leader every three years. PLA regulations specify three years time-in-grade and four years time-in-rank for platoon to corps-level officers [3].

This stair step approach is reflected in the primary and secondary rank structure shown in Figure 1 above. It is not clear what the time-in-rank and time-in-grade requirements are for one-star flag officers and corps leader and above grades, but it appears that there is definitely a minimum requirement for each—possibly three to four years.

It is also important to understand which billets have the same grade. For example, unit deputy commanders and the Chief of Staff (e.g. director of the Headquarters Department) always have the same grade.

FIGURE 1: CURRENT PLA GRADE AND RANK STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retirement Age</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Primary Rank</th>
<th>Secondary Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70?</td>
<td>CMC chairman (<em>junwei zhuxi</em>)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>GEN/ADM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMC vice chairmen (<em>junwei fuzhuxi</em>)</td>
<td>GEN/ADM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/70?</td>
<td>CMC member (<em>junwei weiyuan</em>)</td>
<td>GEN/ADM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>MR leader (<em>daqu zhengzhi</em>)</td>
<td>GEN/ADM</td>
<td>LTG/VADM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>MR deputy leader (<em>daqu fuzhi</em>)</td>
<td>LTG/VADM</td>
<td>MG/RADM*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Corps leader (<em>zhengjunzhi</em>)</td>
<td>MG/RADM*</td>
<td>LTG/VADM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corps deputy leader (<em>fujunzhi</em>)</td>
<td>MG/RADM*</td>
<td>SCOL/SCAPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Division leader (<em>zhengshizhi</em>)</td>
<td>SCOL/SCAPT</td>
<td>MG/RADM*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division deputy leader (<em>fushizhi</em>) / (Brigade leader)</td>
<td>COL/SCAPT</td>
<td>SCOL/SCAPT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLA units have multiple deputy commanders. For example, every Military Region has five deputy commanders, one of which, since 1988, is the Military Region Air Force (MRAF) commander. Since 1988, the commander of each of the PLA Navy’s three fleet headquarters has also concurrently been a Military Region deputy commander.

As a result, a Chief of Staff can move directly to becoming the commander. For example, the current director of the GAD, General Chang Wanquan, previously served as the Lanzhou MR Chief of Staff and the Beijing MR Chief of Staff before becoming the Shenyang MR commander. He did not serve as an MR deputy commander.

CMC Member Grade

Knowing what grade the PLA assigns to each billet helps China analysts understand what the probable promotion ladder to the CMC member and vice chairmen grades looks like. Yet, the CMC member-grade, as well as the military region leader grade, is complicated.

- First, the current senior CMC member, General Liang Guanglie, is concurrently the Minister of National Defense [4].
- Second, the grade for all of the Four General Departments and each director is CMC member grade.
- Third, the PLAN, PLAAF and Second Artillery are MR leader-grade organizations, but their commanders are CMC member-grade officers.

As can be seen, the protocol order for the four General Departments, regardless of who the leaders are, remains the same. The reason for this is that these four organizations are assigned the grade of CMC member. For example, even though Li Jinai and Liao Xilong became CMC members in 2002, Chen Bingde, who became the GAD director in 2004, is still listed first due to his position as Chief of the General Staff based on the protocol order for the Four General Departments.

Conclusion

Although the author does not assume to predict the potential CMC members in 2012, the author does speculate that the next Second Artillery commander may not immediately become a CMC member until he meets “time-in-grade” (TIG) requirements. The promotions in 2010 will provide the first glimpse at the PLA’s possible leaders who will emerge at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. However, one should not focus on the ranks but on the grades, especially the MR leader-grade level that will be addressed in the second part of this series. This is particularly important when determining who the next Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery commanders, will be, as well as the next Chief of the General Staff.

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Notes

1. See Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 3: Military Leaders) and Alice L. Miller, “The 18th Central Committee Politburo: A Quixotic, Foolhardy, Rashly Speculative, but Nonetheless Ruthlessly Reasoned Projection,” in China Leadership Monitor,

2. The information in this article is taken mostly from Kenneth W. Allen and John F Corbett, Jr., Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, Dr. Andrew Scobell and Dr. Larry Wortzel, eds., Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2004, Chapter 8, 237-278, which is available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub413.pdf; and China’s Navy 2007, The Office of Naval Intelligence, Chapters 1 and 2, 1-16, which is available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf.

3. PLA Officer Rank Regulations Amended on December 20, 2002. PLA Active-Duty Officer Law, Published on December 28, 2000. Interviews with PLA officials in Beijing during November 2006 and November 2010.

4. In China, the Ministry of National Defense is responsible only for implementing the PLA’s foreign affairs. It does not have a political commissar. Liang Guanglie’s two predecessors, Cao Gangchuan and Chi Haotian, were concurrently CMC vice chairmen.

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China Building Africa’s Economic Infrastructure: SEZs and Railroads

By Loro Horta

Starting in the late 1990s, China’s presence on the African continent experienced a phenomenal expansion. Far more profound changes, however, have been underway and may only become apparent in the next decade. These changes are likely to transform the regional economic landscape of the African continent in ways never seen before. Chinese experts apparently believe that Africa is entering an era of relative stability and that the time to explore its untapped resources has arrived [1]. Chinese policymakers see in Africa possible solutions to some of China’s most pressing problems, for instance, Beijing’s need to secure access to energy resources and other vital minerals to sustain the country’s rapid economic growth. Yet Chinese interests in Africa extend beyond energy resources and minerals and clearly include markets, infrastructure development and agriculture. China’s operations in Africa are becoming more diversified and multi-dimensional, and the Chinese government as well as private entrepreneurs has seemingly realized the need to look at large regions of Africa in an integrated fashion to maximize the benefits of its growing investments. This new approach has resulted in an ambitious plan, which was announced at the 2006 Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting, to establish five special economic zones (SEZs) in Africa to attract Chinese investment and integrate China’s comprehensive economic activities throughout the continent. In spite of the recent global economic downturn, this program appears to be gaining momentum.

FROM WORDS TO ACTION

In September 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce approved $450 million worth of investments to establish two special economic and industrial zones in Zambia. The zones, which are to be located at Chambuchi and Lusaka, will concentrate primarily on copper mining with China Northern Metal Mining Group as the main operator. On September 16, 2009 the Mauritanian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam and vice-governor of the Chinese province of Shanxi, Li Xiaoping, officially launched the Mauritius Jinfai Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone, the first Chinese special economic zone in Mauritius. China is expected to invest up to $750 million in the next ten years. The SEZ in Mauritius is intended to serve as a manufacturing hub where garments, electronic products such as computers, and TV sets will be assembled. Other manufactured goods include medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and high tech machinery. The SEZ in Mauritius will also act as a major service center for trade, finance and tourism [2]. Mauritius is also being developed into a manufacturing hub in the Indian Ocean Rim, and given its reportedly plentiful supply of human assets, some 50 Chinese companies are expected to move into the mega industrial parks to be created in the outskirts of the capital Port Louis (AFP, February 17, 2009).

At around the same time, the Chinese government confirmed its intent to proceed with the establishment of SEZs in three other countries: Nigeria (two zones), Ethiopia and Egypt. In Nigeria, China plans to invest up to $500 million in two SEZs that will focus on manufacturing machineries and mineral extraction. In Ethiopia, China has pledged to invest $100 million in an industrial park where electric machinery and iron works will be the main activities. In Egypt, the planned SEZ will be located in the south of the Suez Canal where China is committed to invest $700 million.

When the SEZs described above are complete, these projects will be in a position to help facilitate the economic integration of East Africa, the Middle East and Asia in ways not seen since the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century and the subsequent destruction of regional trade routes by the Europeans. These zones together have the
potential to create hundreds of thousands of jobs and go a long way in addressing one of the continent’s perennial curses: poverty. The Beijing initiative may bring additional benefits to these African countries by inspiring Western and other Asian powers, such as India, to spearhead their own initiatives. Indeed, Indian and Arab business interests have shown some interest in similar projects in Kenya and the stable and increasingly prosperous country of Mozambique.

In order to maximize the potential of the SEZs, the Chinese government and private entrepreneurs have started investing in African infrastructure in and around the SEZ areas, particularly in rail, roads and mega dams. Indeed, Beijing has been funding the rehabilitation and construction of new rail tracks that link the southern Atlantic coast of Africa in the Angolan port city of Bengela and to two ports in coastal countries along the Indian Ocean: one in Tanzania at Dar es Salaam and another in Mozambique, probably at Nacala or Beira. A Chinese company has reportedly already begun to modernize the Dar es Salaam port.

For over a century, various Western colonial powers have tried to link the two African coasts. De Angola a contra costa (from Angola to the other coast) dreamed the Portuguese. Upon independence, civil war and chronic instability prevented any progress and that dream was all but forgotten. Now a new power from the East believes this is the right moment to invest in that old dream. This is not without precedent. In the 1970s China built, at the request of Tanzania and Zambia, the Tanzan Railway, a massive 1,800 kilometer line linking landlocked copper-rich Zambia to the coast of China’s long time ally Tanzania. Beijing built the railway at great cost to the PRC and after every Western country rejected the two African states. The Tanzan Railway would allow the PRC to move important commodities to the coast in a much faster and cheaper way substantially cutting down costs. The rail link would also benefit African nations and contribute to foster regional trade.

Three decades later, China may reap some rewards for it continued relations Tanzania. Along with this gesture, China would only have to upgrade the existing line and connect it to the Bengela railway, which it already rehabilitated for the Angolan government. For the first time the continent may be linked from coast to coast, which may pave the way for potential economic benefits.

Egypt may also become a major manufacturing hub thanks to a highly educated work force, good basic infrastructure and its strategic location at the cross roads of three regions: Europe, Asia and Africa. Zambia, where Chinese interests already run 21 farms, could also become a mining and agriculture hub where Chinese capital is expected to modernize the mining and agricultural sector and direct it towards meeting China’s rising energy and food demand.

Along the Atlantic coast of the African continent, China is hoping to transform its two economic zones in Nigeria into dynamos of sub regional growth. China has shown great interest in Cape Verde, and while that country was not selected to host a SEZ, the Cape Verdian government continues to lobby hard for deeper Chinese involvement in the country’s economy. Beijing is likely to create some industrial parks in the archipelago and develop port infrastructure there. Indeed, a more robust Chinese presence in Cape Verde would help consolidate China’s economic strategy in West Africa. As one of the continent’s few success stories, Cape Verde has enjoyed decades of stability and development, boasting a GDP per capita of $7,000 and having one of the most transparent and accountable governments in Africa. Cape Verde is strategically located on the West coast of Africa and in close proximity to Europe. A foothold in this traditionally very pro-Western archipelago would allow China to penetrate the European market via the African continent, benefiting from some of the preferential trading arrangements between the EU and Africa.

Cape Verde is likely to emerge as a major shipping and trading hub for the north and south Atlantic, playing a vital role in serving the ever-expanding Chinese merchant ships that cross those waters in the thousands. The island of Sao Vicente is likely to be used as a major ship repair facility and fish-processing center. The archipelago’s relatively credible banking system and its modern telecommunication infrastructure is likely to make Cape Verde the financial hub for Chinese economic operations in the region. In March 2009, the Bank of China announced its plans to open a branch on the islands by the end of 2010.

The Chinese SEZ that is being established in the Suez seems intended to serve as a hub for Chinese companies to penetrate the European, Middle Eastern and North African markets. Indeed, China has in recent years made significant inroads into the oil rich Arab world, and the SEZ in Egypt could pave the way for further Chinese economic penetration of the region and bring some political and diplomatic dividends for Beijing. The Suez, while not as strategically important for China as it is to the West, is not insignificant for a nation whose interests are now becoming global.

China’s prime motivation for the establishment of SEZs in Africa seems to be economic. China desperately needs raw materials from Africa to sustain its economic growth, and it
needs to find alternative markets to export its commodities to and reduce its dependence on Western markets. As labor costs grow in China, the relocation of certain industries may be beneficial to its economy. However, Beijing certainly has some political objectives. Indeed, in many instances these political objectives may override economic interests. China is keen on consolidating its presence in the African continent with the aim of securing the flow of vital energy resources and raw materials to the continent. African nations are also an important political ally of China and contribute to shore up its position in the international stage. In the long term, as the PLAN expands its reach, the African East Coast will grow in importance to China’s naval strategy and its security.

China is not blind to the Indian Navy’s growing military presence in the African West coast and particularly the establishment of eavesdropping centers by New Delhi on the African coast (Indian Express, July 12, 2007). In the next two decades, several African countries will become militarily relevant to China, such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania and Madagascar. These territories could complement and extend China’s so-called “string of pearls” dotted along critical sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean near India and the approaches to both the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Other concerns such as piracy are most likely to be part of China’s long-term calculations, as demonstrated by the PLAN deployment to the Somali coast. In recent years, Chinese military publications have begun to openly debate the possibility of the PLA establishing bases overseas and the ideas of Mahan on sea power are now dominant in the PLAN (See “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?” China Brief, September 24, 2009).

A LAND OF RISKS

While China’s economic zones are planned in stable countries, many of the neighboring countries are highly unstable and conflict could very possibly spillover. There are also big question marks over issues such as the quality of the labor force, local resentment and competition from other powers, not to mention less risky places to make money in Asia or Latin America. Nigeria and Ethiopia appear to be the most risky bets that China is taking. Nigeria has long faced serious problems with sectarian violence, separatism, military coups and rampant corruption. Several Chinese diplomats have expressed to the author their skepticism over some of the SEZ choices. Mauritius and Zambia seem to be far safer selections. However, in Zambia there are no guarantees that a change of government may not seriously compromise Sino-Zambian ties. During Zambia’s last Presidential elections the opposition candidate threatened to recognize Taiwan and put an end to China’s exploitative actions (Reuters, February 3, 2007; Afrol News, July 18, 2009).

Some in Beijing are growing increasingly concerned over the costs of shoring up dubious African regimes and wonder if the money would not be better spent elsewhere. Others fear that it is just a matter of time before these regimes collapse and China is left with nothing to show for the billions it invested into Africa. There is also growing resentment in some African countries over Chinese firms’ reluctance to employ locally, low salaries and safety standards in Chinese mines throughout the continent. Indeed, when President Hu visited Zambia a tour of a mining town was canceled for fears that miners and their families were preparing to stage a protest (Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2009).

CONCLUSION

In China, both government and private capital seem to believe in a great future for Sino-African relations. China has taken far greater risks in Africa than any other major power and is gambling serious elements of its national interest in the continent. Today over 20 percent of China’s oil imports come from the continent, from places like Angola, the Sudan, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. The stakes are growing higher and higher every year. Therefore, China is willing to invest vast amounts of money, which is so desperately needed by Africa. If managed wisely by African leaders, China’s grand plans for Africa can bring great benefits for all sides. In the end it is more up to the Africans than to the Chinese. Whether Chinese expectations of a bright future for Africa will materialize remains to be seen. Despite some caution among certain circles in Beijing there seems to be enough enthusiasm for the dragon to continue dreaming across the savanna.

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NOTES

1. For a good overview on Chinese perceptions of Africa see Li Anshan “China’s New Policy Towards Africa” in China Brief, Volume X • Issue 15 • July 22, 2010.
The centrality of the seemingly abstruse concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat to ongoing ideological debates in China was spotlighted recently in a wide ranging interview given by the 105 year old senior communist stalwart Zhou Youguang (1906-), best known for his invention of the system of Chinese-English transliteration known as hanyu pinyin. Reminiscing about what brought him to support the communists against the nationalists (Kuomintang), the linguist hearkened back to regular talks he and other intellectuals held in Chongqing during wartime with the future Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (1898-1976). In these discussions, Zhou assured his listeners authoritatively and convincingly that the communists would implement a democratic regime, far freer than that of Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) [1]. Mao Zedong (1893-1976) made a similar assurance in 1945, as the Chinese civil war was ending, telling a Reuters correspondent that “a free, democratic China would ... realize the ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’ concept of Abraham Lincoln and the ‘four freedoms’ proposed by Franklin Roosevelt” [2].

Zhou Youguang pinned these assurances to the bedrock of communist doctrine when he further recalled that the great scholar Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), one of those who introduced Marxist thought into China and helped to found the communist party (although he was later condemned and marginalized) had written in 1940 that the dictatorship of the proletariat—which is what both the Soviet and Chinese dictators have claimed to be, was in fact “the same as the democracy of the capitalist class—a citizen’s freedom of assembly, opinion, organization, publication, to strike and organize opposition parties. After 1949 this important document could no longer be published” [3].

In the USSR, the regime imposed by the Bolshevik coup d'état of 1917 was regularly called a “proletarian” dictatorship, which is to say a dictatorship exercised by or on behalf of the entire population of workers as the final stage in the liberation of hitherto oppressed society. The same process took place in China. Yet as Zhou’s reminiscences suggest, giving such a name to either of those regimes is in fact problematic, since in the fundamental works of Marx and Engels, party rule through dictatorship is not considered as identical to “proletarian” dictatorship as the two founders envisioned it [4].

To understand the issues involved for the serious Marxist in defining different sorts of “dictatorship,” it is essential to grasp that Karl Marx’s (1818-1883) entire vision saw history as moving, through a dialectical process, from complexity toward simplicity. Historical processes steadily rendered more simple and homogenous a human society that had begun full of complexity and differentiation.

Thus, in feudal times, polities and authorities were more than could be counted, and the degrees of personal status complex and diverse. By contrast, with the advent of industrialism, all of this was being sorted out into two antagonistic components: on one side a mass of workers having no property but sharing a common interest, and on the other a handful of capitalists owning the means of production and having interests contrary to those of the workers. As Marx and Engels saw it, the final turn of the dialectical millstone would eliminate the capitalists and make the workers proprietors of everything.

The dictatorship of the proletariat would therefore in their concept be simple and brief: a matter of arresting the remaining capitalists and taking control of the industrial society that had matured under their power, and then stepping aside to allow the emergence of a new and enduring form of society, that would be both materially abundant and politically free, while having little, if any, need for government, for in it social conflict would be impossible. This was so because power would now belong to the workers, all of whom lived and labored in a comparable way and therefore, it was believed, had identical interests, and thus no reason to quarrel over politics.

The reality of communist power in both the USSR and China was very different. It arrived long before society had reached the level of maturity envisioned by Marx and Engels. Therefore, the new dictatorship did not so much transfer a modern society to the workers’ ownership as it did strive to create such a society. Nevertheless, the Marxist view was articulated repeatedly in Soviet communist...
thought, notably at the time we are considering in this series, during the closing decades of the last century. The officially promulgated version was that contradictions that had existed in the old society had ultimately been rooted in differing relationships of individuals to the means of economic production. These differences were steadily disappearing as socialism was built under the so-called proletarian dictatorship of the Soviet party, with the result that a new, homogenous, and equal society was coming into being. “[T]he “improvement and perfection” (sovershenstvovanie) of social relations in the stage of developed socialism were said to be the continued convergence (sblizhenie) of classes and major strata and the gradual effacement (stranie) of the differences between them” [5]. Such developments were in keeping with the Marxist prediction of the eventual homogenization of humanity into a single class, by the workings of the dialectic. The Chinese view, in which the undifferentiated and cohesive mass of the renmin or “people” plays the leading role in history, clearly draws on these Soviet concepts derived from Marxism.

The problem, however, is that history does not move from complexity to simplicity in society, as Marx thought, but rather in the opposite direction: with development, everything grows more complex. Contemporary societies are incomparably more intricate in their myriad of interrelated functions, dependencies, specializations and so forth, than any previous societies. From this fact, it follows that society is likely to face more internal disputes and choices, as it becomes more modern, rather than fewer. Providing mechanisms for the consistent and transparent resolution of those disputes thus becomes all-important.

That this was true for the Soviet Union was confirmed when the sociologist Zev Katz reported in 1973 that because of Soviet research in the late 1960s and early 1970s, “a new picture of Soviet society, possessing a highly stratified and complex nature, is emerging. Instead of the previous official picture, which was basically unidimensional (forms of ownership), a multidimensional image of stratification is gradually appearing” [6]. Much could be said about today’s China that parallels these developments. Social and functional differentiation proceeds apace; differentials grow massively in wages between different regions and occupations. Changing degrees of access to power, the proliferation of new ideas and belief systems, and so forth, are all well-known but less documented developments [7].

For serious Marxists, these are entirely unexpected and unwelcome developments, as they suggest that under “socialism” social conflicts continue and even intensify. This is a fundamental challenge to the whole Marxist vision of governance, in which the state was due to “wither away” because it was unnecessary after the workers’ triumph. In China this unexpected problem is only beginning to be dealt with by such expedients as Jiang Zemin’s (1926-) “three represents” or Hu Jintao’s (1942-) “harmonious society.” Yet, in the Soviet Union “[b]eginning in the middle of the 1970s, the leadership was increasingly insistent on discouraging or suppressing sociological research that tested the limits [of the Marxist predictions of social simplification]” [8].

These issues could be resolved, so Soviet communist theorists thought. They would not disappear of their own accord, following the inexorable laws of the dialectic, as Marx and Engels had believed—though this point was not stressed. Rather, “Soviet sources representative of the Brezhnev (1906-1982) leadership’s outlook resolutely denied … that stronger internal integration would arise solely from the spontaneous development of society. They insisted that if social development were not subjected to conscious, planned direction, the growth of complexity and differentiation would lead to anarchy and disintegration” [9]. No longer were social contradictions thought to be “survivals” or perezhitki of the old society. They were recognized as products, or “acquisitions”—nazhitki—of socialism itself [10]. By implication, then, new institutions would be required, even under socialism, to maintain social cohesion and harmony. This was a view precisely opposite to that of Marx, who saw the advent of socialism as bringing permanent social harmony.

This empirically-derived view was uncomfortable for Soviet theorists, but it fit in well with Mao Zedong’s long-held and distinctly non-Marxist view that class conflict continued even after the attainment of socialism. His 1937 essay “On Contradiction,” which is generally considered his stamp on Marxist Leninist theory, sees the struggle of opposites as ceaseless in history, rather than being, as Marx argued, a process that leads, ultimately, to a new and stable social order [11].

The problem for both the Chinese and the Soviet communist systems was what sorts of mechanisms could smooth over or resolve the contradictions created by the growth of complexity and differentiation, problems it should be noted that were entirely unanticipated by Marx, and arguably products of the distinctly non-Marxist methods in which power had been seized in both countries. Mao attempted to address the issue in his 1957 essay “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” [12]. This essay, it should be noted, was in essence a response to the revelation of discord under the surface of the Communist dictatorship that came with the “hundred flowers” movement of 1956-57, discord that was exploited by Mao himself as he sought to use those excluded from power
by the party dictatorship to regain supreme authority for himself in the Cultural Revolution, and has continued to be a salient feature of “People’s China” right up to the present [13].

As it turned out, when faced by the challenge of continuing, even developing complexity and diversity under socialism, both the Soviet Union and China turned away from strict Marxism toward more traditional concepts in their attempts to resolve these problems. Neither hesitated, until the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev (1931-) to use repression liberally; both sought ways to create social amalgamation in their traditional imperial repertoire, rather than in the actual ideas of Marx and Engels.

China saw much favorable discussion of Gorbachev and inter-party normalization in the late eighties under Premier Zhao Ziyang (1919-2005). In the Beijing Review, as early as 1987, there were a series of articles by Luo Rongxing and others, one of which, “Different Interest Groups Under Socialism,” points out how, in communist China, social diversity was developing (just as it had in the USSR).

“An indisputable fact in China today is that there exist different interest groups whose understanding of the objective situation is different . . . The socialist system has the advantage of being best able to identify the interests of the people with those of society as a whole, but there are still differences of interests between different groups of people.” [emphasis added]

Luo and his colleagues note:

“Since 1978 .... the reform has diversified forms of public ownership, stimulated the growth of individual, private, and other economic sectors, developed commodity and money relations, upgraded the role of market regulation, and broken away from the absolute egalitarian distribution system. All this has meant that interest relations have changed in every respect—making them more varied, complex, and above all more apparent than ever.”

Some mechanisms had to be found to represent and adjust these interests, or China’s society risked disintegration, chaos, or conflict. The methods of the past could not be used. According to Luo: “Before the reforms, the masses and cadres were all easily led away from recognition of divergence of interests between different groups in the community: contradictions and conflicts between people were crammed bag and baggage under the rubric of ‘class struggle.’” Now the need was seen for an enduring structural and institutional solution [14].

After Li Peng (1928-) became premier in April 1988, this prickly topic, which posed a challenge to the whole presentation of the Chinese regime as a proletarian dictatorship in the Marxist sense, was quickly put to one side. In October 1988, an article by Jin Qi appeared in Beijing Review called “Controlling the Diversification of Interests.” Instead of discussing how the growing differentiation of Chinese economy and society might be accommodated, Jin’s article noted, “Future reforms and developments will largely be determined by whether effective ways to check the trend of diversification of interests and to overcome various related negative factors.” The only means proposed are “the establishment of a new series of market-oriented economic mechanisms” (although how markets would limit diversification is not made clear) and the old standbys, “to strengthen ideological education, establish the concept of putting the interests of the state and the people above all else, and subordinate local interests to overall interests. Professional ethics and social morals must be promoted. Overall, the development of socialist culture and ideology has to be accelerated” [15]. In other words, homogeneity was to be enforced and development restricted, even at the cost of overall social welfare.

In 1961, Khrushchev spoke of three stages, rastsvet-sblizhenie-slianie (Flowering-rapprochement-fusion). The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership tried to modify this policy during the 1970s into the less ambitious goal of obshchnost (“community”), with the Russian Republic (RSFSR) as the bulwark and helper of all the other republics of the federation. Yuri Andropov (1914-1984) had to admit on the 60th anniversary of the USSR’s founding that, although all sorts of differences persisted even decades after the triumph of socialism, “national differences will continue much longer than class differences” [16].

What had become clear was that in the USSR at least, the fusion of classes and nationalities expected by Marx on the basis of shared economic interest was not occurring: quite the opposite. Likewise, ethnic and national differences persisted under socialism. So the question became, if class homogeneity was not to be the basis of the unity and harmony of a socialist state, what then would be? The failed Soviet answer was, under Brezhnev and Kosygin (1904-1980), some sort of cultural and supra-national unity. Under Gorbachev, of course, social and intellectual liberalization were taken as the key to stability.

Today in China an idea similar to that of the Brezhnev and Kosygin period in the Soviet Union is being propagated with the revival of the idea of a zhonghua minzu or “Chinese race” and the uneasily associated concept of “multi-racial state” (duominzuguojia), in which according to some the Chinese or Hanzu are the leading race, rather like the
Russians in the former USSR. Whatever happens, China appears to have moved a very great distance away from the fundamental Marxist idea of stability and harmony reached through dialectical processes and delivered by the midwife of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whether the search for social harmony by this route will be more successful in China than it was in the Soviet Union remains to be seen.


NOTES

1. Mark O’Neill, “Zhou Youguang calls it as he sees it—and is not afraid to offend.” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2a6f2eb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/vgnnextoid=5c1e95d130be9210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News consulted 20 July 2010. My thanks to Gordon G. Chang for this reference.
3. Mark O’Neill, see note 1, above.
7. For this see Martin King Whyte, Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Injustice and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
8. Evans, p. 132
9. Ibid., 137, emphasis added.
10. Ibid., 174.
15. Beijing Review, October 24, 1988: 4-5. I am indebted to Professor David Zweig for bringing these articles to my attention.

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