



MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR

Personalities Behind the Insurgency

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TAJIKISTAN CONFIRMS DEATH OF NOTORIOUS MILITANT LEADER MULLO ABDULLO

On April 15, Tajikistan state television reported that its most wanted militant leader and warlord, Mullo Abdullo, was killed in an operation carried out by security forces in the troubled Rasht district east of Dushanbe (Channel One [Dushanbe], April 17). Tokhir Normatov, chief of staff of the Tajik Interior Ministry, said that Abdullo was killed along with 14 of his fighters (AP, April 16). In the aftermath of Abdullo's death a hitherto unknown group calling itself Mojohidini Tokijikiston (Mujahideen of Tajikistan) posted an online statement that its members hailed from all of Tajikistan's major regions as opposed to the Rasht and Badakhshan areas of historic Islamic insurgency. The Mojohidini Tokijikiston called on their fellow Tajiks to overthrow the autocratic regime of President Emomali Rahmon (REF/RL, April 28).

In the group's statement: "We appeal to you, dear brothers and sisters of Tajikistan! Are you not prepared to leave this world, what do you fear and what are you waiting for? Rise up, the peoples of Dushanbe, Khatlon and Badakhshan, Sugda and Rasht! Is there not a single decent man among you who has not bowed his head before the non-entities that is headed by alcoholic [President] Emomali [Rahmon]? Look, where is now the president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak? Where is now the president of Tunisia? What is now happening to the president of Libya? Allah is punishing them in this world and humiliating them in front of the whole world." [1]

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Mullo Abdullo, whose real name is believed to be Abdullo Rahimov, was a major rebel commander of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the country's 1992-1997 civil war which ended in a negotiated peace that Abdullo never accepted (Asia Plus, April 18). Rather than accept a peace with the government of Emomali Rahmon and demobilize his fighters accordingly, Abdullo headed south to Afghanistan before returning to reignite troubles in Tajikistan in 2009. The Tajik government did its best to co-opt leading members of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Islamist component of the UTO, but Abdullo preferred a life on the run. In the days before Mullo Abdullo's death, Dushanbe claimed it was interested in carrying out meaningful dialogue with its internal opponents in the UTO in order to bring them in from the political cold.

A former UTO commander and civil war-era deputy of Abdullo's, Fathullo Khayriddinov, said the he believed Abdullo was irreconcilable: "Even after serving time in prison, someone who had evil intentions is not likely to change. Mullo Abdullo did not accept the peace agreement; he thought he would be imprisoned, and he thinks it now too" (Central Asia Online, April 12). It is clear that Dushanbe felt killing Abdullo was the proper method of resolving his renewed presence in the rugged Rasht valley.

A possible reason for Abdullo's return to the Tajik battlefield may have been the immense pressure from drone missile attacks in Pakistan, where he is believed to have sought shelter after years in Afghanistan. Speculating about the possible motive for Abdullo's reemergence, Tajik analyst Parviz Mullojonov stated: "It is more than likely that under these circumstances [drone strikes in Pakistan], a number of groups will be forced to return to Central Asia and become more active in the region – even they are not ready for large-scale operations" (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 23, 2009).

Abdullo, age 60 or 61, was accused of being behind a large-scale ambush in the Rasht district on September 19, 2010, that killed 28 Tajik military personnel (Interfax, April 19). This brazen attack on the Ministry of Defense convoy is what ultimately triggered the recent manhunt that eliminated Abdullo. The hunt for Abdullo lasted some seven months and cost Tajikistan the lives of 60 of its troops (RFE/RL, April 23). The end of Abdullo is highly unlikely to be the end of militancy in Tajikistan, the causes of which, in the militants' own words, are largely economic rather than ideological. Tajikistan's

militants' grievances include the lack of sustainable heat for homes in the country's bitter winters and President Rahmon's never-ending Rogun dam hydroelectric vanity project. IRP spokesman Khikmatullo Saifullozoda said: "Certain foreign circles have an interest in seeing Tajikistan remain an unstable state. I cannot foresee which Mujahideen will figure, but the 'game' continues. You can always find such Mujahideen here, especially given the socio-political problems we've got" (Central Asia Online, April 28).

LEADERSHIP FISSURES IN SYRIAN MILITARY THREATEN STABILITY OF AL-ASSAD REGIME

As violence has intensified in southern Syria's besieged city of Dera'a, information is creeping out of a deadly schism within the country's Ba'athist military though impossible to independently verify due to the barring of international media from Syria. Anonymous residents of the city reported seeing clashes between the 4th Division, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Maher al-Assad, President Bashar al-Assad's younger brother, and the 5th division (Al Jazeera English, April 29). The regime portrays the violence in Dera'a as a jihadi uprising that is forcing beleaguered Damascus to fight for its survival. The Syrian Arab News Agency describes captured protestors 'confessing' under duress on state television, as members of an unspecified "extremist terrorist group" that was receiving external motivation and support from activists in Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (SANA, April 29). Maher was described in a report by the Council on Foreign Relations as possibly "unstable." [2] His name allegedly originally figured into The Mehlis Report, an investigation into the February 14, 2005 assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, but was later scrubbed from the final text for reasons that remain unclear. [3]

A Facebook group called Syrian Revolution 2011 reports that five officers from Maher al-Assad's 4th Division defected to the dissident side after they were ordered to fire upon unarmed protestors (Ya Libnan, April 25). The uprising, which began on March 18, has taken hundreds of lives, including those in the security forces. Maher al-Assad, a member of the ruling Alawite minority elite, is most likely motivated by regime preservation as protests continue to engulf the country's retrograde Arab socialist nationalist Ba'ath Party, which at the time of this writing can only survive by implementing severe physical and political repression. Maher's troops stormed into Dera'a to crush dissent somewhat reminiscent of his father Hafez al-Assad's

infamous 1982 scorched earth assault on the city of Hama to snuff out the Muslim Brotherhood (Ya Libnan, April 29).

As an integral member of his brother's inner core, Maher will be subject to immediate U.S. sanctions in a report that describes him as "the second most powerful man in Syria" commanding an "ultra-loyal" elite 4th Division (Al Arabiya, April 27). A Lebanese daily suggested that the individual sanctions against Maher, which would be implemented by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, were all but a done deal (An Nahar, April 27). As Maher al-Assad's loyalist troops continue to gun down civilian agitators calling for his brother's overthrow in Dera'a, 200 lower-level Ba'athists resigned from the party as their country's now violent uprising showed no signs of abating (Reuters, April 29). As Militant Leadership Monitor went to press, U.S. President Barack Obama signed an Executive Order imposing individual sanctions on Maher al-Assad, his cousin Atif Najib, and Ali Mamluk, chief of Syria's General Intelligence Directorate coupled by a White House statement that read: "The United States strongly condemns the Syrian government's continued use of violence and intimidation against the Syrian people" (UPI, April 29).

Notes:

1. To view the Mojohidini Tokijikiston's original statement (in Tajik), see: <http://irshod.net/index.php?newsid=290>.
2. Esther Pan, "Syria's Leaders" Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-leaders/p9085#p2>.
3. Mona Yacoubian and Scott Lasensky, *Dealing with Damascus: Seeking a Greater Return on U.S.-Syria Relations*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), p.15.

Emir Muhannad: The Last of Chechnya's Arab Volunteers

By Mairbek Vatchagaev

The late Emir Muhannad, the North Caucasus' recently killed Arab militant leader, hailed from the Medina area in Saudi Arabia's western Hejaz region. Muhannad, born in 1969, was reportedly shot to death in a clash with security forces in the Chechen village of Serzhen-Yurt on April 21 (see North Caucasus Analysis, April 22; Kavkaz Center, April 22) following in a long line of Arab militants killed there since the start of the second Chechen conflict in October 1999. His full name is presumably Khaled Youssef Mohammad al-Elitat, but in the Caucasus he is better known by his nom de guerre, Emir Muhannad (alternately spelled Mukhannad or Moganned in Russian). Along with disagreement over the precise spelling of Muhannad's actual last name – al-Elitat vs. al-Emirate – some Russian language sources claim Muhannad was a Jordanian national, though it is commonly believed that he was a Saudi national (Kavkaz-uzel.ru, April 22; RFE/RL, April 22).

A graduate with honors from the Islamic Institute in Medina, Muhannad began his activities in Chechnya and its neighboring regions in the early days of Russia's second military campaign against Chechen separatists. He arrived to participate in that war and tried to pass through Georgia into Chechnya in late 2000. Upon his arrival in the Pankisi Gorge – a small mountainous alluvial valley in northeastern Georgia abutting the Chechen border and populated mostly by ethnic Chechens known as Kists – he waited almost two years for the window to cross into the Chechen Republic. Living there among the Kists and Chechen refugees of the Pankisi Gorge, he passed the time giving lectures on the history of Islam and actively explaining to young people why the traditional Islam of the Chechens is not the religion in its purest form as it should be practiced. It was during this period that Wahhabi influence began to appear in Pankisi. Muhannad is believed to be from an ancient grouping known as the Medina Ansars, 'supporters of the Prophet', which greatly increased his credibility among the mujahideen. Muhannad finally moved into Chechnya with a group controlled by one of the Akhmadov brothers in 2001.

Muhannad arrived in the Caucasus alongside other notable transnational Arab jihadis, such as Abu Haf

al-Urduni, Abu Atiya, Abu-Rabia and others. [1] These prominent Arab fighters also represented the element within the war who tried to provide financial, military and propaganda assistance to the Chechen fighters and promote the Chechen cause in the Arab world and further afield. [2] This assistance was organized around several high-ranking and influential figures in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The first leader of the foreign volunteers' unit in the North Caucasus region, specifically in Chechnya, was an ethnic Chechen from Jordan called Fathi al-Jordani. The next figure to hold this post was another ethnic Chechen from Jordan, known as Abdurahman. The latter was killed in 2000, after which the unit was headed by the notorious Emir Khattab, a native of Saudi Arabia. Khattab played a crucial role in the establishment of several Muslim militant centers across Chechnya with a special focus on martial arts and short courses on the fundamentals of Islam. Emir Khattab was killed by Russian security services with a poisoned letter in March 2002 (Rosbalt.ru, July 29, 2010). Khattab was succeeded by Abu Walid al-Saudi who was assassinated in April 2004, and Abu Walid was succeeded by Abu Hafs al-Urduni, who became the leader of the foreign volunteers. Al-Urduni was killed in November 2006. In all probability, it was in this period of time – fall 2006 – when Muhannad became the key facilitator connecting the Chechen rebels with the outside Muslim world supporting the Chechen insurgency, specifically in Saudi Arabia, the Levant and the Persian Gulf.

It should be noted that as he was a ranking member of the rebel unit commanded by Aslanbek Vadalov (a.k.a. Emir Aslanbek), Emir Muhannad took part in combat operations, allowing him to speak on an equal basis and make statements not as an outside observer, but as an active participant of the North Caucasus resistance movement. According to different sources, he participated in attacks in 2008 in eastern parts of Chechnya and in 2009 in western Chechnya along the border with Ingushetia.

After the proclamation in September 2007 of the Caucasus Emirate bringing together several ethnic jamaats (communities) of the North Caucasian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and the Nogai Steppe area of Stavropol Krai, Muhannad ended up as the assistant, or naib, to Emirate supremo Doku Umarov, the overall leader of the North Caucasus resistance movement. Holding this high position within

the movement, in January 2009 Muhannad spoke out in support of the beleaguered residents of Gaza who were under siege from Israel. [3] When Emir Muhannad announced a new leader of the Dagestani militants, it suggested that his role was not limited to merely being Umarov's assistant. His Gaza diatribe and his meddling in Dagestan suggests that Muhannad had a bigger say in the Caucasus Emirate's establishment than some might have first thought considering his foreign origins. Muhannad quickly demonstrated his ability to influence decisions made by Umarov.

To observers of events in the North Caucasus, it was a strange twist to see Muhannad, once an Umarov loyalist, emerge as a conspirator siding with the dissenting rebel troika of Vadalov, Hussein Gakaev and Tarkhan Gaziev, who refused to obey Umarov and attempted to remove him from power in early August 2010. Singling out Muhannad as the chief organizer of this factional dissent, Umarov alleged that the Arab warlord encouraged fighters to come out of the subordination of the Caucasus Emir, and called into question the legitimacy of his authority (Lenta.ru, September 26, 2010).

According to Muhannad's own account of the situation, Umarov himself had to obey the decision made by the shura in the first place, and his disobedience of this consensus was the primary reason for some of the most high-ranking commanders – Vadalov, Gakaev and Gaziev – to renounce Umarov as the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. But the actions of the troika found little, if any, support among the rebels in the republics surrounding Chechnya. Rebels in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia unequivocally condemned the rebel schism and threw their full support behind Umarov. Moreover, Saifullah Gubdenski, the leader of the Dagestani fighters, lashed out at Muhannad with a fierce condemnation accusing him and his foreign predecessors of neglecting the aspirations of local rebel leaders and the outsiders' selfish desire to install their men in leading positions in traditionally parochial Caucasian jamaats. [4]

In an effort to curb Muhannad's power, pro-Umarov ideologues in the Chechen resistance began to seek external theological support to justify their position that despite his brief resignation, Umarov was still the ultimate authority among the North Caucasus' disparate rebels. The pro-Umarov group appealed to a London-based Syrian Salafi ideologue named 'Abd Al-Mun'im Mustafa Halima (a.k.a. Abu Basir Al Tartusi)

to weigh in on the matter. Al-Tartsui obliged and personally called on Muhannad to “either repent and obey Emir Doku Abu Usman (Doku Umarov) or leave the [North] Caucasus and return home.” [5] Muhannad did not formulate a response to al-Tartusi and failed to make a decision in response to the powerful statement by one of the most influential theologians representing the Salafi trend of the global Islamist movement.

With his death on April 21, Emir Muhannad was truly the last of the Arab fighters to arrive in Chechnya at the beginning of the Second Russo-Chechen war. It is a strange, ironic twist that the leader of what was left of the Chechen Arabs later became embroiled in an inter-Chechen dispute whereby the Arab militant sided against the creator of the Emirate, Doku Umarov and shifted his allegiance to back the nationalist wing of the Chechen separatist movement led by Vadalov, Gakaev and Gaziev. Indeed, while Muhannad may not be the last Arab to ever go to Chechnya, he certainly is the one volunteer who survived the longest and outlasted every known Arab fighter who preceded him and may eventually be recorded in the history of the conflict as the last of Chechnya’s Arab volunteers.

Dr. Mairbek Vatchagaev is the author of the book, “Chechnya in the 19th Century Caucasian Wars.”

Notes:

1. Igor Prokop’evich Dobaev, Trends in the Development of Islamic Movements in Southern Russia (in Russian), Institute of Religion and Policy, 2006, <http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-5602.html>.
2. To view Saifullah Gubdenski’s tract on intra-Muslim discord in regard to Muhannad (in Russian), see: www.kavkazmonitor.com/2010/11/28/52924.shtml.
3. To view Muhannad’s statement endorsing solidarity with Palestinians in the context of the Israeli assault on Gaza in January, 2009 (in Russian), www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/content/2009/01/20/63503.shtml.
4. To read about Saifullah Gubdenski’s views regarding the division between indigenous and Arab fighters in the North Caucasus (in Russian), see: <http://kavkazanhaamash.com/facty/18--/444-2010-11-12-03-38-07.html>.
5. To view the response by Abu Basir Al Tartusi encouraging Muhannad to fall in line with Doku Umarov (in Russian), see: http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/10/04/75622_print.html.

Between Iran and a Hard Place: A Profile of Bahrain’s Sheikh Issa Qassim

By Rafid Fadhil Ali

The chasm between the Sunni ruling elite and the Shia majority has been always the driving factor shaping the modern political history of Bahrain. Although Shia Muslims form the majority of the population of the small nation, the Sunni al-Khalifa family has been ruling the island since 1783. The clergy have maintained a powerful influence on the Shia community. The most influential among those is Sheikh Issa Ahmad Qassim. Qassim, born in the northwestern village of Diraz in 1943, has had a long history of involvement in Bahrain’s al-Da’wa party and is now the spiritual and supreme leader of al-Wefaq society, also known as the Islamic National Accord Association [1] [2]. Al-Wefaq is the biggest single bloc in the Bahraini parliament but it is no longer part of the government. In protest of the killings of demonstrators in the recent mass demonstrations, 18 al-Wefaq parliamentarians withdrew from the 40-member parliament (AFP, February 27). [3]

Following the example of the public protest against the governments in the Middle East and North Africa, thousands of Bahrainis, primarily, but not entirely, Shia, occupied the symbolic Pearl Roundabout in the capital of Manama on February 14 calling for political reforms. Although neither Qassim nor his party had called publically for protests or mobilized the masses, he soon adapted to the new situation and gave his blessing to the protesters. When the government of King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa attempted to take a

conciliatory approach after its initial harsh reaction to the protests and called for talks with the opposition, Qassim was firm and clear: “There should be no talk [with the government] without commitments and clear time-tables which guarantee that the results of such a talk would be implemented” (Al-Alam News Network, February 25).

Considering the now implacable position of Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini government, struggling to suppress the uprising, realized that there was no chance for immediate negotiation. On March 16, an estimated 2000 Saudi troops, supported by a lesser number of personnel from other Gulf Cooperation Council members, crossed the 16-mile causeway that links Bahrain Island (the largest of the 33 small island archipelago that forms the country) to the Saudi mainland. A state of emergency was declared the same day and the protests were ended forcefully (Al-Doualia, March 16).

Along with Sulaiman al-Madani, the first leader of the Bahraini branch of al-Da’wa, Sheikh Qassim played a major role in building the movement during the 1960s. When Bahrain gained independence from Britain in 1971, Qassim became a member of the first parliament. He was then facing not only the traditional Shia-Sunni divide but also the growing influence of the secular left-wing parties in vogue at the time, which he greatly opposed. A biography of Qassim published on his official web-site, albayan.org, indicates: “After graduating from the Fiqh (Islamic theology) school in Najaf [Iraq] in the 1960s, Sheikh Issa Qassim came back [to Bahrain] and ran for the election of the founding council which would be responsible for writing the constitution. He won overwhelmingly and along with the Islamic bloc succeeded to include several Islamic articles in the constitution.”

Following Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the corresponding crackdown on the mother al-Da’wa organization in Iraq at the hands of the Ba’ath Party, the Bahraini al-Da’wa branch suffered tremendous pressure from the security forces and decided to disband itself in 1984. Many Shia activists were imprisoned while others fled the country. A group of the latter started a new movement in London called Ahrar al-Bahrain (The Freeman of Bahrain- AB). Over the following years the AB tried to succeed al-Da’wa as the primary political representation of Bahrain’s pious Shia. Qassim also had to contend with another rival within the Shia community. The followers of the al-Shirazi movement, a Karbala-centered Shia group, who emerged in the mid-

1970s under the leadership of the Iraqi cleric Sayyed Hadi al-Mudarrisi, challenged the established al-Da’wa as a growing power in Bahrain. Other Shia parties also emerged over the last three decades trying to fill the political vacuum after the dissolution of al-Da’wa in that country.

To deal with the new challenges coming from the authorities, as well as his fellow Shia, Qassim made a vital decision in 1991. He traveled to Iran and enrolled in notable Shia seminaries, known as the Hawza, in the holy city of Qom. The move to Iran marked a strategic choice for Qassim. After his relocation to Qom, Sheikh Qassim embraced the distinctively Iranian ideology of velayat e-faqih (The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) originally propagated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1970s. Qassim later became associated with the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. That association gave Issa Qassim the power and external support he needed. However, the relationship also gave the Iranian regime a greater say in Bahrain’s internal affairs. To understand the scale of the Iranian influence on Bahrain’s Shia population, it is important to note that the latest attempt to undermine Qassim’s legitimacy came from a group of his domestic rivals who paid a visit to Ali Khamenei in 2009. They published a statement claiming that the Iranian supreme leader informed them that he did not have a sole representative in Bahrain and no one cleric had an exclusive right to lead the Shia population there. However, no confirmation of this view emanated from Tehran (or Qom apparently) about that claim and the recent turmoil stoked in part by Qassim proved that his power had not been as significantly eroded as his rivals would have liked (al-Waqt, September 1, 2009).

There was another wave of troubles between the Shia and the government in the 1990s. Qassim had then assigned his associate Sheikh Ali Salman to become the field leader of his movement. In 2001, King Hamad (then titled Emir) introduced a new constitution and offered more rights to the people through free election of the reinstated parliament. [4] Bahrain formally morphed from a state to a kingdom and Qassim was sought after along with other Shia figures to join the political process. He returned to the country, but it took another 4 years to embrace the change. In 2005, the al-Wefaq Society was established under the leadership of Salman and Qassim. Al-Wefaq won in a landslide in both the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2009. Although this new democratic approach angered the hardliners among Bahrain’s Shia populace, Qassim had gained more than he lost with his political choices.

With such results in the elections, Sheikh Issa Qassim and al-Wefaq acquired more power and enhanced their status as the most powerful Shia group in Bahrain. Currently, al-Wefaq is not part of the government, as the political system gave the king, rather than the outcome of the election, the right to appoint the cabinet. Shia protesters in the streets of Manama called for two historical demands: transforming Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy – though this demand later escalated into calling for the overthrow of the monarchy – and the removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman al-Khalifa, who has been occupying his position since Bahrain gained statehood in 1971. The Khalifa family would never have accepted the first demand as it would have meant abdicating real power. The protestor's second demand became much more difficult with the Saudi-led military intervention creating a political buffer for the ruling family. Sheikh Khalifa, who is viewed as the leader of the hardline wing in Bahrain's ruling family, has the full support of the Saudis. Qassim is a necessary component to any political solution to the crisis in Bahrain. If Sheikh Issa Qassim and his al-Wefaq movement decided to pull out indefinitely from politics and take more radical approach, the process of reform that King Hamad started in 2001 appears at the time of this writing to have ground to a halt as the minority Sunni regime has lost its main Shia partner.

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Notes:

1. Laurence Lou r, *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 106-107.
2. In the late 1950s, Shia Muslims founded their first organized religio-political movement, the Islamic Da'wa Party. Fearing the growing appeal of the Iraqi Communist Party among its youth, a group of junior theological students and activists supported by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (executed by the Saddam Hussein's government in 1980) founded the al-Da'wa party in the holy Shia city of Najaf in southern Iraq in 1957-1958. Like the Sunni religious parties of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahreer, which were founded earlier in the twentieth century, the al-Da'wa extended its influence well beyond Iraq. Sheikh Issa Qassim was one of the first Bahraini members and leaders of the Da'wa. (See Rasheed al-Khayon, *Lahoot al-Siyasa*, al-Ahزاب al-Denyah al-Mowasera Fee al-

Iraq, *Theology of Politics, The contemporary Religious Parties in Iraq*, (Baghdad: Dirasat Iraqiya).

3. It is not legal to form parties under the Bahraini laws. However political groups have been allowed to operate under the formation of societies.
4. The first Bahraini parliament was dissolved in 1975.

From Islamist Agitator to Taliban Target: Pakistan's Maulana Fazlur Rehman

By Arif Jamal

Early Life and Education

Maulana Fazlur Rehman was born into a religious family in 1953 in Dera Ismail Khan, one of the more underdeveloped areas in Pakistan. His ancestors came from Kandahar. Due to the severe and harsh winters in Kandahar, they would migrate to Dera Ismail Khan during winter months and return to Kandahar in the spring. When the grandfather of Maulana Fazlur Rehman fell ill and subsequently abandoned the migrant life, he settled in Dera Ismail Khan [1] where he gave his son, who later became known as Mufti Mehmood, a religious education. Mufti Mehmood studied in the local madrassa in Dera Ismail

Khan and went to Darul Uloom Deoband (now in India) for higher Islamic studies. After completing his studies at Deoband, Mehmood returned to his village and started his career as an imam in the local mosque but later joined madrassa Qasimul Uloom in Multan (South Punjab) as a teacher and mufti (one who is authorized to give fatwas).

Maulana Mufti Mehmood, the father of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, was a prominent Deobandi cleric and politician who had opposed the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan on religious basis. However, he later accepted it as a political reality. [2] Following Pakistani independence, Mehmood joined the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), a party founded by Deobandi ulema who had decided to stay in Pakistan. In 1956 he became the vice president of the JUI and later won the 1962 general elections. In the 1970 general elections, Mufti Mehmood won again, defeating Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Later, he joined the Provincial Assembly and was elected Chief Minister of Northwest Frontier Province (now known as the Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa Province).

Maulana Fazlur Rehman began his childhood studies at home before his father placed him in a local elementary school in Dera Ismail Khan. He was later sent to a middle school in the ancient Sufi city of Multan, where he also graduated from high school. After completing his studies, Rehman's father called him home and entered him into a madrassa where he completed his religious education. After finishing at the madrassa, he began teaching at the madrassa Qasimul Uloom in Multan. [3]

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Enters Politics

Although Maulana Mufti Mehmood had not initially been opposed to General Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq's martial law regime, he was not happy when General Zia reneged on his promise of holding free and fair elections after hanging Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. At the time of his death in 1980, Mehmood was holding consultations with his JUI party leaders about whether to oppose Pakistan's Martial Law regime in light of the former prime minister's brutal execution. He did not oppose General Zia because a large section of the JUI was still in support of the general, and any withdrawal of support would have divided the JUI. As happens in many prominent South Asian religious and political families, Maulana Fazlur Rehman replaced his father both as a politician and cleric in the dynastic tradition. Rehman could not be elected the amir of the party because many of the members of its ulema

considered him too young and inexperienced. Despite this perception by his elders, he was eventually elected the general secretary of the party. Rehman remained the de facto head of the JUI because of his family background and the Central General Council of the JUI eventually elected him the central amir.

Though Maulana Fazlur Rehman inherited his father's political clout when Mehmood died, Rehman chose to oppose the military dictatorship from the outset of his political career. Less than a month after his father's death, Rehman severely criticized General Zia in a speech given in Karachi at a function held to condole his father's death. He repeatedly criticized the regime thereafter. In the early 1980s, several parties, including the Pakistan People Party (PPP), decided to form a political alliance to oppose Zia's military dictatorship. The PPP invited the JUI to join the new alliance. Rehman supported the alliance, but a large number of the JUI's central leaders did not. Consequently, in 1981 the JUI broke up into two factions due to disagreement over whether or not to support the Zia regime. The faction led by Rehman became known as the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F) while another religious leader named Sami-ul-Haq formed the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) (see *Spotlight on Terror*, May 23, 2007). [4] The majority decided to join the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and joined Rehman's JUI-F. Rehman remained steadfast in his opposition to the Zia regime and was repeatedly arrested in the years subsequent. The alliance Rehman forged with the PPP lasted until 1996 when the Pakistan Army dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government for the second time.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Electoral Politics

As popular pressure mounted on the regime to return to democracy, General Zia announced that he intended to hold party-less general elections in which politicians could run on individual platforms but not as candidates of any established political parties. The MRD decided to boycott Zia's proposal as a matter of principle. The experiment in democratization ultimately failed. General Zia's handpicked prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, turned on him. Zia dissolved the government and parliament in May 1988 but soon after died in a mysterious plane crash in August 1988. All political parties, including the JUI-F, took part in the general election that followed and JUI-F emerged as the most popular Islamist political party in the country. [5]

The Rise of Maulana Fazlur Rehman -- Chair of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee

As a result of JUI-F's political alliance with the PPP, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his party voted for the PPP's presidential candidate, Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, after the 1993 general elections. Since the support from the JUI-F members in parliament was crucial in the election, the PPP had to accept a number of conditions from the JUI-F, one of which was to help elect Rehman as the chair of the prestigious Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. The PPP followed through with their assistance and Rehman was elected the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 1, 1994. Although this committee is not as powerful as its equivalent in a Western country, it brought Rehman to the world stage. Another condition required the government to designate three ambassadors on the recommendation of the JUI-F. In addition, the PPP members in the Balochistan Assembly were to vote for the JUI-F candidate in the senate elections. The PPP was to also appoint JUI-F leaders as ministers in the federal cabinet and advisers in the Punjab and Sindh governments. [6]

The other conditions to which the PPP government was almost blackmailed into accepting related to the Islamization of Pakistan. They included the strengthening of the Federal Shari'a Court, making the Islamic Ideological Council (IIC) more powerful, and implementing Islamic laws based on the recommendation of the IIC. [7] This Islamization of the country was bound to have a great impact on law making because the PPP government had also agreed to nominate four JUI-F ulema in the IIC. The agreement also included a clause to keep the Islamic articles in the constitution intact and establish an Economic Council to replace the interest-based economy with an Islamic banking system. Another clause recommended the visit of a parliamentary delegation to Makran in Balochistan where a small Muslim sect called Zikris, who Sunni fundamentalists consider to be heretical, is based. The goal of the JUI-F was for Zikiris to be declared non-Muslims in the manner of Pakistan's persecuted Ahmadi minority. [8]

Support for the Taliban

The election of Maulana Fazlur Rehman as the chair of the National Assembly's Committee on Foreign Affairs and the amir of the JUI-F coincided with the beginning of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Since the

movement was Deobandi in origin and many of the Taliban commanders had studied in the JUI-F-controlled madrassas in Pakistan, Rehman, with his considerable domestic political muscle, put all his weight behind the Afghan Taliban. A meeting of the central shura of the JUI-F in June 1996 extended its support to the Afghan Taliban who followed what many in Pakistan believed to be orthodox Islam. They have established peace in the territories they are ruling. The stability in Taliban-ruled territories is crucial for the Islamic laws to go unaffected. [9] Rehman played an important role in making the administration of the late Benazir Bhutto tilt in favor of the Afghan Taliban during her second term as prime minister from 1993 to 1996. In this capacity, Rehman also played an important role in generating support for the movement in other Muslim countries (BBC News, November 6, 2002).

Post 9/11 Period

JUI-F under Rehman reacted very sharply against General Pervez Musharraf's decision to join the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Several JUI-F leaders, with encouragement from Rehman, excommunicated General Musharraf from Islam for supporting American interests in the fight against the Afghan Taliban. A prominent JUI-F leader and then head of Jamia Binoria in Karachi, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamezai, stated: "Musharraf openly supports the U.S. and its allies against Taliban. And under Islamic laws if any Muslim cooperates with infidels against Muslims, he must be excommunicated from the religion."

Mufti Nizamuddin Shamezai was known for his close relations with al-Qaeda. The JUI-F called for strikes and demonstrations in Pakistani cities in support of the Afghan Taliban after the coalition forces and their Afghan allies ousted the Taliban regime in Kabul in late 2001. Many other Islamist parties supported these calls. Although there were protests across Pakistan, the demonstrations in the Balochi provincial capital of Quetta were particularly notable. Tens of thousands of madrasa students descended in the streets and paralyzed life in Quetta. The anti-U.S. demonstrations led by the JUI-F following Friday prayers in Balochistan have been part of its political strategy since the fall of 2001 (The Baloch Hal, April 2).

Friendly Opposition Under a Military Regime

As soon as General Musharraf decided to hold elections in 2002, Islamist parties formed a new political

alliance called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), with encouragement from the Pakistani military. The positions of the Islamist alliance and the Pakistani military on several issues were so similar that the MMA became popularly known as the ‘Military-Mullah Alliance.’ Important components of the MMA are known to have had deep links with the country’s military. The MMA won the Provincial Assembly elections and formed the government in Peshawar, with a nominee of Rehman as the Northwest Frontier Province’s Chief Minister. In Balochistan, the MMA was also an important member of the governing coalition. The MMA Islamized the laws and radicalized societies in the two provinces that border Afghanistan (Newline [Karachi], July 15, 2003). To keep the two most popular parties out of the political system—i.e. the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) – the military helped the MMA general secretary, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, get elected to the office of the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. Despite its role in the opposition coalition, the MMA helped the Musharraf regime pass the Legal Framework Order (LFO) that legitimized the military rule in lieu of the passage of their proposed Shari’a law bill (Ibid.).

Although Maulana Fazlur Rehman has been able to expand his political support base by cooperating with the military, he has failed to endear himself to the even more hardline Deobandi Pakistani Taliban who have emerged from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the last decade. The Pakistani Taliban exist in staunch opposition to the Pakistan Army, unlike the Afghan Taliban that Rehman supported who relied on Pakistan’s military establishment for succor. Two recent suicide attacks on Maulana Fazlur Rehman at the end of March, believed to have been carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, reflect the widening gulf between the traditional Deobandi Islamists seeking to operate within the boundaries of Pakistan’s entrenched political framework and the highly radicalized Deobandi jihadists who have set their crosshairs on the Pakistani state. Anyone who does not fit into this newer, increasingly harsh Deobandi paradigm, including a veteran Islamist stalwart like Rehman, remains a target for the Pakistani Taliban’s wrath (see *Terrorism Monitor*, April 14).

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Notes:

1. Shaikh Abdul Qayyum, “Maulana Fazlur Rehman ka siasi Safar” in Urdu, (Talagang, Punjab Province: Maktaba Farooqia, 1999), Pp 20-22.
2. Author interview with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, July 2002, Islamabad.
3. Ibid.
4. Author interview with Maulana Samiul Haq, February 2002, Akora Khattak.
5. Tabulated from the reports of the Election Commission of Pakistan from 1988 to 1997.
6. Author interview with a former PPP minister, October 1999, Islamabad.
7. Ibid.
8. Not all of these conditions were implemented in the final analysis.
9. Qayyum, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

The Duo from Derna: Libya's Émigré Jihadis Turned Internal Revolutionaries

By Derek Henry Flood

During a March 29 U.S. Senate hearing on the composition of Libya's revolutionary rebel movement, EUCOM commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe Admiral James Stavridis commented that intelligence informed him that there were "flickers" of transnational al-Qaeda jihadis operating in the anarchy of eastern Libya (Reuters, March 29). Stavridis was careful to not risk entirely alienating the leadership of the Interim National Transitional Council based in Benghazi, stating: "The intelligence that I'm receiving at this point makes me feel that the leadership that I'm seeing are responsible men and women who are struggling against Colonel Kadhafi [sic]" (AFP, March 29). Since Admiral Stavridis testified on Capitol Hill a month ago, much has been made of the Libyan coastal city of Derna, its links to the Sinjar Records, the history of specific figures in the largely defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and now the Wikileaks Guantánamo Bay detention facility files that have been released to the press.

An official statement by a spokesman for the 17 February Revolution, as the rebels often refer to themselves, wholeheartedly rejected any talk of al-Qaeda activity in the territory under its nominal control: "While affirming the Islamic identity of the Libyan people, the Libyan Interim National Council rejects extremist ideas and the linking of al-Qaeda to the Libyan revolution. Terrorism is a threat to all the *ummah* (global Islamic community), and we stress our condemnation and combating of terrorism irrespective of who perpetrates it. The Interim National Council underlines its complete commitment to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions against al-Qaeda and Taliban, and the implementation also of all the other measures taken against al-Qaeda and Taliban. The Interim National Council affirms its commitment to the implementation of the UN resolutions aimed at fighting and eliminating international terrorism. The Interim National Council is fully prepared to uphold all the international conventions and protocols against terrorism" (Voice of Free Libya, March 30). Any alliance the LIFG had with al-Qaeda over the years was often tacit, as the LIFG's leadership had significant differences

with Osama bin Laden's outfit due to its more pragmatic outlook. LIFG leader Noman Benotman warned bin Laden that his jihad against the United States was a futile effort that could potentially destroy Afghanistan as a sanctuary for global Islamists. [1]

Much speculation of late has centered on Libya's poor, allegedly Islamist coastal settlement of Derna. Derna is a modest, socially conservative city situated at the foot of the al-Jebel al-Akhdar mountain range in northern Cyrenaica at the western edge of the Gulf of Bomba on the Mediterranean's southern littoral zone. Derna is believed by analysts to be a bastion of Islamist militancy both within Libya and an embarkation point for fighters who battled the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan in the 1990s as well as American forces in Iraq in the last decade. The leadership of the LIFG rose to prominence there in the mid-1990s. Its platform consisted of an overthrow of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's regime based on the notion that it was un-Islamic in nature. [2] One of the most controversial of these figures from Derna is a man named Abdel Hakim al-Hasadi (alternately transliterated as al-Hasidi). Al-Hasadi is purportedly the head of Derna's security as designated by the local revolutionary council. In a recent interview, al-Hasadi claims he spent time in Afghanistan in the 1990s and was later captured by U.S. soldiers in Pakistan who eventually rendered him to Qaddafi's regime back in Libya (The National [Abu Dhabi], April 10). According to an Italian daily, al-Hasadi is known as the "Emir of Derna," a charge al-Hasadi strongly denies (Il Giornale, April 14). In the war's earliest days, al-Hasadi was tracked down by an Al-Jazeera crew. He used the opportunity to try and burnish his image: "I am, Abdul Hakeem al-Hasadi, a Libyan citizen and a former political prisoner. I would like to read the following statement in response to lies made by Dictator Gaddafi [sic] and his propaganda machine. I tell them that I am one of the participants in the revolution of Feb 17th along with the youth and people of Derna against the corrupt regime of Gaddafi. Gaddafi is trying to divide the people of the nation. He claims that there is an Islamist Emirate in Derna and that I am its Emir. He is taking advantage from the fact that I am a former political prisoner" (Al Jazeera, February 25).

Though al-Hasadi claims to be subservient to the command of leaders in Benghazi, whose revolutionary rhetoric is almost entirely secularist in nature, reports claim he recruited fighters in Derna to head to Baghdad to fight occupation forces before his capture and imprisonment. Al-Hasadi states that he fled Libya in

the aftermath of a failed uprising. He wound up living under the aegis of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1997-2002 before being nabbed in Pakistan and transferred to a Libyan prison. Al-Hasadi was likely interrogated by the United States when he was moved from Peshawar to Islamabad after his arrest by the Pakistanis in 2002. From Pakistan he was rendered to Libya, at the request of Libyan authorities, via Afghanistan—perhaps Kandahar International Airport or Bagram Air Base—where it is believed he spent a period of time in American hands before being repatriated to Libya upon Seif al-Islam al-Qaddafi negotiating for his release (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, April 14). Judging by his own statements to international media in Derna, some of which appear to contradict one another in regard to his precise doings in Afghanistan, Abdel Hakim al-Hasadi seems to naively portray al-Qaeda as a global resistance movement aimed at stemming foreign military occupation of Muslim lands rather than a nihilistic terrorist organization. He told an Italian news crew: “I condemn the September 11 attacks, and those against innocent civilians in general. But members of al-Qaeda are also good Muslims and fight against the invader” (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, March 22). At the uprising’s outset, Colonel Qaddafi’s deputy foreign minister, Khaled Khaim, told a group of assembled European diplomats in Tripoli that al-Hasadi was a former prisoner at the offshore detention facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Kaim stated: “Al-Qaeda has established an emirate in Derna led by Abdelkarim [sic] al-Hasadi, a former Guantánamo detainee” (*AFP*, February 23). The obvious problem with the Libyan regime’s poorly disguised propaganda is that not only does al-Hasadi emphatically deny he was ever held in Guantánamo, but the recently leaked prisoners records from the facility list only 11 Libyan nationals, of which al-Hasadi was clearly not one. [3]

Around the same time as al-Hasadi’s capture by Pakistani agents in 2002, another man from Derna, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, was also picked up that May at a Peshawari hotel [4] after departing Afghanistan following the crumbling of the Taliban government there. Following his interrogation in Pakistan, bin Qumu was shipped to Guantánamo Bay. It was reported that bin Qumu was transferred to the custody of Libyan authorities on September 28, 2007 (*Al Jazeera English*, October 7, 2009). Like the rebels’ current military commander, Khalifa Haftar, (see *Militant Leadership Monitor*, March 2011), bin Qumu, born in 1959, served in the Libyan Army in Chad during Colonel Qaddafi’s miserable desert campaign that ended in a humiliating defeat for the Libyans. Unlike Haftar, who was a decorated,

prominent commander at the time, bin Qumu was a lowly conscript serving in a tank division. Bin Qumu, reported in his Guantánamo assessment, existed on the run from the Qaddafi regime that turned into an odyssey of 1990s jihad. He escaped from prison in 1993, where he had been sentenced for violence and drug offenses, and made his way across the Egyptian border. In the official Joint Task Force account, it states that bin Qumu traveled to war-torn Afghanistan as the Taliban were either nascent or ascendant, depending on which account of his life is more accurate. He then relocated to Sudan where he drove vehicles for one of bin Laden’s “flagship” companies, Wadi al-Aqiq (see *Terrorism Focus*, July 3, 2007). The Joint Task force version of events, if accurate, would mean that bin Qumu spent two stints in Afghanistan bookending his period in Sudan. However, the unclassified administrative review document released by the Department of Defense dated September 18, 2006, claims that bin Qumu escaped from prison in 1992 and fled to Sudan with no mention of Egypt or training in Afghanistan. The latter account corroborates an interview bin Qumu granted to a Western journalist in Derna in April of this year. [5]

The Qaddafi regime seems to have successfully sold the idea that bin Qumu was a hardened ‘Afghan-Arab’ holding intolerant Islamist views. The 2006 unclassified assessment points to a statement by an al-Qaeda/LIFG “facilitator” that was a “noncommittal” LIFG member with “no training.” [6] The Wikileaks document cites bin Qumu as heading to Afghanistan first, then Sudan, then Pakistan, where, presumably, one is meant to infer (as it is not specifically written in the account) he returned to Afghanistan where he remained in 2001 until the fall of the Taliban. In the end, whichever narrative proves correct, he was released from prison in Libya in 2010 at the urging of Seif al-Islam al-Qaddafi who was trying to reconcile the LIFG with his father’s regime before the outbreak of hostilities in Libya in February 2011. Since the instant Libya become convulsed with violent revolution, Colonel Qaddafi, his sons, and the members of his regime that have yet to defect, have repeatedly insisted that they are fighting for their lives against a drug-fueled, al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist movement. The overwhelming majority of the international community has scoffed at the Colonel’s bizarre tantrums, judging them to be the last gasps of a dying dictatorship.

As the media coverage of Abdel Hakim al-Hasadi and Abu Sufian bin Qumu at the time of this writing shows, the regime’s propaganda efforts at trying to link the revolt with al-Qaeda have not been a total failure. The

al-Qaeda movement has and has had a number of key ideologues and fighters of Libyan origin. Al-Hasadi and bin Qumu do not appear, upon the scrutiny of available information, to be the wild-eyed Islamist fanatics that should cause decision makers in Western capitals to shudder on equal pairing with their Tripolitan counterparts. Though both of these men hail from the town of Derna, a place with a well documented history of rebellious Islamism, and have shuttled back and forth within Osama bin Laden's small universe, neither seem to be capable of turning a portion of coastal Cyrenaica into an anti-Western bastion of jihadism able to threaten the European Union and the United States. Both men joined the LIFG when that may have seemed the only viable, strong option for vehement opposition to Colonel Qaddafi's regime in a society with no space for free expression. It is here that a nuanced view is required. Both men have vast, very real experience traveling and exploiting the human infrastructure of the global jihad movement. In a reasoned analysis, however, they appear to have been marginal players at best. As al-Qaeda has been made irrelevant in regard to the anti-jihadi Arab Spring, al-Hasadi and bin Qumu seem to have discarded their 1990s Islamist leanings, at least publicly, to work inside the first genuine movement that has a chance of overthrowing Qaddafi in their lifetime, something the LIFG, much less al-Qaeda, could never have comparably offered. That movement goes by many names—the Interim National Transitional Council, the 17 February Revolution, al-Shabaab, the Forces of Free Libya—but the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is not one of them. Jihadis certainly do exist in the Libyan rebel ranks, though it must be understood that their influence at this stage is miniscule as they are swept up in a secular revolution led by technocrats, doctors, lawyers, and ordinary Libyans from housewives to mechanics. The LIFG was a spent force before February 17, 2011, following the jailing, or in the case of Guantánamo, extraterritorial detention of, many of its principle figures. LIFG thinkers had issued the *Corrective Studies on the Doctrine of Jihad, Hesba, and Rulings*, essentially a doctrine of a defeated organization that had recanted its ways as perhaps the only means of survival. This doctrine was meant not only to soften up the LIFG in Libya itself, but to take the wind out of the sails of LIFG fighters abroad who still held out notions of fighting jihad in their homeland.

If al-Hasadi and bin Qumu are able to survive the current conflict unlike their recently fallen LIFG comrade Abdel Monem Mukhtar Muhammed who was

killed by Qaddafist forces on the al-Burayqah (Brega) front (Al Jazeera English, April 19), it is unlikely they would be successful in exerting much Islamist influence beyond their immediate environs of Derna. Certainly neither men are angels, though they are unlikely to be a threat to NATO's strategic aims nor to the weak rebel administration situated on Benghazi's corniche which continues to shout down al-Qaeda and bin Ladenism with throngs of thousands every waking moment. If they desire to stay relevant in the Libyan conflict, Abdel Hakim al-Hasadi and Abu Sufian bin Qumu must go with the tide of history cresting across Libya or risk being washed away by the pro-Western currents espoused by their brethren-in-arms fighting along the Gulf of Sirte.

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Notes:

1. Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda*, (New York: Free Press, 2011), p.7.
2. Ronald Bruce St. John, *A Historical Dictionary of Libya*, (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 2006), pp.148-149.
3. To view the leaked list of Libyan prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay, see The Guantánamo Files: Prisoner list for Libya: <http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/country/LY.html>.
4. According to bin Qumu's JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment, in section 4. Detainee Background Summary: subsection c. Capture Information: "Pakistani Police apprehended detainee at the Plaza Hotel, where he was staying." This information can be accessed via the Wikileaks site at: <http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/pdf/ly/us9ly-000557dp.pdf> From information available from the time period of bin Qumu's capture, no hotel known as the Plaza appears to exist. See John King and Bradley Mayhew, *Pakistan*, (Hawthorn, Victoria: Lonely Planet Publications, 1998), pp. 266-267.
5. To view the Department of Defense unclassified document about the bin Qumu case, see pages 47-50 at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_2_Factors_599-699.pdf#46. For the interview with bin Qumu that fits more in line with the unclassified administrative review document, see Nicholas Pelham, "Bogged Down in Libya," *New York Review of Books*, April 14, 2011, <http://www.nybooks.com>.

com/articles/archives/2011/may/12/bogged-down-libya/?pagination=false.

6. See Section 3. A. 3., http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_2_Factors_599-699.pdf#46.