



Terrorism Monitor

In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror

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Qaddafi with other
AU Leaders in Tripoli

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NEW NIGER PRESIDENT SAYS TRAINING, WEAPONS AND INTELLIGENCE NEEDED IN FIGHT AGAINST AL-QAEDA

Mahamadou Issoufou, the newly elected president of Niger, laid out his vision of a more active and cooperative military response to the threat posed to regional security by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). His views were presented in an interview with Beret Vert, a Niger Army review (*Ennahar* [Algiers], April 8; AFP, April 8).

Issoufou was sworn in as the newly elected president of Niger on April 8, the culmination of a successful democratic transition following the February 2010 military coup that overthrew President Mamadou Tandja. The new president faces enormous problems in stabilizing Niger, where severe economic pressures make smuggling, banditry, insurrection or even employment by AQIM seem like rational opportunities for restless young men. Niger was ranked 167 out of 169 states measured in the 2010 UN Human Development Index. Despite the economic pressures, the new president has promised the military better arms, training and equipment (AFP, April 8).

Warning that AQIM has the potential to destabilize the “whole of the Sahara,” Issoufou said the “countries of the north” were “indispensable” for training and equipping Niger’s defense and security forces. Suggesting that Niger’s military was operating “blind” in the vast desert regions of northern Niger, the new president urged Western cooperation in intelligence matters. He also supported the further growth of the joint Sahel intelligence center in Tamanrasset (Centre de Renseignement sur le Sahel - CRS) established by the intelligence chiefs of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania on October 7, 2010 (see L’Expression

[Abidjan], October 7). Issoufou said he envisaged Niger's military deployed in new barracks and forward posts throughout the country, including the deployment of Nigerien Special Forces in strategic frontier zones.

Niger's own army, the roughly 8,000 man Forces Armées Nigériennes (FAN), is dominated by members of the Djerma-Songhai, historical rivals of the Saharan Tuareg of northern Niger. Fees from uranium concessions form an important part of the military's funding. The Tuareg have urged military recruitment in northern Niger, which would help end local perceptions of the army as an occupation force.

Only hours after his inauguration, Issoufou took an important step towards reconciliation with Niger's Tuareg community by appointing Brigi Rafini, an Agadez Tuareg, as his new Prime Minister. Like Issoufou, Rafini was a former minister in the government of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, who was assassinated by members of his own bodyguard with a truck-mounted machine gun in 1999.

LIBYAN TELEVISION CHIEF DESCRIBES ARAB-WESTERN CONSPIRACY AGAINST TRIPOLI

Libyan poet Ali al-Kilani is a member of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's inner circle and has been described as the "poet of the Green Revolution." As director of Libyan television, al-Kilani has played an important role in defining and presenting the regime's version of events in Libya. Al-Kilani gained international attention in 2007, when he wrote a song entitled "Al-Qidis Saddam" (The Holy Saddam), which praised the late Saddam Hussein and denounced his executioners (al-Bawaba, July 19, 2007; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2009). He recently gave his views on the current rebellion and his perception of bias in the Arab media to a pan-Arab daily (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 12).

From the beginning of the rebellion, the Qaddafi regime has condemned the coverage provided by most of the Arab media, going so far as to jam satellite channels such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. Al-Kilani insists that their coverage is inaccurate and influenced by foreign powers: "These channels say that al-Qaddafi is in Venezuela, while al-Qaddafi is in Libya; they say that al-Qaddafi's daughter has fled, while she is in Libya. This is deceptive news, unfair and supported by foreign funds against Libya."

Al-Kilani is particularly angered by the portrayal

in the Western and Arab press of armed rebels as "innocent civilians": "How can civilians possess RPG and Kalashnikov weapons, and come out with these weapons from their region to Tripoli? ... From Darna to Benghazi, to Ajdabiya and to Burayqah they move riding tanks and military transport vehicles with U.S. aircraft over them; what kind of civilians are these?"

Al-Kilani describes the rebellion as a mix of religious, political, media and military elements forming a "tight-knit conspiracy." On the ground the Libyan regime faces "the weapons of terrorism and al-Qaeda," supported by deviant clerics and F-16 aircraft.

Rejecting all foreign intervention in Libya, al-Kilani states the conflict is an internal affair: "Today some 500 rockets from Qatar and the UAE have been used; these are our brothers; what have we done to them? We go to them as tourists; what have we done to them? What have we done to [Arab League Secretary-General] Amr Musa?" Though Qaddafi's Libya is famous for its meddling in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, al-Kilani claims "If there is a dispute between a Qatari man and his father and brother, we have nothing to do with it; if there is a dispute in the UAE, we have nothing to do with it; therefore this is our own affair."

Responding to reports carried by the Arab press that members of the Libyan government are confined to the Bab al-Aziziyah barracks in Tripoli, al-Kilani insisted that these were "lies and falsifications." When asked why Minister of Defense Major General Abu Bakr Yunous has not been heard from (he was reported to have been detained by Qaddafi in the early days of the rebellion when he refused to issue orders to fire on demonstrators), al-Kilani said: "He is there in his ministry, may God prolong his life. He is a struggler. Come and see him."

Pakistani Taliban Widen the Civil War --- Against Fellow Deobandis

By Arif Jamal

Two recent suicide attacks in as many days on Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the *amir* of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), show that the Pakistani Taliban are further widening their sectarian war on competing interpretations of political Islam (*Dawn* [Karachi] April 1). [1] Although the *maulana* himself survived unhurt, dozens of JUI-F workers died and many more were injured.

Pakistan's Deobandi Taliban came on the scene by waging a war on religious minorities including the Ahmadis. In the 1980s, they started a new sectarian war against the Shi'a Muslims, who make up the second biggest Muslim sect in Pakistan after the Barelvi (i.e. Sufi) Muslims. In the late 2000s, they widened their aim to include the Barelvis. The back-to-back attacks on Fazlur Rehman, the leader of a Deobandi Islamist party which has the largest voting bank among the Islamist parties, show that the Pakistani Taliban cannot tolerate less extremist Deobandi parties. They also show that a bloodier civil war is still looming large over Pakistan.

Ironically, no Taliban group has so far claimed the responsibility for the attacks (*The News* [Islamabad], April 4). The apparent reason is that several Taliban groups still have respect for the JUI-F. Public ownership of the suicide attacks is bound to divide the Taliban movement. In fact, the Gul Bahadur faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) announced it would investigate the attacks and punish the culprits, implicitly accepting that the attacks had been carried out by an extremist group (*Dawn*, April 5). Equally important is the fact that the JUI-F has half-heartedly accused the imperialist forces including the U.S. (*Dawn*, March 31; *The News*, April 4). The reason behind this is the JUI-F does not want to be seen as anti-Taliban. A large number of JUI-F members are now closer at heart with the Taliban than with their own party. Accusing the Taliban of suicide attacks publicly is likely to create rifts within the party.

The JUI has a history of waging struggles against British imperialism and military dictatorships in Pakistan. The JUI-F was a component of the Benazir Bhutto-led Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in the 1980s. The JUI-F also opposed the anti-Soviet Afghan

jihad before the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The JUI-F became the most popular Islamist party because of its pro-democracy policies and has been a breeding ground for extremists. The militant founder of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was a local leader of the JUI-F in Jhang before he founded his own extremist group. Many Taliban in North Waziristan and South Waziristan are former members of the JUI-F or its student wing. Baitullah Mahsud, Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Mufti Waliur Rehman were all local JUI-F leaders before they became Taliban (*Dawn*, November 15, 2009). To stem the flow of members to more militant organizations the party began to move closer to extremist groups in the 1990s. While Maulana Fazlur Rehman remains a pragmatist Islamist politician and tries to play a double game, as the Taliban grow in influence on the Pakistani jihadi scene they are becoming less and less tolerant of such politics.

The Taliban groups which have spun out of the ISI control particularly oppose the JUI-F's politics. They consider the party's cooperation with the General Musharraf-led military regime an unforgivable sin. It was in April 2009 when the Punjabi Taliban (a.k.a. the Asian Tigers), publicly issued a veiled threat to Maulana Fazlur Rehman (see *Terrorism Monitor*, May 20, 2010). The statement was prepared by the Punjabi Taliban and read by their captive, former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operative Khalid Khawaja, just before Khawaja was killed in April 2010. The message named Maulana Fazlur Rehman as a collaborator of the Pakistani military regime which had been handing over Taliban captives to the Americans (*Asia Times*, April 24, 2010). The other crimes included supporting military action against the Red Mosque imams in 2007. [2] After the release of the video, it was a forgone conclusion that Fazlur Rehman was on the hit list of the Punjabi Taliban. It is a safe bet to believe that the Punjabi Taliban are likely to carry out suicide attacks on other Deobandi clerics such as Hanif Jallundari and Taqi Usmani, whom they accuse of collaborating with the Pakistani army.

With the suicide attacks on Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the stage is set for a bloodier civil war to begin in Pakistan. Taliban groups are already at war with other sects and state institutions, particularly the Barelvis, the Shi'a and the Pakistani army. The only sect the Taliban have not pulled into the fray is Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (LeT/JuD), which, interestingly, is the only sect or jihadist group with more firepower and manpower than the Pakistani Taliban.

The pattern in which the civil war in Pakistan has been spreading so far shows that it is only a matter of time before the Deobandi extremists of the TTP and the LeT/JuD are at each other's throats, which would be the bloodiest phase of Pakistan's civil war yet.

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Notes:

1. At present there are two rival wings of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, that of Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and that of Maulana Sami-ul Haq (JUI-S). Both are part of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition. A third faction led by Maulana Ajmal Qadri has an armed wing in Kashmir known as Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen al-Aalmi but is not part of the MMA coalition.
2. The video in Urdu is available on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ8NLDqyz_Y&feature=related and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=te5U8mBLITU&feature=related>.

Conflict Between Somali Leaders Halts Military Operations against Islamist Insurgents

By Muhyadin Ahmed Roble

A new disagreement between Somali president Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad and parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Shaykh Aden over extending the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is disrupting a successful offensive by TFG and African Union troops against the radical Islamist al-Shabaab movement.

Under an agreement negotiated with its international partners, the TFG mandate is set to expire on August 20, by which time the government is supposed to have held elections and introduced a new constitution (Reuters, March 28). With little progress made in these areas or any other areas of government responsibility, Somalia's parliament endorsed a unilateral three-year extension to the mandate on February 3, with the new term to begin on August 20 when the old mandate expires. TFG Prime Minister Abdullahi Muhammad Abdullah described the extension as unconstitutional.

On March 28, the TFG cabinet (which includes the president) voted to give itself a one-year extension rather than face elections before August 20. Despite this, parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Shaykh Aden is insisting that an election for president will be held on schedule this summer. The TFG's international backers, such as the United Nations and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), appear to support the speaker's call for presidential and cabinet elections this year rather than next (VOA, March 30).

In recent days, Sharif Hassan Shaykh Adam appears to have lost the confidence of his own Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirfle) clan, as its elders accused the speaker of wanting to destroy the TFG and called for his dismissal after the speaker attended a UN meeting on Somalia in Nairobi that was boycotted by the rest of the TFG leadership (Shabelle Media Network, April 11; Mareeg.com, April 11). The existing five-month old cabinet is drawn largely from Somali diaspora leaders.

In Somalia, infighting between senior leaders has been common during the last two decades of violence, but it is now threatening the government's military

operations against Islamist insurgents, as confirmed to Jamestown by a cabinet minister who preferred to remain anonymous. The minister explained that the disagreement began as soon as TFG troops started what he described as a well-planned offensive against Islamist militias in coordination with African Union peacekeepers. Though TFG forces had begun moving into areas previously controlled by al-Shabaab in the transitional government's first real military success, military operations were unexpectedly suspended. The minister added the government infighting is threatening the morale of soldiers the TFG needs to continue its strategy to defeat the rebel militias. A recent decision by the TFG to start paying the soldiers' salaries had gone a long way towards bettering their performance in the field. [1]

However, the minister says that payment will mean nothing so long as the politicians continue their internal skirmishes. The troops will make little progress so long as the country's leaders are quarrelling over the constitution as well as personal disputes: "We have been planning a good military strategy since we came into office and the strategy had so far had some successes but we didn't achieve our target. We were going to clear streets of Mogadishu from al-Shabaab fighters and we still have that plan but the struggling between the country's leaders is disabling our strategy."

The payment for the soldiers which Prime Minister Abdullah Muhammad Abdullahi pledged during his speech to parliament on November 20, 2010, was one of the first achievements for the new cabinet. The regular payment of troops was nearly unknown in Somalia prior to this and all former cabinets were accused of pilfering military funds, causing weakness and disappointment in the ranks that often led to troops selling their arms to the enemy. Former deputy parliament speaker Muhammad Omar Dalha says the wrangling is affecting not only military operations but all national institutions, adding that the government will not achieve its targets because of the infighting. [2]

Prior to the eruption of this new dispute, the TFG's 8,000 troops, backed by African Union peacekeepers belonging to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), had made good progress in the last few weeks, taking control of more than half the capital city of Mogadishu as well as a number of Somali towns near the Kenyan border.

The Prime Minister said the one-year extension was meant to ensure the continuity of ongoing operations against Islamist insurgents which most Somalis want to continue in order to end the violence. The speaker, however, is not giving them a chance because he named a committee to organize an election meant to remove both the current president and the cabinet.

Although deputy speaker Muhammad Omar Dalha believes that the cabinet has no constitutional right to extend its term, he insists that the morale of both soldiers and civilians has deteriorated because of the current disagreement: "People are losing faith because they are hoping that the government will do its work, but the country's leaders are fighting and not trying to come together to address their differences." [3]

A former army chief of staff said that the disagreement threatens the government's hold on towns and areas they have captured from the insurgents. Even if the towns go back to the hands of the Islamists, this will not be something new because in Somalia towns change hands periodically. [4]

Not only government officials but also the Ahlu Sunna wa'l-Jama'a (ASWJ), a moderate Islamist militia that backs government soldiers in their attacks on al-Shabaab, is worrying about the infighting between government officials. ASWJ coordinator Ahmed Shaykh Aden says the leaders seem to forget that the enemy is still very active in the country. Speaking to Jamestown in Nairobi, the militia leader said the infighting may lead to losing the battle for Somalia as soldiers lose confidence in the government. "This infighting is killing the will to keep the war going against terrorist groups and it is hard for the soldiers to go on when the leaders are grumbling over power. We are in war, so to win we need to put our differences aside, so I am suggesting the president and speaker not lose this opportunity and [will] think about the country's interest." [5]

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Notes:

1. Interview with a TFG cabinet minister, March 23, 2011.
2. Interview with MP Prof Mohamed Omar Dalha, former minister and deputy speaker in Nairobi, April 7, 2011.
3. Ibid

4. Interview with a former TFG Army Chief of Staff, Nairobi, March 25, 2011.

5. Interview with Ahmed Shaykh Aden, coordinator of moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa'l-Jama'a, Nairobi, March 26, 2011.

Missiles, Money and Migration: The Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the African Sahel

By Dario Cristiani

Unlike many other parts of the world, Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qaddafi enjoys widespread support in Africa as a result of years of Libyan diplomatic and economic engagement in the continent. Libyan money and arms have boosted the stability of many African regimes.

Clearly, Qaddafi's moves in Africa were connected to the advancement of specific geopolitical and diplomatic interests. With its proximity to Libya, the African Sahel region has always been an important target of Qaddafi's ambitious foreign policy.

Libyan support has been strong in the Sahelian nation of Mali. In the Malian capital of Bamako, the Front for Rejection of the Colonial War in Libya organized a march to the Libyan Embassy on March 19. A second rally was held on March 25, organized by the Malian Coalition to Support the Great Libyan Jamahiriya. Both protests were characterized by harsh anti-French and anti-American slogans (Journal du Mali, March 25; Mali Web, March, 29). These marches are only two

examples of a more general feeling spreading throughout Africa after NATO's attacks on Libya began. Mu'ammarr Qaddafi enjoys strong popularity among the peoples of the continent and also among many of its governments. Paradoxically – given the peculiar history of Libyan foreign policy under Qaddafi – the “Brother Leader” has represented an element of stability for many African governments due to his money and his political and diplomatic support, and the possibility that his regime in Libya will come to an end is perceived as a major threat by many African actors.

Libya is one of the largest financial contributors to the African Union and it also pays many bills for small and poor countries, which explains the very cool reaction of the African Union to international efforts against Qaddafi. Through the Libya Arab Africa Investment Company (LAAICO), Qaddafi has invested in a wide range of African economic activities, including hotels, banks, telecommunications, media, agriculture and many other sectors. [1] Qaddafi's active economic foreign policy in Africa, linked to his anti-imperialist stance and his more recent Pan-African narrative, has given him not only the support of the elites of these countries, but also the support of many intellectuals and other sectors of the population (La Depeche, March 18). This peculiar Libyan “soft power” approach to Africa has helped Qaddafi become very popular in many parts of the continent.

The Roots of Libyan Involvement in Africa and Its “Near Abroad”

Africa emerged as a priority in Gaddafi's foreign policy once his attempts to play a major role in the Arab world failed. The African states were more receptive than the Arabs toward Qaddafi's tools of foreign policy, specifically its enormous economic resources. The “king of kings,” as he wanted to be defined by Africans, has since the late 1990s pursued a very active political agenda in Africa. As he had already tried in the Arab world, Qaddafi was an energetic supporter of “unity” among Africans. Neighboring Chad, especially, has always represented a geopolitical priority for Libya in general and Qaddafi in particular for a variety of reasons: the territorial dispute over the Aouzou strip and the anti-Qaddafi plot – the so-called “Black Prince” conspiracy organized from Chad in 1970 – are likely the most notable.

Libya occupied northern Chad in the early 1980s and a few years later it suffered a military humiliation from

the regime of President Hissène Habré (1982-1990). The relationship with Chad improved only when Déby overthrew Habré. Since then, Libya has become one of Chad's most important economic and diplomatic supporters. Qaddafi also played a very important role in Mali and Niger; their economies have been largely supported by Libyan money and Qaddafi has played a fundamental role in brokering the peace agreements between the Malian and Nigerien governments and the Tuareg rebels signed in the Libyan oasis city of Sabha in October 2009 (Reuters Africa, Oct 7, 2009; The Tripoli Post, Oct 10, 2009). This wide net of relations in the Libyan "near abroad" explains why these governments were very reluctant to condemn domestic repression in Libya earlier or to support the international intervention later.

The War in Libya and Its Possible Impact on Sahelian Security

As mentioned before, the economic and political role of Qaddafi's Libya role in Africa has paradoxically represented an element of stability for many governments of the region. In many capitals of the continent there is now a major fear that a prolonged conflict in Libya, as well as a weakening of Qaddafi or his complete fall, could strongly jeopardize their security. There are major concerns related to terrorism, the role of Tuareg rebels and the economic impact of this war.

The first major concern is represented by weapons that could be acquired now on the Libyan market in the absence of any consistent and effective control on its territory and its deposits. Chadian President Idriss Déby has affirmed that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) acquired several types of weapons from the rebels' strongholds and warned of the risks of destabilizing Libya, suggesting, with some hyperbole, that the group is "turning into the most powerful army of the region" (*Jeune Afrique*, March 25). A few days later an Algerian security official told Reuters that AQIM had smuggled a huge amount of weapons acquired in Libya to Mali. The loads allegedly included Kalashnikov heavy machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, Russian-made RPG-7 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades and, most importantly, Russian-made shoulder-fired Strela surface-to-air missiles, known by the NATO designation SAM-7 (Reuters Africa, April 4). The day after, Algerian political officials also expressed their concerns for the situation in Libya. Abdelkader Messahel, the Algerian deputy foreign minister, told Reuters that he was worried by "the increasingly noticeable presence of AQIM

in Libya" (without elaborating) and the increasing circulation of weapons which can be used by terrorists (Reuters Africa, April 5).

The main concern related to the acquisition of these weapons is that they could be used to replicate in the Mediterranean region an attack similar to that which occurred in Kenya in November 2002, when two SAM-7 missiles were fired at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa International Airport. However, even if these allegations were all true, the potential impact of these weapons must be carefully addressed. Most worrisome are the mobile (truck-mounted or man-portable) optically-guided or infrared-guided missiles believed to be in Libyan hands. Russia's Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM) has admitted selling truck-mounted SA-24 "Grinch" missiles after they were spotted in press photos by Aviation Week [2] This modern and highly effective weapon would be in great demand for terrorist operations if it could be made man-portable, but KBM insists this cannot be done without a separate trigger mechanism, one that was not supplied to Libya (Aviation Week, March 29).

It is more likely that these allegedly stolen missiles are the earlier and more basic Soviet-made man-portable SA-7 "Grail" missiles, which were purchased in large quantities by Libya. [3] Though these weapons pose a potential threat to passenger planes in the hands of AQIM, they are more likely to be used for defensive rather than offensive purposes, firing at military helicopters or surveillance planes. However, Africa has a rich and dynamic black market for weapons, which means AQIM could have access to rockets and missiles not only in Libya, but also in other parts of the continent. It is likely, therefore, that both Chad and Algeria want to emphasize this threat in order to advance specific foreign policy interests related to the on-going conflict in Libya. Using the name of al-Qaeda is always a powerful tool to get the attention of Western powers, above all the United States, in trying to make them more receptive to some specific interests of the countries of the area.

Another threat for the stability of the countries of the Sahel could be posed by Tuareg rebels from Mali and Niger who have been employed as mercenaries among Qaddafi's supporters in the past few weeks. In this case, the risk could be presented by the return of these fighters to their own countries, armed with weapons grabbed in Libya (*Ennahar*, March 28). As mentioned earlier, Qaddafi has played a major role in settling many of these domestic conflicts. An end to Qaddafi's regime in

Libya also means the end of the presence of a powerful protector for the Tuareg in these countries. The mix of armed Tuareg and the absence of the most powerful diplomatic broker in the region could represent a serious threat for countries in which Tuareg rebels are present in significant numbers.

A further crucial point for the security of the entire area is the linkage between economy and security. Qaddafi's Libya represents one of the backbones of the Sahelian economy. The countries of this region are very poor and the money that Qaddafi pours into these economies every year is fundamental to their existence. The end of Qaddafi's regime will likely mean the end of the financial flows from Libya to these countries. Given the highly personalized foreign policy of the Jamahiriya and the level of domestic political tension within Libya nowadays, it is likely that a new power elite in Libya will pursue a foreign policy agenda completely opposed to that of Qaddafi. The African option is one among others and not the only one that a new Libyan government could pursue. Even with Qaddafi, the African option became a top priority in Libyan foreign policy agenda only after the failure of attempts to win a major role in the Arab world. The end of Qaddafi's Libya could also mean the return of many Sahelian workers to their own countries; Chadian immigrants alone in Libya number 800,000 (al-Wihda, April 4). The collapse of Qaddafi's regime would ensure enormous economic and demographic pressures on governments whose resources are very limited. This potential crisis should also be analyzed in the wider context of other on-going African crises; the violent clashes in Ivory Coast are only the latest reminders of the potential for instability in Africa. In the next few months, other major African countries, such as Nigeria, will have elections whose outcomes could be contested, sparking other internal conflicts. That could mean a further increase of migration pressures on other countries, economic troubles, the eruption of violence and the risk of spill-over conflicts in other parts of the continent where ethnic and confessional balances are very fragile.

Conclusion

Mu'ammarr Qaddafi's African largesse and popular regional sympathy for the Colonel explain why the governments of the Sahel nations have been reluctant in supporting the international intervention against him. This behavior is not only linked to a sort of "political benevolence": it is also linked to an analysis based strictly on interests, recognizing that Qaddafi in

power better serves the security, political and economic interests of these countries than the unpredictable course of revolution.

Geographically, Libya will always have an interest in the Sahel, but politically the emphasis could be different and far less effective and consistent under a new regime than in the past. These governments fear the loss of funds that are needed to support their weak economies and give these regimes resources to share in order to boost their own power. They also fear the presence of AQIM and armed Tuareg rebels returning from Libya. The collapse of Libya would have an immediate impact on the structurally weak Sahel region with long-term implications for security and development.

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Notes:

1. A complete map of Libyan economic involvement in Africa is available at: <http://www.laaico.com/invest.htm>.
2. The Russian name for this weapon is Igla-S 9K338.
3. The Russian name for this weapon is 9K32M Strela-2.