



Terrorism Monitor

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Jamestown interview with Iraq general

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LIBYAN CONFLICT SHOWS SIGNS OF SPILLING OVER TUNISIAN BORDER

Though first indications suggested that Tunisia had avoided a wave of political violence with the overthrow of Tunisian president Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali on January 14, the continuing civil war in neighboring Libya is threatening to spill over into Tunisia as operatives from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) seek to exploit the worsening situation.

A battle between Tunisian troops aided by National Guard forces and an al-Qaeda cell on May 18 began when a member of the local security forces who was helping cell members carry their luggage after they arrived from a town close to Kasserine became concerned with the weight of their bags. He called for assistance, and when other units arrived, the militants opened fire, wounding two soldiers and killing their commander, Colonel Tahar Ayari. Two civilians were also wounded, one severely. According to several reports, the militants were carrying Libyan passports (AFP, May 18; *Ennahar* [Algiers], May 18; *al-Arabiya*, May 18). The firefight took place in Rouhia, a small town in the Siliana governorate south of Tunis. Two of the militants were killed, while others were reported to have escaped.

Two suspected al-Qaeda members equipped with an explosives belt and several bombs were arrested near Ramada in southern Tunisia on May 15. Security forces said the two men, a Libyan and an Algerian, were tied to two other suspects who were carrying a homemade bomb when they were arrested a week earlier in Tatouine, 80 miles from the Libyan border (*al-Arabiya*, May 18; Reuters, May 15).

Tunisian authorities have made a show of tightening security at the border, but continue to allow Libyan rebels to resupply in Tunisia and seek medical attention there for their wounded. However, this has not prevented Tunisia from threatening to report Libya to the UN Security Council for shelling the border region, saying that it viewed this as “belligerent behavior from the Libyan side, which had pledged more than once to prevent its forces from firing in the direction of Tunisia” (al-Jazeera, May 18; *al-Masry al-Youm* [Cairo], May 16).

AL-SHABAAB PROMISES “OUNCE FOR OUNCE” BLOOD RETRIBUTION FOR UGANDAN MILITARY ROLE IN SOMALIA

Somalia’s radical Islamist al-Shabaab movement has promised retaliation against Ugandan civilians and Ugandan troops belonging to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, has led the African Union’s military effort to preserve Somalia’s ineffective and endangered Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

In a May 14 statement issued by al-Shabaab’s press office and carried on jihadi websites, the movement declared the Ugandan people’s re-election of Museveni and his party for a fourth term makes the people of Uganda “unanimously complicit in the crimes of their soldiers” in Somalia and was a confirmation of their “commitment to the invasion and oppression of the innocent civilians of Somalia” (Ansar1.info, May 14).

Al-Shabaab first issued threats of retaliation against Uganda for its contribution of troops to AMISOM in 2008 (see *Terrorism Monitor*, September 24, 2008). In July 2010, al-Shabaab terrorists succeeded in carrying out two bombings in Kampala that killed 74 civilians gathered to watch the World Cup of soccer final (see *Terrorism Monitor Brief*, July 16, 2010).

The new al-Shabaab statement described the troops of the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) as “paid mercenaries fighting an endless battle on behalf of the West” for a meager salary that can barely support them. Accusing the UPDF of shelling heavily populated residential areas, markets and even hospitals, al-Shabaab promised the Ugandan people would have to repay “ounce for ounce” the blood shed by AMISOM attacks on civilians.

Included in the statement was a reproduction of an identity card issued to a dead Ugandan corporal whose body is being held by the movement. Al-Shabaab fighters continue to defile the bodies of Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM soldiers killed in action by dragging them through the streets. In one such incident last week, the body was believed to belong to one of two Ugandan officers killed in a clash with al-Shabaab – Abdufita Mohammed, the commander of AMISOM forces in the Bakara market area of Mogadishu, and his intelligence officer, Abdiwahab Sheikh Dole (*Daily Monitor* [Kampala], May 16).

Ugandan security forces may have already succeeded in interdicting a new al-Shabaab terrorist effort in Uganda by arresting four young Somali men who had entered the country illegally by crossing through the bush to avoid border control points. Only one of the men possessed a passport, with the other three claiming to have lost theirs (*Daily Monitor*, May 16; Reuters, May 16).

Brigadier James Mugira, the Ugandan military intelligence chief, stated after the death of Osama bin Laden that Uganda continues to face other terrorist threats from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) led by Jamil Mukulu, a former associate of Bin Laden during his time in Sudan in the 1990s (*Daily Monitor*, May 3; for the ADF, see *Terrorism Monitor*, December 20, 2007).

Jamestown Interview: Iraqi General in Mosul Under Pressure From Islamist and Nationalist Groups

By Wladimir van Wilgenburg

The commander of the Mosul-based Second Division of the Iraqi Army, Major General Nasser al-Ghannam, claims he has improved security in the former insurgent hotbed of Mosul and does not need any further support from the United States Army. The general, however, has serious opposition of his own in Mosul. His principal opposition comes from the Mosul governor and his Sunni Arab nationalist party, al-Hadba.

The general, a Sunni Muslim from Anbar, told Jamestown: “Since 2010, we conducted many missions and detained hundreds of these [militant] groups. There is good coordination and cooperation with civilians.” [1] While Mosul was partially controlled by insurgents in the past, he says those insurgents are now on the run: “Most casualties are from IEDS now; the enemy is afraid now and can’t fight face to face” (for the militant groups operating in Niniwa, see: *Terrorism Monitor* Briefs, May 26, 2009).

General al-Ghannam added that the recent unrest in Syria has also helped to decrease external support for insurgents: “They [Syrian intelligence] are busy with the fight within their own country, not in Iraq.” This was confirmed by a Kurdish counterterrorism official in Erbil who also said that Syrian security agencies are occupied with the current unrest in that country. [2] According to the general, 85% of the insurgents currently in Mosul are Iraqi, while only 15% are foreign jihadis.

Statistics seem to confirm that security is improving in Mosul (the capital of Niniwa province), although the province as a whole remains one of Iraq’s most dangerous. [3] Violence in Mosul has decreased remarkably over the past two years. In the first quarter of 2008 there were 1,167 recorded attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the second quarter of 2010, there were only 78 (*Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 2010).

Whether this is directly related to the operations of the Iraqi army is unclear. The decrease in violence might also be related to the election victory of Sunni nationalist Al-Hadba in the 2009 provincial elections. According to Dildar Zebari, deputy head of the provincial council, the decrease is related to the end of the Sunni boycott of electoral politics in Mosul, where the majority of the population is Sunni Arab. [4]. “Nobody can claim this improvement as their achievement, it’s of the people,” Zebari said.

According to Khasro Gorran, Niniwa’s Kurdish former deputy governor, it is true that the army has improved security [5]. “I can tell you they are controlling 85% of the city now. The situation is much better from the previous years.”

However, Mosul’s police still lack professionalism and suffer from infiltration, corruption and even drug addiction. Failure to follow security protocols was said to be behind the killing of police colonel Eid al-Namis in the Namroud area of Mosul on May 3. “It’s his

mistake,” said general al-Ghannam. “Because he goes to his house every day, the same road,” added Brigade Commander Rebwar Younis Abdullah.

The Iraqi army in Mosul has also been praised by others for improving security. A news forum user named Abu-Sa’ad wrote that the Iraqi army succeeded in bringing back security. “He [Ghannam] managed, despite a young age, to achieve miracles and bring life back to the university...,” he wrote (alhadbaa.in-goo.com, December 16, 2010). He added that car show rooms were reopened in the industrial districts, which were controlled by insurgent groups in the pasts. “The fear barrier was broken by the citizens, as shown by conferences attended by hundreds of shaykhs in Mosul,” he wrote.

Local television broadcast an appeal by General al-Ghannam to the shaykhs of the different Sunni Arab tribes in the region asking them not to support the insurgents, as the insurgents make no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims in their attacks.

Al-Ghannam said the situation improved greatly after 2010. “The situation was bad in 2007, 2008, 2009. But after 2010 we had a good security plan with the police. All units are under our command. You can see this university is much better with thousands of students coming from Kurdistan, South-Iraq, Christians and Muslims.” He even claimed Christians were returning. “The patriarch thanked me in a letter, the churches are open and thousands of people go to these celebrations.”

However, the fact that al-Ghannam was appointed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as the Second Division commander has resulted in problems with the local provincial authorities. The provincial governor accused the Iraqi army of torturing demonstrators and shooting civilians. Mosul governor Atheel al-Nujaifi asked for the removal of al-Ghannam, a request the Iraqi prime minister refused (Niqash.org, March 2).

Al-Nujaifi asked the military to end the closing of al-Ahrar square, where demonstrations took place against the U.S. Army presence in Iraq from April 9 to April 26 (Aswataliraq.info, April 27). The Iraqi army claims Ba’athists and insurgents were behind the recent demonstrations (*Dar al-Hayat*, April 27). According to former deputy governor Khasro Gorran, the alleged Ba’athists were trying to use the recent demonstrations against the army.

Niniwa's governor and his allies see the Iraqi army as a pro-Iranian Shiite dominated occupation army over which the Sunni Arabs have no control. "The governor wants the Iraqi army under his control, but the Iraqi army wants the army controlled by its commanders. That's why the governor is spreading rumors that the army is Iranian, but this is not true," said Colonel Rewbar Younis Abdullah, who heads the Fifth Brigade of the Iraqi Army's Second Division in Mosul.

According to al-Hadba party member Dildar Zebari, the Second Brigade "is a tool in the hands of Maliki" and his State of Law party which "didn't receive any seats during the provincial elections and the parliamentary elections in Mosul."

Despite security improvements and political tensions, Islamist and nationalist insurgents still play a major role in Mosul. The overt presence of insurgent groups has decreased, but these groups have simply gone underground and focused on more criminal activities like kidnapping, extortion and assassinations (Niqash.org, April 6).

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Notes:

1. Interview with Nasser Ahmad al-Ghannam, May 3, 2011.
2. Interview with counterterrorism official in Erbil, May 10, 2011.
3. See <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2010/02/casualties-in-mosul-continue-to-drop-in.html>.
4. Interview with Dildar Zebari, deputy chairman of the local provincial council in Mosul and member of the al-Hadba party. Al-Hadba is allied with the Iraqiya list that failed to form the government.
5. Interview with Niniwa's former deputy governor Khasro Gorran and head of the second-largest party in Mosul, the Kurdish Brotherhood list, May 6, 2011.

Pakistani Ex-Servicemen Help Imran Khan Block Supplies to NATO Forces in Afghanistan

By Arif Jamal

As the date for the drawdown of NATO troops in Afghanistan nears, some Pakistani ex-servicemen and cricket hero turned politician Imran Khan are working on a two-pronged plan to prevent the movement of logistical supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan through Pakistan. On the one hand, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is encouraging Imran Khan to lead right-wing and jihadist groups to stage sit-ins so that the supply route to Afghanistan can be blocked whenever desired, while on the other hand it is encouraging the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militant group in the Khyber Agency to accelerate jihadist activities there to render it impenetrable for trucks carrying supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. [1] Former ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul is the chief handler of this operation (for Gul, see *Terrorism Monitor*, January 28). Gul held a meeting with some former servicemen and jihadist commanders in Swabi (Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa province) in mid-April where they decided to increase their efforts to interrupt the supply route. [2]

Small right-wing parties and jihadist groups have been building public opinion and applying pressure on the Pakistani government to have the drone attacks stopped or to limit them to militants opposing the Pakistani Army. Recently, the ISI gave the go-ahead to Hamid Gul to implement the plan to block the main highway used by the truckers who carry supplies to Afghanistan through Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa province. According to Gul's plan, Imran Khan was to call for a two-day sit-in to block the highway in Peshawar on April 23-24 (For Gul's relations with Khan, see *Asia Times*, April 20). Although the sit-in was launched with a lot of fanfare, it failed to attract large crowds. Only a few small parties, such as the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal of Rehmat Khan Wardag and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, led by Maulana Samiul Haq, publicly announced their support (*Dawn* [Karachi], April 23). However, some members of the Deobandi jihadist parties, including the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), were at the event. [3] Although the popular Imran Khan had been predicting millions of people at the sit-in, observers put the number at between 3,000 and 4,000.

Nevertheless, the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI – Pakistan Movement for Justice), founded by Imran Khan, has announced a second attempt to block NATO supplies with a two-day sit-in on May 21-22 in Karachi. The announcement came in response to a U.S. drone strike that killed 15 people in North Waziristan on May 6 (*Express Tribune*, May 8).

In his address to the April sit-in, Imran Khan vowed to continue staging such events until the United States stopped drone attacks in the Pakistani tribal areas. He asked the government to abandon its policy of hypocrisy and openly oppose the drone attacks. Khan threatened that if the Americans did not stop the drone attacks, his party would march on Islamabad (*Dawn*, April 24; April 25).

In an interview with an Australian daily, Khan demanded that Pakistan reject further American aid:

The biggest lesson to learn [from the U.S. raid in Abbottabad] is that Pakistan should stand on its own feet, say no to aid and be a sovereign country. Our government policies have been dictated by aid, they have enslaved us by aid... If the government had roots in its own people and was not perceived as an American puppet, then you could control terrorism in Pakistan... As we have been accused as harboring the world's biggest terrorist that means any act of terrorism that takes place anywhere, all fingers will be pointing at Pakistan (*The Age* [Melbourne], May 12).

General Gul's plan to block NATO supplies includes accelerating jihadi violence in the tribal areas, particularly in the Khyber Agency, where violence seems to be spinning out of control recently. The idea is to make it difficult for the truckers to pass through the Khyber Agency. The number of kidnappings and murders in the agency has gone up considerably in recent weeks. Attacks on security forces are also on the rise:

- On March 6, militants kidnapped four paramilitary personnel and killed one of them. His body was dumped on the roadside with a warning not to remove it for some time so that it would instill fear in the people (*Dawn*, March 7).
- A suicide bomber struck the funeral of the wife of an anti-militant lashkar member in Adezai (an

area between Peshawar and the Khyber Agency), killing 43 people and wounding 53 (*The News* [Islamabad], March 14; *Daily Times* [Lahore], March 12, *Dawn*, March 10).

- Militants blew up a bridge, a school and a convoy of security forces on March 14 (*Dawn*, March 15).
- Militants destroyed two bridges in the Khyber Agency on March 17 (*Dawn*, March 18).
- An attack on a paramilitary training center in Charsadda (near Peshawar) killed 98 people and wounded over 100 (AFP, May 17; *The News*, May 14).
- Five oil tankers carrying NATO fuel supplies were destroyed by a bomb in Torkham on May 13 (*The News*, May 14; AFP, May 16)

The killing and destruction unleashed by the militants in the Khyber Agency and its environs continues to this day.

The situation took a new turn on March 21 when Lashkar-i-Islam militants kidnapped Maulana Hashim, an Islamic scholar belonging to the Zakhakhel tribe, and killed him a day later (*Dawn*, March 23; see *Terrorism Monitor*, April 28). This infuriated the Zakakhel tribe, which declared war on Lashkar-i-Islam. The advancing Zakhakhel militia attacked the LI and pushed them out of the Zakhakhel-bazaar area, presenting the group with a major setback (*Dawn*, April 3). The bloody fighting between the two armed groups continues as the Zakhakhel militia does not want to stop fighting without getting custody of the killers of Maulana Hashim (*The News* [Islamabad] April 6). The fighting has displaced hundreds of families in the Khyber Agency (*Daily Times* [Lahore], April 10). According to credible sources in Khyber Agency, it is the bloodiest episode of violence there in the last few years and has left the Agency unsafe for travel. [4]

In view of the emerging situation in the Khyber Agency and the expectation of further attacks following the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the United States and NATO may not find it easy to receive supplies through the Khyber Agency after they start drawing down their troops in July 2011. This route may not be blocked permanently, but it is not likely to remain open without interruption either. Some commentators

and the main Pakistani opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, have accused the ISI of trying to make Imran Khan the next prime minister of the country. If the ISI succeeds in their plan to interrupt this vital supply route it may spell disaster for NATO troops in Afghanistan.

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Notes:

1. See http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/15/choking_off_pakistan_us_relations.
2. Author’s interview with a local journalist from Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa who requested anonymity, April 2011.
3. Author’s interview with a journalist who covered the event and requested anonymity, April 2011.
4. Author’s interview with a journalist in Khyber Agency who requested anonymity, April 2011.

After Bin Laden: Al-Qaeda Strategy in Yemen

By Michael W.S. Ryan

Information seized by American forces in Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad has sparked questions about Bin Laden’s involvement in the planning and current strategy behind al-Qaeda operations in places like Yemen. We have known for some time that Bin Laden has had a strategic relationship with Yemen, but we did not know to what extent his personal involvement continued in recent years (see *Terrorism Focus*, February 2, 2008). Some have speculated that Bin Laden’s death should not only demoralize al-Qaeda but should also remove a major source of authoritative planning and decision-making. The obvious immediate task for American authorities is to glean whatever information may help deter or disrupt planned terrorist operations. A longer-term goal must be to understand the extent to which al-Qaeda affiliates continue to follow a common strategy and doctrine even in the absence of the iconic Bin Laden. Al-Qaeda’s media output continues to be a

good indicator of at least the intentions of the affiliates. In the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), we previously have had strong evidence that the local affiliate has been following al-Qaeda’s global plan to exhaust American patience, resources, and political will to maintain a strong military posture in the Middle East in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular (see *Terrorism Monitor*, January 28, 2010). The publication of a book with the title *Why Did I Choose Al-Qaeda?* gives some indication of how AQAP intends to operate in the post-Bin Laden period. [1]

The leader of AQAP, Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi, endorsed the publication of *Why Did I Choose Al-Qaeda?* on March 10, 2010. The book was published posthumously after the death of its ostensible author Muhammad Amir al-Awlaqi. [2] Al-Wuhayshi claims that the author was “martyred” in an American attack in Shabwah, Yemen. The identity of the author is less significant than the endorsement of his book by AQAP’s leader. [3] A book published by al-Qaeda has a life that goes beyond its immediate readership. For example, the text of the book is used as a resource for recordings and videos that reach a much larger audience and its existence as an authorized source helps keep the far flung affiliates and small cells united in common goals and principles. The book is composed of 75 pages of Arabic text and provides 46 reasons why the author chose to join al-Qaeda in 46 brief explanatory chapters. Most of the chapters contain now familiar themes used to recruit al-Qaeda members; two of these chapters confirm AQAP’s continuing strategic orientation by citing passages from Abu Bakr Naji’s *The Administration of Savagery* (see *Terrorism Monitor*, September 10, 2009).

Chapter 29, “Because of Their War Policy,” asserts that jihadists, and especially al-Qaeda, have a war policy that includes goals they have been pursuing throughout the post-9/11 period. The first of these goals includes reducing fear and respect for the United States and building confidence “in Muslim souls” by “revealing [America’s] deceptive media halo to be a force that does not compel and forcing America to change its war on Islam from a system of war through proxies to prosecuting the war directly.”

The second goal is to replace the losses to the jihadist movement “over the last thirty years” by recruiting young men and by carrying out significant acts of terrorism against the United States by capitalizing on Muslim anger about the presence of American forces in “the Islamic World.” [4]

These themes are by not new to anyone following al-Qaeda's rhetoric or reading its books on strategy. For those unfamiliar with al-Qaeda, the author makes a point of referring the reader of his book to Abu Bakr Naji's book, *The Administration of Savagery*. [5] Muhammad 'Amir al-Awlaqi goes on to explain that the war policy of al-Qaeda now is to force the United States to prosecute its war, not by following its own strategy, but by falling into the trap of fighting as al-Qaeda's strategy dictates. The author then challenges the reader by stating that whoever is not convinced by what he has written should examine al-Qaeda's strategy and then consider whether they are following it or not. In effect, he is saying: if you do not believe me, read Naji's strategy and see whether AQAP is following it or not. To emphasize his point, al-Awlaqi then lists the elements of the classic three stage guerrilla strategy in Naji's idiosyncratic terminology and then poses another challenge to doubters and detractors: "O you who describe the mujahideen as without a plan, have you examined carefully their method and their strategy?" The author then asserts that al-Qaeda is the vanguard of these unidentified mujahideen.

Another reference to Abu Bakr Naji is contained in a chapter with the title "Because the Method of the Mujahideen is the Promised Guidance," which would appear to tie al-Qaeda's jihadist strategy to divine guidance. To drive this point home, the author cites the Qur'anic verse: "And those who strive in Our cause We shall guide in our ways, and Allah is with the beneficent." [6] The interpretation of "striving" for al-Qaeda always includes performing jihad in the sense of combat against Christians, Jews, and those considered to be apostate Muslims. On the other hand, the author goes on to state that it is well known that the concept of jihad is wider than combat because "the mujahideen today do not confine themselves to combat." They fight with their tongues, their money, and with their personal dedication. They follow a path that combines jihad and knowledge. The guidance they receive from Allah includes their knowledge of the capacity of their enemy and their own capacity as well as their strategy. AQAP in its endorsement of this kind recruitment message is trying to associate itself with anyone who supports classic jihad involving non-Muslim invasion of traditionally Muslim lands.

Another quotation from Naji's book used in *Why Did I Choose al-Qaeda?* is his saying: "The greatest field for learning, is the field of jihad." [7] The context of the statement is the need to rebut those who argue that

an individual or community is not ready for jihad in the sense of combat because they are not prepared or trained. In this chapter on divine guidance, the author claims that al-Qaeda should be the vanguard because they know the enemy. Because of their combat experience and devotion to jihad in the wider sense, they have received Allah's promised guidance. Furthermore, the organization is international and capable of successfully attacking even America. The argument continues with the rhetorical question: "For if the mujahideen in Afghanistan, Iraq, the [Arabian] Peninsula, Somalia, Palestine, and the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb were not the people of guidance, then who are the people of guidance?" Al-Qaeda is divinely guided because they have knowledge of religion, of the laws of warfare and politics, and have engaged in jihad, both in combat and in the wider sense of supporting other Muslims against the common enemy. One of the proofs of their status is that they follow their strategy, the strategy of Abu Bakr Naji and al-Qaeda's leadership.

Finally the author transitions to a long passage from Naji's book to give his readers an actual example to show them that "contemporary mujahideen are rightly guided." [8] Naji's passage presents the fabled story of Sayyid Qutb (the Egyptian ideologue executed in 1966) and Abdullah Azzam (assassinated in Pakistan in 1989) predicting the downfall of the Soviet Union. According to this story, Qutb predicted the downfall in general terms but Azzam was able to describe the downfall "and almost everything he said happened as in a movie."

In addition to demonstrating that jihadists can miraculously predict the future, the author uses the passage to remind his readers how jihadists not only defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but also, as the al-Qaeda myth goes, destroyed the Soviet Union itself. The quoted passage contains Naji's assertion that the Soviet Army was the most powerful in the world, much more powerful in numbers equipment, harshness and the ability to take casualties than the United States. *Why Did I Choose Al-Qaeda?* was published before Bin Laden's death, but it is a good bet that AQAP will be using this message to argue that al-Qaeda is still the group that can defeat the United States and local tyrants even after the loss of its founder. The organization will do everything it can in the short term to take advantage of the security vacuum caused by the current turmoil in Yemen to recruit, train, and act against the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia to prove al-Qaeda is still a threat and to draw recruits to its ranks. In the long run, AQAP probably does not have much of a

future in Yemen because its message runs counter to the goals of the majority of the population, but in the short run it remains very dangerous.

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Notes:

1. Accessed May 6, 2011 at <http://www.archive.org/details/WhyIChooseALQaeda> (in Arabic).
2. The English language magazine Inspire in its 2011 Winter and Spring issues has published selected translations of *Why Did I Choose al-Qaeda?* with the author's name given as "Shaykh Abu Mus'ab al-Awlaqi."

3. AQAP's Melahim Media also produced promotional videos both for the author and his book, for example: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNXFXWVcVrw> which contains footage of the author purportedly one day before his death.

4. *Why Did I Choose Al-Qaeda?* (in Arabic) p. 51.

5. Naji's book in Arabic is available at: <http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=chr3ofzr>; in English translation here (the reference is to page 10): <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/images/Management%20of%20Savagery%20-%2005-23-2006.pdf>.

6. Surah Al-'Ankabut: 69. Fakhry, Majid (trans.) *An Interpretation of the Qur'an*, 2002, New York University Press, p. 405; "strive" is "*jahadu*" in Arabic.

7. *Why Did I Choose Al-Qaeda?*, p. 42.

8. *Ibid.* p. 55; the example is taken from *The Administration of Savagery*, p. 8-9.