




**IN THIS ISSUE:**

IN A FORTNIGHT	
By L.C. Russell Hsiao.....	1
THE DEATH OF FACTIONS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY?	
By Willy Lam.....	2
PLA DEVELOPING JOINT OPERATIONS CAPABILITY (PART ONE): JOINT TASK FORCE EXPERIMENTATION	
By Kevin McCauley.....	5
"SHAHEEN 1" EXERCISE SIGNALS EXPANSION OF CHINA-PAKISTAN ALLIANCE	
By Chris Zambelis.....	7
THE DRAGON AND THE MAMBA: CHINA'S GROWING PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE	
By Loro Horta.....	10



People's Liberation Army Navy

*China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia.*

*China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a private non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. and is edited by L.C. Russell Hsiao.*

*The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Jamestown Foundation.*



For comments or questions about *China Brief*, please contact us at [hsiao@jamestown.org](mailto:hsiao@jamestown.org)

1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320  
Washington, DC 20036  
Tel: (202) 483-8888  
Fax: (202) 483-8337

Copyright © 2011

heavy-tonnage vessels including cruisers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers and aircraft carriers (*Global Times*, May 11).

According to Xia, in the 11<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, the Chinese navy admitted more than 20,000 military officers from the armed forces' and local academies, and sent them to the Navy's surface warship units, submarine units, naval aviation units, army units and coast guard units. Xia lamented that back in 2001, the Chinese navy had only one commander with a Ph.D. degree, but during the 11<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, the Navy cultivated hundreds of commanders with Ph.D.s and Masters degrees, who have enhanced the Navy's military training, live fire exercises, joint training, warship visits and far sea missions (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10).

In the 12<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan, the Chinese navy plans to train over 2,000 Ph.D.s, which means that around 20 percent of personnel will hold graduate degrees. Furthermore, all combat division level commanders will have to undergo 2 – 3 series of academic trainings, in order to develop a command of informationization, system warfare and to raise the the Navy's capabilities to conduct informationized warfare (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10). However, Li Jie pointed out that the Chinese navy is still understaffed as it accounts for less than 10 percent of the military, totaling over 200,000 personnel (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10; *Global Times*, May 11).

Xia Ping said that in the past five years, the Navy directly recruited over 7,000 people from the country's 20 provinces' 400 some technical institutes, encompassing more than 100 technical fields (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10). Furthermore, officers make up about 70 percent of all soldiers in the Navy, and 83 percent of all soldiers deployed on surface warships. In the past five years, the Navy relied on academies to train more than 11,000 officers. As a result, the Navy officers' education level and professionalism increased exponentially (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10).

Xia stated that in the past five years, the Navy has recruited nearly 1,000 soldiers from local colleges at the undergraduate level and above. Every year the Navy will select from these college soldiers a proportioned amount to rise through the ranks and go through military academy training. After qualifying through tests, these soldiers will be deployed to officer regiments. Starting this year, the Navy will start to select soldiers from regular academies to become pilots; after they attend flight school, they will be deployed to aviation units as pilots (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], May 10).

The PLA Navy's effort to strengthen education and training reflects a continuous codification and standardization for enhancing the Navy's operational capabilities. Indeed, the PLA Navy's future operational effectiveness depends just as much on expanding and cultivating its human resources as developing new platforms, which require experienced pilots and commanders to operate. More significantly, the standardization of training regulations and new officer commissioning is indicative of new levels of professionalism.

The expansion of staff could also signal an expansion of the PLA Navy and the growing role of the Navy in the Chinese armed forces. At the very least, these efforts, in the long-run, will greatly enhance the operational capabilities of the PLA Navy.

*L.C. Russell Hsiao is Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation.*

[The author would like to thank Tiffany Ma at the Project 2049 Institute for providing insightful comments.]

\*\*\*

## The Death of Factions within the Chinese Communist Party?

By Willy Lam

**O**n the surface, trends in recent months would suggest that the conservative and reformist wings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are locked in a ferocious struggle over seminal issues such as political liberalization and the treatment of dissidents. On the one hand, public and state security units have, since the outbreak of "color revolutions" in the Middle East and North Africa, launched the most severe crackdown on "destabilizing forces" in recent memory. A few members of the CCP Politburo have also called for the resuscitation of values heralded by late chairman Mao Zedong. On the other hand, pleas for political reform and tolerance for individual expression have continued to be made by supposed reformers including Premier Wen Jiabao. Yet, Beijing appears to be undergoing a major shift toward conservative and even quasi-Maoist norms, which begs the question: are there still checks and balances among the party's disparate camarillas? This is despite the fact that while the 90-year-old party has always claimed that there are no "mountain strongholds"—meaning cliques and power blocs—within its leadership, factions pushing different ideologies and policies have existed since Mao's days.

Before answering this question, it is instructive to examine the unprecedently iron-fisted repression of dissent. Since the spring, CCP authorities have attempted to impose near-total control over all aspects of the nation's political, ideological and cultural life. In addition to globally known activists such as artist Ai Weiwei, scores of *weiquan* ("protect civil rights") lawyers, dissidents and NGO organizers have been detained since early this year (Reuters, May 14; AFP, May 14). A dozen odd editors and reporters in relatively liberal media such as the Guangzhou-based *Southern Metropolitan News* have been reprimanded for appearing to show sympathy for Ai, as well as detained Nobel Peace Prizewinner Liu Xiaobo (*Ming Pao* [Hong Kong], May 13; CPJ.org, May 13). Police action against a broad array of underground churches has also intensified. Last Sunday, Beijing's public-security officers clamped down on worshippers at the Shouwang Church—who were trying to hold an

open-air gathering in the capital's southwest corner—for the sixth Sunday in a row. Hundreds of believers were briefly detained. Arrests of leaders of “house” churches in the provinces have also increased (*South China Morning Post*, May 16; BBC News, May 12).

Out of fear that dissidents may call for a Chinese version of the Jasmine Revolution that hit Tunisia earlier this year, the word *molihua* (“jasmine”) has been banned in the print and electronic media as well on the internet. The China International Jasmine Cultural Festival, which was scheduled to open this month in Guangxi Province, has been cancelled. To ensure that the airwaves are broadcasting only politically correct and “harmonious” materials, the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television has urged TV stations nationwide to broadcast in prime time “wholesome” and “patriotic” programs such as Cultural Revolution-vintage “revolutionary operas.” Apparently, “Westernized” and “vulgar” programs such as detective shows and spy thrillers have also been proscribed (*Theatlantic.com*, May 11; *New York Times*, May 11).

More significantly, much of the nation is in the throes of a feverish campaign to resuscitate Maoist values. The western metropolis of Chongqing, which initiated the Maoist revival three years ago, has asked cadres as well as students to spend at least one month a year working in impoverished villages so as to “learn from the masses.” Prisoners in Chongqing’s jails are being released earlier if they excel in belting out Maoist ditties. Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is also head of the Central Party School, said at a semester-opening ceremony last week that students should devote more time to studying the “major works of Mao Zedong” and other Marxist canon. Such efforts, Xi said, would help up-and-coming cadres to become more “politically reliable” and better able to “creatively use the Marxist standpoint and perspective to solve problems” (*New York Times*, May 5; China News Service, May 14).

Observers who think a modicum of checks-and-balances still exists within the CCP factions have cited a series of remarks recently made by Premier Wen Jiabao, who is deemed the most liberal cadre within the 25-member Politburo. Wen is the only senior official to have insisted that “there is no way out” for the country if political reform is frozen; he has also reiterated that the achievements of economic reform will be rolled back in the absence of political liberalization (See “Premier Wen’s ‘Southern Tour’: Ideological Rifts in the CCP?” *China Brief*, September 10, 2010). The premier repeated more or less the same mantras during his visit to Malaysia and Indonesia last month. More significantly, during an hour-long meeting with a senior pro-Beijing politician from Hong Kong, Wu Kangmin, the premier lashed out at “two political forces” that were holding up reform: “the remnants of feudalism and [representatives] of the residual poison of the Cultural Revolution.” Wen accused adherents of these forces of “refusing to tell the truth and being enamored of lies” (Chinareviewnews.April 26; *Ming Pao*, April 27).

It is doubtful, however, whether Wen can be characterized as a *bona fide* representative of the CCP’s traditional “right” or liberal

faction. Despite his time-honored rhetorical support for “universal values” such as human rights and rule of law, Wen has never once criticized his Politburo colleagues for the repression of civil rights of dissidents, NGO activists, or Christian missionaries. It is perhaps for this reason that a sizeable number of Chinese intellectuals have called Wen “China’s best actor” (*The Telegraph*, October 17, 2010; BBC News, October 16, 2010). After all, most of the associates and advisers of the party’s two most prominent “rightist” leaders—former general secretaries Hu Yaobang (1915 – 1989) and Zhao Ziyang (1919 – 2005)—have been marginalized since the Tiananmen Square crackdown 22 years ago. Liberal cadres who still clamor for a resumption of reforms once championed by Hu and Zhao—such as former vice-director of the CCP Organization Department Li Rui, former chief editor of *People’s Daily* Hu Jiwei and former director of the State Press and Publications Administration Du Daozheng—are well past 75 years of age. Bao Tong, 78, Zhao’s political secretary who has been indefatigable in calling for Western-style political reform, is still under 24-hour police surveillance (Asianews.it, March 23; Radio Free Asia, March 22).

There are, of course, still a good number of academics and intellectuals who dare risk police harassment by speaking out against the ongoing conservative trends. Economist Mao Yushi (no relations to Chairman Mao), who runs a private think-tank in Beijing, has made thinly veiled attacks on conservative cadres for turning back the clock. In a widely read essay entitled “Returning Mao Zedong to his original person,” which was circulated earlier this month May on the Internet, Mao said that China’s intellectuals should have the moral courage to “assess and condemn the many Mao blunders that have ruined the nation.” Shanghai-based historian Xiao Gongqian warned that the restitution of Maoist principles could deal a body blow to reform and open-door policy. “There is an intimate connection between ‘red culture’ and ‘extremely leftist’ ideologies and policies, and we must raise our guard [about the Maoist revival],” Professor Xiao noted (Dnews, April 26; *The Times of London*, May 5). While the liberal credentials of elite intellectuals such as Mao and Xiao are not in doubt, they do not belong to any CCP clique, and they have very limited means of influencing top-level decision-making.

The clearest indication that the overwhelming majority of top cadres are embracing conservative, even quasi-Maoist values, comes in the form of the apparent alliance between President Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League (CYL) faction and crypto-Maoists headed by Politburo member and Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai. Together with Vice-President Xi, Bo is a senior member of the powerful Gang of Princelings, a reference to the offspring of party elders. Bo has since 2008 waged in Chongqing the twin campaigns of “hitting out at the black [elements] and singing the glories of redness.” In Chinese politics, black elements refer to the triads or the Chinese mafia, while “redness” is shorthand for Maoist precepts. At the beginning, Hu and his CYL colleagues refused to render support to the charismatic Bo. Some of Hu’s aides even hinted that the president was scandalized by Bo’s Machiavellian use

of the “black-and-red” crusade to bolster his national profile—and to lobby for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) (See “Chongqing’s Mafias Expose Grave Woes in China’s Legal Apparatus,” *China Brief*, November 4, 2009).

Since late last year, however, a phalanx of top cadres from Beijing has begun to show up in Chongqing, and to heap encomiums on Bo’s performance. They have included the following PBSC heavyweights: propaganda czar Li Changchun, Vice-President Xi, anti-corruption chief He Guoqiang and law-and-order supremo Zhou Yongkang. Xi, who is slated to succeed Hu as CCP General Secretary at the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress and state president soon afterward, indicated that “the anti-triad campaign is well done because it has won popular support and brought relief and happiness to the masses” (Chinadigitaltimes.net, December 19, 2010; Chinaelections.Net, March 14). Eyebrows were raised last month when NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo and Politburo member in charge of organization Li Yuanchao also paid their pilgrimages to Chongqing (Xinhua News Agency, April 10; China News Service, April 19).

Li’s trip caught the most attention because of the CYL affiliate’s intimate ties with President Hu. Chongqing media quoted Li as endorsing Bo’s track record: “We must persevere with the anti-triad campaign because triads wreak havoc on society as well as the basis of state power.” Li eulogized the so-called Chongqing model of socio-economic development because, he said, the city’s innovative policies “represent a new approach to solving China’s many problems.” The CYL stalwart even lent his support to the reinstatement of Maoist standards. Referring to the fast-growing fad of “red songs,” the Organization Czar indicated that “if we don’t sing these songs, our society may soon change color” (Chongqing Daily, April 20; *Ming Pao* April 20). “Changing color” is a party term for the possibility that the socialist state might morph into a “vassal of capitalism.” Li’s backing of Bo highlights the growing concern of the party’s dominant factions toward dissenting voices and could signal that the two factions have struck a deal to jointly suppress the nation’s apparently growing opposition forces.

Indeed, a firm consensus seems to have emerged among major factions such as the CYL, the Shanghai Faction and the Gang of Princelings that the CCP’s “perennial ruling party” will be jeopardized unless Beijing is able to stamp out dissent with ruthless efficiency. There was nary a sign of discord within the National People’s Congress when the CCP-dominated parliament approved earlier this year a budget of 624.4 billion yuan (\$95 billion) for the purpose of *weiwen* or “upholding socio-political stability.” For the first time in CCP history, *weiwen* expenditures have exceeded funds earmarked for the People’s Liberation Army. Moreover, party-and-state organs in charge of ideology, propaganda and organization have pulled out all the stops to foster harmonious and patriotic norms, many of which have clear-cut Maoist roots (Asia Times, March 12; Asianews.It, April 12).

This is not to say, of course, that CCP cliques have stopped being embroiled in heated competition. Up until the era of Deng

Xiaoping, the apple of discord among heavyweight power blocs used to be ideology, especially whether the country should adopt market mechanisms or absorb foreign capital. Battles among the factions, however, are now apparently fought over issues of personnel and economic spoils—not ideological or political matters. For example, different power blocs are jockeying for the maximum number of seats on the CCP Central Committee and Politburo that will be formed at the 18th Party Congress in October 2012. Equally significant is the rivalry among the camarillas over control of lucrative business sectors (Asia Times, May 6; *Apple Daily* [Hong Kong], May 17; Chinaelections.net, February 16). For instance, the fast-rising Energy Faction within the party hopes to continue their monopolistic grip over state-held conglomerates in the oil-and-gas, electricity and nuclear-power sectors (See “The Rise of the Energy Faction in Chinese Politics,” *China Brief*, April 22).

On the surface, the falloff in factional bickering could render the CCP more united and better placed to tackle the tough challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Yet, the death of the cliquish in-fighting—at least as far as key ideological and political issues are concerned—carries inherent risks for China’s political future. Particularly, given the indefinite moratorium imposed on political liberalization, the diminution of checks and balances within the party’s top echelons could result in the authoritarian regime becoming even more isolated from the aspirations of the masses. So far, the most tangible result of the consensus within the Hu-led Politburo is the no-holds-barred suppression of “disharmonious” voices in the community. Partly due to the uniformity of thinking at the very top, decision-makers as well as mid-ranking executioners of policy may become less sensitive to whatever mistakes overzealous law-enforcement departments have committed in their scorched-earth policy against dissidents and other alleged sympathizers of the West. A highly unified leadership—especially one that is reviving Maoist and nationalistic values—may also make it less predisposed to listening to the advice let alone the criticism of Western countries.

As China gets ready to take its seat at the head table of the international community, it may discover that its Leninist political structure, which has been reinforced by the curtailment of factional give-and-take, will render the country increasingly at odds with those universal values on which the global architecture is anchored.

*Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including *Asiaweek* newsmagazine, *South China Morning Post*, and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the recently published “Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges.” Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.*

\*\*\*

# PLA Developing Joint Operations Capability (Part One): Joint Task Force Experimentation

By Kevin McCauley

The White Paper on *China's National Defense in 2010*, released by the Chinese government, discussed the foundation for an integrated joint operations (IJO) capability as part of its long-term, three stage military modernization effort. The PLA is researching the theoretical basis of this new joint operations doctrine and increasing experimentations in field exercises (*PLA Daily*, November 3, 2010). The implications of this shift toward integrated joint operations are manifold. When fully operationalized and integrated with new weapon systems and technologies, these efforts could significantly enhance the PLA's joint operations capability for contingency operations in potential conflicts along its continental and maritime periphery. The new joint operations doctrine will bolster joint operations capability to the operational and tactical levels, providing strategic depth as well as greater agility and flexibility for military operations.

Two important factors in developing this new joint operations doctrine are integration of the services and training the forces. The first part of this article will examine doctrinal developments for the implementation of integrated joint operations, focusing on experimentation with joint task forces that integrate the services at the campaign and tactical levels. The second part of the article will examine training developments to operationalize integrated joint operations, with an emphasis on the Military Training Coordination Zones and the role they play in joint operations developments.

## Joint Operations in Transition

The PLA is transitioning from coordinated joint operations to integrated joint operations (*yithua lianhe zuozhan*), which they believe is a more advanced stage of conducting warfare (*Jiefangjun Bao*, September 20, 2005; *Wen Wei Po*, July 31, 2007). The PLA believes that achieving an integrated joint operations capability is a requirement for building a modern armed force, and for fighting and winning wars under informationized conditions (*Jiefangjun Bao*, July 7, 2004).

## INTEGRATED JOINT OPERATIONS

The Nanjing Army Command Academy is taking the lead in advancing the theoretical basis for integrated joint operations and other transformational issues within the PLA. The academy's expertise in IJO theory grew out of its research into U.S. operations in the Iraq War in 2003 [1]. This academy published the first book on IJO in the PLA, *Integrated Joint Operations Command*, indicating the importance of command and control in achieving an integrated joint operations capability. The Academy formed a teaching and research group gathering select personnel, and

comprising the reorganized offices of "Command Automation," "Intelligence Information" and "Military Planning," combined with two other offices in the academy—"Operational Command" and "Military Theory" (*Jiefangjun Bao*, November 21, 2006).

PLA National Defense University (NDU) researchers stated that a joint headquarters structure is established or authority is delegated to a commander of an established unit to act as the joint force commander during joint combat. At the time (2004), this designated authority was most likely a military region commander, as the NDU researchers state that campaign and tactical level units will still conduct primarily combined operations with some coordination between services. Joint direction and coordination will primarily occur at the joint headquarters. The main issue for joint operations is that of establishing a high level unified command to coordinate joint combat by the services in different areas and throughout the phases of the operation (*Jiefangjun Bao*, July 7, 2004).

Integrated joint operations represent a significant refinement in the concept of joint operations for the PLA. The joint operations plan will synthesize and integrate the action plans of the subordinate units, unlike the current focus on issues of coordination. At the campaign and tactical levels, service units will be more unified, providing a greater synergy that will increase their effectiveness and combat power (*Jiefangjun Bao*, July 7, 2004).

These efforts include (Xinhua News Agency, Mar 31):

- Intensifying research and building the theoretical foundation for integrated joint operations and the supporting command doctrine;
- Developing new types of combat forces using modularized groupings of forces at both the combined-arms and joint levels;
- Improving joint C4ISR systems supporting service integration
- Enhancing integrated joint logistics capabilities;
- Implementation of a strategic project to develop talented personnel;
- Intensifying command and control training, joint training of task formations, trans-regional exercises, improving large-scale integrated training bases and developing simulation training.

## JOINT TASK FORCE EXPERIMENTATION

A key component in implementing IJO within the PLA is pushing joint operations capabilities down to the campaign and tactical levels, and creating integrated modular forces at those echelons that are organized to execute specific joint missions (*Jiefangjun Bao*, April 15, 2008; *Jiefangjun Bao Online*, May 2, 2009). The PLA plans on modularly combining combat units to optimize their mutual support for a specific mission (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, September 2, 2008).

The PLA is examining different force groupings to conduct IJO based on level and scale (campaign and tactical) and based on participating forces (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, October 14, 2010). The following are groupings based on level and scale:

- Joint Campaign Large Formation/Corp (*lianhe zhanyi juntuan*) (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, March 26, 2009) [2]—group army level units from two or more services to conduct campaign level operations (*Zhongguo Xinwen She - China News Service*, October 11, 2009; *Xinhua Domestic Service*, September 22, 2008)
- Joint Tactical Formation/Corp (*lianhe zhanshu bingtuan*)—tactical level units (division or brigade and below) from two or more services (*Jiefangjun Bao*, December 26, 2006)
- Combined Arms Tactical/Battle Groups—combined arms battalions reinforced with ground force combat arms elements for a specific mission (*Jiefangjun Bao*, December 26, 2006; *Jiefangjun Bao Online*, December 15, 2009)

The following are groupings based on participating forces and the operations they might conduct (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, October 14, 2010):

- Ground-air: joint border defense and counterattack campaigns (potential Indian or Korean peninsula contingencies) or anti-terrorism and maintaining stability operations (counterinsurgency or internal stability operations, either supporting a Central Asian regime under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as exercised in the Peace Mission exercises or conducting internal stability operations in Tibet or Xinjiang)
- Naval-air: blockade or counter-blockade operations (possible contingencies in the South China Sea or Taiwan)
- Ground-naval-air: joint island landing campaigns (a possible Taiwan contingency)

The force groupings could be formed at either the campaign or higher tactical levels. If fully developed, the campaign level joint task force could command joint tactical formations, depending on the situation (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, March 26, 2009).

## Tactical Level Joint Task Forces

The PLA believes the trend in joint operations is to integrate joint forces at the tactical level, employing smaller formations that can achieve campaign and even strategic goals (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, May 2, 2009). The PLA is experimenting with various types of Joint Tactical Formations (JTF), examining various joint issues, particularly command and control, and coordination. While different Military Regions and exercises have experimented with joint task forces, the *Lianhe* (Joint) series of exercises in Jinan Military Region (MR) appear to be a primary PLA effort of experimenting with JTFs, in particular on command and control

issues. Different service elements are assigned the lead in a particular exercise or during a phase of an exercise, which is reportedly raising enthusiasm for joint training within the services. The Military Training Coordination Zones (MTCZ) are attempting to shift away from an army-centric training focus in joint exercises, with joint exercises now planned to allow for the navy and air force to take the lead, which reportedly has raised enthusiasm for joint training within the other services. The MTCZs have reportedly adopted a three year training cycle, with the focus of the exercises changing each year during the cycle (*Jiefangjun Bao*, April 15, 2008; *Jiefangjun Bao Online*, September 28, 2010).

- *Lianhe-2004* began testing command models for joint tactical formations by creating a unified joint command. The PLA discovered that this unified group joint command model for a JTF worked well for a short-duration, small-scale operation, but believed that it would not be suitable for a larger-scale joint operation (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, November 11, 2008).
- *Lianhe-2006* and *Lianhe-2007* tested a “distributed coordination” joint command model for a multi-service JTF. During these two exercises, coordination groups were dispatched to participating units. The PLA found that this reduced the conflicts in the existing service command systems, and promoted a certain level of jointness. The coordination was lax between the services, however (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, November 11, 2008; *Zhongguo Xinwen She - China News Service*, September 4, 2007).
- *Lianhe-2008* experimented with a “distributed embedding” joint command model where “command coordination groups” with coordination and command authority were deployed to units. The JTF commander discussed operational issues with subordinate commanders to determine key operational issues and formulate decisions. There was a shift in command based on phases of the operation. For example, during the embarkation and sea crossing phases, the navy joint commander played the main command role. Exercise participants thought this joint command method was an improvement over the previous models, but they recognized that the PLA was still in an initial stage of joint development (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, November 11, 2008).

## CAMPAIGN LEVEL JOINT TASK FORCES

The PLA began with an emphasis on joint training at the tactical level, and now is progressing up echelon. In 2009-2010, the PLA began a transition to greater experimentation at the campaign level. The MR headquarters is becoming more involved in directing joint training. The PLA is attempting to streamline the standard five stage development process through experimentation in the field to determine what works, and then writing the theoretical foundation and doctrinal manuals (*Jiefangjun Bao*, January 21, 2010).

The PLA emphasis on joint campaign large formations, based on a service level campaign formation, began in the *Qianfeng-2009* exercise organized by the Jinan MR headquarters. The joint pilot training program is considered a “major strategic task” assigned by the Central Military Commission and General Staff Department to the Jinan MR, which established a theater joint training leading group in 2009 to supervise the joint training (*Zhongguo Xinwen She - China News Service*, October 11, 2009; *Jiefangjun Bao*, January 21, 2010; *Xinhua Domestic Service*, August 2, 2010).

## CONCLUSION

The PLA is developing a more advanced joint operations doctrine—integrated joint operations. When fully developed, the PLA will be capable of operating joint task forces at the campaign and tactical level that can achieve campaign or strategic goals during contingencies. The PLA’s effort to develop a more modular force and organize joint task forces is a key to developing the PLA’s concept of integrated joint operations. These modular joint task forces can be specially tailored to meet specific mission requirements for campaigns in various theaters. Command and control issues are an important focus of the experimentation, with Jinan MR taking the lead in joint experimentation.

The development of a more advanced joint operations capability, joint training developments and employment of joint task forces represents a beginning of a move by the PLA away from an army-centric force to one that is more balanced. The role of Naval and Air Force commanders is increasing as they command joint task forces during exercises and provide greater input to planning and operations. Officers are also gaining greater knowledge of the other services as they gain joint training experience and work more closely with their counterparts. Yet, the ground forces will remain the *primus inter pares* as long as they represent the largest force element within the PLA; but there does appear to be some rebalancing occurring.

The PLA began examining joint operations in earnest after the first Gulf War. It took close to a decade of theoretical development before it began to focus on integrated joint operations, followed by testing and experimentation in the field. The PLA states that “the establishment of the command organizations for joint trainings in our army is still at [a] research and demonstration stage” (*Jiefangjun Bao Online*, March 26, 2009). It could easily take the PLA the remainder of this decade to fully develop and implement its new joint concept force wide. If the PLA can succeed in this major doctrinal undertaking, the PLA’s combat power will increase significantly while allowing it to employ smaller tailored formations. This will provide the PLA with greater agility and flexibility in responding to contingencies along its periphery.

*Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the former Soviet Union, Russia, and China during his career in the federal government. He has written numerous intelligence products for*

*decision makers and combatant commands, including contributing to the annual Report to Congress on China’s military power. Mr. McCauley is currently researching and writing a book on Chinese warfare.*

## NOTES:

1. The Nanjing Army Command Academy published a series of books on the Iraq War including, “Analysis of the Iraq War,” and “Electronic Warfare in the Iraq War.”
2. Since 2009, the PLA has turned to examining how to establish a campaign-level joint formation on the basis of a service-level basic campaign/corps large formation [*jiben zhanyi juntuan*] for joint operations.

\*\*\*

## “Shaheen 1” Exercise Signals Expansion of China-Pakistan Alliance

By Chris Zambelis

The recent headlines have been dominated by the progressively deteriorating relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory in May by U.S. forces exacerbated the widening rift and further overshadowed the recent staging of a sensitive military exercise involving Pakistani and Chinese forces. It is against this backdrop that China’s strong ties with Pakistan in the diplomatic, economic, and military realms have gained salience. Indeed, the timing of Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s four-day visit to China, which commenced on May 17—the third series of meetings between Prime Minister Gilani and Chinese leaders in less than 17 months—illustrates the extent to which Islamabad counts on Beijing for support during this historic low point in U.S.-Pakistan relations (*The News* [Karachi], May 17). Rumors that Pakistan seriously considered allowing China to access remnants of a secret U.S. stealth helicopter that went down during the raid against Bin Laden, thus allowing China a firsthand looking into the latest stealth technology employed by the U.S. military—Pakistan has since agreed to return the remnants of the helicopter to the United States—also reflect the priority Pakistan places on proving its worth to China (ABC News, May 16).

While news of cooperation between the armed forces of longtime allies would normally come at no surprise, details surrounding “Shaheen 1” (“Eagle” in Urdu) remain scant. The exercise was composed of what both sides acknowledged to be “operational” aerial maneuvers involving the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), held over a period of a few weeks in March 2011. The exercise represented the first time PLAAF combat aircraft deployed to Pakistan and joined alongside their Pakistani counterparts in operational maneuvers in Pakistani

airspace (*The News*, March 18). In addition to “Shaheen 1,” both countries also plan to stage joint ground maneuvers involving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its Pakistani counterpart in Pakistan later in 2011. The exercise also took place against the backdrop of the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan and the recognition of 2011 by both countries as the “Year of Pakistan-China Friendship” (GEO Pakistan [Islamabad], January 2).

China’s participation in “Shaheen 1” marks another milestone in its limited but expanding expeditionary military capability. Perhaps most importantly, China’s involvement in “Shaheen 1” reflects its growing eagerness to showcase its expeditionary capability in countries the United States considers strategic allies [1]. In spite of the current crisis in relations, the United States continues to count Pakistan as a vital ally. In regard to the war in Afghanistan, for instance, Pakistan is indispensable. The main supply line that sustains U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan originates in the Port of Karachi. At the same time, the central role of Pakistan in U.S. operations in Afghanistan has not precluded Beijing from extending its hand to Islamabad.

## THE EXERCISE

Designed to foster enhanced joint air capabilities and to underscore the priority both sides place on preserving bilateral military ties, the maneuvers executed during “Shaheen 1” featured combat aircraft from the PAF and PLAAF, as well as technicians and other participants (Xinhua News Agency, March 5). Specifics involving the exercise, including the types of aircraft deployed by both forces, the total number of aircraft and personnel involved, the exact nature and scope of the missions performed and the location of the maneuvers, have not been disclosed by either Pakistan or China. A press release issued by the PAF, however, did contain a photograph of Pakistani and Chinese pilots and other personnel participating in “Shaheen 1” dated March 11; 13 Pakistani and 12 Chinese officers appear in the photograph (Pakistan Air Force Press Release, March 11). Concerns that the PAF may have deployed its fleet of advanced U.S.-built F-16 Fighting Falcons alongside PLAAF combat aircraft likely raised concerns in Washington. In addition to potentially exposing sensitive U.S. technology to Beijing, the PLAAF also stands to gain great insights into the operating performance of the aircraft in relation to their own. The PAF currently boasts a fleet of 63 F-16s of different variants (45 A/Bs and 18 C/Ds) in its inventory and it recently entered into negotiations with the United States for additional planes. The PAF’s current fleet of F-16s is also scheduled to undergo comprehensive upgrades (*Aviation Week*, March 8). In spite of the expected concerns in the United States about the potential deployment of F-16s during “Shaheen 1,” there is no evidence to otherwise indicate that Pakistan deployed F-16s during the exercise [2].

The absence of detailed official statements by Islamabad and Beijing or other publicly available information regarding the dynamics of

“Shaheen 1” did not prevent outside observers from making their own estimates about what transpired during the exercise. A number of official photographs showing Pakistani and Chinese pilots preparing for flight missions and engaging in other activities during “Shaheen 1,” which circulated on websites and online discussion forums dedicated to Pakistani defense and foreign policy issues such as *Pakistan Air Force Falcons* and *Pakistan Defense*, however, elicited extensive commentary, including among many claiming to be Pakistanis, Chinese, Indians, or in some way affiliated to (or at least knowledgeable of) Pakistani military issues [3]. Some of the photographs posted online showed Pakistani and Chinese pilots seated inside the cockpit of what appeared to be a Chinese-built Shenyang J-11BS air superiority fighter. The J-11BS is regarded as an indigenous version of Russia’s Su-30 Flanker fighter series; while relying on the Su-30’s mainframe, the aircraft is said to be equipped with Chinese-designed and manufactured engines, avionics, radar and weaponry (*Aviation Week*, November 5, 2006).

## POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

In many respects, “Shaheen 1” represents a continuation of what is already a broad and multifaceted bilateral military relationship that has been cultivated over decades. While both Pakistan and China deny that the exercise was designed to “target” any third parties, aspects of the exercise, as well as its timing, illuminate the trajectory of wider trends that are having far-reaching geopolitical impacts on South and East Asia (Xinhua News Agency, March 5). In this context, the implications of “Shaheen 1” are best understood in political as well as military strategic terms.

The timing of “Shaheen 1” must be considered against the background of the current poor state of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistan has watched nervously as the United States expanded its ties with India in recent years while the latter continues to make impressive inroads into Afghanistan, a country Pakistan sees as vital to its concept of strategic depth and its overall security posture relative to its rival India. Bin Laden’s presence and subsequent death in Pakistan—and the likely existence of a support network within the echelons of state power that allowed him to remain there—adds another layer of complexity to Pakistan’s predicament. Losing faith in the durability of its alliance with the United States, an increasingly insecure Pakistan feels compelled to act; Islamabad may have once calculated that navigating a fine line between Beijing and Washington represented the most prudent path to protect its national interests, but a tilt away from the United States and toward China may prove more beneficial down the line.

The symbolism underlying Islamabad’s willingness to host Chinese combat aircraft on its territory in the current political climate was clear. Such a bold measure is indicative of China’s evolution in recent years and the confidence it has nurtured among its allies as both a reliable and credible partner. Pakistan sees China as a country that delivers on its promises, an “all-weather friend,” according to Prime Minister Gilani (*Dawn* [Karachi], May 10). The United States,

on the other hand, is viewed as impervious to Pakistani concerns and a meddler in its affairs. For its part, China is eager to exploit the widening diplomatic chasm between the United States and Pakistan. In light of the circumstances behind the killing of Bin Laden on Pakistani soil and the concomitant threats by Washington to cut financial aid to Islamabad, China found an opportunity to offset U.S. criticism of Pakistan's conduct. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao seized the occasion of Gilani's latest visit to China to acknowledge the "huge sacrifices" endured by Pakistan in "the international fight against terrorism" while adding that Pakistan's "independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected" (Xinhua News Agency, May 18).

Rhetoric aside, China has backed up its words with substance. During the Pakistan-China Business Cooperation Summit held in Islamabad in December 2010, Prime Minister Jiabao declared that China would "never give up" on Pakistan; the meetings culminated in the signing of 35 agreements and memorandums of understanding regarding cooperation in numerous sectors, including energy, banking, technology, construction, defense, and security, totaling \$35 billion (*Daily Times* [Lahore], December 19, 2010). The volume of Sino-Pakistan bilateral trade hovered close to \$7 billion in 2010, an over 30 percent increase over bilateral trade in 2009; Pakistan and China are aiming to achieve bilateral trade by volume of at least \$15 billion by 2015 (People's Daily [Beijing], December 13, 2010).

While the United States remains a critical source of arms to Pakistan, especially advanced weapons platforms such as the F-16, the politics behind U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan and the strict terms that accompany the sales of weapons systems—a humiliating reality, in Pakistan's perspective, especially in light of the perceived special treatment India receives by the United States and international community in areas related to defense—have driven it further into the arms of China. When it comes to arms exports, Pakistan is China's biggest customer. Over 40 percent of China's arms exports are destined for Pakistan. Moreover, China has jointly developed the JF-17 Thunder (known as FC-1 Fierce Dragon in China) multi-role fighter plane with Pakistan. A joint venture between China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) and Pakistan's Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), the JF-17 is currently in operation and available for export (*The News*, February 9). China has also recently agreed to supply Pakistan with an additional 50 JF-17 fighters and to expedite their transfer to the PAF, a move aimed to demonstrate China's capacity to fill the vacuum if the United States decides to reduce or eliminate economic and military aid—the United States has provided Pakistan with over \$20 billion in economic and military aid over the last decade—to Pakistan (*PakTribune* [Rawalpindi], May 19; *Financial Times* [London], May 15). Reports that both sides plan to jointly develop a stealth variant of the JF-17 indicate that future Sino-Pakistan cooperation in this area is in the works (*Nawa-i-Waqat* [Lahore], April 18; *Aviation Week*, July 19, 2010). Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the aerospace industry is also seen by Islamabad as a counter to its rival

India's similar cooperation with Russia, as both India and Russia cooperate on a number of joint defense projects involving combat aircraft. China is also keen to keep pace with its rival India in the military sphere (*Aviation Week*, March 8).

As the United States continues to pressure Pakistan over its nuclear weapons arsenal, China remains a dependable source of nuclear technology. China has also agreed to build additional nuclear reactors in Pakistan. With China's assistance, Pakistan is believed to be on the cusp of overtaking the United Kingdom as the world's fifth-largest nuclear weapons power (*Maclean's* [Toronto], April 6). A recent report in the Pakistani media also alleged that China declared in "unequivocal terms" during the recent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue meetings held in Washington in May that any U.S. attack on Pakistan would be "construed as an attack against China" (*The News*, May 19). The diplomatic, economic, and military support China has given Pakistan during the period of heightened U.S.-Pakistan tensions has not gone unnoticed in Islamabad. Leader of the opposition in Pakistan's National Assembly, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, issued the following words: "I pay tribute to China for supporting and assisting Pakistan in every difficult time. I on behalf of the parliament and the people of Pakistan pay tribute to China for supporting Pakistan at this critical time" (Associated Press of Pakistan, May 9).

## CONCLUSION

As U.S.-Pakistan relations continue to plummet, the implications of events such as "Shaheen 1" will rightfully be examined through a broader geopolitical lens, particularly in the context of their impacts on U.S.-Sino relations. China is poised to earn considerable strategic benefits by enhancing its relationship with Pakistan. At the same time, however, there are no indications to suggest that it is willing to jeopardize its relationship with the United States over Pakistan. In spite of its opposition to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the robust U.S. military presence and U.S.-led alliance architecture in East Asia—a region China deems to be part of its rightful sphere of influence—Beijing is likely to operate a pragmatic foreign policy with respect to Pakistan so as to not overly disrupt the balance of power in South Asia and, as a result, alienate the United States. China will also continue to view Pakistan as a crucial strategic ally, and a potential lever over the United States (as well as India), strengthening the bond underpinning Sino-Pakistan relations for years ahead.

For all of its rhetoric, Pakistan lacks the leverage to outmaneuver the United States, even considering the convergence of interests between it and China on issues such as India and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and it surely understands this. Nevertheless, Islamabad's diplomatic campaign and other activities showcasing its potential to downgrade its relationship with Washington in favor of Beijing may earn it the attention (and concessions) it desires from the United States.

*Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc., a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. He specializes in Middle East politics. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc.*

## NOTES:

1. In a related point, the PLAAF's participation in Turkey's "Anatolian Eagle 2010" aerial exercise in October 2010, an event marking the first instance of Chinese participation in joint military exercises with a NATO member shortly followed by a likewise unprecedented demonstration of Sino-Turkish military cooperation in the form of ground maneuvers in Turkey – the first instance of Chinese ground forces operating jointly with a NATO member on NATO soil – appeared to set a precedent for increased Chinese military activities involving U.S. allies on their territories. For more details, see Chris Zambelis, "Sino-Turkish Strategic Partnership: Implications of Anatolian Eagle 2010, *China Brief*, January 14, 2011.
2. Considering Turkey's fleet of advanced F-16s, it is worth noting that the United States expressed similar concerns during "Anatolian Eagle 2010."
3. For examples of the official photographs posted online of some of the purported Pakistani and Chinese participants in "Shaheen 1," aircraft deployed during the exercise, and accompanying commentary, see "PAF-PLAAF undertaking joint Air Exercise - Shaheen-1," Pakistan Air Force Falcons, [http://www.paffalcons.com/news/2011/PAF-PLAAF-undertaking-joint-Air-Exercise-Shaheen-1\\_3182011.php](http://www.paffalcons.com/news/2011/PAF-PLAAF-undertaking-joint-Air-Exercise-Shaheen-1_3182011.php) (accessed May 2011); also see "PAF-PLAAF undertaking joint Air Exercise - Shaheen-1," <http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-photos-multimedia/105146-paf-plaaf-undertaking-joint-air-exercise-shaheen-1-a.html> (accessed May 2011).

\*\*\*

## The Dragon and the Mamba: China's Growing Presence in Mozambique

By Loro Horta

In just the past three years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has established an impressive foothold in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique in southern Africa. While China's relations with Mozambique date back to the early 1960s when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supported the small African nation's struggle for independence, China remained—until recently—a marginal player in a country where South Africa, the United States, Britain and Portugal were the main political and economic drivers. In late April, Senior official Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau, made an important good-will visit to Mozambique that

highlighted the growing ties between the two countries. While trade between China and Mozambique was a mere \$208 million in 2007, by 2010 it reached \$690 million. Indeed, China has been investing heavily in the country's infrastructure, mining, and agriculture. For example, Chinese state-owned Eximbank granted the Mozambican government more than \$2.3 billion for the construction of a mega dam in the central part of the country. Chinese companies have built roads, bridges, military installations and hospitals, among others throughout the country (Macahub, May 19, 2009; *O País*, February 7). Furthermore, Beijing contributed \$160 million to modernize the country's main airport and built several important national buildings, among them the national stadium, the ministry of foreign affairs, the parliament and the country's largest convention center. China is fast emerging as the most important foreign power in Mozambique.

## MORE INVESTMENTS TO COME

China's single largest investment in Mozambique (so far) is a \$1 billion investment in the coal mining sector by Wuhan Iron and Steel (*Financial Times*, June 24, 2010). In 2010, Mozambique national radio announced that the Chinese company Kingho has expressed its intention to invest \$5 billion in the country's growing coal sector (African Press Agency, July 22, 2010). Following an investment seminar hosted by the Mozambican government in Shanghai in June 2010, Chinese business interests pledged upward to \$13 billion in investment for the next 10 years in areas such as infrastructure, mining, agriculture and tourism (Reuters, August 27, 2010). Around the same time, Chinese banks announced \$165 million in investments. The money is to be invested in a cement plant, a cotton processing facility and agricultural projects.

Chinese businesses have also been pouring money into the cement sector with investments worth \$78 million in a cement plant in Magude, while CF-Moz has pledged \$38 million for a cement plant in Matituine. In 2010, China Development Bank granted \$110 million to Mozambique for another cement plant in Beluane in the south. The massive plant is expected to produce one million tons of cement a year (Radio Mocambique, March 4). The growing investments in the cement sector are ostensibly aimed at dealing with China's shortages and reducing costs. Moreover, Chinese companies stand to make good profits as a result of the country's growing infrastructure expansion and an ongoing spree in construction.

Direct flights between Mozambique and China are expected to start in 2011, this will further increase economic interaction. China is the fastest growing tourism market in the world with 50 million Chinese tourists in 2010, and Mozambique's tourism sector is also growing. Chinese tourism companies reportedly hope to bring a million Chinese tourists to Mozambique over the next 10 years, thereby making the PRC the most important source of tourists for the country (Radio Mocambique, August 28, 2010). There is no definitive data on the number of Chinese residing in Mozambique,

with numbers ranging from as low as 7,000 to as high as 12,000. China has also shown significant interest in the country's large fertile land as way to meet its growing food demand and shrinking arable land. In May 2008, Li Zhengdong, the Director for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture, announced that the Chinese government was in negotiations with Mozambique to lease land for cereal production. The Mozambican government denied the report. Yet, in August 2010, following the investment seminar in Shanghai, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce stated that the Mozambican government was offering Chinese investors one hectare of land for eight dollars for a yearly lease (Gongsibaike.com, July 23, 2010). Chinese business interests from Macau were reported to be in negotiations for the lease of several thousand square kilometers of land for biofuel production. China has also invested \$15 million in an agriculture research center in the country, and built three processing plants for various agriculture products.

Several Chinese companies have started prospecting for mineral resources such as diamonds, rubies, gold, iron and marble. The Chinese have, since the early 2000s, been heavily involved in exploiting the country's rich timber resources and importing enormous amounts of timber. Chinese involvement in the timber sector in Mozambique is rather controversial, with widespread illegal logging that saw the Mozambican government cancel several licenses to Chinese companies. The Chinese have also been accused of plundering the country's fisheries particularly for shark fins [1]. Nevertheless, China is not the only culprit here.

With the intent of assisting with education and building its soft power, China has also provided hundreds of scholarships to Mozambique with more than a 100 Mozambican students now pursuing higher education in the PRC. Despite these efforts, most Mozambicans still prefer to pursue their studies in the West due to a perceived better quality of education and better financial bursaries. This may soon change, however. Beijing has also sent agricultural specialists, doctors and military advisors to assist the Maputo government, and Chinese is now being taught at several educational institutions.

## BEYOND THE LAND OF THE MAMBA

China's presence is growing fast around several of Mozambique's neighbors, particularly in Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Zambia and Tanzania are hosting two of China's Special Economic Zones in Africa, with Zambia being developed as a major mining and agricultural hub. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe are landlocked countries whose nearest exit to the sea is by the central ports of Mozambique. Mozambique lies on a strategically important maritime route since the Mozambique Channel provides an important alternative route to the Suez Canal. In July 2010, the author wrote in the *China Brief* that the Chinese were interested in modernizing Mozambican harbors to export the goods from their growing ventures in the interior of the continent and that the Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira were the most likely

(See "China Building Africa's Economic Infrastructure: SEZs and Railroads," *China Brief*, July 22, 2010). On January 31, Mozambican media reported that Chinese interests were negotiating with the government to modernize and expand the Beira harbor. The Chinese investors did not specify how much money they were willing to invest, stating simply that they had a lot of money to invest (Canal De Mocambique, January 31). The spokesperson for the consortium, George Wang, stated: "We have extensive interests in the diamond industry in Zimbabwe. So far we have been using the land route all the way to Durban. If the Beira harbor is modernized, countries like Zambia and Malawi will also use the port for it's much closer than Durban" (Canal De Mocambique, January 31).

## A BRIC THAT BREAKS

China is not alone in its interest in Mozambique—India and Brazil have also begun to invest heavily in that country. Just like Beijing, New Delhi's interests appear to extend beyond Mozambique. Indian companies have a strong presence in manufacturing, mining and services and, unlike many Chinese companies, they tend to employ large numbers of locals. Some Western academics have argued that China imports large numbers of workers from the mainland to Africa due to the lack of skilled workers. Yet, Indian companies investing in the same countries do not seem to have that problem—neither do Malaysian, South Korean or Brazilian companies.

The import of thousands of Chinese workers into Africa has been a source of tension between the Chinese and labor unions throughout Africa. Yet, in the past two years, the Chinese government has grown more aware of this problem and has been addressing the issue with some degree of success in places like Cape Verde, Namibia and increasingly in Mozambique. Industrial relations between Chinese managers and workers have also been very problematic, with widespread accusations of racism and physical abuse (The Associated Press, April 6). In 2009, the provincial government of Manica warned Chinese company Henan International Cooperation over its industrial relations record and demanded the Chinese treat workers fairly; other local governments have expressed similar concerns (AIM News, July 7, 2009). Beijing already faces significant difficulties in enforcing its own labor laws in China; doing it in Africa is an even greater challenge. Yet, as labor costs increase in China, more Chinese companies are moving their factories to the most stable African countries to take advantage of local cheap labor, just like Western companies did in China years ago.

India has focused its investment in areas where China has also been investing heavily, particularly in the mining sector. India has pledged to invest \$1 billion in the coal sector and has offered \$45 million in trading and technology transfer to the country's mining sector (*O Pais*, January 11). In 2010, following President Armando Guebuza's visit to India, New Delhi granted his country a \$500 million credit line for infrastructure, mining and agriculture. India has also funded the construction of several important buildings (AIM

News, September 30, 2010). Yet, India is clearly losing the race in Africa; its democratic system makes the disbursement of large loans slow and complicated. In early 2011, Mozambican Prime Minister Aires Ali said that India needed to be more efficient and quicker at keeping its promises (*A Verdade*, March 28).

With the exception of the U.S. Navy, the Indian navy is by far the dominant force in the Indian Ocean, and India has been growing quite apprehensive over China's growing presence in East Africa. In 2008, the Indian military established an electronic listening center in Madagascar, just off the coast of Mozambique and near Mauritius, the home of one of China's Special Economic Zones (SEZ), and a country home to a large Indian community (*India Defense*, July 28, 2007). In 2007, at the request of the Mozambican government, Indian warships patrolled the capital's coast during the Summit of Heads of state of the African Union. Mozambique is important for both China and India from a resource and energy point of view as well as from a strategic point of view. As both countries' navies expand their interest in the Indian Ocean, the importance of East Africa will likely increase and may perhaps lead to greater conflict.

Brazil, another rising power, has also been investing heavily in many of the areas of Mozambique's economy where the two Asian giants have been concentrating their efforts. Brazilian mining giant CVRD is competing with Chinese and Indian companies for Mozambican coal and has invested heavily in that sector. Since 2009, CVRD has invested \$1.3 billion in coal mines in the central provinces of Zambezia and Tete, so far excluding Chinese and Indian investment (*O Globo*, February 28, 2009; *Macauhub*, November 1, 2010). Brazilian steel giant CSN has since invested \$179 million in a joint venture with Australian mining giant Rio Tinto in steel processing plants. Brazilian investors have announced their intentions to invest up to \$6 billion in biofuel and take advantage of the Mozambican government allocation of 60,000 hectares of land for foreign investors.

Brazil has been involved economically with Mozambique for decades and resents the growing presence of the newcomers, particularly China. Since April 2009, China became Brazil's largest trading partner, and many in Brazil are unhappy with China's growing dominance of the local economy and its encroachment on Brazil's traditional markets. In order to balance China, Brazil has entered in joint ventures with Japanese, European and Australian companies, while also engaging India (Reuters, July 10, 2010).

So far the FRELIMO government in power since 1975 has been able to play a sophisticated balancing game, preventing any one country from having an overwhelming dominance over the country. In February, the Mozambican government refused to grant to India three additional blocks of coal mining in order to prevent that country from dominating this vital sector.

## CONCLUSION

China is fast emerging as the most important economic and diplomatic player in Mozambique, bringing billions of dollars in investments and asking no questions. While there have been a few issues of tension such as Chinese workers and environmental degradation, Sino-Mozambican relations have been perceived as largely beneficial for both countries. While the West has closed its markets to Mozambican agricultural products through heavy domestic subsidies, China has exempted 420 Mozambican agricultural products from tariffs. In a time when the West is facing a serious economic crisis, China and other emerging powers are becoming crucial for the wellbeing of several African nations. Sino-Mozambican relations are likely to continue to grow with Beijing emerging as the main economic and strategic player in Mozambique and in East Africa. China is now quickly replacing the continent's traditional former colonial powers as the main actor. Yet, riots, high crime rates and poor infrastructure hinder an even faster expansion of Chinese influence in Mozambique. Furthermore, as pressure grows in China and India for energy resources and other commodities, it remains to be seen if Mozambique will be able to maintain its delicate balancing act. As the African saying goes: "when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled."

*Loro Horta is a graduate of the Peoples Liberation Army National Defense University senior officer's course and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Central School. He is also a graduate of the US National Defense University and is currently pursuing further studies at the US Naval Post Graduate School.*

## NOTES:

1. Loro Horta, "China's Relations with Mozambique: A Mixed Blessing," Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 18, 2008, at <http://csis.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-relations-mozambique-mixed-blessing>.

\*\*\*