



# MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR

## Personalities Behind the Insurgency

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### IN THIS ISSUE:

BRIEFS.....	1
FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO YEMEN: FARIS AL-ZAHRANI, THE IDEOLOGUE OF JIHADI OPERATIONS IN THE GULF By Murad Batal al-Shishani.....	4
A LIFE ON THE RUN: A PROFILE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIAH'S MARWAN By Jacob Zenn.....	5
TERROR'S PUPPET MASTER: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA'S SAJID MIR By Arif Jamal.....	8
VICE, VIRTUE, AND VITRIOL: THE RESURRECTION OF FORMER TALIBAN MINISTER MAULVI QALAMUDDIN By Derek Henry Flood.....	11



Maulvi Qalamuddin

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### KILLING OF 'THE COMORIAN' AT MOGADISHU CHECKPOINT PROVIDES DETAILS ABOUT WIDENING SOMALI INSURGENCY IN AFRICA

The alleged mastermind behind the coordinated August 7, 1998 East Africa embassy bombings called Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun; Haroon), sometimes referred to as 'The Comorian' in counterterrorism circles, was gunned down along with an accomplice at a Mogadishu checkpoint on the night of June 7-8 by Transitional Federal Government (TFG) authorities. Mohammed operated as a virtual specter in eastern and southern Africa for well over a decade since the precision attacks that wreaked havoc on the American diplomatic installations in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing a combined total of at least 223. Mohammed is also believed to have been the "mastermind" behind a suicide attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in the resort city of Mombasa on Kenya's Swahili coast on July 28, 2002 which killed 13. [1] After the 2002 attack, Mohammed reportedly worked his way out of Kenyan custody twice.

Mohammed was born in the early 1970s in Moroni, the capital of the tiny Union of Comoros archipelago situated in the Mozambique Channel midway between Madagascar and Mozambique in the Indian Ocean. Mohammed was one of the War on Terror's most elusive figures, evading being killed or captured for years despite a \$5,000,000 bounty on his head. [2] An unnamed American official familiar with the incident described Mohammed's downfall as that of being "in

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the wrong place at the wrong time -- for him, that is” (Reuters, June 11). At the time of his killing, he was reportedly carrying \$40,000, medical supplies, laptops, and spare mobile phones while traveling under the alias “Daniel Robinson” (AFP, June 12).

Details emerging since the event may tell a different tale. Mohammed’s companion in death, a Kenyan national called Musa Hussein Abdi (a.k.a. Musa Dhere; Abdullahi Musa) was a frequent visitor to Somalia’s battlefields according to Kenyan police. Abdi had lost his right leg fighting in Mogadishu in 2006 and was fitted with a telltale prosthetic limb which helped make his corpse more identifiable (*Suna Times*, June 17). When not involved in activities inside Somalia, Kenyan authorities charge that Abdi was involved in the recruitment of fellow Kenyan citizens to fight for al-Shabaab and was sheltered at the home of Omar Awadh Omar (a.k.a. Abu Sahal) while in Nairobi. Omar is currently being held in the high-security Luzira prison in Uganda on charges of orchestrating the twin bombings that rocked Kampala on July 11, 2010, which killed a combined 79 as they tried to enjoy viewing the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Omar was believed to be Mohammed’s immediate deputy in East African al-Qaeda (EAAQ) as well as a logistician and fundraiser for al-Shabaab. At the time of his capture in a Kampala hotel on September 15, 2010, Kenyan and Ugandan authorities believe that Omar was in the process on planning a similar twin bombing in his native Kenya (*New Vision* [Kampala], September 23, 2010).

The al-Shabaab movement has transformed in recent years from a strictly internal insurgency struggled to wrest Mogadishu from the eternally incompetent but internationally supported TFG administration following the demise of the Islamic Courts Union and the Ethiopian military occupation to one that seeks to strike blows against regional African actors who have dared interfere in Somali affairs. Previously al-Shabaab has made threats against Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi for their respective military involvement in Somalia. Kenya has now been added to that undesirable list. In the words of al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Rage: “Kenya has constantly disturbed us, and now it should face the consequences of allowing Ethiopian troops to attack us from Mandera town...We have never openly fought Kenya but now we shall not tolerate them any more. Kenya has been training soldiers to attack us” (Reuters, February 27). A TFG source told an opposition Kenyan daily that Mohammed – holding a bogus South African passport – had not been killed seemingly at

random, as was initially reported in the global media, but was in fact a victim of a TFG intelligence initiative. The TFG source claimed there was quarreling within Mohammed’s EAAQ-al-Shabaab network over the allotment of monies that the TFG exploited to take down East Africa’s most wanted man. “We used the same money they [EAAQ] were wrangling over and made our way to Fazul [Abdullah Mohammed]. That fateful day he was lured to the TFG forces by his own driver who took a wrong turn to deliver Fazul [Abdullah Mohammed] to our forces where he was gunned down” (*The People* [Nairobi], June 13). Following the death of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, it is not immediately clear who will succeed him. Mohammed claimed to derive his power from the late Osama bin Laden and pledged that he would personally widen the al-Shabaab fight beyond Somalia’s porous borders. With the killing and capturing of such key EAAQ operatives, it remains to be seen if Somalia’s internal Islamist chaos will continue to threaten fellow sub-Saharan states as Mohammed once promised.

#### QUESTIONS ARISE SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION OF ILYAS KASHMIRI

As images of a dead Muhammed Ilyas Kashmiri have yet to surface or be produced by either Pakistani government officials or any of the myriad militant organizations operating freely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), some in both Pakistan and Washington have expressed doubts over the veracity of the claim that Kashmiri was wiped out in a South Waziristan drone attack on June 3. Kashmiri has been a major militant leader heading both the ‘Brigade 313’ of Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and al-Qaeda’s Lashkar-e-Zil (LeZ) ‘shadow army’ (For more on Kashmiri, see *Militant Leadership Monitor*, January 2010). At the time of his supposed assassination, he was in an area of South Waziristan controlled by Maulvi Nazir in the village of Ghwakhwa when the compound he was in was leveled by a missile launched from a CIA-operated unmanned aerial vehicle (*The News International*, June 5). As some American officials began to express doubts about whether Kashmiri had indeed been eliminated from the theater, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik told the media that there was a “98 percent chance he is dead” (Reuters, June 5). Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani asserted that American officials were on board with the Pakistani narrative that Kashmiri had been eliminated but when pressed neither the United States Department of State or Department of

Defense was willing to publicly line up with PM Gilani's statement (Economic Times [New Delhi], June 7). CIA-run drones continue to pummel the Wana area of South Waziristan in the weeks after Kashmiri's alleged death, while Pakistani authorities have still not been able to confirm beyond a shadow of a doubt that Kashmiri has been removed from the militant scene in that agency (AFP, June 15).

It has been speculated that Kashmiri has been involved in a host of terror plots across the wider region including the bombing of a restaurant frequented by foreigners on February 13, 2010 in Pune, India that killed 17 (*The Hindu*, June 17). Kashmiri's lifelong enmity toward India stems from his jihadi involvement in the Kashmir conflict and his hatred of the Indian state. His desire to attack India proper may have been part of a strategy to divert Pakistani military attention back toward the Indian border thereby depriving Pakistan of the troop numbers it would need to launch operations in North Waziristan and elsewhere in the FATA. Pakistan, constantly seesawing back and forth between American pressure to go to war against its own citizenry in the FATA and its military stance toward India, would be much more comfortable in its traditional mode of mobilizing against India to the east than facing Kashmiri's militants in the west.

The most recent operation attributed to Kashmiri, a May 22 attack on the Pakistan Naval Station Mehran in Karachi – home of the Pakistan's Navy's air wing – led many, including Pakistani journalists and police, to believe that Kashmiri's arm of al-Qaeda had tentacles inside the Pakistani military (Asia Times Online, May 27). Initial reactions in Pakistan were colored by two consecutive bombings on buses transporting Pakistani navy personnel in late April. Islamabad promulgated the notion that ethno-nationalist Balochi separatists were behind these attacks and that perhaps the attack on the Mehran base was a continuation of a spate of said attacks. A Pakistani counter-terrorism official described a Pashto-language phone intercept after the April 26 and 28 IED attacks which greatly lessened the idea that Balochi radicals were involved and pointed to either Pakistan-based al-Qaeda or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (*The Express Tribune* [Karachi], May 24). After Syed Saleem Shahzad reported the depth of Kashmiri's Brigade 313 penetration into the Pakistan Navy for Asia Times Online, he was subsequently abducted and killed while en route to a television interview in Islamabad. An anonymous Inter-Services Intelligence official stated that it may be in Kashmiri's interest for the world to

believe he is gone, as he is (or was) well aware of his being targeted by the United States government (Asia Times Online, June 8). The U.S. Department of State website links Kashmiri to a March 2, 2006 suicide bombing on the American consulate in Karachi which resulted in the death of a U.S. diplomat and three others. [3] HuJI purportedly released a photo said to be Kashmiri's corpse but upon closer inspection, it was in fact an image of one of the killed Lashkar-e-Taiba attackers involved in the November 2008 Mumbai siege (Frontline [Chennai], June 15). If the ISI officer's comment is accurate, that would make HuJI's claim that Kashmiri has been killed part of a ruse aimed at helping him go even deeper underground as the drone war in the FATA grinds on.

Notes:

1. Robert I. Rotberg, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p.184.
2. To view Fazul Abdullah Mohammed's Rewards for Justice listing, see: [http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted\\_terrorists/fazul-abdullah-mohammed](http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/fazul-abdullah-mohammed).
3. To view Muhammed Ilyas Kashmiri Rewards for Justice listing, see: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160071.htm>.

## From Saudi Arabia to Yemen: Faris al-Zahrani, the Ideologue of Jihadi Operations in the Gulf

By Murad Batal al-Shishani

In 2004, the then Saudi Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz announced a four week long amnesty and pardon program for al-Qaeda operatives who were engaged in an open, bloody confrontation with Saudi authorities and Western expatriate workers. Those who voluntarily gave themselves up during this grace period were to be spared the Kingdom's no nonsense death penalty. The name Faris bin Shuweil al-Zahrani (a.k.a. Abu Jandal al-Azadi) emerged at the time as one of the Kingdom's most wanted men. The suggestion that he would have surrendered under these conditions as a result of mediation was allegedly made by a comparatively mainstream Islamist Saudi Sheikh called Safar al-Hawali, whom al-Zahrani would later lash out at in response.

Just days later, al-Zahrani, who is now one of the more prominent post-2003 jihadi ideologues in Saudi Arabia, released an open letter responding to what he described as al-Hawali's "lies." He demonstrated his staunch belief in the infidelity of the Saudi state by recalling to his followers that he refused to receive a prize awarded to him six years earlier in order to avoid shaking the unclean hand of someone he considered "an infidel tyrant." A strident al-Zahrani stressed that he would not willingly surrender. Al-Zahrani described a stark choice presented to him in an email purportedly emanating from Sheikh al-Hawali: he had to choose between turning himself in to the Saudi state or face exile in an anarchic Iraq. [1] Choosing instead to live on the run, al-Zahrani was eventually arrested along with a fellow traveler on August 5, 2004, in the city of Abha, capital of Asir Province, ostensibly en route to Jizan Province in the south from where he would travel to Yemen (*al-Watan*, August 7, 2004). At the time of his capture, al-Zahrani was listed as number 12 on a list of 26 most wanted terror suspects issued by Riyadh following the outbreak of jihadi violence in the Kingdom in the spring of 2003 (AP, August 6, 2004).

Al-Zahrani represents a new generation of Salafi-jihadi theorists, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Despite being imprisoned, al-Zahrani's writings continue to be widely consumed by jihadis, especially in Yemen, where the

merger between members of Saudi al-Qaeda and their Yemeni counterparts created al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009. Al-Zahrani, 37, holds a Masters degree in Islamic law from Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh. He had also been registered in a PhD program but failed to complete it. Al-Zahrani is married with two children.

### Theorizing

The significant role of al-Zahrani as a jihadi ideologue can be seen in his writings, in which he scripted prolific tracts discussing the legality or the ideological justification of the strategies and tactics employed by jihadis. As an example, al-Zahrani wrote a book entitled *The Texts of [Islamic] Scholars on the Provisions of Raids and al-Tattrus [Shielding] (Traps and Explosives)* which was released on May 19, 2003, and in which he stresses the importance of such tactics.

A second book, entitled *The Huge Amount of Verses and Hadiths [that prove] the Infidelity [of the] Peninsula Shield Forces*, was published in 2002-2003. In this book, al-Zahrani refers to the Gulf Cooperation Council forces as not true Muslims, "because they played a major role in facilitating American occupation of Iraq."

Another notable book authored by al-Zahrani was *al-Bahith fi Jwaz Qatl Afrad Thobat al-Mabahith (An Inquiry into the Ruling of Death upon Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces)* which was first published on November 17, 2002. In this book, al-Zahrani justifies the killing of members of the secret services by labeling them as apostates and advocates of the "tyrants" he constantly rails against. He legitimizes this tactic by exploiting religious texts.

And in a fourth book called *Tabrid al-Mujahideen al-Abtal A'al Ihiya'a Sunnat al-Ightyal (Inciting the Heroic Mujahideen to Revive the Practice of Assassination)*, [2] al-Zahrani presents the jihadi perspective of the importance of assassination as a tactic. In this text, he provides the tactical definition of assassination while detailing its various means and methods. More significantly, he discusses the religious legitimacy and feasibility of using such tactics. Al-Zahrani lists those individuals who should be targeted for assassination; in addition to diplomats, military officers and security agents of designated 'enemy' countries, he urges jihadis to assault the security and military apparatuses of those Muslim countries whose governments were regarded by Salafi-jihadis as "tyrants" or "apostates."

**The Yemen Connection**

These last two books indicate the influence of al-Zahrani on the jihadis in the Arabian Peninsula, as these have been incorporated into use by AQAP. The assassination attempt on Prince Mohammad bin Nayef in August 2009, as well as the targeting of secret service officers in Yemen beginning in 2008, was a clear example of the spread of this deadly meme.

Furthermore, al-Zahrani played a significant role in efforts to appeal to the southern tribes in Saudi Arabia (to which he himself belongs) which appears to have been successful in mobilizing young men from the region to join the corresponding jihadis in Yemen. Since Saudi and Yemeni jihadis unified their command in 2009 under the umbrella of AQAP, the number of jihadis from the southern provinces of Saudi Arabia joining the group increased, benefiting from tribal interrelations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen as well as their geographic proximity.

According to figures compiled by the author, southerners make up nearly 22% of the whole Saudi Salafi-jihadi movement's membership, close to the number of those who came from the western region, estimated at 21%. Those who came from the central provinces constituted 52%. [3] This development was accompanied by a manifesto from al-Zahrani entitled *Ya Ahla Al-Janoub (A Call to the People of the Southern Region)*. This tract is considered as an exhortation directed to Saudi Arabia's southern tribes in 2004 and it includes an early allusion to the possible involvement of Yemeni groups in a peninsular conflict. Among the one-third of AQAP comprised of Saudi nationals, 50% helm from the south and 39% from the central region, particularly Al-Qassim Province. Such figures point to importance of the ideology promulgated by al-Zahrani.

In addition to his operational theorizing for jihadis, Faris al-Zahrani has written several books disseminating his insights on more mundane general issues, which serve as guides for dedicated and potential jihadis. Nonetheless, it is his influence on the new generation of AQAP that is the most visible sign of his reach.

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**Notes:**

1. "Statement on the False Allegations of al-Hawali", July 6, 2004, [www.tawhid.ws](http://www.tawhid.ws).
2. *Tahrid al-Mujahideen al-Abtal A'al Ihiya'a Sunnat al-Ightyal* is available at: [www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=dh5d8za3](http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=dh5d8za3).
3. Figures derived from the forthcoming book, *The Geopolitics of al-Qaeda* by Murad Batal al-Shishani.

## **A Life on the Run: A Profile of Jemaah Islamiyah's Marwan**

*By Jacob Zenn*

**Z**ulkifli bin Hir (a.k.a. Zulkifli Abdkhir), who goes most frequently by the alias Marwan, is the highest ranking of the 20 to 30 active Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists in the Philippines. The Philippine government intensified its manhunt for Marwan on May 1 because he has the operational skills, ideological preparation, and experience to mastermind a terrorist attack in retaliation for Osama bin Laden's killing. On May 2, the Philippines National Police were placed on full alert in anticipation for a revenge attack and the military's Western Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM) called on the Filipino public to help the government locate Marwan (Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 4).

One of the leaders in the *markaziyah*, or central command, of JI, Marwan is a longtime follower of bin Laden and has been on the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Rewards for Justice Program's Most Wanted list since 2007. Then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice authorized a reward of up to \$5 million for information leading to his arrest or conviction.

A Malaysian national, Marwan is reported to be one of five foreigners with links to bin Laden currently hiding in southern Mindanao. In addition to Marwan, the Philippine army is hunting for Mauwiyah, a Singaporean; Indonesians Saad and Qayyim; and another Malaysian, Malaysian Amin Baco (*Philippine Star*, May 16). On June 3, the Philippine navy's intelligence command captured a Malaysian terrorist financier, Abdul Aziz Usman, who had studied accounting and finance at the University of Tennessee from 1996 to 1999. Marwan, too, is feeling the pressure from the Philippine government's redoubled efforts in 2011 to track down terrorists and keep them on the run so they cannot coordinate new attacks.

Marwan was born in the town of Muar, in peninsular Malaysia's Johor State, in 1966. During his time in secondary school at Sekolah Datuk Abdul Razak in Seremban from 1979 to 1983, Marwan earned a reputation among his fellow students for being a jihadist sympathizer (*Zambo Times*, June 6, 2007). He may have been influenced to embark on a career in terrorism early on in life by his family members.

Marwan's elder brother, Rahmat Abdkhir (a.k.a. Sean Kasim; Sean Kalimin (b. 1964)), is a naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in San Jose, California and studied computer science in the U.S. Rahmat was arrested by FBI agents at his place of employment in Sunnyvale, California in 2007 on charges that included "contributing goods and services to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (Marwan)." [1] According to American authorities, at the time of Rahmat's capture, ammunition, sniper scopes, and military training manuals were found in his home.

Over a one-year period from 2006-2007, Marwan communicated with Rahmat in code to order items in the United States. Using aliases for sender and recipient, Rahmat sent \$10,000 to Marwan's bank accounts in the Philippines as well as accessories for firearms, Colt .45 magazines, two-way radios, backpacks, binoculars, camouflage clothing, and knives. Marwan kept Rahmat

informed of his situation on the ground in the Philippines by providing coded reports of battles between Philippine troops and his protectors there.

Marwan's younger brother, Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani, (b. 1976), is in an Indonesian prison serving a life sentence for terrorism charges. In 2002, he botched the bombing of a Christian prayer group in the Atrium Shopping Mall in Jakarta. He placed a bomb in a cardboard Dunkin' Donuts box, but it exploded prematurely as Taufik was carrying it into the mall, costing him one of his legs (*New Straits Times* [Kuala Lumpur], May 7). Taufik had entered Indonesia illegally in 2000 to wage jihad against Christians in Indonesia's Molucca Islands and participated in several church bombings in Indonesia. Taufik was a member in Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a terrorist group led by Marwan (*The Star* [Petaling Jaya], February 7, 2003).

Many of the details of Marwan's life from 1983 to 1989 – the years following his graduation from secondary school – are unclear. However, during that time he is believed to have studied engineering in the United States and may have received bomb-making training under the tutelage of JI explosives expert Dr. Azahari Hussin, who was killed in 2005 by Indonesian anti-terrorism police. Those learning experiences helped to propel Marwan's later career as an explosives master.

Marwan first engaged in jihad overseas in 1989 when he traveled to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting alongside the late Osama bin Laden. From 1989 to 1992, he was deployed to a combat zone to defuse remaining Soviet ordinance and landmines and recycle them for use by the mujahideen (*Zambo Times*, op. cit.).

After Marwan returned to Malaysia in 1992, he began working as a district engineer in a local council. He married and had four children but was leading a double-life. At that same time, he was the leader of a Malaysian JI cell and helped to found KMM, an organization comprised mostly of former Afghan mujahideen that advocated for the overthrow of the government of then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the southern Philippines. KMM was implicated in church bombings in Malaysia in the 2000s and Mahathir and others have blamed KMM for involvement in interreligious violence in Indonesia's troubled Molucca Islands (which

Taufik was involved in), kidnapping activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao, and the separatist Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia.

In 2000, Marwan, as the leader of the KMM, was responsible for the murder of Kedah State assemblyman and member of the Malaysian Indian Congress, Dr. Joe Fernandez, who KMM accused of trying to convert Muslims to Christianity (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 18, 2002). Marwan was also involved in the bombing of a Hindu temple in Pudu, Kuala Lumpur. Then in May 2001 he led KMM in the Southern Bank Robbery in Petaling Jaya, a suburb of Kuala Lumpur, in order to obtain more operating funds. While leading KMM in Malaysia, Marwan maintained close contact with militant groups in Chechnya and Bosnia and allegedly recruited Malaysians to fight in those two countries (*The Star* [Petaling Jaya], March 29, 2007).

In January 2002, Marwan fled from Malaysia to Indonesia after Malaysian police raided and detained JI members who operated the “JI Ivy League” Lukmanul Hakiem religious school in Ulu Tiram, Johor State in 2001. [2] In Indonesia, Marwan became involved in the October 12, 2002 bombings in Kuta, Bali’s jam-packed tourist district, with the help of his older brother, Rahmat, who provided him with radios and cash that were used to carry out the attack. On September 5, 2003 Malaysia offered a \$16,500 reward for Marwan’s capture, but by August 2003 Marwan was already in southern Mindanao under the protection of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Marwan traveled to Mindanao from Indonesia with Suryadi Masud, an Indonesian from Makassar, Sulawesi, who ran a cosmetics business in southern Mindanao and disguised his use of the route to traffic JI militants into Mindanao. Suryadi – who was also involved in the bombing of a McDonalds in Makassar in 2002 – picked up Marwan while Marwan was in a training camp in Pandeglang, West Java in 2002. When Suryadi visited the camp, Marwan asked for Suryadi’s help in getting to Mindanao because Marwan knew the Indonesian police were searching for him. Soon after, Suryadi secured cosmetics orders in Jakarta’s Chinatown and left with Marwan on a ship from Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta bound for Makassar. In Makassar, Suryadi dropped Marwan off at the house of Agus Dwikarna, an administrator of a terrorist camp in Sulawesi and a JI and al-Qaeda facilitator. [3] Marwan stayed there for a week until Suryadi took Marwan to the Indonesian island of Manado.

From Manado, Suryadi accompanied Marwan to the Sangihe islands in north Sulawesi, which serve as the final staging point before entering the “back door” into southern Mindanao. In Sangihe, Suryadi took Marwan to meet Sardjono Gabriel, a fisherman who helped transport JI militants to Mindanao for training. Suryadi arranged for Sardjono to take Marwan to Mindanao. Although Philippine police believe Marwan arrived in Mindanao in August 2003, other reports suggest he arrived early enough to have taken part in the Davao airport bombing in March 2003. [4]

Since 2003, Marwan has lived in southern Mindanao training Abu Sayyaf members in explosives and sniping and has helped to set up terrorist camps. His record there includes attacks on U.S. interests and military bases, as well as involvement in a number of bombings in Central Mindanao in 2006-07 conducted with a member of the MILF, Abdulbasit Usman (see *Terrorism Monitor*, April 5, 2007). While many believe he was killed in a U.S. drone attack in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas in early 2010 (see *Militant Leadership Monitor*, January 2010), local Philippine officials state that Usman remains at-large. His cell was broken up on March 3, 2010 when Philippine security forces arrested three of his men in a raid in Manila’s Maharlika district, which is home to a large Muslim community (Reuters, March 3, 2010). Marwan’s disciples and trainees have also been responsible for numerous bombings that have plagued the Philippines since his arrival.

As Marwan has been on the run in the Philippines for the majority of the last five years, he may be having difficulty organizing major attacks, thus focusing his efforts on training others to carry out attacks. Marwan escaped death on August 10, 2006 in an incident that resulted in the killing of two Philippine National Police (PNP) officers. The PNP approached his hideout in Central Mindanao, but a firefight ensued and Marwan got away. In a similar incident, at dawn on March 8, 2010, five men and two women, all suspected to be members of Abu Sayyaf and part of Marwan’s cell, were killed in a military raid off an island of Siasi in Sulu province (Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 7, 2010). Marwan is believed to have escaped during the assault with other fleeing militants (*The Straits Times* [Singapore], March 8, 2010).

The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ intelligence-driven operations to locate and kill Marwan are ongoing, but Marwan is elusive, benefitting from the protection of Muslim militants in Mindanao. The Philippines – as well

as the United States, Malaysia, and Indonesia – are all as eager to see the demise of Marwan. The international community believes Marwan intends to facilitate more terror attacks to avenge Osama bin Laden. They also believe he seeks to avoid the fate of other JI leaders who have been killed in recent years, including Dulmatin, and Noordin Mohammed Top. Nor does Marwan want to fall prey to arresting authorities like JI's Umar Patek who was captured in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January of this year (Jakarta Post, March 31, 2011).

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Notes:

1. To view the U.S. Department of Justice press release, see: "Specially Designated Global Terrorist and His Brother Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists," August 3, 2007, [http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07\\_nsd\\_578.html](http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_nsd_578.html)
2. See the International Crisis Group report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, p.26, August 26, 2003, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/063-jemaah-islamiyah-in-south-east-asia-damaged-but-still-dangerous.aspx>
3. Agus Dwikarna is listed as a sanctioned individual pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), known as The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. To view his entry, see: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI11103E.shtml>
4. International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.22.

## Terror's Puppet Master: Lashkar-e-Taiba's Sajid Mir

*By Arif Jamal*

Sajid Mir (a.k.a. Sajid Majid), commander of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is perhaps one of South Asia's least known jihadi commanders. Though details of his background are scarce, knowledge of his doings began to surface during the 2003-2004 interrogation of a jihadi called Willie Brigitte by French anti-terrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere. Now further information on the activities of Sajid Mir have come to light during the testimony of David Coleman Headley (né Daood Saeed Gilani) in the trial of accused Mumbai plotter Tahawwur Hussein Rana in Chicago. Mir is currently believed to be the principal plotter of the massive November 2008 terrorist siege in Mumbai. According to Headley, Mir very clearly orchestrated the details of the attack. Mir originally wanted it to take place during the 'Night of Power' in the Islamic calendar (September 29, 2008), but the initial operation failed, as did a second attempt in October. The attack finally went ahead under Mir's direction in November (Press Trust of India, May 27). Though Rana was convicted of plotting to attack the offices of Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, he was found not guilty of being directly involved in the LeT Mumbai operation despite Headley telling a Chicago jury that not only did Rana know Sajid Mir, but that Mir phoned Rana to thank for his help on pulling off the plot (*Hindustan Times*, June 10). According to Western intelligence sources, Mir and other co-plotters of the Mumbai attacks are living in a safe house under the protection of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate (*The Hindu*, May 30).

### Background

Sajid Mir was born in a lower middle class family in the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore in the early 1970s. [1] However, according to the Interpol warrant issued for him, his date of birth is January 1, 1978 (Rediff.com, January 27). [2] He was schooled and raised in Lahore. As is common in Pakistan, Mir's father left for Saudi Arabia as an economic migrant while Mir was still very young. In Saudi Arabia, the family saved enough for his father to start a modest textile business in Pakistan. Mir married the daughter of an army imam with whom he had two sons (*The Hindu*, op. cit.). Mir's years in Saudi Arabia and his in-laws seem to have had tremendous influence on him. Unlike most members of



the LeT, he had adopted a radical Salafi outlook before he came into contact with the group. In the early 1990s, he briefly joined the Pakistan Army, through which he came into contact with the Pakistani mujahideen fighting in Kashmir. He left the army soon thereafter to join LeT in the fight against India. He rose fairly quickly in LeT's hierarchy because of his military background and relative knowledge of English. Soon he became deputy to LeT operational commander Maulana Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi in the international operations wing. In the pre-9/11 period, LeT was organizing itself at the global level and planning to start global jihad. However, the organization had to put its plans for international jihad on hold in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as Islamabad was faced with a stern ultimatum brought by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage urging the government of Pervez Musharraf to abandon its clandestine support for terrorist groups or face consequences from Washington. However, LeT's aspiration to be a key component in the global jihad were hardly abandoned, merely shelved for the time being.

## The Case of Willie Brigitte

Despite the lull in LeT's plans for jihad well beyond South Asia, Mir refused to remain idle. As a certain element of Muslims arose in the West, however miniscule, who were ready to fight Americans and their allies in Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S.-led attack on the infrastructure of the Islamic Emirate and its Taliban foot soldiers, Mir sprung into action. He was soon entrusted with dealing with Willie Brigitte and American nationals associated with the so-called Virginia Jihad Network. Willie Brigitte was born on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe, an Overseas Region of France, and moved to Paris to finish his education. He opted to join the French Navy in 1989 rather than complete his studies. He married a Syrian Muslim woman whom he divorced shortly thereafter. Although his Arab wife was not particularly religious, it may have been her nominal faith that prompted Brigitte's curiosity to study the Quran and Islam. In late 1997 or early 1998, Brigitte converted to Islam. In 1999, Brigitte married for a second time to a Senegalese Muslim. Unlike his Syrian wife, his West African bride was a practicing Muslim. They, too, later divorced (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, February 9, 2004).

In September 2001 Brigitte left France for Pakistan to join LeT. He was driven by the notion of fighting Americans in Afghanistan, apparently unaware of the fact that the United States had only a small ground force

there in late 2001. In Lahore, LeT sent him over to Sajid Mir who soon cleared him to take jihadi training in the Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. In his later testimony in France, Brigitte described Mir as an important personage in the LeT hierarchy. He was about 30 at that time. Mir came across as a pleasant and cordial person. He was of medium build with a dark complexion. He spoke English and Arabic in addition to Urdu and Punjabi. In the training camp, Brigitte met with a number of foreign jihadis and their trainers. It is highly probable that a good number of the trainers were from the Pakistan Army, as Rawalpindi would have a keen interest in directing the activities of non-state groups in the territory it controls. Although Brigitte had ideas to fight Americans in Afghanistan, the LeT had no plans in doing so at that time. Sajid Mir convinced him to go back and wait for orders in France, essentially creating a sleeper cell.

## Jihad in Australia

Brigitte did not have to wait long before Mir presented him with a new jihad plan. Mir asked Brigitte to travel to Australia and join Faheem Lodhi in Sydney. Faheem Lodhi was an architect-turned-militant and a trusted lieutenant of Mir. Brigitte arrived in Australia in May 2003 and started a new life by marrying a former Australian Army intelligence officer who had converted to Islam. Brigitte had access to a great deal of classified material possessed by his new wife. At the direction of Mir, Brigitte adopted a new alias and created a fictitious business to collect bomb-making material. Investigators believe that they were planning to target the Lucas Heights nuclear facility. However, French agents alerted the Australians, who deported Brigitte before the plot could be carried out. They later arrested the Pakistani-Australian Faheem Lodhi, who was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison for plotting to destroy Sydney's electrical grid (AFP, August 23, 2006).

With mounting evidence of the role of Sajid Mir in plans to carry out terrorist acts in metropolitan France and Australia, France's leading counterterrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere issued warrants for his arrest in October 2006, though unsurprisingly Islamabad refused to cooperate. In 2007, a French court sentenced Mir in absentia to 10 years in prison. Jean-Louis Bruguiere had become convinced that Mir was a former or serving officer in the Pakistan Army and was protected at the highest level according to a report by ProPublica's Sebastian Rotella.

## The Virginia Jihad Network

At the time of working to carry out terrorist acts in Europe and Australia, Mir was also working to set up a bigger terror network, which came to be known as the Virginia Jihad Network, in the heart of the United States. The Virginia Jihad Network was a multi-ethnic group of American Muslims who were angered by the American response to 9/11. Trainees from the Virginia Jihad Network trained at the same camp and at the same time as Brigitte (*The Hindu*, December 12, 2009). It seems Sajid Mir had planned to wreak havoc in the United States through the Virginia Jihad Network. Sometime in 2001, at a dinner in Lahore, Mir and another LeT commander asked Yong ki Kwon, a Korean-American convert to Sunni Islam, and a Pakistani-American called Masoud Ahmad Khan to undertake missions inside the United States for “a lot of propaganda, information-gathering and emailing” but they declined. Khan later told the FBI that the LeT commanders had also asked them to conduct surveillance of a chemical plant in Maryland, apparently to later bomb it. [3]

By early 2003, the FBI had unearthed the Virginia Jihad Network. In June 2003, the FBI indicted 11 of its members on 42 counts. The indictment showed that they had trained with and fought for LeT (Times of India, June 28, 2003).

## Mumbai, November 2008

By 2005, the failure to carry out large-scale terrorist acts in Europe, Australia, and the United States convinced Mir to give more attention to India, where he could find many Western targets as well. By this time the Pakistan Army had started slowly loosening its tight control over jihadi groups. Mir visited India as a cricket fan in 2005 to do reconnaissance for terrorist attacks in Mumbai. He and Headley prepared for the attacks for nearly three years. The Pakistani terrorists kept Mumbai hostage for nearly 60 hours during which 166 people died and scores were wounded. The targets of these terrorists were iconic building such as Taj Mahal hotel, Oberoi hotel, and Jewish Chabbad House. Mir personally directed the terrorist operation from a safe house in Karachi. Indian security agencies intercepted the live communications between the attackers and Mir, who used one of his *noms de guerre*, Wassi, when communicating with the attackers (Indian Express, May 10).

By the time Mir made his first reconnaissance visit to India in 2005 to prepare for the future Mumbai assault, he had recruited a Pakistani-American businessman calling himself David Coleman Headley. Headley made several visits to India per the instructions of Mir. After every visit to India, he reported to Mir and Pakistan Army Major ‘Iqbal’ who apparently was in the ISI.

## The Mickey Mouse Project

Although the Mumbai attack aroused international attention, Sajid Mir and David Headley continued working on their next plot termed the “Mickey Mouse Project.” Major ‘Iqbal’ had disappeared from the scene after the Mumbai attacks. The Mickey Mouse Project aimed at targeting *Jyllands Posten*, the Danish newspaper that had published the controversial cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005, which ignited the ire of Muslim radicals around the world as orthodox Sunni Islam traditionally forbids images of the human form (AFP, October 27, 2009). In the wake of the international uproar over the Mumbai attacks, Mir was adamant about carrying out large-scale attacks in Denmark. While Headley proposed a narrow plot to attack only *Jyllands Posten’s* editor and offending cartoonist, Mir insisted on a wider target because he believed “all Danes are responsible for this” (AP, May 25).

Headley visited Denmark in January 2009 to scout locales for Mir. Under the auspices of a business trip, he visited the *Jyllands-Posten* building and recorded video of the newspaper’s offices and the surrounding neighborhood. However, Mir decided to put the Mickey Mouse project on hold, apparently due to growing international pressure on Pakistan. Mir asked Headley to make another visit to India in March 2009 to scout for the next project. Headley, however, kept pressing Mir on the Mickey Mouse project. As Mir and Headley were discussing the next target, British intelligence alerted their American counterparts about Headley’s contact with two al-Qaeda suspects in Britain. The FBI arrested him on October 3, 2009 in Chicago (Economic Times [New Delhi], June 23).

## Conclusion

Sajid Mir is one of hundreds of former army officers who have joined LeT since the mid-1990s after retiring from the army. Many other members were handling LeT as ISI officers before joining the group. Some of them left the army to join the group. In the 2000s, when the Musharraf regime came under intense Western pressure,

many army officers voluntarily left the army to work with LeT. [4] This latter type of member forms the most influential group within LeT and they are slowly taking on important leadership positions. Both the Pakistan Army and the LeT leadership are symbiotically encouraging this trend. On the one hand, this is helping the Pakistani military to exert more control over LeT in order to stop it from spinning out of its control. On the other hand, LeT's leadership is using this trend to gain more and more support from the army.

At the same time, this trend also poses an unprecedented danger to international stability. The militant-minded former military officers are generally far more educated than the traditional clerical leaders of the group. They have more technical know-how and logistical abilities to turn LeT into a truly global jihadi group. Many of the former army officers who have joined LeT believe in global jihad and left the Pakistan Army because of its singular focus on its Indian adversary. As a former military man, Sajid Mir is the new face of the LeT. He represents the evolving danger the LeT poses to both India and the world.

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Notes:

1. Author interview via a research assistant with a LeT official, Lahore, Pakistan, June 2011.
2. Author interview via a research assistant with an additional LeT official, Lahore, Pakistan, June 2011.
3. "Virginia Jihad" Member Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison, July 24, 2007, cached via Google at: [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:w\\_9tHIGUNFsJ:www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr.html+chemical+plant+Maryland+FBI+masoud+khan&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari&source=www.google.com](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:w_9tHIGUNFsJ:www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr.html+chemical+plant+Maryland+FBI+masoud+khan&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari&source=www.google.com)
4. Author interview via a research assistant with a LeT commander, Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, June 2011.

## Vice, Virtue, and Vitriol: The Resurrection of Former Taliban Minister Maulvi Qalamuddin

*By Derek Henry Flood*

Maulvi Mohammed Qalamuddin, the former chief of *Amr-e-Bil M'arouf wa Nahi Anil Munkar* (the General Department for the Preservation of Virtue and the Elimination of Vice) [1] in the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996-2001, has been chosen as a player in President Hamid Karzai's "High Council of Peace." The peace council that President Karzai is actively promoting was formed with the stated goal of negotiating a settlement with the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and other deadly non-state actors whom Karzai often terms 'our brothers' in that these movements are largely made up of Afghan nationals. In September 2010 when the Karzai government initially announced the 68-member council, including Qalamuddin, the Taliban rejected the idea outright based on the presence of foreign troops stationed in the country. The Taliban released a statement in reaction to the development stating that their "Islamic Emirate" had no use for any style of track two negotiations with Karzai's "powerless government" (Tolo News, September 28, 2010).

Recently, the United Nations Security Council split Resolution 1267 (1999) – The al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee – in a bid to decouple the two movements to foster peace building in Afghanistan. After lobbying by the Afghan government and purportedly the British and American governments, Qalamuddin and four other former high-ranking Taliban commanders involved in the High Council of Peace may be removed from sanctions if the amended Security Council resolution is altered further pending future deliberation (AFP, June 18). Qalamuddin portrays himself as a simple, pious man with humble motives who has little to lose or gain from any controversial international machinations regarding his name. Though he may indeed live a comparatively quiescent existence today, it should not be forgotten that Qalamuddin, a staunch veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad, was no marginal Taliban actor. Along with heading the loathsome religious police (of which some sources describe him as its deputy head), he also chaired the Afghan Olympic Committee and was listed as the Deputy Minister for Mosques and Hajj

pilgrimages to Mecca. Many Kabulis cannot let go of bitter memories from the period of his tenure when his sandal-clad shock troops subjected men and women to humiliating public beatings for the smallest infraction of Qalamuddin's doctrinaire code.

During his notorious heyday, Qalamuddin quickly gained a reputation for issuing rigid, often cruel, edicts that made the difficult lives of Afghans markedly more miserable. As the Taliban gained infamy for persecuting Afghanistan's ethnic and religious minorities, most notably the Shia Hazara, Qalamuddin ruthlessly ordered the closure of a network of underground Shia girls schools in Kabul that provided an education for perhaps the country's most embattled demographic. [2] Qalamuddin was personally responsible for formally banning women from working in the public space during the five core years of the Islamic Emirate's existence. Without a hint of irony, he stated that it was necessary to restrict women's movements due to a lack of security while the Taliban's singular achievement was the elimination of insecure, warlord-torn environments in Afghanistan's cities and roads. In a 1997 interview, Qalamuddin laid out his rationale: "We have security problems...Women must be completely segregated from men...We fought for sharia law and this is the organization that will implement it. I will implement it come what may." [3] Officially, Qalamuddin was merely enforcing the edicts issued by Mullah Muhammed Omar that were deemed essential to cleanse Afghan society of un-Islamic influences.

At the height of his power, a force of 400-odd men patrolled Kabul meting out punishments to citizens for almost absurd indiscretions under Qalamuddin's strict orders. [4] Qalamuddin, today a sullen, remorseless man, once careened around downtown Kabul in a pick-up truck beaming instructions from a jerry-rigged loudspeaker ordering his thugs to wantonly demolish television sets in order to ostensibly eradicate the influence of 'idolatry' (AFP, July 30, 1998). Qalamuddin did not want the Taliban's Afghan subjects influenced by Bollywood films' projection of Hindu and Sikh culture which he viewed as divisive, corrupting element in 1990s Afghanistan. All it would take to eradicate such foreign influences, primarily those of Indian pop culture rather than Western, was to simply ban technological advances that crept into the heavily isolated heart of Central Asia, or so the thinking of Maulvi Qalamuddin went. Qalamuddin insisted that his religious police sought only to eradicate 'vice' in Afghanistan's public space in order to create the Islamist utopia that the Taliban

movement sought to implement by force. In his efforts to create a purely Sunni state inspired by the Deobandi thought of late Islamic India, he defended the practices of the Emirate's religious police to an Egyptian journalist at the time: "We see it as our responsibility to combat these vices because they harm the Islamic society we are seeking. In addition, our silence about them would be tantamount to encouraging the spread of vice." [5]

Today, the Afghan Taliban have embraced the imagery and sound of new media wholeheartedly as the primary component of the propaganda war against their Afghan and Western adversaries. The movement that once confiscated televisions and strung up cassette tape from trees at checkpoints is now engaged in a major campaign of disseminating songs and video clips via Afghanistan's expansive mobile phone network in efforts to promote itself as a nationalist, anti-occupation force thereby gaining the critical rural support it needs to sustain itself (Afghan Recovery Reports, June 23). The Taliban's depressing edicts, once enforced so vigorously by Qalamuddin a decade ago, are only as valid as they are useful, as the movement must constantly adapt in the war-fighting environment.

Qalamuddin is a product of the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqani madrassa in the town of Akora Khattak, Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa Province (then named the Northwest Frontier Province). The same madrassa produced Jalauddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network and one of the most dreaded insurgent leaders in the war theater of eastern Afghanistan-western Pakistan (*The Nation* [Islamabad], July 19, 1997). As one of the most feared, hardliner Taliban leaders, Qalamuddin has been a staunch ally of Pakistan, which sheltered and educated him. When Pakistan conducted a highly controversial series of underground nuclear bomb tests in a remote corner of its Balochistan Province, Qalamuddin was quick to defend Pakistan's escalation of a South Asian nuclear arms race. "We support these tests which show to the superpowers that Moslems can also be nuclear power...according to Islamic Sharia, the Muslims have to defend their territory and honors. For this defense it is very good if they have sophisticated arms equal to that in the hand of their enemy [India]" (AFP, June 2, 1998).

Maulvi Qalamuddin went underground following the dissolution of the Islamic Emirate in Kabul and Kandahar in mid-November 2001. He managed to evade Afghanistan's nascent authorities for a nearly a year and a half until he was captured in Logar Province

in April 2003 (Reuters, April 17, 2003). Though the concept of reconciling with the Afghan Taliban has gained much attention in 2011, it is not an entirely recent development. In September 2004, Qalamuddin was released from prison following successful lobbying efforts by members of his tribe in Logar Province (Deutsche Press Agentur, September 14, 2004). [6] The Karzai government thought he would be more useful as a conduit for talks with ‘moderate’ Taliban. Afghan Chief Justice Fazel Hadi Shinwari cited Qalamuddin’s extension of an “olive branch” to his Taliban brethren upon his release as a justification for renewed amnesty efforts and pressed the U.S. military to release 80 Taliban fighters from Bagram Air Base to encourage more reconciliation (AFP, January 17, 2005). Although the Afghan judge, who hailed the release of Qalamuddin as a potential avenue for peace talks, stated that Qalamuddin swiftly went to speak to his comrades about some kind of settlement, the Taliban immediately denied such exchanges ever took place. Qalamuddin likely had other ideas upon gaining his freedom. The man who once implemented al-Qisaas (the Law of Equality in punishment stipulated in the Quran), whereby a male relative is forced to execute a member of his family who has been convicted of manslaughter under Islamic law – while the victim’s family observes, – is now being courted as a potential peacemaker, having supposedly met outgoing International Security Assistance Force chief General David Petraeus. [7]

In September of 2005, Qalamuddin ran unsuccessfully for a seat in Afghanistan’s *Wolesi Jirga* (Lower House of parliament) to represent his native Logar Province in national legislative elections (Pajhwok Afghan News, September 16, 2005). At the time he announced his candidacy, he told an Afghan daily his aim was “to serve the people and promote national peace and solidarity,” which indicated that he maintained a strong desire to remain relevant in the Afghan political sphere (Arman-e-Melli, May 24, 2005). The arc of Qalamuddin’s life reads like that of the perennially troubled nation from which he hails. From anti-Soviet jihadi to Deobandi zealot to fugitive to prisoner to political candidate to teacher, Maulvi Mohammed Qalamuddin remains both a symptom and a symbol of what plagues Afghanistan. While not unrepentant about his Taliban past, he has been brought into the fold to a degree judging by the mere fact of his living openly in Hamid Karzai’s Kabul while his former overlord, Mullah Mohammed Omar, has been in hiding for close to a decade.

As the idea of coming to a negotiated settlement with the Afghan ‘Quetta shura’ Taliban gains more and more traction in the eyes of the international community, Qalamuddin has the potential to become an important interlocutor if he indeed has sufficient credibility with those still fighting NATO-led forces in the country. The man who gained infamy for trying to keep Afghanistan a closed, retrograde society may be asked to walk on the world stage, albeit behind closed doors, if he is to be included in meaningful talks aimed at easing the withdrawal of American and allied soldiers. The obstacle to involving Qalamuddin in potential third-country meetings, for which he will need to be definitively removed from the Taliban sanctions list, will be opposition from international human rights and women’s rights organizations who want Qalamuddin kept isolated. The man who once dictated the height of women’s heels is now being courted to possibly end a multi-front, inter-ethnic, international war in which he was a key antagonist.

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#### Notes:

1. Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p.154.
2. Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al-Qa’ida, and the Holy War*, (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p.160.
3. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp.105-107.
4. Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997*, (Darby: Diane Publishing Co, 1999), p.37.
5. Fahmi Huwaydi, *Taliban: Jund Allah fi al-Ma’rikah al-Ghalat* (Arabic), (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001), p.81.
6. Some sources list Qalamuddin as having been released in 2005. See: “The Consolidated List established and maintained by the [UN] 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qa’ida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them,” October 27, 2008, p.17.
7. Muhammed Moosa, “The Taliban Movement and Their Goals,” *Darul Ifta-e w’al Irshad*, Peshawar, June 20, 1998.