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AFGHANISTAN'S TALIBAN DECLARE VICTORY AS PEACE INITIATIVES GET UNDER WAY

The opening of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan office in Qatar as the first step in a Qatar-backed Afghan reconciliation process has been interpreted by the Taliban as a sign of the movement's "victory" in Afghanistan. A January 15 statement entitled: "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Formal Proclamation of Islamic Emirate's Victory" said the development had "proved to the world that the Islamic Emirate is deeply rooted internally in the Afghan nation and externally in the whole Islamic Ummah. Militarily successful resistance against a gigantic international alliance, full presence on the whole soil and overall perseverance are the signs and secrets of the Islamic Emirate." (Ansar1.info, January 15).

According to the Taliban, the Islamic Emirate has overcome "the claims of Karzai and America" and demonstrated it is "a well-organized political power besides being a political power… The Afghans and Taliban are not a trivial phenomenon but an ideological and national movement which should be acknowledged as a political fact."

The Taliban used the statement to express their pleasure with the choice of Qatar for the opening of a formal office, noting that Qatar has balanced relations "with all sides and a prestigious status in the Islamic world." The movement outlined why several alternatives would be less desirable; Pakistan (referred to here only as a "neighboring country") would have allowed the Karzai regime to continue its propaganda efforts to describe the Taliban as being under the

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control of Pakistan's security services; Saudi Arabia was out of the question due to its close bilateral relationship with Pakistan, and Turkey was also unsuitable due to its membership in NATO. Some reports state the United States is considering a proposal to allow five Taliban leaders to leave confinement at Guantanamo Bay for Qatar as a confidence-building measure (*The Nation* [Lahore], January 24; January 25).

Another Taliban statement responded to images circulated in the Western media of U.S. troops urinating on the bodies of recently killed Taliban fighters by calling for the UN and other human rights organizations to bring an end to "such inhumane acts" (Shahamat.com, January 13). The statement charged American soldiers with committing torture, abusing the Quran, killing women and children and desecrating the dead, alleging that these were "only a small fraction of the crimes which are perpetrated by the American soldiers." The statement concluded by warning U.S. troops would have to face "the consequences of such actions and will have to confront the extra wrath and hatred of the Afghan masses."

While the Taliban proclaims victory in its struggle against U.S. and NATO forces, there are signs that U.S. authorities have begun a wider effort to initiate peace talks with all the major insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. Dr. Ghairat Baheer, a representative of Afghan warlord and former U.S. ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has reported having talks on behalf of Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami movement with CIA director General David Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and U.S. Marines General John Allen (AP, January 25; *The Nation*, January 24). Hekmatyar has been a U.S. "specially designated global terrorist" since 2003.

There are also reports that the United States is exploring the possibility of including the notorious Haqqani Network in the peace talks. Working in close alliance with the Taliban, the cross-border Haqqani Network has been identified as a major threat to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (*Express Tribune* [Karachi], January 9; AP, January 25). Earlier this month, the UN added the names of two Haqqani Network members to its list of proscribed Taliban associates; Fazi Rabi, a Haqqani Network financier involved organizing suicide attacks, and Ahmed Jan Wazir, described as a key commander in the network and a deputy to Sirajuddin Haqqani (United Nations, January 6, 2012: http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/215627.pdf).

GAZA SALAFISTS CLAIM TO "WIDEN WAR" WITH NEVADA FOREST FIRES

A Gaza-based Salafist militant group, the Ma'sadat al-Mujahideen, has made a surprising claim of responsibility for igniting a series of devastating forest fires near Reno, Nevada. The claim was made in a statement from the group entitled "Declaring War on America by Setting Fire to Nevada Forests" that was carried on a number of jihadi websites (Ansar1.info, January 21).

According to the statement, a group of "brothers from the lions of Ma'sadat al-Mujahideen set the fires on January 19 as part of an effort to widen "the area of war" by transferring it to locations inside America and elsewhere. The Salafist movement declares that fighting against the civilians and military of Israel, America and their allies to be *fard ayn*, or individually obligatory on all Muslims until "the liberation of Palestine" is achieved. The Salafists also issue a warning:

> We give the enemies of Islam and the allies of the Jews who occupy the land of Palestine three months beginning from the date of this statement to disown [themselves] from the Jews who occupy the land of Palestine, and their actions against our Moslem brothers, and we demand the end of their alliances that oppress our rights as owners of the land, or we will be forced to extend our war until it spreads in all the lands that plot with our enemies.

Demanding that the Jews "return from whence they came since they have no place among us," the movement points out the ease with which damaging attacks can be inflicted on nations such as America from within. Referring to the alleged setting of the Nevada forest fires, the message encourages similar actions by other Muslims: "Here you see with our own eyes what simple materials can do, that are cheap in your enemy['s homeland], and how much damage it can inflict in them." The brush fire in a valley between Carson City and Reno consumed more than 3,000 acres and forced the evacuation of more than 4,000 residents (Los Angeles Times, January 19). The Gazan Salafists did not provide any evidence of their claim, the veracity of which remains highly questionable at the moment.

Though it has been impossible to confirm the role of Ma'sadat al-Mujahidin in a number of incidents of suspected arson to which the movement has made claim, the group seems rather fixated on the use of fire as a tactical weapon in an asymmetric jihad. Last December the group issued a statement entitled "Setting a Fire in Factory on Materials and Chemical Fertilizers," and a year earlier claimed to have started the fires in the forests of the Mount Carmel mountain range in northern Israel that killed more than 40 people.

Led by Shaykh Abu Ubaydah al-Ansari, the Ma'sadat al-Mujahideen is heavily influenced by the Salafists' intellectual hero, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), and have declared it their duty to "liberate our [Muslim] lands and sanctuaries, not out of patriotism, but as a compulsory Islamic duty" (Shabakat al-Tahadi al-Islamiya, February 16, 2010). The movement is highly critical of Hamas for its alleged failure to fully implement Shari'a in Gaza, its failure to confront "the Jews" militarily, and its alleged "apostacy" (see *Terrorism Monitor*, March 4, 2010).

The Uludere Air Raid and Systemic Gaps in Turkey's Intelligence Infrastructure

Francesco F. Milan

When smugglers were mistaken for militants in southeastern Turkey on December 28, 2011, a Turkish air raid killed 35 civilians who were carrying fuel across the Turkish-Iraqi border near the village of Ortasu, in the Uludere district. In the following days, media reports hinted that the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT – Turkey's national intelligence organization) might have provided the military with misleading information in relation to the nature of expected movements across the border, resulting in the military's mistaken threat assessment. The operation was launched after the smugglers were mistaken for militants belonging to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), whose members generally infiltrate Turkey from northern Iraq using the same routes (*Hurriyet*, December 29, 2011). In an attempt to cast light on the incident, the Turkish General Staff released a statement which reported that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Turkish Army spotted a group of people trying to cross the Turkish-Iraqi border from the Iraqi side at 06:39 PM, and that Turkish F-16 jet fighters carried out the subsequent air strike between 09:37 and 10:24 PM after the group failed to respond to warning shots and signals (*Today's Zaman*, December 29, 2011).

Right after the incident, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemed to be buying time while trying to come up with an explanation, stating that the operation was carried out on the basis of information MIT provided in the previous weeks, but that MIT did not provide any real time intelligence immediately before the operation was launched. The uncertainty was still apparent on January 2 when a meeting with the Chief of General Staff, General Necdet Ozel, did not lead to a joint official statement on the incident, suggesting that further examination of the case was needed (*Hurriyet*, December 31, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, January 2). Following the incident, the MIT declared it had no role or responsibility in the air raid and released an official statement on January 5 claiming it did not share any intelligence on people, locations, dates or routes which might have been related to the attack (*Cumhuriyet*, January 6; *Vatan*, January 6; *Hurriyet*, January 6).

It seems unlikely that MIT had any responsibility for the incident. As stated by the military, reconnaissance and surveillance had been carried out through UAVs, which are controlled and monitored by the Army. Still, what Huseyin Celik, the deputy chairman of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) described as an "unfortunate operational accident" might in fact be a demonstration of Turkey's systemic intelligence gaps rather than the fault of a single institution (*Hurriyet*, December 29, 2011).

One of the problems the incident highlighted is the lack of civilian oversight of military operations. As the military stated, the UAV spotted the moving group at 06:39 PM, while jet fighters attacked at 09:37 PM. For a three hour-span, commanding officers were acting with total autonomy but clearly took some time before deciding to launch an air raid. The fact that the Prime Minister was collecting information from the military after the fact suggests there was no civilian monitoring of the operation. During that time the military did not contact any political or civilian authority to involve a civilian decision-maker in the operation. The absence of civilian oversight during military operations is a recurrent and troublesome element in Turkish civil-military relations, but it becomes particularly problematic in situations such as the one at Uludere, where the same institution ends up being in charge of both the intelligence cycle and the decision-making process.

Another systemic problem in Turkish intelligence is the lack of interagency cooperation. In the context of the Uludere case, the extent of cooperation between MIT and the military remains uncertain. The two institutions have a history of rivalry, especially since MIT came under civilian control 15 years ago, with the most recent example occurring in October 2011, when the chief of general staff General Ozel stated the military was absolutely in the dark about the fact that MIT was engaged in secret negotiations with PKK leaders, a fact that was revealed only after a secret recording of a meeting was leaked (*Hurriyet*, October 30, 2011). Recent reforms tried to diminish personnel attrition and distance between different intelligence bodies, but with no tangible results so far. The National Intelligence Cooperation Council, created in 2005, did not help in developing a cooperative culture amongst Turkey's intelligence agencies. Even the creation in February 2010 of the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security, conceived to ensure coordination between institutions involved in different aspects of counterterrorism, including intelligence, did not deliver significant results.

The head of the MIT, Hakan Fidan, is working in close cooperation with Prime Minister Erdogan in order to implement a reform of the intelligence system that will gather all relevant agencies around a new undersecretariat that will come under the authority of the MIT, an organization Fidan predicts will be one of the world's ten largest intelligence agencies within the next two to three years (*Hurriyet*, January 6; Sabah, January 6). An important step in this process occurred earlier this month, when the MIT took control of most of the functions of the Joint Staff Electronic Systems Command, about 20 km south of Ankara. While some of the sophisticated communications equipment will continue to be used by the military for communications with Turkish forces operating outside of the homeland, the rest, including advanced monitoring equipment, will come under civilian control (*Hurriyet*, January 3). The promised reforms to Turkey's intelligence institutions have significant potential, as they might help mitigate the existing lack of civilian oversight of Turkish military operations and promote interagency cooperation, but they need to succeed exactly where previous reforms have failed.

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Why the Arab Spring Passed By Contested Kirkuk

Wladimir van Wilgenburg

Kirkuk's Sunni Arab parties are not happy over the recent decisions of the Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki and the Iraqi cabinet to turn the U.S. military base at Kirkuk into a civilian airport, to approve 1,400 new police officers requested by the Kurdish head of Kirkuk police, and the cancellation of agricultural contracts that were granted to Sunni Arabs by the Ba'ath regime to increase the number of Arabs in the province (Kirkuk Now, January 4; AKnews [Kurdistan News Agency], January 17; Sumaria News, January 24). They also expressed dissatisfaction over the continued Kurdish security dominance of Kirkuk, the on-going arrests of prominent Sunni Arabs by security forces from Baghdad and the assassination of Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk. [1]

Members of the Sunni Arab-dominated "Sahwa" militias in the Kirkuk region of northern Iraq have also been under steady attack this month in the ethnically divided district where Kurds and Arabs struggle for control. A Sahwa commander was killed and his three guards injured during a January 23 attack on the commander's vehicle, a bomb exploded in front of the house of two brothers who are Sahwa members on January 20 while another Sahwa member was shot dead by unknown gunmen on January 7 (Aswat al-Iraq, January 23; January 20; January 7). Despite the pressure being applied to the Sunni Arab population of Kirkuk, the community's political leaders and movements have failed to mobilize Kirkuk's Arabs against the desire of many Kurds to bring the oil-rich district under full Kurdish control.

There were expectations a year ago that the Arab population of Kirkuk would engage in a Tunisia-like uprising or engage in mass protests against Kurdish control of the province in response to calls from the Arab Political Council (APC) in Kirkuk (Sumaria TV, January 21, 2011). Headed by politicians from the Jibour and Obeidi tribes, the APC is an Arab nationalist council uniting various Arab politicians in Kirkuk that supported the secular Iraqiya list during the 2010 elections.

Despite expectations, there have been few examples of political mobilization on the part of Kirkuk's Arab community. An APC effort last year to make February 25 a "day of wrath" by calling for massive protests by Arab demonstrators was averted by the deployment of Kurdish troops outside Kirkuk and the enforcement of a curfew by the Kurdish-controlled police within the city (See *Terrorism Monitor*, April 1, 2011). APC calls for protests and sit-ins last summer brought few Arabs into the streets and failed to create any significant unrest (Rudaw.net, August 26 2011). Some of the February 25 protests in Arab-dominated districts of Kirkuk like Hawija and Rashaad actually called for the removal of Arab politicians and the elimination of corruption. As a result Arab politicians called the Arab youth of Kirkuk "disloyal" and claimed they were influenced by Kurds [1].

In fact, the APC does not have the financial resources, organizational capacity or popular support for their efforts to initiate a Tunisian-style uprising or even mass protests against the Kurdish-controlled authorities in Kirkuk. Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Assi, head of the APC, has threatened to conduct sit-ins and protests against the Kurdish security forces several times, but in reality he is unable to follow up on such threats.

Election results and surveys from 2005 to 2011 show consistently that the majority of Kirkuk's Arabs oppose the ambition of Kurdish nationalists to annex the province to the Kurdistan Region through Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, which calls for normalization of Kirkuk's disputed status through an overdue census and referendum (see *Terrorism Focus*, February 25, 2009). Such data also confirms widespread support for some of the claims of popular support made by Arab nationalist politicians in Kirkuk. [2] However, data collected from the police and local press show that between 2004 and 2011 there were only around 30 demonstrations against Kurdish claims to Kirkuk. The majority of the demonstrations carried out in Kirkuk by Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen focused on a lack of services, jobs and electricity [3].

Surveys and interviews show there is widespread frustration in Kirkuk and the rest of Iraq regarding the effectiveness of the nation's politicians [4]. Iraqis see their politicians as corrupt, ineffective and more involved with their own personal squabbles than with running the country (AKnews, July 18, 2011). One survey shows that 81% of Kirkuk's population support calls for more democracy and government responsiveness in both their own province and the rest of the Arab world [5].

The results show that there is a great gap between the Arab politicians' focus on ethnic-related demands and the daily needs of the population of Kirkuk. Therefore, it was not surprising that the APC withdrew their support for the February 25 demonstrations days after they found out the protesters would call for the removal of Arab politicians.

The Arab nationalists' lack of organizational skills and resources in is in stark contrast to Kirkuk's more experienced, more organized and better funded Kurdish political parties. These groups dominate most of the official institutions and maintain their own telecommunication networks, satellite channels, newspapers and a large number of NGOS in Kirkuk. The Kurdish parties have even succeeded in running NGOs and projecting their security influence in Arab-dominated districts of Kirkuk, while the APC lack television stations and newspapers while failing to operate a single NGO.

Kirkuk's Sunni Arabs did not have any political organizations prior to 2003, unlike the Kurds, who have controlled the autonomous Kurdistan Region since 1991. As a result the Sunnis are disorganized and depend largely on the political participation of various tribes and former military officers. The dependence of the dis-unified Sunni politicians on tribes also leads to divisions and disaffection over tribal nepotism. Although Arab politicians control Sahwa (Awakening) militias and city councils outside of the city, they do not have a major influence within the provincial council of Kirkuk or the city itself.

Furthermore, the APC lacks support from independent centers of power within Iraq on a local, regional and national level. Kurdish political groups in Kirkuk have support from the KRG and dominate the city's political and security structure, including the police and the local branch of the Asayish, the KRG security agency. The APC's main allies in the Iraqiya list failed to form the government and do not hold any influential posts at present as the List is boycotting the Iraqi parliament.

In August 2011, APC politicians visited prominent Sunni politicians Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi and Deputy PM Salih al-Mutlaq to voice their demands (Rudaw.net, August 26, 2011). Now, however, Hashimi is wanted on terrorism charges and has taken refuge in Kurdistan region, while Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wants to replace al-Mutlaq for calling him a "dictator" (al-Jazeera, December 28, 2011; Niqash.org, January 12).

Despite the fact that Kurdish political parties are stronger in Kirkuk than Arab nationalist parties, this does not change the fact that the Kurds lack support from Baghdad, neighboring countries and the West for annexing Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region. This means that the Kurdish parties will remain in *de facto* control of Kirkuk in the future and that Arab politicians in Kirkuk will be unable to challenge that control without support from Baghdad and effective political mobilization.

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Notes:

1. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, "Failed (or Aborted) Arab Spring in Iraq: A Study of the Political Mobilization of Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk," MA Thesis, Utrecht University, August 12, 2011.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Survey of Northern Triangle Public Opinion April 13-18, 2011: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20June%2016%20IRI%20Releases%20Survey%20of%20Iraqi%20Public%20Opinion,%20April%2013-18,%202011.pdf

The Indigenization of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Jacob Zenn

The last major attacks in Uzbekistan associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were carried out in 2004, a year in which gunmen and suicide bombers, including females, struck the U.S. and Israeli embassies, markets, and police stations in Tashkent and Bukhara (*Guardian*, April 7, 2004; Arab News, July 31, 2004). While the government blamed Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Qaeda as well as the IMU for the April 2004 attacks, responsibility for both these and the embassy attacks was claimed by the Jama'at al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Group), believed to be a variant name of an IMU offshoot, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). [1]

In 2009, the IJU claimed an attack on Uzbek border officials in the city of Khanabad, near Kyrgyzstan, and in Andijon, a city in the Ferghana Valley, where the IMU first emerged (RFE/RL, May 27, 2009). However, with the exception of these attacks, the IJU, like the IMU, has also focused its operations and propaganda outside of the Ferghana Valley for the past decade. Both IMU propaganda and operations have apparently shifted in focus from the movement's "homeland" to its current operational space in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan.

The IMU's shift from the objectives it had in the late 1990s and early 2000s - overthrowing the regime of President Islam Karimov, "liberating" the Ferghana Valley, and establishing an Islamic caliphate across Central Asia - to its current goals, including "the liberation of Muslim people from their sufferings" and their protection from "Western infidels" and "NATO invaders." reflects the IMU's "indigenization" in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and its response to new priorities that have emerged in that region. If IMU fighters are able to return to northern Afghanistan as American and NATO forces withdraw from the region in 2014, Ferghana may come back into the IMU's focus (RFE/RL, December 8, 2010). President Karimov has warned that the departure of American forces from Afghanistan will bring "an increased threat of the expansion of terrorist and extremist activities" and "the creation of a permanent source of instability" in Uzbekistan (Trend.az [Tashkent], January 14).

Background

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, IMU militants were forced out of Uzbekistan by Islam Karimov's ruthless crackdown on Islamists. They were able, however, to establish bases in Tajikistan, taking advantage of the country's instability following a 1992-1997 civil war and in areas of northern Afghanistan under Taliban control. With the American invasion of Afghanistan to root out the Taliban and its allies in October 2001, the IMU fled to Pakistan. From 2001 to 2007 it set up training camps in South Waziristan under the protection of Waziri Taliban commander Maulvi Nazir, whose fighters were taking advantage of their mountainous homeland to regroup and launch attacks against American forces in Afghanistan.

The IMU was evicted in 2007 from South Waziristan to other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by Maulvi Nazir partly because Uzbek fighters offended local customs and acted like an "occupying" force in Pashtun territory (see *Terrorism Monitor*, January 14, 2008). When the IMU joined Baitullah Mehsud's faction of the Taliban, it had to accept Mehsud's priorities, foremost of which was fighting the Pakistani state.

The IJU, which was first called the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), was founded in 2002 in South Waziristan by two ethnic Uzbeks who were former IMU fighters, including Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih (a.k.a. Najmiddin Jalolov). In contrast to the IMU, which had its roots in Namangan in the Ferghana Valley in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the IJU had its roots in the post- 9/11 multi-ethnic jihad environment of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier in which America was defined as the main enemy.

Even though Fatih may have intended for the IJU to focus on Uzbekistan, from its inception the IJU appealed to young and internationally-minded "foreign" fighters, including Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, Germans, and Turks, to fill its ranks. Some Uzbek fighters in Pakistan continued to follow Tahir Yuldash (or Yuldashov), the leader of the IMU from its formation in 1998 until his death in a 2009 U.S. drone strike. Yuldash prioritized overthrowing the "apostate" regime in Uzbekistan and other regimes in "Turkistan" (the name for Central Asia preferred by Islamists), but fighters in the IJU were too preoccupied with expelling the American forces in Afghanistan to focus on Central Asia.

Indigenization

Over the course of the 2000s the international agenda of the IJU gained popularity among IMU fighters, with the organization eventually dropping the liberation of the Ferghana Valley as its top priority. So long as the IMU was based in Pakistan, the Uzbekistan regime led by President Islam Karimov was less of a direct threat to the IMU than the Pakistani army or international forces operating in the region. Yuldash was recorded in a video released shortly after his death saying, "Our goal is not only conquering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Our goal is to conquer the entire world" (*Die Welt*, January 10, 2010).

The ethnic and national composition of the IMU became so "indigenized" that the IMU ceased to be "Uzbek" except in name. For example, the IMU's current "mufti" (expert in Islamic law), Abu Zar al-Burmi, is an Urdu and Arabic-speaking Pakistani national of Burmese Rohingya descent with neither a trace of Uzbek blood nor proficiency in the Uzbek language (see *Militant Leadership Monitor*, November 2011). Several thousand Uzbek fighters may have joined the Taliban in Helmand and other provinces in Afghanistan after being evicted from South Waziristan in 2007, further diluting the Uzbek contingent in the IMU (*Guardian*, March 25, 2007). In addition, hundreds of Uzbeks who remained in Kanigurum, South Waziristan until 2009 simply integrated into the Taliban (*The Nation* [Lahore]. November 2, 2009).

In late November 2011, the IMU released a list of 87 of its members "martyred" in 2011. [2] Only four of the martyrs came from Uzbekistan while 64 others came from Afghanistan, ten from Tajikistan, six from Kyrgyzstan and one each from Germany, Pakistan and the Russian Republic of Tatarstan.

In the preface of the list of martyrs, the IMU does not even mention Uzbekistan. An excerpt from the preface says:

> As in previous years, this year Afghan members of the community made the greatest sacrifice in order to honor Allah's religion. 64 Afghan mujahideen consisting of *hafeez* (reciters) and *taliban* (students) of the Koran engaged in devastating attacks against U.S. and NATO soldiers, the Afghan National Army, and the hypocritical band of Arbakai [government-supported community defense groups]. Jihad operations took place in the following provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Samangan, Badakhshan, Faryab, Sar-e-Pol, Kabul, Zabul, Ghazni, Panjshir, and Kapisa. This year in Afghanistan, one helicopter was shot down and several tanks exploded together with enemies inside. We consider it one of our greatest achievements that 45 Americans were killed as a result of *fidai* (sacrifice) operations in Panjshir; 35 apostate hypocrites were killed as a result of *fidai* operations in Kunduz, and 137 NATO troops were killed in the night battle in Baghlan.

At the same time, however, the list of martyrs did show pride in Uzbek ethnicity and was written in Uzbek language, so the group is retaining some of its Uzbek character. This could be a sign that the IMU is strategically focusing on Afghanistan-Pakistan until a more suitable time arises to target Uzbekistan, at which point it will need Uzbek recruits. Profile no. 76 was of Sayfulloh Wazir, who came from Wana in South Waziristan. According to the profile: "Sayfulloh was a student at school in 2002 when IMU comrades came to Pakistan. He was envious to see armed jihadi warriors. He ran away from home and joined the Movement in 2004. He learned Uzbek and Tajik languages and became a real Uzbek…"

Pan-Turkic Revival

Of note was the absence of Uyghurs or Kazakhs in the list of martyrs, possibly because Uyghurs and Kazakhs in Afghanistan-Pakistan are now affiliated with two groups that represent Uyghur and Kazakh causes: the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which was established in 2008 and targets Xinjiang, and Jund al-Khilafa (JaK), which was founded in 2011 and targets Kazakhstan (for the JaK, see Terrorism Monitor, November 23, 2011).

From their bases in North Waziristan, the TIP and JaK may have delivered attack orders to fighters in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. The TIP claimed that Memtieli Tiliwaldi, who participated in a July 2011 attack in Kashgar, was a TIP member and showed footage of Tilwaldi allegedly recorded in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region several months prior to the attack. [3] Memtieli Tiliwaldi and another suspect were shot dead

by police in a cornfield a day after the attack (Reuters, August 2, 2011). Similarly, an investigation of two botched bombings in Atyrau, Western Kazakhstan in October 2011 revealed that the cell responsible for the bombs had received orders from JaK leaders in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area (Interfax [Astana], November 9).

The division of labor emerging between the TIP and JaK resembles a cell of the Islamic Jihad Group (predecessor of the IJU) in the early 2000s. The cell, called "the Mujahideen of Central Asia," consisted of a Kazakh branch and an Uzbek branch which were led by a Kyrgyz and Uzbek respectively. Some of the perpetrators of the 2004 attacks in Tashkent had been affiliated with this cell and reportedly received orders from the movement's leadership in Pakistan. [4]

The Mujahideen of Central Asia, with its specific "Uzbek" and "Kazakh" branches and its style of leadership with orders sent from a command group in Pakistan, appears to be a prototype of the way the TIP and JaK operate today. The TIP and JaK represent their respective homelands, take orders from leaders based in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and cooperate on operations. If the IMU returns to the focus on Ferghana it had under Tahir Yuldash, then it may once again carry out attacks in the name of an Islamic Caliphate based in Uzbekistan, if not Tajikistan and Kazakhstan as well.

Looking Ahead To 2014

In 2014, nine provinces in northern Afghanistan are scheduled to come under Afghan government control as American and NATO forces withdraw. In December of the same year,
Islam Karimov will be 76-years old and preparing for "re-election" or a transfer of power in December, possibly passing the presidency along to his Harvard-educated daughter, 39-year-old Gulnara Karimova, or the current head of the Senate, Ilgizar Sobirov. Karimov pushed through amendments to the Uzbek Constitution in 2011 that appointed the head of the Senate to the position of head of state in the event that the president is no longer able to carry out his duties. However, if Karimov is "unable to carry out his duties," he will still be able to run the country from behind the scenes as a "senator-for-life" or hold sway over his potential successor, Sobirov, who is from Khorezm, a remote province with a traditionally weak power base in government (Uznews.net, March 23, 2011).

In light of the protests over fraudulent elections in Russia in 2011 and political upheavals of the Arab Spring, any move by Karimov towards hereditary succession, a "for-show" election, or "Putin-like" governance from behind-the-scenes will contravene trends in both the Islamic world and Russia and provide recruiting ammunition for the IMU. At the same time, a genuine democratic transition could result in a period of instability, which, together with the departure of American forces from northern Afghanistan, could make Uzbekistan vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The IMU could exploit these circumstances to return to northern Afghanistan and launch a terror campaign against Uzbekistan.

One other possibility exists. In 2014 Kyrgyzstan will shut down American access to Manas airbase. The United States may search for a new way to project power in Central Asia and Uzbekistan, currently a vital part of the Northern Distribution Network and the former host of an American air base in Qarshi, is a possible partner (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 14, 2011). If this occurs, the IMU's reorientation toward its "homeland" will simply be a matter of following American forces from Afghanistan to Central Asia.

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Notes:
1. Based on its claims of responsibility for these attacks, the IJG/ IJU was proscribed by the UN the following year. See Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 1267/1989, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE11905E.shtml.

2. See http://furqon.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195:-1432-2011-&catid=1:2011-08-26-10-42-51.

3. A video link is available at: http://jihadology.net/2011/10/15/%E1%B9%A3awt-al-islam-media-foundation-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-amir-of-%E1%B8%A5izb-al-islami-al-turkistani-turkistan-islamic-party-shaykh-%E2%80%98abd-al-

shakur-damala-on-the-occas/

4. See Steinberg, Guido. A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflicts. July 2008.