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**In a Fortnight**

By Peter Mattis

**CHINA FÊTES TURKISH LEADER AS BEIJING RECOGNIZES ANKARA'S GROWING ROLE**

On April 11, Chinese President Hu Jintao met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Beijing during the latter's lavish if brief state visit. Both sides naturally promised cooperation and to expand ties (Xinhua, April 11; *China Daily*, April 11). The visit marked the first state visit by a Turkish prime minister in 27 years, even though the two sides established a strategic partnership in 2010 (*People's Daily*, April 10). Prime Minister Erdogan met with most of China's top leaders, including Hu, Premier Wen Jiabao, National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Wu Bangguo, and Vice President Xi Jinping (Xinhua, April 10). The content of these discussions was relatively muted, suggesting continuing differences related to how to address Syria's ongoing turmoil and the Iranian nuclear program. Regardless, Ankara and Beijing trumpeted their economic relationship this week, which, coming out of this state visit, appears to be about to boom.

Interestingly, Erdogan started his China trip in Urumqi, the capital of the restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, on April 8. Beijing's mistreatment of the ethnically-Turkic Uyghurs has long been a sore spot with Ankara, but the Turkish position has softened as Sino-Turkish ties have blossomed. Turkey now condemns any discussion of separatism or an "East Turkestan," despite Turkish sympathies for the Uyghurs. Both NPC Chairman Wu and Premier Wen thanked Erdogan

for Turkey's support for the "one China principle" with respect to Taiwan and Xinjiang (*Beijing News*, April 11; *People's Daily*, April 10; China News Service, April 10; *Today's Zaman*, April 8).

The primary reason for the trip, or at least the trip's outcomes, was economic and both sides pledged to work on expanding trade. From a decade ago when Sino-Turkish trade was \$1.6 billion, bilateral trade is now nearly \$25 billion. The Chinese and Turkish sides set \$50 billion in bilateral trade as the goal for 2015 and \$100 billion for 2020 (Xinhua, April 11, April 7; *China Daily*, April 11). Energy deals however were the biggest story of the state visit. Chinese and Turkish firms signed six agreements, including a \$1.5 billion deal for a Chinese coal plant, more than \$1 billion for two wind farms and construction of a solar panel factory (Reuters, April 10). Additionally, during the Wen-Erdogan meeting, both sides agreed to pursue nuclear power cooperation, suggesting China may have an edge in the bidding to build a nuclear power plant on the Black Sea (*21st Century Business Herald*, April 10; Xinhua, April 9).

It may be Turkey's "Year of China,"—to be reciprocated next year as China's "Year of Turkey"—but cultural exchange played a secondary role compared to the business delegations accompanying Erdogan to China (Xinhua, April 7). On April 10, Beijing played host to the "Sino-Turkish Business Forum," which included 700 business representatives from the energy, textile, light manufacturing, chemicals and mining industries. The forum was an industry-led discussion on where the Chinese and Turkish economies could complement each other and how to meet the political goals of boosting trade (*21st Century Business Herald*, April 10). Finally, Propaganda Department Chief Liu Yunshan met with the Chairman of the Calik Group, a Turkish conglomerate, which signed a deal to (Xinhua, April 11). In parallel, China Radio International announced ahead of the visit that it wants to expand its Turkish service (*Today's Zaman*, April 8).

While economics may have headlined the Erdogan's many meetings with Chinese leaders, some tensions clearly existed between the two sides over China's relationships and support for Iran and Syria. Official Chinese press carried only the terse line that "both sides exchanged views on the Syria and Iran problems." In

contrast to Beijing's UN Security Council veto, Ankara has imposed supplemental sanctions on Syria—the kind of action recently condemned by China's commerce minister (*People's Daily*, April 10; Xinhua, April 10; *The Telegraph* [India], March 29). Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who was accompanying Erdogan, had to cut short his visit to attend to matters related to Syria, including phone calls with NATO counterparts, a briefing for G-8 ministers and presumably to prepare for the Iran nuclear talks Turkey is hosting in a few days (*Today's Zaman*, April 11; Xinhua, April 10).

Chinese rhetoric surrounding the Erdogan's visit suggests Beijing is trying to boost Turkey's international standing and create a grateful partner that can assist Beijing internationally more than countries like Iran and North Korea. In meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan, Wen Jiabao said "China attaches great importance to Turkey's role as a major emerging power" (Xinhua, April 9). Wu Bangguo also praised Sino-Turkish ties "in the context of the profoundly changing international context" as "increasingly having a concrete strategic influence" (*People's Daily*, April 10). While the Sino-Turkish strategic partnership two years ago may have overstated their convergent interests, the real tests of the relationship in Iran and Syria are still to come. Ankara may be charting its own path, less connected to its previous European aspirations; however, as its disapproval of Beijing's veto of UN action related to Syria suggests, the Turks do not share China's at times almost reflexive stance on sovereignty.

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## The Limits to Sino-Indonesian Relations

By Prashanth Parameswaran

From March 22 to March 24, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono paid a state visit to China. The visit, which saw the inking of several agreements in a wide range of areas, is only the latest boost to bilateral

cooperation which has increased significantly since the two countries forged a strategic partnership in 2005 (Xinhua, March 23). I. Even as these Asian giants continue to push their ties forward, however, the Sino-Indonesian relationship still faces several significant limits in the economic, security and political realms.

Sino-Indonesian relations have a long and rich history, as Chinese premier Wen Jiabao noted in a speech in Jakarta last year (Xinhua, April 30, 2011). Monks from ancient China studied in Sumatra and Java as early as the first century CE, Chinese merchants traded with ancient kingdoms in maritime Southeast Asia, while mosques were built by Chinese Muslim navigator Zheng He in Indonesia during his legendary voyages in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Indonesia's relationship with China, however, underwent several decades of turbulence since they established diplomatic relations in 1950. Initial ideological solidarity, most clearly demonstrated in the Bandung Conference of 1955, gave way to hostility as Indonesia's second president Suharto came to power in 1965 in a counter-coup against communist elements funded and armed by Beijing and severed diplomatic ties in 1967 (*China Daily*, April 20, 2005). As a result, Sino-Indonesian relations were frozen during most of Suharto's New Order regime, which saw the repression of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority and deep distrust toward China's communist government.

Though ties were normalized as early as 1990, it took years for both sides to begin the process of strengthening the relationship. China viewed Indonesia as valuable not only as a large market and a source of raw materials to fuel its economic development, but as a key littoral nation near strategic maritime chokepoints where China's energy flows, a vital partner in ASEAN, and increasingly as a fellow developing country in global institutions. As it emerged from the tumultuous Asian financial crisis in 1998 and elite distrust of China began to subside, Jakarta began to see Beijing as an important partner in its efforts to rebuild its economy, return to its traditional regional role as *primus inter pares* within ASEAN and increase its maneuverability vis-à-vis other powers in the global stage [1].

The idea of a “special relationship”, first privately proposed by China in 2001, gained traction and finally culminated in a strategic Partnership in 2005 when

Chinese president Hu Jintao visited his counterpart Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (*People's Daily*, April 26, 2005). Since then, both sides have been deepening and broadening cooperation in the political-security, economic, and socio-cultural realms. Total trade between Indonesia and China more than doubled between 2006 and 2011, when it hit \$49.2 billion and China became Indonesia's second biggest trading partner. There has even been some cooperation in the military realm, such as on joint missile production and military exercises [2].

Yudhoyono's visit to China this March was an important step in further cementing Sino-Indonesian relations. It witnessed the signing of fifteen agreements between Indonesian and Chinese businesses amounting to \$17.65 billion and six memorandums of understanding covering fields like maritime cooperation, counter-narcotics and statistical and archival data exchanges (Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, March 24). The joint statement emphasized promoting a healthy and sustainable economic relationship to boost the trade volume to \$80 billion in 2015 and encouraging businesspeople to invest in support of Indonesia's 2011-2015 Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development (MP3EI). Beyond economic issues, the joint statement addressed expanding bilateral cooperation in fields like science and technology, food and energy security and regional cooperation in forums—such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (Xinhua, March 26). In a speech after receiving an honorary doctorate from Tsinghua University, Yudhoyono also stressed the importance of both countries working towards “developing a regional architecture to assure a conducive order for peace and welfare” in the Asia-Pacific region (ANTARA News, March 23). After his bilateral meeting with President Hu, Yudhoyono also expressed confidence that “both countries have the spirit to increase strategic cooperation in various sectors” (ANTARA News, March 24).

Yet Yudhoyono's optimism belies the significant obstacles that remain in Sino-Indonesian relations. In the economic realm, China's size and history continue to stoke fears of a hegemon trying to turn Southeast Asia into a neo-tributary system by flooding Indonesia with cheap Chinese goods, extracting critical raw materials and using its political leverage over the ethnic Chinese minority. Trends in the economic relationship over the past few

years have only reinforced these perceptions in some parts of the population, private sector and government. Indonesia went from having a trade surplus with China in 2006 of \$1.1 billion to a deficit in 2011 of \$3.2 billion, while just five raw materials—coal, palm oil, gas, crude petroleum and rubber—constituted around 60 percent of total Indonesian exports to China in terms of value in 2011 [2].

These fears were most clearly manifested with respect to the implementation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). Despite some efforts by China to assuage Indonesian concerns, ACFTA came under fire for worker layoffs in local manufacturing and the flood of Chinese textiles, garments and other goods into the Indonesian market, and the Indonesian government was forced to renegotiate the agreement (*Jakarta Globe*, April 3, 2010). Indonesia's Trade Minister Mari Pangestu, an Indonesian-Chinese and globally respected economist, eventually lost her job the following year partly over issues related to the ACFTA (*Jakarta Globe*, October 17, 2011).

Both sides have tried to overcome these economic concerns. When he visited Indonesia last year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that China did not “pursue a trade surplus” and was willing to increase imports from Indonesia “to promote sound, balanced and sustainable development of bilateral trade” (Xinhua, May 1, 2011). After viewing the data discrepancy that existed in the trade statistics of both countries during his visit in March, Yudhoyono firmly demanded that his trade minister eradicate smuggling as a major cause of the trade deficit (*Jakarta Post*, March 25). Indonesia also has introduced a raft of protectionist measures covering fruits and vegetables, rattan and foreign investment in sectors such as mining, which will shield domestic firms and affect Chinese businesses and investors.

Despite these efforts, experts posit that the trade structure is unlikely to shift significantly for some time. The complimentary requirements between the two economies are structural—with Indonesia needing more raw materials and capital goods while China requiring more commodities and energy. Furthermore, the process of making Indonesia's manufacturing industries more competitive to push more exports to China also will take a long time because it is enmeshed within deeper

governance problems including inadequate infrastructure, smuggling and red tape (*Jakarta Post*, April 25, 2011). The deficit also may increase in the coming months as China shifts more of its exports to Asian markets in response to sagging demand in Europe and the United States due to lingering economic crises (ANTARA News, April 6).

Obstacles also remain in the security realm despite some progress. Following the signing of the strategic partnership in 2005, agreements were reached on defense technology cooperation, inaugurating a bilateral defense consultation and establishing a joint military cooperation committee to arrange joint military and training exercises. Movement has been seen more recently in a number of these areas as well. For a few years now, Indonesia has been buying Chinese anti-ship missiles (specifically the C-705 and C-802), and its navy recently unveiled the KRI Kujang-642, a locally-produced guided-missile boat equipped with C-705s (Xinhua, February 16). Both sides also began a partnership in military arms production by initiating the joint procurement of missiles in a memorandum of understanding last March, and Jakarta is particularly interested in jointly procuring C-907 missiles to arm its Sukhoi jet fighters (*Jakarta Post*, March 23, 2011). Additionally, in June 2011, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Indonesia's National Armed Forces (TNI) finally conducted “Sharp Knife” in Bandung, Indonesia, the first ever joint military training of their special forces (Xinhua, June 18, 2011).

Equally important, however, is what has not taken off. Beyond the anti-ship missiles, China has not made much inroads in terms of selling military hardware to Indonesia. For instance, Beijing's repeated offer of JF-17 jet fighters, jointly produced with Pakistan, does not appear to have been met with much enthusiasm by Jakarta. Aside from the joint military exercise held last year, Indonesia seems to be approaching joint operations with caution. When Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro met with his visiting counterpart Liang Guanglie last May, he was mute on Chinese proposals to conduct coordinated patrols with Indonesia and other ASEAN member states to escort merchant vessels from the region through the Gulf of Aden as part of joint anti-piracy efforts (*Jakarta Post*, May 23, 2011). Even progress with regard coordinated sea patrols—which Jakarta already has with several countries including Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, India and Australia—was limited as they

were placed within the framework of a broader joint committee for a range of defense cooperation.

Several factors, such as where the Indonesian military wants to source its equipment and Indonesian suspicion of Chinese motives, could explain Jakarta's ambivalence with respect to security ties with China. Indonesian military equipment acquisitions to close out 2011 suggest Jakarta believes there are many better places where it can get most of its defense equipment. These deals included six Sukhoi Su-30MKK jet fighters from Russia worth \$470 million; three submarines from South Korea worth almost \$1.1 billion; nine NC-295 medium transport aircraft from Spain worth \$325 billion; and eight Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano counter-insurgency aircraft from Brazil as well as the planned transfer of 24 F-16C/D jets from the United States (*Jakarta Post*, March 22). The desire for higher quality and potentially more expensive military equipment from dispersed sources probably will continue if Indonesia's defense budget continues to rise year-on-year by more than 20 percent until 2014 in order to reach its 2015 target to elevate defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP (*Xinhua*, March 22).

The lukewarm reception also could be a product of distrust with respect to China's military intentions in Southeast Asia, particularly but not exclusively in the South China Sea. China's claims in the South China Sea include gas-rich marine territory that overlaps with Indonesia's exclusive economic zone extending from the Natuna Islands. Jakarta's detention of 75 Chinese nationals and their fishing boats off the Natuna Islands in 2009 and Beijing's prickly response provided a useful reminder of how this continues to be an irritant in bilateral relations (*Jakarta Globe*, July 2, 2009). Although Indonesia has long seen itself as an arbiter and has sponsored workshops devoted to resolving the issue since the 1990s, Jakarta submitted a letter to a United Nations commission in 2010 challenging China's expansive position on sovereignty in the South China Sea.

There are also limits to Sino-Indonesian relations in terms of foreign policy more generally. While China would like to be closer to Indonesia, Jakarta's current foreign policy—best encapsulated by the “dynamic equilibrium” concept attributed to foreign minister Marty Natalegawa—strives for a region not dominated by one country or two rival powers. Instead, Indonesia would

prefer a situation where a range of actors can engage intensely across issues in an inclusive way and the rise of one is not seen as the loss of the other (*Jakarta Post*, July 1, 2011). That means that while Indonesia on the one hand may oppose any Cold War-style attempt to contain China; on the other, it also would welcome quieter forms of engagement by other powers (including the United States) that promote regional stability. Beijing however may see such engagement as attempts to undermine its rise. This delicate balance or hedging is designed to ensure that Jakarta maintains both just the right amount of closeness and distance between the various regional actors, including China.

President Hu's reminder to Yudhoyono that Indonesia and China were “close neighbors separated by only a strip of water” suggests little has changed since Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on both sides to “join hands to strengthen our good-neighborly relationship, deepen comprehensive cooperation [and] create a bright future” last April (*Xinhua*, March 23; April 30, 2011). Lingering distrust and Indonesia's foreign policy outlook probably will ensure that a certain distance continues to remain in Sino-Indonesian relations even as cooperation selectively deepens.

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#### Notes:

1. Bronson Percival, *The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, pp. 62–64. Greta Nabbs-Keller, “Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia-China Relations,” *Security Challenges*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Spring 2011, pp. 23–41.
2. There is in fact a discrepancy in the trade statistics between both sides. Data from the Chinese side illustrate that China's exports to Indonesia were actually lower than its imports, such that both countries claimed a deficit. This data discrepancy is attributed to various sources, including smuggling and transiting by exporters.

For additional information on trade between the two countries, see, Anne Booth. “China’s Economic Relations with Indonesia: Threats and Opportunities”. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2011, pp. 141-160.

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## Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Reveals Rift with Beijing

By Andria Matrone

Although relations between Hong Kong and mainland China have never been trouble-free, the past few months have been marked by unusual antagonism. The souring of the relationship portended trouble for Beijing in the recent chief executive race, which ended on March 25. Beijing’s preferred candidate, Henry Tang, was so damaged by criticism that it switched its support to another candidate at the eleventh hour. Like former chief executives, Tang is loyal to the mainland and Hong Kong’s tycoons. His election would have meant a continuation of the status quo, which has not been particularly good for the average Hong Kong resident. As Hong Kongers’ fears of more-of-the-same politics grew, so did feelings of insecurity about their future as part of China and the sanctity of Beijing’s promises for “one country, two systems.”

Tensions have been simmering for some time in Hong Kong, but the most recent spat started in December 2011 with the release of results from an annual Hong Kong University poll. Each year, the university conducts a poll to determine how Hong Kong citizens identify themselves. The latest results found that only 17 percent of respondents describe themselves as Chinese, a 12-year low, whereas those identifying as Hong Kongers is at a 10-year high [1]. An official in the Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong reacted harshly to the survey results, calling them unscientific and illogical (*South China Morning Post*, December 30, 2011). A commentary in the mainland-owned paper *Wen Wei Po* called the authors of the survey “hit men of the Hong Kong opposition force”

and suggested they were pawns of U.S. Consul General Stephen Young and former Hong Kong Chief Secretary David Ford. Beijing frequently has accused Young, who previously served as the director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office, of meddling in Hong Kong’s internal affairs and promoting democracy in Hong Kong (*Wen Wei Po*, January 14).

Relations grew testier in January when more than 1,000 people appeared outside a Dolce & Gabbana shop in Hong Kong to protest the store’s “policy” that only mainland tourists could take photos of the store. Speculation followed that a mainland official insisted that Dolce & Gabbana employees prohibit Hong Kong residents from taking photos because of concern that photos of him buying expensive goods would be released on the internet, suggesting that he is corrupt (*The Standard* [Hong Kong], January 9). Then, the following week, a mainland tourist’s child violated the law by eating a snack on Hong Kong’s metro system. A local resident commented on the infraction, which sparked an argument that was eventually stopped by a Mass Transit Railway (MTR) staffer. A cell phone video of the incident went viral.

In another incident, Kong Qingdong, a professor at Peking University and alleged descendent of Confucius, was angered by the criticism of the mainland tourists and called Hong Kong people “running dogs for British imperialists” and amoral. The inflammatory comments caused Peng Qinghua, the Director of the Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong, to apologize publicly for Kong’s comments in (*Wen Wei Po*, February 1). Despite this, a group of Hong Kong citizens were so outraged that they took out a full page ad in *Apple Daily* that disparaged mainland citizens as “locusts” that deplete Hong Kong’s resources.

Mainland press coverage of these events tried to mitigate tensions by downplaying the episodes. A *Global Times* editorial urged both sides to cease engaging in offensive behavior, saying that “upping the ante on the verbal cross-fire is exaggerating the difficulties of integration between Hong Kong and the mainland” (February 4). A journalist formerly of *China Daily*’s Hong Kong office wrote an op-ed suggesting the Hong Kong people realize that they are now inferior to mainland citizens and suggested that their reactions stem from worry that they will lose their status (*China Daily*, January 20). Other articles

highlighted the importance of China to Hong Kong's well-being. For example, one report released one day after the publication of the locust advertisement stated Hong Kong's economy would be weak in the beginning of this year due to slowing exports, but tourism from the mainland would temper any negative impact (*China Daily*, February 2).

A primary cause of the recent anger among Hong Kong residents is the use of Hong Kong's resources by mainlanders. Birth tourism is one of the most visible examples of this. Large numbers of mainland women travel to Hong Kong to give birth so they can receive better medical care and obtain a Hong Kong identification for their child, entitling the child to Hong Kong's resources, including public education. Last year, approximately 40,000 mainland women gave birth in Hong Kong, which caused hospital beds to be in short supply and required residents to book beds months in advance. In January, more than 1,500 Hong Kongers protested the increasing number of mainland babies born in Hong Kong hospitals (*The Standard*, January 16; Agence France Presse, January 15).

Both the Chinese government and the Hong Kong government are working to address the birth tourism issue, although they waited to do so until after the aforementioned events occurred. The Hong Kong government reduced the quota for the number of non-local mothers that can give birth in Hong Kong to 34,000 (*The Standard*, February 8; Xinhua, February 3). Beijing and Hong Kong officials agreed to work together to find "birth agents" who assist mainland women traveling to Hong Kong to give birth, and they have already made several arrests (Xinhua, January 22). In addition, Beijing has threatened that if women go to Hong Kong to give birth to a second child, they will be heavily taxed upon their return to the mainland for violating the one-child policy (*Global Times*, February 10).

Both governments also took limited steps to address the issue of rising housing prices, but the impetus for alleviating the high cost of housing came from China. After Beijing took notice of this problem—partly caused by mainland investors—the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office warned that there was a danger that the housing bubble could burst. This raised alarm bells and prompted the Hong Kong government to take

quick action (*China Daily*, June 23, 2011).

Despite these steps to ameliorate problems relating to property speculation and birth tourism, many local residents remain wary of Beijing's rule. Last year, Beijing proposed a "national education" plan to teach students about China's development to build "affection for the country," which many in Hong Kong viewed as brainwashing. Implementation of this curriculum has been delayed due to criticism (*South China Morning Post*, January 26). Academic freedom is highly valued in Hong Kong, as is freedom of the press, which is seen to be in jeopardy. The new editor of the *South China Morning Post* is from the mainland and is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, prompting skeptics to suggest he will make the paper "red" (*The Standard*, February 2).

Hong Kongers concerns of Beijing's growing influence in their city also were evident in the recent Chief Executive election. Previous elections were relatively quiet and proceeded as planned with Beijing's preferred candidate easily winning the election, whereas this election had competition between candidates and particularly negative coverage by the press—even Vice President Xi Jinping called for the mud-slinging to stop (*South China Morning Post*, March 9). Henry Tang, Beijing's initial favorite for chief executive, rapidly fell from grace as scandals marred his image. C.Y. Leung was not scandal-free and has even been accused of being a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member. His more populist platform, however, may have prevented him from falling too far in the polls.

As a result of growing criticism and dislike of Tang, Beijing signaled it preferred Leung a few days prior to the election (*South China Morning Post*, March 21). Given that Chinese officials had called for the chief executive needed to be capable, popular and patriotic, Beijing's decision to throw its support to Leung was not completely unexpected (*The Standard*, July 19, 2011). China recognizes it cannot ignore public opinion and growing discontent in Hong Kong. Moreover, Leung's popularity should not be exaggerated. While Leung fared better than Tang in some polls, many in Hong Kong were skeptical of him; at best, he represented the lesser of two evils. In a mock poll conducted two days prior to the election that was open to the general public, 54 percent of those polled abstained from choosing any candidate [2]. Of course, those that

voted in this mock poll are a self-selected group, but a significant portion of the 222,990 participants found all candidates unacceptable.

Supporting Tang for Chief Executive was a poor judgment call by Beijing in the first place. Backing a candidate with visibly strong ties to tycoons meant supporting the status quo at a time when Hong Kongers want to see change. Furthermore, Beijing failed to recognize that a free press could bring about Tang's downfall. That Beijing did not select a candidate who legitimately cares about protecting Hong Kong's interests and is relatively honest fuels worries that the rampant corruption present in Chinese politics will become a regular part of Hong Kong politics as well (*South China Morning Post*, March 25; *New York Times*, March 5).

After Leung was announced the victor, pro-democracy protestors who fear that the new chief executive's alleged CCP membership will result in the stripping of Hong Kong's freedoms pronounced that Hong Kong was "dead." If Leung is unable to reassure residents that he will protect Hong Kong's rights, protests will swell as they did nearly a decade ago.

At this point, Hong Kongers clearly want to remain distinct from the mainland. They do not want Beijing meddling in their politics nor do they want mainlanders to exploit their resources. They want what was promised to them under the "one country, two systems" framework—that their political and economic system would remain the same for 50 years after 1997 and that they would get fully democratic elections. The recent tensions can be summed up as resulting from fears that the framework is more about creating "one country" than it is about maintaining "two systems."

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Notes:

1. "HKU POP releases latest survey on Hong Kong people's ethnic identity," *The University of Hong Kong*, December 28, 2011, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release884.html>.
2. "Results of '3.23 Civil Referendum,'" *The University of Hong Kong*, March 24, 2012, <http://hkupop>.

[hku.hk/chinese/release/release915.html](http://hku.hk/chinese/release/release915.html).

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## China's Awkward Presence at Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

By Richard Weitz

President Hu Jintao joined 54 heads of state, deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers at the March 26-27 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. The main objective of the summit was to secure, reduce and eliminate global stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials to keep them from terrorists and criminals. The major obstacle to nuclear terrorism is acquiring the material needed to make a nuclear explosive device. The summit strived to avert this disaster through encouraging cooperative action to prevent the theft of nuclear weapons or the fissile material that could be used to fuel a nuclear explosion.

Of course, all states share with China a desire to avert such an outcome. Thus, supporting the objective provided an easy way for Beijing to cooperate with the United States, Europe, Russia and other countries on an important but uncontested objective. China's stance however was complicated by its close ties with North Korea, Iran and Pakistan—the three countries that could most plausibly transfer nuclear materials or technologies to terrorists. In addition, the Chinese government is eager to press ahead with a massive expansion of its domestic nuclear power production despite security and safety concerns ("Wenzhou Crash Shows the Dangers of China's Nuclear Power Ambitions," *China Brief*, July 29, 2011). Hu's call at the summit for a "scientific and sensible" approach toward nuclear security and energy could also apply to China's views regarding nuclear nonproliferation and other nuclear issues (*China Daily*, March 28).

### Opposing Nuclear Terrorism

Preventing nuclear terrorism has to be the one of the best "win-win" issues for Chinese diplomacy around. As leading Chinese nonproliferation scholar Li Bin notes, most security issues are zero-sum games. When one country increases its security, it often hurts the security of

another. In the domain of countering nuclear terrorism, however, when a country increases the security of its dangerous nuclear materials, everybody benefits except for would-be terrorists (“Nuclear Security Cooperation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 20). Another Chinese commentary noted the growing global use of nuclear power was increasing the risk of nuclear terrorism and, therefore, the importance of strengthening nuclear security and safety (*People’s Daily*, March 28).

As the world’s leading trading state, China has a strong interest in avoiding an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere since it could inflict a major, perhaps crippling blow to the international economy. For example, if a nuclear device detonated in a major seaport or a major maritime choke point, then maritime traffic would be disrupted for months. If a nuclear device was smuggled into a country, then countries would close their borders pending guarantees that no further nuclear weapons smuggling would occur. It took months for global air traffic to recover from the 9/11 hijackings—and that was a conventional attack.

In addition to not wishing to disrupt international commerce, Chinese officials want to prevent yet another blow to the global nuclear industry, which is still reeling from the consequences of last year’s meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant and placed nuclear safety on the agenda of the Seoul summit. A nuclear detonation anywhere in the world would increase popular aversion to nuclear power, which the Chinese government is counting on to meet China’s growing energy needs. In addition, China’s nuclear industry wants to expand its role in global nuclear exports.

In his address to the summit, entitled “Toward Greater Nuclear Security through Cooperation,” Hu reviewed the key measures that his government had taken in the last few years to strengthen China’s nuclear security. Hu then offered a four-point proposal on enhancing nuclear security:

- One, follow a scientific and sensible approach to nuclear security and boost confidence in the development of nuclear energy. We should face up to the associated risks, making nuclear energy safer and more reliable.
- Two, strengthen nuclear security capacity building and live up to national responsibility for ensuring

nuclear security. We should establish and improve the regulatory system for nuclear security, building up a team for handling nuclear emergencies.

- Three, deepen international exchanges and cooperation to improve nuclear security around the world. We need to promote nuclear security standards and norms, helping developing countries to raise their technical capabilities.
- Four, take a comprehensive approach and address both the symptoms and root causes of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism while adhering to the principles of the UN Charter and China’s New Security Concept to resolve international disputes peacefully (*Xinhua*, March 27).

Meanwhile, Miao Wei, Chinese Minister of Industry and Information Technology, told the delegates that, with China’s having a large nuclear energy program, his government has always rigorously controlled his country’s nuclear materials through increasingly effective administrative measures against nuclear theft or terrorism (*Xinhua*, March 28).

Chinese government representatives subsequently praised the summit’s outcome and their government’s performance. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang and Assistant Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu said the event had helpfully increased attention on nuclear security and safety issues, provided opportunities for the countries to exchange their experiences and encouraged states to make voluntary domestic and international commitments to strengthen their nuclear security (*Xinhua*, March 27). Qin claimed the points in Hu’s speech “have been well received by various parties” (*Xinhua*, March 28).

Chinese scholars and commentators offered similarly favorable assessments of the summit (*China Daily*, March 28). An article by Zhao Shixing praised Hu for setting out a distinctive “Chinese model” to nuclear security. Zhao added that Hu “demonstrated Chinese wisdom, promoted the image of China as a responsible power and produced so much favorable comment from the international community” (*People’s Daily*, April 2). Another commentary under the penname Zhong Sheng said Hu’s speech boosted the confidence of countries in developing nuclear power (*People’s Daily*, March 29).

## Practical Measures

At the 2012 summit, Chinese officials took a number of steps to illustrate that Beijing shared its goals. Like the other summit participants, Beijing submitted a progress report, entitled “National Progress Report on Nuclear Security of the People’s Republic of China,” describing how China had strengthened the security of its nuclear materials, especially since the 2010 summit. For example, the report related how China had inspected all its nuclear facilities and assessed how to improve their security. China also has enacted new laws and regulations to enhance the security of its nuclear and radioactive storage facilities. In August 2010, the Chinese government ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

In addition, China has developed new high-tech devices to detect explosives and radioactive substances in vehicles. The Chinese authorities deployed these devices at several major international events, including the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. The report said that China was willing to share its experience with these devices with other countries.

The Seoul summit broadened the nuclear security agenda to encompass radioactive materials at less-secure civilian facilities, such as hospitals. Terrorists could use these sources to manufacture so-called dirty bombs in which conventional explosives are used to spread radioactive material. Making one requires only bomb-making expertise and radioactive isotopes suitable for the purpose are much easier to obtain than the weapons-grade fissile material needed for a nuclear explosive. China also upgraded storage facilities and issued new regulations to answer this potential challenge.

Beijing has devoted considerable resources to developing its nuclear security human resources through education and training. In conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other countries, China conducted 20 training courses and seminars for more than 500 nuclear security workers since the April 2010 summit. In addition, China and the IAEA conducted nuclear security training courses and seminars for some 100 specialists from more than ten Asian-Pacific countries. Their subjects included physical protection, control of nuclear materials, countering illicit trafficking

in nuclear materials and promoting a working culture for nuclear security. Chinese representatives also participated in various international nuclear security workshops and exercises so they could learn from foreign experience.

The report noted how China and the United States have been cooperating closely on several such projects. They are conducting a pilot project in Shanghai under the U.S.-led “Megaport Initiative,” a program to detect the illicit nuclear material trafficking in the world’s major seaports. The two countries are creating a radiation detection training center for Asian and Chinese customs officers and are collaborating to raise the technical expertise of China’s export control staff. Finally, they are jointly constructing a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing that China will use to train nuclear security staff in other Asian countries.

Furthermore, China and the United States are collaborating to convert a miniature research reactor in China from using high-enrichment uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel. HEU can be dangerous, because, as fissile material, it can be used readily to make nuclear weapons. The report said China was “willing to assist other countries in converting their research reactors by utilizing the expertise and experience gained through cooperation with the [United States].”

## Dampening Nuclear Safety Concerns

Last year’s nuclear disaster in Japan placed nuclear safety on the summit’s agenda—an unwelcome development for a Chinese government committed to the domestic development of nuclear energy. Even with the anticipated post-Fukushima reductions, China is unique in the magnitude of its nuclear energy expansion plans, which Chinese officials see as essential for achieving their energy security, climate change and other development goals. China, which currently has 15 operating nuclear power reactors, plans to resume building nuclear power plants (26 are under construction) by the end of this year (CNTV, March 28). Beijing still hopes to double the share of national energy produced by nuclear power, to four percent, by the end of this decade. Since this requires increasing the country’s domestic nuclear power production from 11 gigawatts in 2010 to 80 gigawatts by 2020, China’s political and energy leaders want to minimize any safety and security obstacles in its path (Xinhua, March 28). As Zhao Shixing’s article

explained, “The serious nuclear accident that happened in Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in 2011 made the international community become jittery at the mention of nuclear. Some countries even suspended their nuclear development program. However, in the context of energy shortages, global warming, advocating low-carbon clean energy, the nuclear energy plays an irreplaceable role on ensuring energy security and dealing with climate change” (*People’s Daily*, April 2).

Immediately preceding the summit on March 22, South Korea organized a two-day nuclear industry conference to discuss how the nuclear industry plays on nuclear security. Emphasizing how a nuclear accident in one country could easily affect another, Sun Qin, president of the China National Nuclear Corporation, urged the importance of establishing an effective communications and mutual support arrangement among nuclear industries for issues related to nuclear safety—which should include sharing best practices and joint technology development—and called on the IAEA to play a larger role. He offered assistance to other Asian countries—such as handling nuclear fuel as well as nuclear security training—to ensure their safe development of nuclear power (Xinhua, March 24; China Radio International, March 23).

### Nuclear Proliferation Tensions

Hu’s address at the summit reaffirmed China’s opposition to further nuclear proliferation and support for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons as well as the right of all countries to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To further these goals, Hu said “China would work to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons, continue its nuclear no-first-use policy, support nuclear nonproliferation efforts, support countries’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and make its due contributions to building a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” (Xinhua, March 27). President Barack Obama delivered a speech a few days earlier detailing the same three U.S. goals (White House Press Release, March 26). Beijing however has found it harder than most countries to balance among these three objectives since it does not participate in the Russian-U.S.-NATO arms reduction processes and has close ties the states of most proliferation concern.

A major drama at the first nuclear security summit in Washington in April 2010 was whether President Hu would even show up, much less eventually support sanctions on Iran. The Obama administration lobbied heavily for Hu to come and additional UN sanctions on Iran were the focus of the bilateral Obama-Hu meeting at that summit. After Western diplomatic initiatives with Iran were unsuccessful, the Chinese UN delegation voted in favor of the fourth round of economic sanctions on Iran, because of Obama’s lobbying.

Tensions over China’s ties with Iran persisted at the 2012 summit as China is one of Iran’s major oil buyers. Washington has led other countries in imposing additional sanctions on Iran to supplement those approved by China and the UN Security Council. China along with several other important countries, such as Russia and India, oppose these supplementary sanctions since they penalize foreign firms outside U.S. or EU jurisdiction for dealing with Iranian firms. Before the summit, an authoritative *People’s Daily* editorial attacked the latest U.S. supplementary sanctions, which penalize foreign banks involved in Iran’s oil trade, as counterproductive, unfair and a form of arrogant “unilateralism” that led to the U.S. setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan (*People’s Daily*, March 22). After the summit, China’s commerce minister, Chen Deming, insisted Chinese entities were “not obliged to follow any domestic laws and rules of any particular country” (*The Telegraph* [India], March 29).

North Korea’s nuclear antics also made its policies a subject of last month’s summit. The fact that the gathering was occurring in neighboring South Korea probably made its nuclear program an unavoidable subject. This focus put China in an awkward position, given Beijing’s unsought status as Pyongyang’s patron. The day before he met with Hu in Seoul, Obama called on Beijing to pressure Pyongyang to cancel its planned launch of rocket—which the United States and others consider a means of developing long-range ballistic missiles—and cease “rewarding bad behavior (and) turning a blind eye to deliberate provocations.” “I believe that China is very sincere that it does not want to see North Korea with a nuclear weapon,” Obama told a news conference. “But it is going to have to act on that interest in a sustained way” (Reuters, March 25).

## Conclusion

Responding to China's awkward position on nuclear issues, the *People's Daily* editorialized post-summit that "the root cause" of the proliferation problem was that "that the United States and other nuclear powers implement the hegemonic policies," including employing military force against weaker non-nuclear states, which leads some of them to seek nuclear weapons (*People's Daily*, April 2). Fan Jishe, Deputy Director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies at the China Academy of Social Sciences, said the summit made considerable progress, but that Russia and the United States "should assume a greater share of the responsibility for strengthening global nuclear security" by making further nuclear arms reductions, decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies and accelerating their fissile materials repatriation programs. Other countries with developed nuclear industries could join them to establish an international nuclear fuel bank, promote awareness of nuclear security and provide technology, training and money to developing countries launching civilian nuclear programs (China.org.cn, March 29).

China undoubtedly will remain one of the world's most important nuclear players for decades to come. Beijing can easily cooperate on stopping nuclear terrorism—a development all governments oppose. China, however, is likely to clash further with other countries as long as it abstains from participating in nuclear arms control and has ties with some of the most troublesome emerging nuclear weapons states.

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## Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: How Much is Enough?

By Michael S. Chase

The modernization of China's nuclear missile force capabilities has led a number of analysts to ponder the question of "how much is enough" for China. Some have speculated that China may take advantage of the declining numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals to "rush to parity" with the nuclear superpowers. Others have even argued China already could have secretly amassed a much larger number of nuclear weapons than is widely believed, apparently basing this conclusion largely on their interpretation of the motives behind China's large-scale construction of tunnels to support Second Artillery Force (SAF) operations (*Wall Street Journal*, October 24, 2011; "China's 'Underground Great Wall' and Nuclear Deterrence," *China Brief*, December 16, 2009). No compelling evidence has been provided to support these assertions, however, and several analysts have shown that they are based on questionable sourcing and flawed research (*Asia Security Watch*, January 9; Federation of American Scientists, December 3, 2011). Nonetheless, Chinese nuclear force modernization is real in both quantitative and qualitative terms. As the latest *Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* indicated, China is moving toward a larger and more survivable force consisting of silo-based and road-mobile ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

These force modernization developments should come as no surprise. China has long sought an assured retaliation capability, though for many years China lived with a relatively modest and potentially vulnerable nuclear force [1]. More recently, however, China has been modernizing its nuclear forces in pursuit of "effective" nuclear deterrence, a requirement that can be traced to Chinese military publications such as the 1987 edition of the authoritative book, *The Science of Military Strategy*. More recently, China's national defense white paper in 2006 described China's nuclear strategy as requiring a "lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs" but official Chinese sources provide little

in the way of specifics with regard to how many nuclear weapons or what type of force structure is required to meet this objective (State Council Information Office, *China's National Defense in 2006*). Non-governmental experts in the United States estimate China currently has a few hundred nuclear warheads [2]. Given China's lack of transparency, however, analysts must draw their own conclusions about how many nuclear weapons Beijing believes will be enough to allow China to achieve its deterrence objectives in the future.

The writings of Chinese strategists shed some light on this problem in that they suggest quite strongly that China will continue to modernize and expand its nuclear missile force. These same strategists, however, see little benefit to be gained by amassing thousands of nuclear weapons in an attempt to achieve parity with the United States and Russia. With respect to its nuclear missile force, China has shown determination to maintain the secure, second-strike capability that is required to ensure that it will have a credible strategic deterrence force—even in the face of advances in adversary ISR, precision strike and missile defense capabilities. Yet the writings of Chinese strategists strongly suggest going much beyond what is required for an unquestionably credible assured retaliation capability would lead to diminishing returns at best and strategic instability at worst. For example, Major General Yao Yunzhu of the PLA's Academy of Military Science (AMS), a prominent analyst of nuclear issues, argues China adheres to the views of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who clearly believed “deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons,” but rather that “a survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence” [3]. Along similar lines, Sun Xiangli argues the experience of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War shows the pursuit of a “war-fighting” strategy “does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.” Moreover, because it requires a very large nuclear arsenal, it consumes “substantial economic and technological resources.” Worse still, Sun argues, large arsenals and “war-fighting” strategies lead to strategic instability and increase the risk of nuclear war [4].

Assessments such as these appear to reflect the longstanding views of senior leaders. As a recent article based on Chinese military publications and the memoirs and selected works of key figures in China's nuclear

weapons programs points out, “Chinese leaders have believed that nuclear weapons were basically unusable on the battlefield and that once mutual deterrence was achieved, a larger arsenal or arms racing would be costly, counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating” [5]. China thus is unlikely to attempt to exceed the United States or Russia in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it deploys. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe Beijing will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal as needed to ensure that it maintains an assured retaliation capability in response to perceived security challenges. This could result in substantial increases to the quantity and quality of China's nuclear arsenal.

Indeed, many observers expect China to field a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force over the next 10 to 15 years. The DIA presentation in the annual worldwide threat assessment provided Congress expresses this foreign consensus. Last year, DIA Director Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr. testified “[China] currently has fewer than 50 ICBMs that can strike the continental United States, but probably will more than double that number by 2025” (DIA Public Affairs, March 10, 2011).

At least three key factors are likely to influence Chinese decision-making about what exactly it requires in terms of nuclear force structure. First, at a broad level, China's perception of its external security environment and its relationships with major powers is an important consideration. At a more operational level, China also must consider potential nuclear and conventional threats to its silo-based, road-mobile and sea-based nuclear forces. Finally, China also will weigh its concerns about future missile defense developments that could undermine its ability to maintain an assured retaliation posture capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Chinese scholars suggest missile defense is the most important factor in determining China's future requirements. According to Yao Yunzhu, for example, U.S. missile defense deployments will be “the most significant factor that will influence China's nuclear calculus” [6]. Furthermore, according to Chu and Rong, “Trying to retain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in the face of a BMD system, China may increase its nuclear arsenal until it is beyond doubt that it is large enough” [7]. Chinese writers rarely provide specific numbers, but Chu and Rong suggest perhaps 200 nuclear warheads could

be needed today, with that number possibly increasing to 300 or 400 in the future.

Yao writes China will need to “reevaluate the sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. missile defense systems and retain a guaranteed ability to retaliate.” Yao argues, however, such a reassessment will result only in variation in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, not in changes to the “basic nature” of China’s nuclear policy. In short, as Yao puts it, the purpose of Chinese nuclear missile force modernization “is to keep valid its longstanding nuclear policy” [8].

### Implications of Chinese Nuclear Missile Force Developments

In recent years, the SAF has made impressive strides in the development of its nuclear deterrence capabilities. The deployment of road mobile ICBMs is giving China the assured retaliation capability it has long sought for its growing, but still relatively small nuclear missile force. Over the next ten years, China can be expected to continue to strengthen the SAF’s nuclear missile force, which will remain the most important element of China’s nuclear deterrent posture. Perhaps the most vital development in this regard could be the deployment of MIRVed road-mobile ICBMs.

China almost certainly does not plan to build thousands of nuclear weapons, but the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities still will have major implications. First, the SAF’s growing nuclear arsenal will make China a more important consideration in discussions about future nuclear arms control agreements. Chinese nuclear force modernization will become a more important consideration for Russia and the United States as they reduce the size of their own nuclear arsenals. Moreover, China’s integration into the global nuclear reduction process that President Obama outlined in his 2009 Prague speech, as well as that of the other nuclear powers, will eventually be required to make further progress toward his long-term vision of a world free of nuclear weapons—a goal recently echoed by Hu Jintao (Xinhua, March 27). The *2010 Nuclear Posture Review* reflects this challenge, stating, “over time” the United States “will also engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future.”

Chinese scholars expect that China will face greater pressure as a result. Teng Jianqun of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-run think tank China Institute for International Studies, for example, sees Washington’s approach as still focused mainly on Russia, but notes “as bilateral disarmament progresses, the US will certainly pay increasing attention to China’s arms control policies” [9]. Beijing, however, is clearly reluctant to be drawn into the process, especially given China’s small nuclear arsenal relative to the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As Teng explains, “American and Russian stockpiles make up more than 90 percent of the world’s total nuclear weapons. Though both nearly have halved their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their total number of nuclear weapons is still many times greater than that of states with small nuclear forces. Only when the two great nuclear powers have reduced their arsenals to an appropriate level will China follow suit.” It should be noted, however, that government-affiliated Chinese analysts have not specified what number would constitute an “appropriate level,” suggesting Beijing will remain reluctant to enter into such negotiations.

Second, beyond the implications for arms control, challenges for escalation management that arise from the SAF’s growing capabilities and evolving doctrine also merit consideration. In particular, some of China’s thinking with respect to using the missile force to send signals aimed at influencing an adversary raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The risk of miscalculation could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. Some of the signaling activities described in Chinese publications easily could be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning, but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing the ability of policymakers to successfully manage an unfolding crisis or even escalating a conflict rather than limiting its destructiveness. Indeed, some Chinese sources raise troubling questions about potential miscalculations that could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or a conventional conflict. For instance, one SAF publication suggests Chinese missile force units can attempt to deter an adversary by conducting simulated missile launches. For China’s solid-fueled mobile systems, this involves deploying the mobile missile forces to training areas and

fake launch sites just before the enemy's reconnaissance satellites are about to pass overhead. The mobile missile units can then prepare their equipment, erect the missiles and conduct pre-launch inspections. China's liquid-fueled missiles also can carry out simulated launch preparations. The purpose is to persuade the enemy to believe China's missile forces are prepared to strike enemy targets, thus convincing the enemy to abandon activities that China considers particularly threatening. According to the same SAF publication, such simulated missile launches "make the enemy believe that our missile forces are already in a situation of waiting for an opportunity or conducting pre-combat exercises; because of this, the enemy will consider the consequences and abandon some of its activities" [10].

Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate at least some awareness of the danger that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead trigger escalation, discussions of these risks in the relevant publications are quite limited. For instance, Zhao Xijun notes deterrence must be calibrated to maximize the chances of achieving the desired results. If the level of threat is too low, it will not influence the enemy; but, if it is too high, the enemy may lash out in desperation. Zhao also offers a cautionary note that deterrence operations accidentally could trigger escalation if they are poorly timed: "Whether the timing for conducting the military deterrence of the missile forces is correctly chosen will directly affect the progress of deterrence and its outcome. If the appropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence will deter the enemy, contain the eruption of war and obtain the objective of peace with the small price of deterrence. If inappropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence may cause the situation to deteriorate, even leading to the eruption and escalation of war" [11]. Nonetheless, how Chinese decision makers would determine the "right" timing is not clearly specified, and the available sources suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks of specific actions may be rather underdeveloped. Importantly, they do not appear to reflect a detailed assessment of how potential adversaries might react to some of these actions, which could make attempts at escalation management in a crisis or conflict extremely challenging and potentially very dangerous.

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#### Notes:

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