



# MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR

## Personalities Behind the Insurgency

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Hashid's Sadiq al-Ahmar

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### IMU ANNOUNCES USMAN GHAZI AS NEW EMIR AFTER MONTHS OF DELIBERATION

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) announced in a statement that Usman Ghazi is the IMU's new emir (high-ranking Sheikh), taking over the position from the late Abu Usman Adil, who was killed in a drone strike in Miranshah, North Waziristan, Pakistan in April 2012 (furqon.com, August 3, 2012). Although Usman Ghazi was previously Usman Adil's deputy, it took the IMU four months to announce Ghazi's promotion, possibly because of the lack of consensus within the IMU leadership about Ghazi's suitability for the position. Ghazi, who is believed to be 40-years old and a non-Uzbek, has a criminal past in arms smuggling and drug trafficking (Central Asia Online [Tashkent], August 2012). However, for an IMU leader, this is consistent with the modus operandi of the movement. After having been based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region for nearly a decade, the IMU is now comprised mostly of non-Uzbek fighters and has taken advantage of the lucrative drug trade from Afghanistan to Central Asia, Russia, and further beyond to Europe to sustain itself financially.

The IMU has reportedly moved so far from its Uzbek roots that it has tried to rebrand itself under the Persian Dari name for the group, "Tehreek-e-Islami-e-Uzbekistan," rather than the Uzbek name for the group, "Uzbekistan Islami Harikati" (Central Asia Online [Miranshah], August 6, 2012). Therefore, if, as reported, Usman Ghazi speaks Arabic, Russian and English, but not Uzbek, he should still be sufficiently equipped to communicate with the fighters under his leadership and other militant organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Taliban, on which the IMU depends for logistical support.

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The IMU has carried out more than 20 attacks in northern Afghanistan alone in 2012, and in April 2012 the IMU helped the Taliban to execute the prison break in Bannu, Pakistan, which freed Adnan Rasheed, who was accused in 2003 of conspiring to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (See *Militant Leadership Monitor*, Volume 3, Issue 5). Despite the IMU's wide area of operations, the IMU is hardly relevant in Uzbekistan anymore, which may be one reason why some of the leaders have concerns about Usman Ghazi and took several months to announce his leadership. In less than two years, the United States is expected to withdraw from Afghanistan. At that point, the IMU may set its sights on northern Afghanistan and the movement's homeland once again. While Usman Ghazi might be the right leader for the moment, he may not be the right leader for the next phase of IMU's operations, especially if the movement intends to target Uzbekistan again.

## **BOKO HARAM LEADER ABU SHEKAU MOCKS "FOREIGN TERRORIST" LABEL**

In a video posted on YouTube but then immediately taken down, Boko Haram leader Abu Shekau made a mockery of reports that the United States is likely to apply the label of "foreign terrorist" on three Boko Haram leaders (Reuters [Washington], June 20, 2012). Of the three leaders, two are virtually unknown—Abubakar Adam Kamar and Khalid al-Barnawi—while the third, Abubakar Shekau, was Boko Haram founder Mohammad Yusuf's deputy before Yusuf was killed by Nigerian security forces in July 2009. Now Shekau is the undisputed leader of Boko Haram, at least as it relates to speaking on behalf of Boko Haram (See *Militant Leadership Monitor*, Volume 2, Issue 8). The internal dynamics of the Boko Haram Shura Council are not entirely clear, but Shekau and his spokespeople, usually named Abu Qaqa, are the only people who speak on behalf of Boko Haram to the media.

In the 38-minute video, which was called "Shekau's Fourth Video Message," Shekau spoke in the Hausa language, which is common to northern Nigeria, and issued a message to U.S. President Barack Obama declaring, "You said I'm a global terrorist, then you are a terrorist in the next world." He added that, "I know the United States exists, but I don't know which part of the world it is located in, whether in the west or the north, the south or the east. I don't know where it is, not to talk of freezing my assets there." To Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, Shekau said, "I call on you Goodluck Jonathan, you should abandon this ungodly power, you should repent, repent and forsake Christianity, including Obama, who said I have business interests in the United States" (Firstpost [Abuja], August 6, 2012).

The video confirms that Abu Shekau is still alive and confident enough to continue to show himself publicly and have his voice heard, and that he is not in such a remote hideout as to become disassociated with current events. However, the fact that the video, like previous Boko Haram videos, was not posted on traditional jihadi media forums suggests that Boko Haram is still independent from al-Shabaab in Somalia and Ansar al-Din, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, all of which are connected to mainstream al-Qaeda media forums that post their videos online.

## **A Profile of Zuheir Salim: A Leading Strategist in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood**

*James Brandon*

As Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria shows further signs of weakening, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has begun maneuvering to take advantage of the regime's expected collapse. In light of this, it is important to look at the Syrian Brotherhood's leading political strategist, UK-based Zuheir Salim (b. 1947) who is the organization's third most important figure after Ali al-Bayanouni (b. 1938), the elderly head of the group's political wing, and the group's newly promoted chief leader, Mohammad Riad al-Shakfa (b. 1948).

Zuheir Salim, the Syrian Brotherhood's leading political thinker, was born in the Syrian city of Aleppo in 1947. Salim fled Syria in 1979 when the group escalated its armed activities against the regime and moved to London, as did many other leaders of the Syrian Brotherhood in the mid-1980s. He has since become the key advisor to Bayanouni, the group's main leader from the mid-1990s who moved to London in 1999. In this position, he has established himself as the group's main political strategist and he has become a prominent face on Arabic satellite new channels. In London he also established the Syrian Brotherhood's main front-organization, "The Arab Orient Centre" (Mashreq al-Sharq al-Arabi) which under his leadership produces the group's main intellectual output.

Although Salim's role in the Brotherhood's terrorist campaign in Syria in the late 1970s is unclear, like many of the modern Muslim Brotherhood members, Salim has now rejected many aspects of the Brotherhood's original hard-line ideology. For instance, along with Bayanouni, Salim was one of the leading

proponents of the Brotherhood's shift away from violence following the failed uprising in Hama in 1982. He also played a key role in reconciling the Brotherhood's original Islamist vision with aspects of democratic governance, for instance supporting the idea of elected parliaments, multi-party politics and the use of referendums to decide issues of national importance. In an article posted on his website, he writes of modern Islamists such as himself having "admiration for [the] political mechanisms" of Western governments, referring particularly to "the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, and setting the bases of modern state, in terms of freedom of choice, and the rules of transparency and regular inquest, mechanisms of the peaceful transfer of power, equal access to opportunities" (Mashreq al-Sharq al-Arabi website, November 21, 2011). Reflective of this new stance, in January 2012, he told a Turkish newspaper that "Syria will be a democratic country...The Muslim Shari'a protects freedom, justice and a civilized way of living. We want people to be governed according to their own free will. This is democracy. A parliament will make all the decisions. There won't be compulsory Shari'a or any other law that the people don't want in the country" (Today's Zaman, January 31, 2012).

But while helping the Syrian Brotherhood to move in a more democratic and inclusive direction, Salim has also become a shrewd political operator, playing a key role in the group's cynical political maneuverings, such as leading the group's unstable alliances with both the Syrian regime and opposition forces. In the mid-late 2000s, Salim - on behalf of the Brotherhood--became a key figure in the "National Salvation Front," a coalition of secular and Islamist opposition parties aiming to overthrow Assad's government. In this capacity he often spoke to the media on the movement's behalf, as well as appearing regularly at public events with the Brotherhood's new democratic allies, for instance appearing at several human rights-themed events in London in 2008 alongside secular Syrian opposition groups such as the Movement for Justice and Development (Movement for Justice and Development, July 7, 2008). However, after the Brotherhood unilaterally withdrew from this opposition alliance in 2009, Salim led the Brotherhood's efforts to court Syria's Assad regime, particularly seeking the right for the Muslim Brotherhood to operate in Syria, without lobbying for similar rights for other opposition groups. Having built his previous alliance against the regime on the basis of democracy and human rights, Salim now couched the Brotherhood's outreach to Assad in terms of opposition to Israel and even of making Assad's one-party state more "stable" saying in one media interview: "We would like to go back to Syria and continue our opposition in democratic scene [sic]. [A] Syria that [makes] peace with the opposition

will be more stable and stronger against Israel" (Ikhwanweb, January 23, 2009). With the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, however, Salim—like the Brotherhood itself—deftly switched sides again, with Salim now turning against the regime and taking a seat on the Syrian National Council, the main exile opposition group.

In his new position, Salim has again played a key role in the Brotherhood's PR program, for instance telling the Wall Street Journal in May 2011 that the Brotherhood had played only a minor role in anti-Assad protests, saying "We are supporters, and not creators," a humble turn of phrase presumably designed to allay US concerns over Brotherhood influence in Syria (Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011).

But while Salim, like the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, has shown himself a pragmatic operator in his quest for political power and influence, his writings and speeches often reveal some hard-line views and ambiguity toward the West. In a 2010 article on his website, for instance, he argued that the West is engaged in a "cultural war" against Islam, writing that this "war against Islam began even before the campaign of Napoleon against Egypt," warning readers that this is a battle between "what's good and what's evil" (Mashreq al-Sharq al-Arabi website, September 4, 2010). Similarly, in November 2011, in an interview with a Kurdish journalist, he seemed to reject the idea of the Syrian state and to favor a return to the Caliphate, at one point reportedly telling the interviewer: "To hell with Syrian [identity]! We do not recognize Syria. Who created Syria? Sykes-Picot. [...] We want to overcome Sykes-Picot and live together again as we did for one thousand five hundred years" (Kurdwatch, November 12, 2011). In line with his track-record for strategic dissimulation, however, Salim also recently reportedly told a moderate Israeli-Arab newspaper that the Brotherhood would leave the question of recognizing Israel to "the Syrian people" (Al-Sinara, February 16, 2012).

As Syrian opposition forces move closer to toppling the Assad regime, Salim is likely to emerge once again as a key figure in Syria and in the Syrian Brotherhood, aided by his political skills and experience of dealing with the media. Salim is a key person to watch as Syria becomes the latest Arab country to attempt a transition from dictatorship to democracy.

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## **Nasiruddin Haqqani (a.k.a Dr. Khan): The Haqqani Network's Emissary and Fundraiser**

*Animesh Roul*

The Haqqani Network (HN) has recently been receiving global attention for its active support to militant movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tagged often as the “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the HN allegedly masterminded many sensational attacks in Afghanistan including the January 2008 Serena hotel bombing and the September 2011 attacks on the US Embassy and NATO bases in Kabul (The Dawn, September 22, 2011).

This deep-rooted, informal though robust network is headed by Afghan warlord Jallaluddin Haqqani, with active support of his family and clan members, mostly comprising of his three sons Sirajuddin, Badruddin and Nasiruddin. [1] They are assisted and guided by Jalaluddin’s brothers, Ibrahim Haqqani (a.k.a Ibrahim Omari) and Khalil Haqqani and many trusted commanders.

Besides its much touted military muscle, the ever-growing financial strength of the HN is a matter of serious concern in recent times. Activities ranging from drug trade and gun running to kidnap-for-ransom operations are the basis of the HN’s financial potency. Behind all this, Nasiruddin’s role as Jallaluddin Haqqani’s close aide, chief emissary and fundraiser are well established.

Nasiruddin Haqqani (a.k.a. Dr Khan), was born in the Nika district of the Paktika Province of Afghanistan sometime in the year 1972. Unlike his illustrious warlord father and notorious brothers and relatives, Nasiruddin Haqqani maintains a relatively low public profile. Yet, he has maintained a responsible position in the hierarchy. It was learned that following the death of Janbaz Zadran in October 2011, the Network’s ever growing financial lifeline has been managed by Nasiruddin and Badruddin, while Sirajuddin has maintained the overall command of the network since 2005.

However, few details have become available to date on the role of Nasiruddin as an able fundraiser and as the HN’s chief emissary. He is believed to have many Pakistani passports in his possession and frequents between Pakistan and the Gulf region (e.g. UAE and Saudi Arabia) to get donations and business payments from al-Qaeda and Taliban sympathizers. The U.S. Treasury Department has noted that in 2004 he

traveled to Saudi Arabia with a Taliban associate to raise funds for the Taliban. In the same year, he provided funds to pro-Taliban militants in Afghanistan to carry out disruptive activities during the October Afghan presidential election. From 2005 to 2009, Nasiruddin collected funds for the HN and undertook fundraising trips to Gulf States (The Treasury Department, July 22, 2010). He is reportedly responsible for smuggling and extortion operations of the HN and remains the main contact point for payments from “transport, construction and telecoms firms” operating in the areas under their protection. [2]

A picture of Nasiruddin by his father’s side in 2001 suggests that he has been assisting his father in many ways. Since his father’s reported illness in 2005, Nasiruddin has served as the chief negotiator and translator for his aging father and present chief of the HN. His increased role may be a result of his educational background along with his knowledge of Arabic and other languages. [3] Nasiruddin also acts as a communication link between Afghan Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin. He reportedly represents Sirajuddin in matters involving business and operational activities with Pakistan’s ISI, with the Afghan Taliban and contacts in the Arab world (NATO/ISAF Report, “State Of The Taliban: Detainee Perspectives,” January 6, 2012).

He has been based in the Miranshah area in North Waziristan in Pakistan. There are reports that Nasiruddin and other senior Haqqani leaders also maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad (Ibid). The ISI agency maintains close ties with the Haqqanis and sometimes exerts pressure with occasional raids and arrests to keep control over other Taliban factions and groups in North Waziristan region.

Nasiruddin Haqqani’s meeting with Pakistan’s emerging leader, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan, in 2007 made national headlines (Pak Tea House, April 27, 2011). The meeting brought forth the much needed political push for the dialogue process with the Taliban. Imran Khan urged the Pakistan government in subsequent years to use Haqqani Networks to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. Nasiruddin’s role as the network’s emissary was noticed early this year when he travelled to the United Arab Emirates to meet with top Taliban negotiator Tayyeb Agha, to discuss the Doha peace talks held between the United States and the Taliban (Khaama Press, January 26, 2012). To note, Agha is a key confidant (brother-in-law) of Mullah Omar and in charge of the Taliban negotiation team. Agha’s meeting with Nasiruddin was itself a significant event, which shed some light on the importance of the Haqqani Network in any future reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

His name came into the limelight in early 2009 when he was arrested in Pakistan and was exposed to public attention. More than the arrest, the release made quite a lot of noise in Pakistan which came as a result of intervention by then Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah Mehsud who swapped abducted security force personnel for the safe release of Nasiruddin. [4]

There were conflicting reports of Nasiruddin's arrest and subsequent release in December 2010 in Pakistan (CNN, December 24, 2010). He was reportedly arrested while traveling from Peshawar to the tribal region of North Waziristan along with four associates, including a senior Haqqani commander Mullah Muhammad Jan. Other sources indicated that Nasiruddin and his four associates were arrested while returning from Saudi Arabia. The purported arrest was considered to be a policy departure on the part of Pakistan as Nasiruddin himself was part of a backchannel dialogue for a ceasefire with NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Arguably, Nasiruddin's increasing stature as the HN's key representative has cemented his role in any negotiations with the Taliban for future Afghan reconciliation. Saudi Arabia's most recent initiative—to play a supportive role in Afghan peace talks, the invitation to Haqqani network members including Nasiruddin and Khallil Haqqani to participate and at the same time to accelerate the reconciliation process—speaks volume (Express Tribune, August 24, 2012). Being a non fighting commander of the HN, it would not be an exaggeration to foresee a future political role of position for Nasiruddin, if a pro-Taliban government comes to power in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Along with his two siblings, Nasiruddin is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 and listed under the United Nations 1267 resolution (United Nations, May 18, 2012). Many leaders of the Haqqani Network have been designated global terrorists, and the United States is presently considering designating the entire Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

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Notes:

[1] Another brother identified as Mohammed Haqqani is believed to have died in a drone strike near Miranshah, Pakistan in February 2010. Many of Jalaluddin Haqqani's family members were killed in a similar drone strike in Danday Darpa Khel (near Miranshah) in September 2008,

though he and his three sons survived that strike. There is no clarity in the open sources about the birth order of the living Haqqani siblings. While scholars like Thomas Ruttig argue that Nasiruddin is the youngest of them all, one confidential NATO/ISAF document (January 2012) noted that Nasiruddin is the eldest, followed by Sirajuddin and Badruddin. See, Thomas Ruttig, "Loya Paktika Insurgency: The Haqqani Network As an Autonomous Entity," in Antonio Giustozzi (ed), *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*, Hurst/Foundation Books (London) 2009, p. 64; NATO/ISAF Report, "State Of The Taliban: Detainee Perspectives," January 6, 2012, <http://afghanhindsight.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/20120106-nato-paper-state-of-the-taliban.pdf>

[2] Gretchen Peters, "Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry," Harmony Program/The Combating Terrorism Center, July 2012, p. 27 [www.ctc.usma.edu](http://www.ctc.usma.edu)

[3] There is no information about his educational background in the open sources, though the title "Dr" indicates he could be a highly educated man. Various reports suggest that he is proficient in many languages including Arabic. There are also conflicting reports about his mother; some sources indicate that his mother belongs to the Zadran tribe of Afghanistan, and is not from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). See, Thomas Ruttig, "Loya Paktika Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity," op.cit. p. 64; Other mentions of her Afghan origin can be found in, Gretchen Peters, "Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry," p.26.

[4] Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*, Palgrave (London), 2011. p. 65.

## An In-Depth Portrait of Sadiq al-Ahmar: A Window into Yemeni Tribal Power Politics

*Joshua Jacobs*

One of the principal power brokers in Yemen is Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar. As leader of the Hashid tribal federation, the strongest and second largest in Yemen, al-Ahmar is an individual of unique power. It was via his ability to control both the levers of legitimating and hard power—his ability to simultaneously call forces into the field, and force their withdrawal or defection by tribal fiat—that enabled General Ali Moshin's uprising after he led the charge against Ali

Abdullah Saleh's regime in 2011. Though Moshin had nearly half of the Yemeni military under his roster, as commander of the 1st Armored Division and most of the Northwestern Military district, it was only when al-Ahmar gave the uprising his sanction that major defections occurred. Al-Ahmar tapped into a deeply held tribal loyalty that transcended conventional military and political lines.

[1] His sanction lent the uprising decisive support.

Since the end of open hostilities, al-Ahmar has receded into the background, seemingly content to let others, such as his brother Hamid al-Ahmar engage in the political sphere and push the family's public agenda. This is in part emblematic of the nature of his power and his capacity as an individual. His strength is not derived from personal acumen or brilliance; it comes as a result of the nature of his position. As tribal power by its nature is diffused across families and disparate elements, al-Ahmar's power and his relationship to the forces under his command is more subtle and complex than might be expected.

## Early Life

Sadiq al-Ahmar is the eldest son of the late Sheikh Abdullah ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar, one of the most powerful figures in modern Yemeni history and the late leader of the Hashid tribal federation. Born in 1956, Sadiq was raised in the heartland of the Hashid in the Amran province and the titular capital of the al-Khamri tribe. He was an early observer of the subtle machinations of Yemeni politics, having watched his father maneuver between the competing Republican and Royalist governments of North Yemen.

By the mid 1970's with the fighting at an end, Sadiq's father dispatched his son to be educated in Egypt; but simmering disagreements between his father and the Egyptian government led Sadiq to conclude his studies in Yemen. Sadiq then went on to study in the United States for several years, pursuing a graduate degree in California, and eventually attaining a light aircraft pilot's license at Howard Pilot College.

While a higher education, especially in foreign schools, was and to a degree remains the norm for the Yemeni elite, it did not match the kind of grooming or attention usual for an heir apparent. In particular, Sadiq's decision to pursue a pilot's license instead of returning to engage in politics is seen as an oddity and according to some sources reflective of a strained relationship with his father. [2] However in the early 1990's he returned to Yemen, and was promptly ushered into the Assembly of Representatives by his father. In his time as a representative, he performed few activities

and left most responsibilities to other members of his faction, particularly his brother Hamid who despite being ten years his junior attained the Speaker's position.

## Tribal Chief and Family Ties

Despite his position as tribal chief, he has relatively few personal accomplishments, while his personal acumen and intelligence has been a persistent subject of rumor and debate. His lackluster record becomes particularly striking when compared to his brothers. His younger brother Hamid al-Ahmar has amassed a large personal fortune as a result of his investment in telecommunications companies and has positioned himself as a principal backer of the opposition group, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform better known as al-Islah. [3] Another younger brother, Himyar al-Ahmar was the Deputy Speaker of Parliament and a key political interlocutor between the General Peoples Congress (GPC) and the tribes. The third younger brother, Hussein al-Ahmar is a deft military and political organizer and heads the National Solidarity Grouping a political organization that represents the disparate Yemeni tribes.

Nevertheless it was Sadiq who was selected as tribal leader after his father's death in 2007. This was for several reasons. The first and simplest was that as the eldest son, he could claim the greatest traditional right. The second is more complicated and has to do with the familial politics of the al-Ahmar family. The two strongest contenders, Hamid and Hussein have a great dislike for one another considering their mutual desire for power and their positions on opposing tracks of Yemeni politics.

In the years before their father's death the two brothers had already established the narratives that hold true for them today. Hamid had taken up position as the "modern" man of the family, aggressively moving to secure his position in the telecommunications industry and to establish an opposition media, while simultaneously becoming the strongman patron of a major political party, al-Islah. Hussein on the other hand has taken the opposite tact, building old tribal alliances and familial connections with the hope of tapping into the traditional routes that have led to power in Yemen. [4]

Others have speculated that there is also an internal rift between the two, rooted in having different mothers and thus different sub-tribal backgrounds. Two sources close to the al-Ahmar family confirmed this assessment, while a third source attested the brothers do not have different tribal affiliations. Nevertheless the contrast that the two brothers have drawn between themselves is stark, with

Hamid embracing modernity, and Hussein cultivating tribal connections, and both having aspirations for power.

Considering these family schisms and dilemmas, the natural choice shifted to Sadiq. In addition to his aforementioned legitimacy as the eldest son, he had a harmonious relationship with his brothers, and maintained excellent relationships with other tribes and sub-tribal groups. These characteristics made him attractive as a competent and neutral steward of the tribes' fortunes. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly as far as his brothers' views may be concerned, Sadiq has not fathered any children and is not likely to do so. [5]

This last point may be the most important considering Sadiq is nearing 60, meaning he will not provide an heir. According to several keen observers of the al-Ahmar family, this has two significant results. The first is that it has blunted Sadiq's own ambition, since he has no legacy to protect or pass on, and has consequently made him more amenable to working and compromising within his family. The second is that his powerful brothers, Hamid and Hussein, who are much younger than Sadiq, can look at his position with the reasonable expectation that they will have the chance to compete for it once again.

## Objectives and Perspective

While Sadiq may not be the most intellectually astute of his brothers, he has demonstrated a tremendous natural instinct for tribal politicking with the overriding concern of defending the interests of his tribe and lines of patronage. Like many tribal leaders, Sadiq al-Ahmar is no ideologue. Interested primarily in material benefits, he is unlikely to find common cause with political outcasts like al-Qaeda. Instead Sadiq has focused on maintaining his family and his tribe's position in the conventional political landscape, which has meant continuing to partner with and back the Saleh government despite personal disagreements.

Indeed despite several of his brothers taking strong and bellicose positions against the Saleh regime, Sadiq did nothing until Ali Moshin openly rose against the state. It was not until the military had been nearly split in two by Moshin's defection that Sadiq felt confident enough to act. However it is important to note that once Sadiq acted, his commands were obeyed. His brothers, their relatives, and the entire tribal support structure reacted and reacted quickly.

Aside from expressing some support for the demonstrators in a public appearance, Sadiq has made little commentary

on the political scene since the end of the fighting. However according to some sources Sadiq has become enamored with the idea of Hamid al-Ahmar occupying the presidency after the next elections, which may be held in as little as two years time. [6] This would put the al-Ahmar family in the unprecedented position of controlling the actual levers of patronage from the Presidency, as well as the Hashid tribal, military, and political network that is the recipient of said patronage.

While former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was from the Sanhan tribe, a group within the Hashid, and while he created significant conduits of patronage and bribes to the Hashid and al-Ahmar family in particular, it was conditional and obviously not a permanent arrangement.

Removing the presidential intermediary and placing an al-Ahmar in the position would be an almost unprecedented boon for a political family in Yemen. Not since the Zaydi Imamate has a family controlled the executive as well as tribal political space. With the authority of the presidency, a strong position in Parliament, and control over the substantial military and tribal assets of the Hashid, the al-Ahmar family would be the most powerful leadership Yemen has seen since the fall of the monarchy more than half a century ago.

Attractive as this route to power for the al-Ahmar family is, it will require a close relationship between Hamid and Sadiq, and may in fact require close coordination between Hamid and Hussein to avoid open dissension. If this is the objective that the al-Ahmar family decides to pursue, it is one that will require familial consultation. Convincing Sadiq to take risky positions has never been an easy thing to do, his slow reaction to his brothers belligerency in last years revolution is a testament to that. But the allure of power and such unbridled control may prove decisive. If that is the case, then Sadiq will be an actor of paramount importance in the coming years as the turbulence of Yemeni politics offers an opening for him to fortify the family's position and assist Hamid's electoral pursuits.

## Saudi Connection

The relationship between the al-Ahmar family and Saudi Arabia goes back to the early 1930's when King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia clashed with the Yemeni Zaydi Imamate in the Asir War that saw Saudi Arabia take control of what is now southwestern Saudi Arabia. In that conflict Sadiq's grandfather Sheikh Husayn Bin Nasser al-Ahmar made the decision to acknowledge the temporal authority of King

Abdulaziz and the spiritual authority of the local religious establishment. This decision contributed greatly to Husayn's eventual execution by the penultimate Imam of the Zaydi Imamate, but bound the al-Ahmar family and the Hashid to Saudi Arabia.

Since that time, the Hashid via the al-Ahmar family have been the primary vehicle Saudi Arabia has used to affect their agenda in Yemen. The al-Saud (term referring to the royal family of Saudi Arabia), have pumped huge amounts of money to their tribal contacts and cultivated long term relationships with senior tribal figures across north Yemen. The government and tribal offensives against the Houthi in 2010 would likely have been impossible without coordination and consultation with Riyadh. A case and point is the Popular Army, an amalgam of Yemeni tribes utilized by the government to fight the Zaydi insurgency. This group was financed with money from the al-Saud and coordinated by Hussein al-Ahmar. [7]

The involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni revolution was significant, especially as it pertained to its contacts within the al-Ahmar family and the government camp. Senior Saudi royals such as Prince Nayef had been murmuring discontent about Saleh for sometime, and may have agitated to reduce support for the government as early as late 2010. However concern for stability, ever the watchword in Saudi politics overrode such concerns. The civil uprising caught them by surprise, and as it transitioned towards a violent confrontation there was an immediate need to intercede and avoid the sort of civil war that analysts were predicting with increasing regularity. [8]

Saudi involvement consisted of overt measures like the GCC Peace Proposal, and high profile delegation missions. But below the surface, many sources have claimed that Saudi officials exerted intense effort to restrain both Ali Abdullah Saleh and the al-Ahmar family. Specifically it has been alleged that senior Saudi royals, perhaps even King Abdullah himself, told them that assassinating the other or allowing the situation to devolve into outright civil war was not an option. There is some circumstantial evidence that gives credence to this when considering the relatively light weaponry used to raid Sadiq's compound in al-Hassaba and the use of light mortars to attack the Presidential Palace instead of Ali Moshin's heavy artillery.

With the revolution over and the political dust still settling, how Sadiq and the rest of the al-Ahmar family move forward with their plans and objectives will remain contingent on how amenable they remain to the al-Saud. Without Saudi money and without money flowing from

the Presidency, the power of the family will be significantly neutered. The relationship is somewhat symbiotic however, as Saudi objectives in Yemen are likely to be achieved via the utilization of the al-Ahmar family and their Hashid tribal contacts.

## Military Potential

Like most tribal leaders, al-Ahmar's military potential comes from his ability to draw upon reserve tribal levies. In the case of the Yemeni uprising this numbered upwards of 40,000 with some estimates as high as 60,000. However al-Ahmar is unique in terms of the permanent force he has at his disposal. At his compound at al-Hassaba, reliable sources place his personal guard at 200 fighters, which proved critical in the early stages of the uprising last year. [9]

Towards the end of May, Saleh chose to mount a raid on Sadiq's compound in an effort to stop the budding insurrection at its source. Several hundred police and troops from the al-Najda (Emergency Police), the Interior Ministry, and the Republican Guards attempted to storm the compound. Sadiq's personal bodyguard was capable of fending off the attacks long enough for more tribal fighters and members of Ali Moshin's military detachments to reach his position and launch a local counter-attack that eventually reached the Interior Ministry and SABA buildings.

On a larger scale al-Ahmar controls a network of at least 2,000 fighters dispersed so as to protect himself and key members of his family. [10] It was these forces that formed the first wave of the Hashid resistance as tribal fighters began their march to Saan'a.

While Sadiq and the Hashid retain significant military power, and the ability to dilute the strength of their opposition, they are severely limited by the lack of heavy equipment. In the Battle of San'aa the majority of the tribal fighters were unable to make it into the city itself. [11] Reinforced elements of the Republican Guard, though heavily outnumbered, were able to hold the fighters at checkpoints north of the city. Without the backing and pressure from Ali Moshin, it is likely that Sadiq's forces would have eventually been swept back to their tribal strongholds.

## Conclusion

Sadiq al-Ahmar is not as important as the tribe he represents. The Hashid remain the most well-organized,



well-armed, well-funded, and well-connected tribal group in Yemen. Furthermore the existing alliance between the Hashid and Bakeel that Sadiq has been steward of only enhances their position. At present the future of the Hashid will in part define the future of Yemen. The lines of patronage from the state and from Saudi Arabia remain robust and active, their large representation in the military remains relatively unchallenged, and members of the al-Ahmar family are rising stars on the emerging political scene.

The phenomenon of Yemeni tribal politics has placed an immense amount of intrinsic respect and power into Sadiq's hands. He has proven to be a quiet and prudent individual; a man deeply concerned with his tribes position in Yemen, and one who despite his weaknesses has a natural gift for tribal politics. As long as the situation in Yemen remains relatively calm it is unlikely that much will be heard from Sadiq al-Ahmar.

Given the current state of affairs in Yemen, it seems unlikely that political calm will last for too long. The aspirations of his brothers, the continued al-Qaeda insurgency, the enduring presence of Yemeni secessionists, and of course the familiar dance between the al-Ahmar family and the central government, all seem likely to give Sadiq a reason to re-enter the fray at some point in the near future.

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Notes:

- 1] Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012
- 2] Author interview with senior Watan party member, July 2012
- 3] State Department Cable 222993 released via Wikileaks and may be viewed here: <http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/83500/09sanaa1617.pdf>
- 4] Author interview with senior political leader Abdulghani al-Iryani , August 2012
- 5] Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012
- 6] Ibid
- 7] Author Interview with Ali al-Ahmed, August 2012
- 8] Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012
- 9] Ibid
- 10] Ibid
- 11] "Clashes between Yemeni Tribal Fighters and Military Leave 9 Dead" al-Arabiya, September 14, 2011

## War Crimes, Gold Mines and Mutiny in the North-East Congo: A Profile of General Bosco Ntaganda

*Andrew McGregor*

Over 22 years of fighting for a variety of rebel-movements and national governments, General Bosco "The Terminator" Ntaganda has established himself as the leading warlord in the little-known Nord-Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Nord-Kivu region is at the heart of seething Hutu-Tutsi ethnic tensions that have already exploded into one genocide in Rwanda and two vast conflicts in the DRC that have claimed millions of lives. Further contributing to insecurity in the region is the presence of gunmen and insurgents from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

The commercial and political capital of Nord-Kivu is Goma, situated on the north side of Lake Kivu on the border with Rwanda. Goma's political volatility is accentuated by the looming presence just outside the town of Nyiragongo, an active volcano that destroyed 40% of the city in 2002. Goma is also threatened by a vast pool of poisonous gas under Lake Kivu that awaits only a volcano-related event known as a "limnic eruption" to surface and poison everyone in the region (as happened with two similar lakes in Cameroon in the early 1980s, killing nearly 2,000 people). Ntaganda currently operates out of the nearby Virunga National Park, a Mountain Gorilla refuge and a popular haven for various guerrilla movements operating in the Rwanda-Uganda border region.

### The Rwandan Patriotic Army

A Rwandan Tutsi, General Ntaganda was forced to flee tribal violence to the eastern DRC with his family from their Rwandan home of Kiningi while still a teenager. In 1990 he began his long military career at age 17 by joining the military arm of the Uganda-based Rwandan Patriotic Front, a movement of Tutsi exiles determined to end Hutu domination of Rwanda and restore Tutsi rule. Ntaganda remained with the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA – built largely around Tutsi deserters from the Ugandan Army) through a difficult campaign against national army units supported by French and Zaïrean detachments. Led by Paul Kagame, the FPA eventually expelled the génocidaire Hutu government in 1994 after a nation-wide massacre had killed

some 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. Nearly one million Hutu fled across the border into what was then northeastern Zaire, where many have remained as refugees or as members of extremist Hutu Interhamwe militias that have conducted cross-border attacks and carried out atrocities against the local Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda Tutsi communities. With the Tutsis back in power in Rwanda, the RPA became the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF), the new national army.

The failure of President Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire to prevent Hutu attacks launched from Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu led to the First Congo War (1996-1997), which ended with Rwanda's invasion of the region and Mobutu's overthrow by Rwandan and Ugandan-supported rebel forces under Laurent Kabila.

## The Terminator Emerges in the FPLC

After the First Congo War, Ntaganda became military deputy chief of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC), the military wing of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). Formed by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo near the end of the Second Congo War (1998-2003), the FPLC was backed by Rwanda and Uganda despite a notorious reputation for human rights abuses, including a 2002 massacres of civilians in Mongbwalu (Ituri district) and the murder of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in 2005. As an FPLC commander, Ntaganda was directly implicated in the kidnapping of a Moroccan peacekeeper and the killing of a Kenyan peacekeeper as well as being a suspect in the murders of two aid workers. [1] The Second Congo War had begun when Rwanda crossed into Nord-Kivu again in support of the Banyamulenge Tutsi, attacking refugee camps hosting the notorious Hutu militia known as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

Ntaganda took orders from General Floribert Kisembo Bahemuka, who was Lubanga's chief of staff before breaking away from the movement in 2003. Kisembo became a leading general in the Congolese national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), but after splitting with President Joseph Kabila he was assassinated by DRC troops in May, 2011 (Radio Okapi [Kinshasha], May 1, 2011). As the movement collapsed with Lubanga's arrest by Rwanda and the arrival of a new peace settlement Ntaganda was offered the post of general in FARDC in December, 2004, but declined the offer.

During the period 2002-2003, Ntaganda is accused of running FPLC recruitment and training centers for child soldiers under 15 years of age as well as commanding troops

accused of killing 800 civilians in the Ituri district in 2002 as his forces seized control of local gold mines (BBC, May 15). Ntaganda has attempted to downplay his involvement in the FPLC, insisting he was only "the fourth ranking member" of the movement, while suggesting that "Even Thomas Lubanga was just trying to defend himself" (AFP, May 2).

## Joining "The Chairman" in the CNDP

Though once close, the relationship between Ntaganda and Lubanga began to deteriorate and Ntaganda decided to leave the FPLC in 2006 for the Nord-Kivu-based Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), a new movement being organized by Congolese Tutsi General Laurent "The Chairman" Nkunda. Ntaganda became chief of operations as the CNDP's chief-of-staff under Nkunda. It was in this capacity that Ntaganda oversaw the massacre of an estimated 150 civilians at Kiwanja in Nord-Kivu on November 4-5, 2008. UN peacekeepers nearby did not interfere with the massacre according to a report issued by the Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (Radio France Internationale, September 10, 2009). The CNDP offensive of late 2008 brought the movement as far as the outskirts of Goma, but though the garrison had fled after looting the city, Nkunda failed to give the order to occupy Goma, causing dissension within the movement (The Times [London], October 30, 2008; AFP, January 7, 2009).

Ntaganda's close CNDP colleague, Colonel Innocent Zimurinda, was the field commander who implemented Ntaganda's orders in the Kiwanja massacre and was further accused of responsibility for a similar massacre at Shalio (Nord-Kivu) the following month during the Kimia II offensive against the FDLR in which some 50 refugees in a camp near a FDLR base were slaughtered, with the survivors reporting gang rapes and mutilation. An FDLR revenge massacre killed 97 ethnic-Tutsis in a neighboring village (BBC, October 16, 2009).

A growing dispute between Ntaganda and Nkunda over the movement's leadership became public in January, 2009, with Nkunda promising Ntaganda would be charged with "high treason" and Ntaganda claiming he had dismissed Nkunda (AFP, January 6, 2009; January 8, 2009; BBC, January 6, 2009). There was speculation at the time that Ntaganda's Bagogwe Tutsi followers from the Masisi region had grown tired of the prominence enjoyed in the movement by Nkunda's Tutsi followers from Rutshuru (AFP, January 8, 2009).

## Charged by the ICC

An International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for

Ntaganda's arrest for charges relating to the use of child soldiers was filed under seal in August, 2006, but was only made public on April 29, 2008 (AFP, April 29, 2008). Nkunda dismissed appeals to turn Ntaganda over to the ICC, arguing that his military commander was only a "small fish" compared to government officials involved in various atrocities. Nkunda further awarded himself sovereign status when he argued that he was not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC and was therefore under no obligation to turn over Ntaganda (Rwanda News Agency, June 21, 2008).

A second warrant released on July 13, 2012 included additional counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, pillaging, persecution and sexual slavery. Thomas Lubanga, Ntaganda's former commander in the FPLC, was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the ICC in July for recruiting and using child soldiers in the early 2000's. Two other DRC nationals, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have already been extradited and await trial in the Hague. Despite the strong possibility he may follow these commanders to the Hague for trial, Ntaganda recently declared: "If the ICC has questions to ask me I can answer them because I don't blame myself for anything" (AFP, May 2).

## **Ntaganda's Commercial Empire**

Wielding ultimate power in Nord-Kivu allowed General Ntaganda to build his own economic structure in the region, one that placed him atop a financial pyramid in which the illegal sale of raw materials and minerals and "taxes" imposed by his men on markets, charcoal production, vehicle checkpoints and anything else that can be taxed have permitted Ntaganda to invest in a flour factory, a bar, a ranch outside Goma and a hotel on the Rwandan border (Le Potentiel [Kinshasha], February 7, 2011).

In 2011, Ntaganda is reported to have run a sophisticated gold-sales scam using former NBA basketball star Dikembe Mutombo as a front-man. Mutombo convinced controversial Nigerian-American businessman Kase Lawal (owner of Houston-based energy firm CAMAC) and Houston diamond merchant Carlos St. Mary that 4.5 tons of gold could be obtained in Africa for a hugely discounted \$10 million in cash, a third of the real value. St. Mary gave half the money to middlemen in Nairobi, then went on to Goma, where Ntaganda, still a general in the national army, relieved St. Mary of \$3 million, with the balance going to the local Customs department. When asked to return the missing cash to DRC Customs, Ntaganda is alleged to have turned in a suitcase containing \$3 million in counterfeit bills printed

on yellow copy paper and all bearing the same serial number (Mail & Guardian [Johannesburg], August 10). [2]

## **Integration into the Congolese National Army**

The CNDP's independent existence came to an abrupt end in what appeared to be a pre-planned scenario in January, 2009, as General Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities on the border with the DRC and Ntaganda stepped up to take control of the movement, announcing that the CNDP would now fight alongside its former FARDC enemy against Hutu rebel movements in the eastern DRC (AFP, October 23, 2010). In a surprising development, former enemies Rwanda and the DRC now began effective joint operations in the northeastern Congo against Hutu rebels, though President Kabila was criticized for "inviting foreign troops" into the DRC (East African [Nairobi], March 2, 2009).

Ntaganda agreed to integrate his forces with FARDC according to the terms of the March 23, 2009 peace agreement, ensuring that Kinshasha would not pursue the ICC warrants against Ntaganda and other CNDP officers. Though officially tasked with reintegration duties at Kinshasha, Ntaganda quickly became a principal planner and advisor on a FARDC offensive against Hutu extremists (though this has been denied by Kinshasha – see Agence Congolaise Presse, October 10, 2009). He was also accused of planning at least eight assassinations of opponents in Nord-Kivu during this time (Jeune Afrique, October 29, 2010). Ntaganda's role as a leading commander in the anti-FDLR Amani Leo operation caused intense embarrassment to the UN's peacekeeping mission, the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC), which was an active participant in the operation.

Until his desertion from FARDC in April of this year, Ntaganda was living openly in a house in Goma and was commonly seen in that city wearing a large cowboy hat and Western-style clothing, playing tennis or dining in Goma's best restaurants (La Flamme du Congo, April 13).

## **M23 – New Threat in Nord-Kivu**

On April 11, President Kabila said he resented international pressure to issue a warrant for General Ntaganda: "We have more than a hundred reasons to arrest him and we don't lack the force or the means to arrest him, but I will not work under pressure from the international community" (AFP, April 12). However, with the ICC fugitive clearly acting as part of the DRC regular army and Kinshasha subsequently risking being cited for complicity in the Ntaganda case, word began to circulate in mid-April that Kabila had finally issued

the order to arrest the Tutsi warlord. Though the UN mission had no mandate to arrest war criminals, it pledged to assist government efforts to detain the warlord (Le Potentiel [Kinshasha], April 12; Le Phare [Kinshasha], March 19; April 12). The DRC later clarified that Ntaganda would face charges in Kinshasha first: “He will be judged according to our laws, and it is our justice that will determine if he should be extradited or not... “We have our own grievances against the general Ntaganda, who was associated at one moment with the peace process and who has committed an act of felony, compounded by several blood crimes against both our army and civilians... We intend to catch him and try him in our country” (AFP, May 14). On May 9, government troops discovered 25 metric tons of arms and ammunition on Ntaganda’s farm in the Masisi region of Nord-Kivu, including mortars, recoilless rifles and small arms (Le Potentiel [Kinshasha], May 11; AFP, May 9).

With pressure growing against Ntaganda, ex-rebels of the CNDP integrated into FARDC mutinied in mid-April (La Tempete des Tropiques [Kinshasha], April 11). As the number of desertions increased, Ntaganda at first issued vehement denials of involvement in M23, the armed group formed by the mutineers (AFP, May 2). Colonel Sultani Makenga, a former CNDP commander tied to the 2008 Kiwanja massacre and the 2007 Buramba massacre, was named the official head of M23. Despite Makenga’s own record, it was no doubt considered safer to place M23 under his nominal command rather than admit the movement was led by an individual wanted by the ICC. At the time of his desertion in May, Colonel Makenga was the second-in-command of DRC operations against the FDLR. As the mutineers abandoned positions in Nord-Kivu, they were quickly replaced in some villages by members of the FDLR under its Hutu military commander Sylvestre Mudacumura (also charged by the ICC with nine counts of crimes against humanity in July) and an allied militia known as the Patriotic Army for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) (L’Observateur [Kinshasha], April 5). Not all the men under Ntaganda’s command joined the mutiny – several hundred appear to have taken advantage of an amnesty offered by FARDC in May (AFP, May 10). President Kabila suspended the joint operations with Rwanda after the scale of the desertions in Nord-Kivu became apparent.

M23 took its name from its principal demand – the full implementation of the March 23, 2009 accord that called for full integration of the former CNDP into the DRC political and military structure. The demand was slightly facetious; during his time in FARDC, Ntaganda created a parallel chain of command in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu, much to the annoyance of the FARDC general staff (Jeune Afrique,

April 3). His Tutsi troops also avoided mixing with other elements of the national army. While M23 spokesmen cited various other reasons for the group’s formation, including military mismanagement, poor living conditions and the release of CNDP prisoners, the most important reason was Ntaganda’s fear he would soon be brought to trial in the DRC or, worse, be extradited to face the ICC charges. This called for a quick (and apparently well-planned and financed) exit from FARDC, where he was vulnerable, and a return to his loyalists in the hills of Nord-Kivu to flex some muscle and negotiate a new deal with Kinshasha providing for his personal security.

The Addendum to the draft UN Experts Report released in June cites Rwanda for direct assistance to M23 through the provision and transport of weapons and soldiers and direct military intervention in the DRC in support of the mutineers. [3] Despite the growing evidence collected by the UN that Rwanda is supporting Ntaganda and M23, Rwandan president Paul Kagame’s denials have grown even louder, recently telling a group of Rwandan officers: that not a single bullet had been supplied to the mutineers, adding that the UN “screwed up the case of the Congo and are instead [trying] to put it on our shoulders” (Rwandan News Agency, August 7; Africa Review [Nairobi], August 7). In May a DRC government spokesman said they were sure that Ntaganda and his men would not be allowed to take refuge in Rwanda, adding that there were “good reasons” why the warlord had not been arrested earlier: “It was to consolidate the peace process to which he has contributed” (Digitalcongo.net [Kinshasha], May 16).

## Conclusion

Despite all the turmoil in Nord-Kivu, some things have changed little. Human rights organizations active in the DRC have reported Ntaganda has returned to the recruitment of child soldiers in Nord-Kivu and the Tutsi warlord’s forces are once again poised outside of Goma, where an assault is expected soon by a garrison of 3,000 men reinforced by artillery, mortars, armor and rocket launchers (AFP, May 16; August 6).

Inability to contain Ntaganda may destabilize the regime in Kinshasha, which is already the target of growing protests over FARDC’s failures in the northeast and the perceived support provided by Rwanda to M23. However, Rwanda cannot be seen to be supporting a sanctioned individual. If Rwanda has indeed backed Ntaganda, it will be placed in a bind if a Congolese offensive should push Ntaganda and the M23 up against the border. If Rwanda allows Ntaganda to cross into its territory, it will inevitably become the immediate target of international criticism and will open

Kagame up to charges of abetting war crimes. If, however, Ntaganda is captured there is a danger he might be extradited to The Hague for ICC prosecution, where he might decide to describe the exact nature of his relationship with Kagame and the Rwandan government. A remaining possibility would be Ntaganda's arrest and quiet imprisonment in the Congo. However, the weaknesses of FARDC, including indiscipline, poor morale and shortages in food, ammunition and salaries do not encourage optimism in this latter result. For the moment, "the Terminator" appears to have the upper hand in Nord-Kivu.

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### Notes

1. Trial Watch, Geneva, <http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trial-watch/profils/profile/761/action/show/controller/Profile.html>.
2. See Armin Rosen, "The Warlord and the Basketball Star: A Story of Congo's Corrupt Gold Trade," *The Atlantic*, March 1, 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-warlord-and-the-basketball-star-a-story-of-congos-corrupt-gold-trade/253813/2/>.
3. UN Security Council, S/2012/348/Add.1, "Letter dated 26 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348/Add.1](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348/Add.1).