




**In This Issue:**

IN A FORTNIGHT By Peter Mattis.....	1
REGIONAL CHIEF SELECTIONS HIGHLIGHT CONTINUITY IN LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT By Willy Lam.....	3
WHAT DIRECTION FOR LEGAL REFORM UNDER XI JINPING? By Carl Minzner.....	6
CHINA AND CAMBODIA: WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE... By Prashanth Parameswaran.....	10
CHINA-UGANDA RELATIONS: CLOSER IS NOT NECESSARILY BETTER By Kenneth W. Allen and Eva Baguma.....	12



National Rejuvenation

*China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia.*

*China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a private non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter Mattis.*

*The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Jamestown Foundation.*



For comments or questions about *China Brief*, please contact us at [mattis@jamestown.org](mailto:mattis@jamestown.org)

1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320  
 Washington, DC 20036  
 Tel: (202) 483-8888  
 Fax: (202) 483-8337

Copyright © 2011

**In a Fortnight**

By Peter Mattis

SOOTHING TONE ON CHINA'S RISE STRIKES DISSONANCE

The newly-appointed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping's talk of China's national rejuvenation has generated a lot of concern in foreign analyses about the implications of the just-completed leadership transition. Although "The Great Renewal of the Chinese Nation" (*zhonghua minzu weida fuxing*) is a long-time justification for reform, Xi has returned it to a place front-and-center in Chinese propaganda, calling the achievement of national rejuvenation the "the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern times" (*PLA Daily*, December 13, 2012; *People's Daily*, November 30, 2012). Such sentiment suggests to some that Xi's China will be more sensitive to slights against China's dignity or possibly even more aggressive internationally. Perhaps as a response to these concerns, official Chinese press carried a series of articles and editorials, especially at the end of December, to reassure foreign audiences about Beijing's intentions. Such soothing lines about China's behavior, however, are unlikely to receive an attentive hearing, because they suggest the problems of resolving China's rise require other countries to give way.

One commentary directly confronted the issue of foreign concerns, dismissing them as irrelevant to challenges at hand: "with some even claiming an ever-

growing China might be seeking ‘dominance.’ This viewpoint is groundless” (Xinhua, December 12, 2012). As Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei noted, “China’s development aims at making greater contributions toward peace and development of mankind, as well as a happy life for its people, instead of overwhelming others or scrambling for world dominance” (Xinhua, December 12, 2012). In addition to the repeated commitments for China to adhere to the path of peaceful development, Xinhua added a historical element, stating “Anyone familiar with Chinese history knows that aggression or expansion has never been in the blood of the Asian nation” (Xinhua, January 1). Outgoing President Hu Jintao’s New Year address described “the Chinese people’s determination to pursue a road of peaceful development will never waver no matter how volatile the international situation may become” (Xinhua, December 31, 2012). Overall, according to Xinhua, China is not a challenge to the international system and is not the instigator of disputes:

“China, which advocates peaceful solutions to international disputes, has walked the talk. Whoever that suspects a rising China could be a global danger is advised to check the country’s record to see whether China has ever been the first to attack. If still unconvinced, China’s persistence in opposing hegemony and power politics serves as another clue” [sic] (Xinhua, January 1).

Apart from the potentially contentious historical narrative, China also actively defended its military modernization and military activities as a natural outgrowth of Chinese interests. As Ministry of National Defense spokesman Yang Yujun said, “it is justifiable for the Chinese military to provide security in waters under China’s jurisdiction” and foreign governments are “in no position” to make an issue of Chinese actions (Xinhua, December 27, 2012). According to the Chinese Navy’s headquarters, roughly 60 percent of the 5,000 commercial vessels the navy has escorted through the Gulf of Aden had ties to China’s international trade. Moreover, China has 18,000 kilometers of coastline and 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters as well as expanding interests abroad. Especially in light of Japanese and Philippine provocations, Beijing’s efforts to build a modern blue water navy is “commensurate with its development status and caters to its need to safeguard its national maritime

interests” (*China Daily*, December 27, 2012). This defensive concern also was echoed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a recent forum on China’s diplomacy, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun said “While China is firm in its resolve to follow the path of peaceful development, it is equally firm in the nation’s resolve to uphold its territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights and interest” (Xinhua, December 28, 2012). Regardless of the state of Chinese military modernization, provoking tensions and using force are not a part of Beijing’s foreign policy tool box, because “having benefited a lot from a peaceful environment in the past over three decades, China is deeply committed to solving international disputes by peaceful means and opposes the random use of force, and has never provoked any of those maritime disputes” (Xinhua, December 12, 2012).

Nowhere is the messaging more clear than recent articles on correcting the escalating tensions of Sino-Japanese relations. Because China is an indispensable economic partner for Japan, Tokyo needs “to show its sincerity to relieve the tensions stirred up by itself.” Japan’s problem and “restoring mutual trust” is particularly acute, because, despite new Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s reassurances, his “double-tongued statements” could not help but “cast a shadow of suspicions over China-Japan relations” (Xinhua, December 26, 2012). In a separate article, commentator Wang Haiqing stated “The new Japanese cabinet has to earnestly reflect on its foreign policy and adopt concrete measures to show its sincerity in mending strained ties with China” (Xinhua, December 26, 2012). Japan’s new ambassador to China also received such admonitions delivered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and official outlets (Xinhua, December 24, 2012). In contrast to Japan’s ostensibly illegal actions, China’s actions related to the simmering territorial dispute in the East China Sea, however, are described as “completely normal” and the marine surveillance patrols as operating in territorial waters (Xinhua, December 21, 2012; December 13, 2012).

China’s attempts to reassure the United States and its neighbors, however, probably will be about as successful as the formulation of a “New Type of Great Power Relations.” This new formulation for how the United States and China should accommodate one another is laudable in spirit as an attempt to answer U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s challenge “to write a new

answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet” (“China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship,’” China Brief, September 7, 2012). Unfortunately, Beijing’s description of what the relationship should be involves Washington conceding to Chinese demands on Taiwan, human rights and regional maritime disputes without any reciprocity. As Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai and Pang Hangzhao wrote, “China has never done anything to undermine the U.S. core interests and major concerns... yet what the United States has done in matters concerning China’s core and important interests and major concerns is unsatisfactory” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012). This one-sided view of China’s actions in which Beijing ignores that a dispute even legitimately exists or that there are legitimate questions to ask of the Chinese leadership is unpersuasive to the foreign parties involved. Almost by definition, China’s behavior cannot be as bad or have any malignant intent, because, as the Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “China has always adhered to an open and inclusive foreign policy and persisted in building good relations with neighboring countries” (Xinhua, December 12, 2012).

The problem with how Beijing frames concerns about Chinese behavior is that it denies foreign countries any standing whatsoever from which to complain. For example, when Chinese ships harassed the USNS Impeccable in March 2009 and attempted to damage the towed array, Beijing’s only admission of the incident was of routine law enforcement activities—an entirely domestic affair involving lawbreakers (Xinhua, March 11, 2009). This dismissive approach combined with China’s placing the onus on foreign governments to improve relations does not suggest a good faith effort. Trust is a two-way street and, contrary to Xinhua’s press releases, Hanoi, Manila, Tokyo and Washington cannot develop a trusting relationship with Beijing without Chinese empathy and reciprocity. Neither of which are suggested in Chinese statements, which now seem more likely to fuel tensions than ameliorate them.

*Peter Mattis is Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation.*

\*\*\*

## Regional Chief Selections Highlight Continuity in Leadership Development

By Willy Lam

China has reshuffled the party and administrative leaderships of a dozen-odd provinces and directly-administered cities in the wake of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress. The traits and political orientations of the new regional chiefs reflect the authorities’ priorities about seeking gradual changes while guaranteeing stability. At the same time, ample opportunities have been afforded to a handful of Sixth Generation leaders—a reference to rising stars born in the 1960s—to build up their national stature and reformist credentials.

Beijing’s preference for continuity is reflected in the fact that leadership changes in several provinces and major cities simply have involved internal promotions. For example, the just-named party secretaries of Shanghai, Jilin, Shaanxi and Zhejiang, respectively, Han Zheng, Wang Rulin, Zhao Zhengyong and Xia Baolong are former governors or mayors of the same jurisdictions. The newly-appointed governors or governors-designate of Guizhou, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Shanxi and Jilin, respectively, Chen Min’er, Li Qiang, Lou Qinjian, Li Xiaopeng and Bayin Chaolu, also had worked in senior positions in the same provinces (Xinhua, December 19; China News Service, December 19). It is significant that Party Secretaries Wang, age 59, and Xia, age 60, as well as Governor-designate Li Qiang, age 53, had worked as secretaries of the Political-Legal Committees that run the police and judicial apparatus of their provinces. The law-and-order experience of Shaanxi’s Zhao, age 61, is even more considerable. He is a former police chief of Anhui Province as well as the chief of the Political-Legal Committees of Anhui and Shaanxi. This testifies to the importance that Beijing attaches to “social management,” a euphemism for stifling dissent and minimizing challenges to the regime (*Ming Pao* [Hong Kong] December 19; *Ta Kung Pao* [Hong Kong] December 18).

The top leadership’s preoccupation with stability also is evidenced by the fact that the regional reshuffles have largely followed late patriarch Deng Xiaoping’s famous

**Table 1. Recent Senior Personnel Changes**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>New Post</b>	<b>Former Post</b>
Hu Chunhua	49	Guangdong Party Secretary	Inner Mongolia Party Secretary
Sun Zhengcai	49	Chongqing Party Secretary	Jilin Party Secretary
Han Zheng	58	Shanghai Party Secretary	Shanghai Mayor
Sun Chunlan	62	Tianjin Party Secretary	Fujian Party Secretary
You Quan	58	Fujian Party Secretary	State Council Deputy Secretary-General
Wang Rulin	59	Jilin Party Secretary	Jilin Governor
Wang Jun	60	Inner Mongolia Party Secretary	Shanxi Governor
Xia Baolong	60	Zhejiang Party Secretary	Zhejiang Governor
Bayin Chaolu	57	Jilin Governor-Designate	Jilin Deputy Party Secretary
Li Qiang	53	Zhejiang Governor-Designate	Zhejiang Deputy Party Secretary
Lou Qinjian	56	Shaanxi Governor-Designate	Shaanxi Deputy Party Secretary
Li Xiaopeng	53	Shanxi Governor	Shanxi Executive Vice Governor
Chen Min'er	52	Guizhou Governor-Designate	Guizhou Deputy Party Secretary
Yang Xiong	59	Shanghai Mayor-Designate	Shanghai Executive Vice Mayor

“principle of the five lakes and four seas.” This is a reference to a rough balance of factions, administrative specialties and places of origin among the country’s senior cadres. For example, Guangdong’s new Party Secretary Hu Chunhua and Jilin’s Bayin Chaolu are members of the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction headed by President Hu Jintao. Han Zheng, age 58, who spent the bulk of his career in Shanghai, has close links with both the CYL Faction and the Shanghai Faction led by ex-president Jiang Zemin. Moreover, Han’s replacement as Shanghai Mayor, Executive Vice Mayor Yang Xiong, age 59, is also a veteran Shanghai cadre. The appointments of Han and Yang as the two top officials of Shanghai have continued the tradition of “Shanghai-nese running Shanghai” (*Ming Pao*, December 21; *People’s Daily*, December 20; *Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong] December 19). Li Xiaopeng, who is the eldest son of former premier Li Peng, is among the few Fifth Generation “princelings” who are deemed to have potentials for further advancement. The latest appointments also feature protégés of General Secretary Xi Jinping and Premier-in-waiting Li Keqiang. For example, Guizhou Governor-designate Chen Min’er, age 62, was Director of Zhejiang’s Propaganda Department when Xi was party secretary of the coastal province from 2004 to 2007. Finally, Fujian’s new Party Secretary You Quan, age 58, a long-time State Council bureaucrat, is deemed a protégé of Li Keqiang’s (*China Daily*, December 19; Sina.com, December 5).

Relatively few of the new faces have a reformist track record. Nor do they appear to be charismatic leaders or what the Chinese media used to call “cadres with personality” (*gexing ganbu*). Their elevation seems to be based on the long-standing principle that, as General Secretary Xi has reiterated, cadres “should have both moral rectitude and professional competence, with priority given to moral rectitude” (*People’s Daily*, October 23; China News Service, December 19, 2011). In the Chinese context, “moral rectitude” is shorthand for unthinkingly toeing the party line. It is not surprising that the first speeches made by several regional chiefs upon assuming their new offices consisted of a declaration of fealty to the central party leadership (*zhongyang*). Thus, Zhejiang Party Secretary Xia vowed to “closely rally behind the *zhongyang* with comrade Xi Jinping as general secretary, and to resolutely fulfill the responsibilities that the *zhongyang* has entrusted me.” Similarly, the new party boss of Inner Mongolia Wang Jun pledged he

would “in the areas of thought, politics and action stay at a high level of unison with the *zhongyang* with comrade Xi Jinping as general secretary” (*Xinhua*, December 18; *China Daily*, December 18).

Most of the new appointees are veteran party apparatchiks with dubious professional competence particularly in areas such as finance, management or information technology-related innovation. Take, for example, Tianjin’s party boss Sun Chunlan, the former Fujian Party Secretary who is one of only two female members of the Politburo. The specialty of the 62-year-old Sun, who began her career as a laborer in a watch factory in Liaoning, is running “mass organizations.” Before her transfer to Fujian, Sun had headed the provincial branch of the All China Women’s Federation and the All China Federation of Trade Unions (*People’s Daily*, December 23; *Xinhua*, November 22). Questions, thus, have arisen as to whether she is the best leader for metropolis of Tianjin, which prides itself as China’s new hub for finance and high technology. Among the newly promoted regional chiefs, Shaanxi’s governor-in-waiting Lou seems to have the best professional qualifications. A computer expert with a Ph.D. in engineering, Lou served for 11 years as a deputy minister in the Ministry of Information Industry and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology before becoming vice governor of Shaanxi in 2010. In the past two years, Lou was credited with having lured a record number of high-tech multinationals into the landlocked province (*China Daily*, December 22; *Huashang Daily* [Xi’an] December 21).

Most attention, however, has been focused on two Sixth Generation stalwarts, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, who were inducted into the Politburo at the 18th Party Congress. There is speculation in the Hong Kong media that Hu (who is not related to Hu Jintao) might succeed Xi Jinping as general secretary and that Sun would replace Li Keqiang as premier ten years down the road (*Ming Pao*, November 16; *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 15). Judging by professional qualifications alone, Sun, who has taken the hot seat of Chongqing, seems to have the edge over Hu, who is a specialist in party affairs. A renowned agronomist and former deputy chief of the Beijing Institute of Agriculture Sciences, Sun served for three years as minister of agriculture before becoming Jilin party secretary in 2009. According to the new CCP Organization Department Director Zhao

Leji, Sun was, apart from being “steadfast in politics and rich in leadership experience,” “familiar with party affairs and economic work.” Zhao also praised Sun for having “broad perspectives” on a wide range of issues of governance (*Chongqing Daily* [Chongqing], December 21; China News Service, December 21).

Hu Chunhua, who took over from the reformist Politburo member Wang Yang as Guangdong party secretary in mid-December, is a veteran party functionary with scant exposure to areas such as finance, foreign trade or high technology. Having spent 19 years in Tibet and three years in Inner Mongolia, Hu has ample experience dealing with tough law-and-order situations, including defusing the anti-Beijing plots of Tibetan and Mongolian separatists. It is doubtful, however, whether the fast-rising star can satisfactorily accomplish the task, first set by predecessor Wang, of turning the Pearl River Delta from “world factory” into a global innovation hub. It is perhaps significant that upon taking over his Guangdong job, Hu hewed to the CCP tradition of giving top priority to establishing a trustworthy and combat-ready corps of cadres rather than reforming institutions and systems of governance. “We must put together a [ruling] team that is united, capable, influential and full of combative [spirit],” the Hubei-born Hu told local officials (*Guangzhou Daily* [Guangzhou], December 19; China News Service, December 19).

It is unique to China that almost all members of its top ruling council, the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), since the end of the Cultural Revolution are former party secretaries of provinces, autonomous regions or directly administered cities. Amongst the seven newly-appointed PBSC members, only Liu Yunshan, who is in charge of the CCP Secretariat, has never been a provincial party boss. As the mass-circulation *Global Times* put it in a commentary, provincial party secretaries constitute an elite “talent pool” for the CCP’s highest echelon. “It is the requirement of the Chinese system that the provincial party secretary must have the ability to handle the full range of [political] situations,” the paper said, “They need to have a large ‘magnetic field,’ a sense of authority and ability to project personal warmth. They must also have a very high level of expertise and perceptiveness” (*Global Times* [Beijing], December 19). There seems little doubt that all the newly-elevated party secretaries—and to a considerable extent, governors—

have passed muster in terms of tackling tough political challenges as well as abiding by Beijing’s instructions. The jury is still out, however, on the equally pivotal issue of whether they can break new ground in reform as General Secretary Xi pledged to do during his trip to Shenzhen in early December.

*Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.*

\*\*\*

## What Direction for Legal Reform Under Xi Jinping?

By Carl Minzner

Hopes for reform in China have risen in recent weeks. Xi Jinping’s decision to make Shenzhen the site of his first formal inspection tour as party general secretary spurred predictions that he will seek to assume Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as an economic reformer (“Xi Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour’ Reignites Promises of Reform,” China Brief, December 14, 2012). Similarly, Xi’s speech regarding China’s need for the rule of law—given on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 constitution—gave rise to press speculation that he may pursue legal and political reform (*South China Morning Post*, December 13, 2012; AFP, December 4, 2012).

Naturally, this comes against the background of a conservative turn against legal reform by Chinese leaders in recent years [1]. Since 2005, party authorities have cooled on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s. Party political campaigns have warned Chinese judges and courts against foreign legal norms. Public interest lawyers have been subjected to increased pressure, harassment and periodic disappearances or torture. Moreover, under

the leadership of former party political-legal committee head and standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, extralegal “stability maintenance” (*weiwen*) institutions have ballooned in size and influence.

New language in official pronouncements now suggests Chinese leaders intend to reverse at least some of these policies. This appears to be linked directly to internal party efforts to curb the power of political-legal committees in the wake of the Bo Xilai scandal (“Year-End Questions on Political-Legal Reform,” *China Brief*, December 14, 2012). This shift has allowed activists some greater space to advocate for reforms to state practices, including the reeducation through labor (RETL) system. Central authorities, however, remain committed to maintaining party political control, rendering it unclear how far such legal reforms will be permitted to proceed.

### Changes in Party Rhetoric

Ironically, some of the key linguistic shifts have not originated (at least on the surface) from Xi himself. Rather, they came from former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao during the run-up to the November leadership handover.

One such shift originated with Hu’s July 23 speech to ministerial and provincial heads. Attended by all of the then-members of Politburo Standing Committee and presided over by Xi, it was accompanied by an unusually high degree of media coverage. At the time, the speech was widely viewed as an opportunity for top Chinese leaders to demonstrate their unity in the aftermath of Bo’s dismissal and publicly emphasize Xi’s role as the heir apparent in the political succession process, but lacking in substantive content regarding institutional reform (Reuters, July 24, 2012). This speech, however, appears to have introduced a new political phrasing (*tifa*), calling for authorities to “devote more attention...to the important uses of rule of law in national governance and social management (*shehui zhili*)” (*People’s Daily*, July 24, 2012). Since party political-legal authorities had employed “social management” as an umbrella term for the expansion of their activities in recent years, this new phrasing appears to be an implicit rebuke. It suggests that Chinese leaders may deploy rule-of-law norms strategically to curtail the power of party political-legal authorities.

Further linguistic changes appeared in the 2012 work

report delivered by Hu and drafted by Xi (“The 18th Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint for the Xi Administration,” *China Brief*, November 30, 2012). Parallel passages of the 17th and 18th Party Congress work reports also offer some hints of reform:

“Each party organization and all party members must self-consciously operate within the boundaries of the constitution and the law, and must take the lead in upholding the authority of the constitution and the law” (Xinhua, October 24, 2007).

“Since the party has led the people to promulgate the constitution and laws, the party must operate within the boundaries of the constitution and laws. No organization and no individual are entitled to special powers exceeding the constitution and laws. It is absolutely impermissible for (any individual in power) to take their own words as law, to use power to suppress the law, or to bend the law for ones relatives or friends” (Xinhua, November 27, 2012) [2].

The 18th Party Congress Work Report has marginally stronger language that the party itself is obligated to operate within the confines of the constitution and laws. This, however, remains nuanced by the statement that the party itself remains the originator of both. Last, the final sentence clearly implied that this change in nuance is aimed at combating problems raised by recent scandals, such as the one surrounding former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai.

Yet a third example of a change in rhetoric occurred in the White Paper on Judicial Reform released by the Information Office of the State Council in October 2012 (*The Diplomat*, October 13, 2012). Such documents (issued in 2008 and 2011 as well) serve a regular propaganda function, reeling off state accomplishments in the field of human rights. They also serve to transmit the officially approved political line regarding legal reform.

For example, the 2011 white paper confirmed the shift away from pro-reform agenda of earlier years. Rather than emphasizing the need to establish the “rule of law,” it spoke of building a “socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.” Where the 2008 document spoke of these efforts as a work in progress, the 2011 version stressed that these efforts were largely completed. It also deleted

discussion of China's efforts to engage in international legal cooperation in favor of extensive rhetoric regarding the inapplicability of foreign legal norms to China.

Now, the 2012 white paper marks a sharp break with the version issued just a year ago. The politicized language regarding a "socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics," a hallmark in Party political-legal pronouncements over recent years, has receded. The white paper clearly states that the current round of legal reforms begun in 2008 (not coincidentally, the year that Wang Shengjun, the current conservative head of the Supreme People's Court, assumed office) is "basically finished." Even more noteworthy, there is not a single reference in the entire document to the Chinese Communist Party.

Of course, it is important to not overstate the thrust of the 2012 white paper. While it characterizes judicial reform as an integral part of "institutional political reform" and states that it will continue to strengthen in the years to come, it gives no concrete suggestions as to how this will be carried out. It also clearly states that Chinese judicial reform will proceed from its own "national characteristics" and will not "copy" models from other countries.

Nonetheless, the white paper does suggest that some Chinese leaders may seek to curb efforts of party political-legal organs to re-impose greater political controls on the Chinese judiciary in recent years. The paper also suggests there may be some openness to dealing with the issue of judicial and legal reform in a more objective manner.

## Implications

Liberal intellectuals and reformist officials have sensed the shift in political winds. Many view the party political-legal apparatus as politically vulnerable now, following the fall of Bo Xilai, central discontent with Zhou Yongkang's role in the affair and subsequent central moves to downgrade the bureaucratic rank of political-legal committees.

Over the fall, this led to a rising tide of criticism directed at the RETL system run by China's security organs (*New York Times*, December 15, 2012). Used as a convenient tool to suppress prostitutes, petitioners, political dissidents and underground church members, this extrajudicial

detention system has been linked to a range of abuses against detainees. In August, journalists, academics and citizen activists seized on the case of Tang Hui, a mother sentenced to a year and a half in a labor camp after petitioning authorities in search of heavier punishment for the men who allegedly kidnapped and raped her 11-year old daughter. Tang's case generated a surge of sympathetic commentary on micro-blogging sites, resulting in her release by Chinese authorities seeking to appease popular sentiment (*Guardian*, August 16, 2012). Official commentary in state media appeared to indicate some central support for broader reform. For example, a November editorial in the *People's Daily* criticized the RETL system as having devolved into a "tool for attacks and reprisals" by some officials and singled out the case of Ren Jianyu, a local official in Chongqing sentenced to RETL in 2011 for his criticism of Bo Xilai's policies (*People's Daily*, November 21, 2012). Liberal academics and activists have since merged their reform calls with these developments and some have pressed for the complete abolition of the RETL system (t.163.com/weifanghe, October 25, 2012).

Nor have they stopped there. Liberal critics have latched on to new language emanating from central authorities to push for yet deeper reforms. Academics and public interest lawyers have held conferences calling for judicial independence (*Dui Hua Human Rights Journal*, December 20, 2012). Jiang Ping, one of the key figures involved in late 20th century legal reforms, has noted that Hu Jintao's July 23rd speech has had a "positive effect," but that emphasizing rule of law remains "meaningless" absent political reform. Jiang specifically criticized hard-line policies pursued by party political-legal authorities in recent years, including heavy emphasis on social stability, shifts away from efforts to professionalize the Chinese judiciary and promote court adjudication of citizen disputes according to law as well as the heavy use of mediation ratios to evaluate Chinese judges (*Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, November 6, 2012). Similarly, constitutional law scholar Tong Zhiwei has called for central authorities to back up their statements on reform with meaningful action, separating party and state organs and creating mechanisms to supervise rights guaranteed in the constitution (*Time Weekly*, December 14, 2012).

Such calls for deeper legal and judicial reform face serious internal opposition. Supreme People's Court President

Wang Shengjun, one of the key figures responsible for recent hard-line policies in the court system, has retained his seat on the Central Committee. Joseph Fewsmith predicts Wang will follow the bureaucratic path of his predecessor, Xiao Yang, and be permitted to serve until the 19th Party Congress in 2016 (*China Leadership Monitor*, No. 40, Forthcoming). Moreover, as of late December, Wang himself was continuing to reiterate key themes—such as the importance of social stability considerations in handling cases and the overriding emphasis on mediation—that have been hallmarks of the conservative turn against legal reform in recent years (Xinhua, December 27, 2012).

Additionally, prior experience suggests caution in evaluating the promise of legal reform by new party leaders. Following Hu Jintao's accession as party general secretary in 2002, the appointment of moderate reformers to government posts and an increase in official rule-of-law rhetoric, domestic and foreign observers sensed Chinese authorities might be open to meaningful legal reform. This led to a surge of activism by citizens, journalists and legal activists regarding an extralegal detention system (custody and repatriation) linked to the abuse and deaths of detainees [3]. When the new party authorities abolished the system in 2003, many took this as a sign that China's constitutional moment perhaps had dawned ("NPCSC: The Vanguard of China's Constitution?" *China Brief*, February 4, 2008).

A decade later, however, it appeared that these hopes had been premature ("Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value of the Constitution Outside the Courtroom," *China Brief*, February 3, 2012). Once the new party authorities had navigated successfully the domestic political transition, officials moved to curtail the judicial institutions, the rule-of-law rhetoric and the public interest lawyers that had marked the late Jiang and early Hu periods.

So is the current bout of reformist language a marker of real change or simply a transitory artifact of party divisions arising from the fight over leadership succession? Since it remains highly unlikely that central authorities will announce the creation of meaningful electoral or legal checks on party power, here are some other potential markers to watch over the coming year:

- Whether personnel reforms raise the bureaucratic

profile of the Chinese judiciary vis-à-vis that of the public security organs;

- Whether concrete performance evaluation measures facing local officials
- are altered, particularly the hard-line emphasis in recent years on maintaining social stability and controlling citizen petitioners;
- Whether the content of official "model judge" propaganda campaigns—which has shifted in recent years away from an emphasis on judicial professionalism in favor of revived Maoist populism—is altered to reflect the new language coming from the center;
- Whether official pressure and repression of public interest lawyers is reduced.

*Carl Minzner is an associate professor at Fordham Law School specializing in China law and governance. Prior to entering academia, he served as Senior Counsel to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. He is the author of "China's Turn Against Law" (American Journal of Comparative Law, 2011).*

Notes:

1. Carl Minzner, "China's Turn Against Law," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2011, p. 935, available online <[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1767455](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767455)>.
2. Author's translation from the original.
3. Keith Hand, "Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, p. 114, available online <[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1972011](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972011)>.

\*\*\*

## China and Cambodia: With Friends Like These...

By Prashanth Parameswaran

When Chinese President Hu Jintao paid his most recent state visit to Cambodia in April 2012, both sides agreed to designate 2013 the “China-Cambodia Year of Friendship” in a lavish commemoration of the 55th anniversary of their relationship (Xinhua, April 2, 2012). Although Cambodia remains arguably Beijing’s closest ally in Southeast Asia today and there is plenty to celebrate in the year ahead, several important limits to bilateral ties could nonetheless pose challenges for both sides in the future.

Sino-Cambodian relations date back to the days of the Khmer Empire, which lasted from the 9th to 15th centuries (*Global Times*, August 25, 2010). The most famous historical point of the relationship was during the Yuan Dynasty, when the Chinese envoy Zhou Daguan visited Cambodia in 1296 and wrote what remains one of the most detailed accounts of the city of Angkor and Khmer society [1]. Since modern diplomatic relations were established in 1958, China has backed various players in Cambodia to preserve its influence there, ranging from ex-King Norodom Sihanouk in the 1960s to the notorious Khmer Rouge in the 1970s and 1980s and now its current prime minister Hun Sen.

The latest major turn in Sino-Cambodian relations came in 1997 when the current Cambodian President Hun Sen ousted Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranaridh, and ended a coalition government in a violent coup. While the international community condemned the move and isolated Cambodia, China not only recognized the coup’s result but showered Hun Sen with aid. Since then, Cambodia, still one of the world’s poorest countries, has welcomed Chinese trade and investment because it is not tied to good governance reforms championed by the West. Beijing in turn has viewed Phnom Penh as not only a source of energy and minerals to fuel its own development, but a useful friend to support its sovereignty claims against Southeast Asian states; a partner to address various cross-border issues like narcotics and trafficking; and a crucial ally to advance its objectives in Southeast Asia and beyond.

China is Cambodia’s largest trading partner and investor, and its economic footprint has grown rapidly over the past two decades. Bilateral trade has increased from around \$76 million in 1996 to more than \$2.5 billion in 2012, and both countries have vowed to double it by 2017 (Xinhua, December 4, 2012). Between 1994 and 2011, China invested in nearly 400 projects in Cambodia totaling \$9 billion dollars—initially in the manufacturing and garment sectors but increasingly in natural resources and energy (Xinhua, December 26, 2011). China also has funded upgrades of airfields and ports that could help it leverage Cambodia’s strategic location at the heart of Southeast Asia to project power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Strait of Malacca. Beijing’s economic influence is only set to grow over the next few years. Earlier this week, two Chinese firms reached a deal to build a rail line, steel plant and port worth \$11 billion by 2016—by far the biggest ever investments into Cambodia (*South China Morning Post*, January 3).

The relationship also has expanded into the security sphere over the last few years. In terms of law enforcement, since a cooperation agreement was inked in 2008, Yunnan province has given equipment and technical assistance to Cambodia’s National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) to crack down on drug-trafficking and terrorism along the troubled Sino-Cambodian border (Xinhua, January 1). Military-to-military ties also have blossomed, and Beijing is Cambodia’s largest provider of military aid today. Both sides signed a military cooperation pact in May 2012 where China agreed to provide Cambodia with \$17 million in military aid and to construct a military training facility in the country (Xinhua, May 28, 2012). In addition, Beijing periodically signs off on loans to Phnom Penh for various military equipment and training programs, including patrol aircraft, military helicopters and a recent six-week course for Cambodian armed forces to clear landmines (Xinhua, December 13, 2012).

Both sides also have strengthened cultural and people-to-people ties. Bilateral visits are frequent and increasingly occur at the state as well as party and provincial levels (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 22, 2011). China is Cambodia’s third biggest tourism market with around 270,000 Chinese visiting Cambodia in 2011, a number Cambodia wants to increase to one million by 2020 (Xinhua, December 4, 2012). Mandarin Chinese is the second most popular language in Cambodia after English,

and Chinese schools are mushrooming nationwide (Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2012; Xinhua, October 5, 2011). China also invests significantly in emphasizing the rich history of Sino-Cambodian relations. When Cambodia's former King Norodom Sihanouk died in China in October last year, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo personally escorted the coffin to Cambodia and national flags were flown at half-mast as they were in Phnom Penh (Xinhua, October 17, 2012). Sino-Cambodian relations also are facilitated by the country's Cambodian Chinese population, one of its largest minority groups prominent in politics and business.

China has used its growing influence in Cambodia to reap political benefits, often with pressure and inducements on sensitive issues perceived to affect its sovereignty. Joint statements between the two countries boosting cooperation, including the one issued after Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Cambodia in April 2012, often are accompanied by reaffirmations of Phnom Penh's steadfast commitment to the one-China policy (Xinhua, April 2, 2012). In 2009, despite international furor and some initial hesitation, Cambodia eventually repatriated 20 asylum-seeking Uighurs back to China and subsequently was rewarded \$1.2 billion in aid one day later by Beijing. Most recently, Cambodia also was accused of towing Beijing's line on territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea during its 2012 ASEAN chairmanship and even sharing internal drafts of proposed agreements with Chinese interlocutors ("China Pushes on the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses," *China Brief*, August 3, 2012; *Asia Times Online*, July 27, 2012).

Despite Beijing's increasing clout in Cambodia, there are several limits to the relationship that could pose challenges for both sides. First, while Phnom Penh certainly is constrained by the invisible strings attached to Chinese assistance, it has cultivated other relationships to ensure it does not fall fully into Beijing's camp. For instance, U.S.-Cambodian relations have warmed in recent years, and cooperation proceeds in the form of counterterrorism training, small-scale joint exercises and assistance via the Lower Mekong Initiative. Balancing various powers is a strategy that dates back centuries to the Khmer kings, and Hun Sen is unlikely to abandon this practice because he remembers China's own opportunism in Cambodia's history and remains distrustful of Beijing (*Asia Times*

*Online*, July 20, 2011).

Yet this is still a tricky balance, and it is unclear whether Cambodia will be able to execute it successfully in the next few years or whether Beijing will tolerate it. In several cases, such as Cambodia's decision to deport the Uighurs in 2009 or its position on the South China Sea in ASEAN meetings in 2012, Phnom Penh has taken China's side (at times with inducements) and has alienated the international community and its fellow ASEAN brethren. What if Cambodia decided in the future to take a position not entirely in line with Beijing on a given issue? Would Beijing condone this, and what would the consequences be? Sino-Cambodian relations only can mature if Cambodia can exercise its autonomy fully and China learns to respect it instead of just expecting complete deference in return for its patronage.

Second, China's influence in Cambodia comes at a domestic cost. Concerns about corruption, human rights violations and environmental degradation in Chinese-backed projects are growing louder and stirring up trouble for Cambodia's rulers. 4,000 families were evicted from their homes around Boeung Kak Lake for a development project by Erdos Hongjun Investment Corporation, a case which has received high-level attention from human rights groups, ordinary Cambodians and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (*Phnom Penh Post*, May 28, 2012). In another case, Tianjin Union Development Group, a Chinese real estate company, has come under scrutiny for transforming Botom Sakur National Park into a gambling paradise (*Jakarta Globe*, March 7, 2012). Both cases have become tied to growing national agitation over land rights and government inaction, which is expected to be a hot issue in general elections this July (*Phnom Penh Post*, June 15, 2012; *Rasmei Kampuchea Daily*, November 29, 2012). If domestic opposition to China's footprint in Cambodia becomes even louder in succeeding years, it could trigger tensions within the bilateral relationship or limit prospects for cooperation.

Third, while China's dominant position in Cambodia is due in no small part to the regime's continuity since the 1990s, even Hun Sen cannot last forever. Judging from his ruling Cambodian People's Party's (CPP) overwhelming victory in last year's commune elections, his grip on power probably will be cemented by a landslide victory in upcoming polls (*Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 2012). Whether

the 60-year old strongman can rule the country until age 90 as he says he will, however, is less clear (*South China Morning Post*, November 20, 2012). He himself has suggested that health issues may curb the longevity of his rule (*Radio Free Asia*, January 21, 2010). Moreover, though some have suggested Cambodians currently are willing to overlook democracy for the sake of political stability after years of genocide and civil war, history offers plenty of cases, including in nearby Myanmar, where transitions have nonetheless occurred in various forms. In a more democratic environment, there would certainly be more scrutiny on China's footprint in Cambodia, and perhaps even a relative erosion of its influence in favor of other countries to better balance Cambodia's foreign policy.

Short of these limits though, few expect Beijing's formidable influence in Cambodia to ebb anytime soon. At least for now, China, which Hun Sen famously called "the root of everything that is evil in Cambodia" in a 1988 essay, is the source of enough good in the country to be courted rather than condemned [2].

*Prashanth Parameswaran is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a freelance journalist. He has written widely about international affairs in the Asia-Pacific and blogs about the region at The Asianist [www.asianist.wordpress.com].*

Notes:

1. Zhou Dagan, *The Customs of Cambodia*, translated by Michael Smithies, Bangkok: The Siam Society, 2001.
2. Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 151.

\*\*\*

## China-Uganda Relations: Closer is Not Necessarily Better

By Kenneth W. Allen and Eva Baguma

The long-delayed, Chinese-funded Entebbe expressway in Uganda once again is running into delays as government funds are insufficient to compensate the citizens who will lose their land to the

highway. Although construction began only last month, Entebbe claims it has only sufficient funds to buy the land for 15 of the planned 51 kilometers (*New Vision [Uganda]*, January 3). Even though most of the roadway construction will be funded from Chinese largesse, this under-funded infrastructure project is draining Ugandan coffers and refocusing attention on how Beijing relates to the Ugandan government. Much of China's relationship with Uganda has been positive even if not especially significant; however, as Chinese traders have moved in and Beijing supports investment in the country's natural resources, Uganda may be losing more than it is gaining. To evaluate these developments, this article systematically examines the different areas—diplomatic, economic, security and cultural—of Sino-Ugandan relations over the last fifty years since the two countries established diplomatic relations.

### China-Uganda Diplomatic Relations

China and Uganda established diplomatic relations in October 1962. During the period of 1962-1985, bilateral relations witnessed a steady development in spite of the regime changes in Uganda (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2006). The two countries saw relatively few high-level exchanges with each other during their first part of the relationship, but Beijing has become a patron of Ugandan diplomacy, donating \$6.5 million in 2001 to construct the headquarters building for Uganda's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was opened by 2004 ([ug.china-embassy.org](http://ug.china-embassy.org), October 28, 2004).

In 1971, Uganda supported China's accession to the UN General Assembly. Bilateral relations between the two countries entered a new stage of development after the National Resistance Movement of Uganda came to power in 1986 with bilateral cooperation expanding and mutual high-level exchanges increasing. Uganda backed China's stance twice at the sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1996 and 1997. In 2000, Uganda also supported the bill put forward by China on the maintaining and observing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the UN.

Since 1962, a wide sample of Chinese leaders have visited Uganda including Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members; National People's Congress (NPC)

Standing Committee members; as well as state councilors, foreign ministers and vice premiers. For example, in 2001, then-Vice President and Politburo Standing Committee Member Hu Jintao counted among Uganda's visitors. Ugandan leaders have reciprocated Beijing's attention, dispatching senior ministers and heads of state.

### Trade Relations and Economic and Technical Cooperation

When China and Republic of Uganda established diplomatic relations in 1962, they also started developing trade, which has had both positive and negative effects in Uganda. On the positive side, China has helped Uganda set up the Kibimba and Doho Rice Schemes, the Kampala Ice Plant, methane-generating pits, the Foodstuff Porcelain Research Center and the National Stadium. It also has donated anti-Malarial drugs to Uganda and built the Naguru Friendship Hospital (*The Independent [Uganda]*, January 16, 2012).

In 2005, the trade volume between the two countries came to \$99.37 million—of which China's exports and imports amounted to \$79.37 million and \$20 million, respectively. China's main exports to Uganda are mechanical and electrical appliances, textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals, porcelain and enamel products as well as footwear (*New Vision [Uganda]*, February 24, 2012; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2006).

According to Chinese statistics, from 1993 to 2011, China invested \$596 million in Uganda, and 256 Chinese firms opened businesses in Uganda, creating 28,000 job opportunities for Ugandans. In 2011, the amount of bilateral trade reached \$400 million, increasing by more than 40 percent from 2010 and 300 percent from 2005. Many Ugandan traders are now opting to go to China instead of Dubai to do business and, in return, many Chinese also are coming to Uganda to engage in trade and investment (*Allafrica.com*, September 21, 2012).

In recent years, Uganda has benefited a lot from its good relationship with China in several ways. First and foremost, China cancelled Uganda's \$17 million debt that had accrued from interest on loans before 2005, and China agreed to provide a grant of \$6.8 million. China also granted tariff-free and quota-free treatment to more than 400 commodities from Uganda. China also plans

to loan \$350 million to the government to construct a six-lane, 51 kilometer express highway linking the capital city of Kampala to Entebbe International Airport, which will start in 2012 with funding on loan from the Chinese Government. In addition, China has constructed government offices and the state-of-the-art Mandela National Stadium Namboole. In southwestern Uganda, a Chinese road construction company, Chongqing International Construction Corporation (CICO), is constructing a 103 kilometer road linking the western town of Fort Portal to the Democratic Republic of Congo through the mountainous district of Bundibugyo (*Inter Press Service*, September 20, 2012; *Xinhua*, December 24, 2010; June 24, 2006).

China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) also is seeking to build an oil refinery in western Uganda, in partnership with Total and Tullow, which would massively increase China's investment in the country's oil resources. CNOOC already has signed an agreement with Tullow Oil for the exploration of oil in Western Uganda, and several Chinese companies have also submitted bids for the construction of the Karuma Hydro power station (*The East African*, December 1, 2012; *Allafrica.com*, September 21, 2012). There are several other projects and programs in the pipeline for Uganda from China.

To the dismay of Western donor agencies and countries, China has scaled up its aid to Africa over the last 10 years, making it a formidable force on the continent. For the African governments, it never is as good as this. Many of them are happy about China's increasing economic interest in the continent, which is in dire need of pulling millions of its people out of poverty. The assistance provided by China—based on friendship, mutual respect and South-South cooperation—is fast, easy and effective. There is little discussion of uncomfortable topics, such as economic policy and good governance—the hallmarks of Western support.

On the negative side, despite this growing trend in the relationship, the trade imbalance is still wide. Uganda's exports to China last year reached \$40 million, jumping by 49.5 percent, but it is still barely one-tenth of China's exports to Uganda. Following the October 2012 FOCAC meeting in Hangzhou, China has now allowed up to 95 percent non-tariff, barrier-free goods (*Xinhua*, September 22, 2012).

Consequently, this can only mean one thing—the Ugandan market will see an influx of even more cheap, unsafe and counterfeit goods (*International Business Times*, July 7, 2011). In addition, businesspeople like co-author Baguma’s mother, a textile trader on Luwum Street, as well as the wholesale business men and women in Kikubo (Kampala’s biggest wholesale and retail market), spare parts dealers and car bonds across the city face a stiff challenge from the Chinese. Local businesses now find it difficult to sustain themselves as Ugandan customers always prefer the cheaper, more easily available options. This onset of counterfeit products (mostly Chinese-made) will not only undermine the economic advances made by Ugandans over the last 20 years, but also will threaten the health and safety of Ugandans who buy these substandard goods.

The influx of Chinese businesses, labor and producers has affected the local manufacturing and production sector hugely by creating increased competition for the local market, local contracts and high consumption of scarce resources like water and power. Accordingly, this is driving local producers and manufacturers out of the market. This also has resulted in increased local unemployment not only as a result of local manufacturers going out of business, but also because Chinese manufacturers prefer to bring labor from China to man their operations.

Finally, a six-lane express highway, which would take three years to construct based on loans from China, will not only plummet the country into further debt, but also would require the displacement of nearly 1,000 families from their homes and land. In addition, the Ugandan government will contribute \$100 million toward the construction of this highway, which could otherwise go toward fixing dilapidated but already existing roads. Furthermore, the \$35 million in compensation to the people who will be evacuated and displaced from the area is not nearly enough to compensate for the loss of one’s home or livelihood. For example, over 1,760 tenants of the Nakawa/Naguru estate sitting on a 66-hectare piece of land were evicted forcefully in July 2011, and the project land still remains idle even after the hasty eviction of the tenants. The eviction resulted in riots and violence that contributed to the international image of Uganda as a politically unstable and corrupt country, which has no regard at all for its peoples’ economic, social, cultural and

human rights (*Daily Monitor*, July 4, 2011).

### **Military Relations**

China’s military relations with Uganda include high-level exchanges and educational exchanges. For example, Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie visited Kampala in November 2011 and pledged \$2.3 million to support the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in its war efforts against Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants (alshahid.net, December 1, 2011; AFP, November 30, 2011). He was the highest ranking PLA officer to visit Uganda. Of note, some of the PLA delegations to visit Uganda in the 2000s were led by political officers from the General Political Department and military regions (“Resources, Security and Influence: The Role of the Military in China’s Africa Strategy,” *China Brief*, May 30, 2007). By contrast, only a few Ugandan military delegations have visited China, including Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga’s visit in April 2010 (Xinhua, April 24, 2010).

Although China has military attaché offices in at least 14 African countries out of a total 109 offices abroad, it does not have one in Uganda; nor does Uganda have a military attaché office in Beijing. This situation implies there is little day-to-day interaction between the two militaries (“Resources, Security and Influence: The Role of the Military in China’s Africa Strategy,” *China Brief*, May 30, 2007). Even so, the Chinese Embassy in Uganda did celebrate the PLA’s 80th Anniversary in August 2007, which was attended by Uganda’s Minister of Defense and key military officials (ug.china-embassy.org, August 2, 2007).

Even though the two countries do not have reciprocal military attachés, Ugandan military personnel have received training and education in various PLA academic institutions. For example, in 2010, a Ugandan Air Force pilot attended the PLA Air Force Command College’s foreign officers’ course. Each of the 21 foreign students, including 11 pilots, was paired with a PLAAF officer during the course, and they all spoke English (*Global Times*, January 16, 2010).

### **Chinese Arms Sales to Uganda**

During the years immediately after independence,

Ugandan ties with Britain remained strong. Although relations with Britain remained important, Uganda broadened its foreign military relations during the 1960s. Israel, China and the Soviet Union substantially increased military assistance. China hoped to block Tel Aviv's efforts to gain a foothold in Africa because of Israel's pro-Western orientation, but this effort was short-lived. In 1965, Beijing sent some small arms and a military aid mission to Uganda; however, in late 1967, after Ugandan officers complained that the Chinese mission was "engaging in revolutionary activity" and distributing lapel buttons displaying the picture of Mao Zedong, President Obote asked the mission to leave the country. In contrast to China's relatively minor role in Uganda, the Soviet Union eventually became one of Kampala's closest allies.

Compared to China's arms sales to other African countries, such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, its arms sales to Uganda have been minimal. Although one article citing the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted that Ukrainian and Russian arms sales to Uganda were likely to force China out of the top ranking in 2012, no information was found indicating which arms China actually was selling to Uganda. One author did note, however, that China has sold Y-12 small transport aircraft to Uganda (*Washington Post*, August 25, 2012; "China's Re-emergence as an Arms Dealer: The Return of the King?" *China Brief*, July 9, 2009).

### Cultural Relations

Cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two countries is growing rapidly, highlighted by a series of programs known as "Focusing on Culture", which are held every year in Uganda and other countries across Africa, to expose people to Chinese music, dance and culture. The two countries signed a cultural cooperation agreement in June 1985. In August 1999, China and Uganda signed the 2000-2002 Implementation Program of the Agreement on the Cultural Cooperation between China and Uganda (Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda, July 2009; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2006; ug.china-embassy.org, October 28, 2004).

Since 1983, China has sent over ten medical teams to Uganda and has opened multiple departments in various

hospitals. Ugandan doctors have also received training in China. In addition, the China Red Cross Society has occasionally provided donations to Uganda to fight natural disasters and diseases such as Ebola (ug.china-embassy.org, October 28, 2004; *People's Daily*, October 26, 2000).

Educational exchanges started in the 1950s, and since 1959, China has received more than 315 Ugandan students. Today, Ugandan students study medicine, construction, engineering, food science, computer science and information technology. A total of 35 scholarships are provided to Ugandan students every year. China's Ministry of Education also donated 50 computers to set computer labs in Makerere University and Mbarara University (ug.china-embassy.org, October 28, 2004).

In addition, 27 African countries have increasingly become overseas destinations for Chinese tourist and vacation groups and companies as the continent opens itself up for business. The number of visitors going both ways is rising rapidly as many Ugandans are opting to travel to China for work, education, business and pleasure.

### Conclusion

As China increases its economic profile in Uganda, it needs to be aware of possible negative repercussions that have affected Chinese interests in Africa. For example, in June 2012, rioters in South Africa, which has a high unemployment rate, attacked workers from China and other countries (*Global Voices*, July 9, 2012). In addition, in 2011, China stepped in to help protect its citizens from Chinese gangsters in Angola, who kidnapped, robbed and extorted Chinese workers there (*Global Times*, August 28, 2012). As a result of events such as these and the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, Beijing is being faced with the need to protect its citizens abroad in a way that was unthinkable before ("Kidnappings Highlight Weakness in Chinese Security Posture Abroad," *China Brief*, February 3, 2012). Although the two countries probably are closer than ever, the Ugandan resentment at the Chinese presence and its anecdotal effect on hollowing out the local economy may be sowing the seeds of the relationship's destruction. The question is whether Beijing can find a way to stay in Uganda that balances between the interests of the government elite

and the ordinary citizens.

*Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense Group Inc. (DGI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force officer, whose extensive service abroad includes a tour in China as the Assistant Air Attaché. He has written numerous articles on Chinese military affairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in international relations from Boston University.*

*Eva Baguma is an Atlas Corps Fellow from Uganda, who is currently a Development and Operations Associate at Ashoka. She previously served as the Program Officer of Fundraising and Resource Mobilization at the Uganda Society for Disabled Children and has five years of experience in the development field.*

\*\*\*