




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“Ding Jinhao was here”: Chinese graffiti at Luxor prompted a wave of outrage about uncivilized tourists

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In a Fortnight

China’s trade-backed charm offensive has reached India and the United Kingdom, as Chinese leaders signed a raft of trade deals with the United Kingdom and a border pact with India that may reduce incidents along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). These follow high-profile trade diplomacy tours through Central and Southeast Asia, during which Chinese leaders made small proposals for lowering tension on territorial disputes. Premier Li Keqiang suggested cooperation Vietnam in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. These deals appear to belong to a broad, if shallow effort to shelve political questions in favor of trade (For more on the SCO, see “China and the SCO: Dead Wood but a Good Platform” in *China Brief*, Volume 13, Issue 20; for Southeast Asia, see “Beijing Unveils New Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations” in this issue).

China does not appear willing to make concessions on political issues—but it is trying to change the subject in bilateral relationships that have grown increasingly confrontational in recent years. All these deals appear to fit with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s concept of “a new type of international relations”—while China has not inserted the term into speeches or official statements at recent meetings, it is increasingly clear that China is seeking to improve the tone of its relationships with foreign countries, avoiding confrontation while quietly winning foreign recognition of the legitimacy of the regime (see *China Brief*, Volume 13, Issue 15).

This charm campaign may be aimed at, as a quasi-authoritative editorial in the *People’s*

Daily proposed in May, “Building a Favorable External Environment in Order to Achieve the China Dream” (*People’s Daily*, May 31—the editorial was signed “Guo Jiping,” described by the newspaper as an internationally-focused equivalent to *Zhongsheng*). However, China still appears to have an aggressive posture towards its most contentious territorial disputes, with Japan and the Philippines. Most recently, China canceled an invitation to Philippine President Benigno Aquino to a trade fair, seemingly in retribution for his pursuit of international arbitration in the South China Sea (*South China Morning Post*, August 2).

BRITAIN SETTLES DALAI LAMA ROW

By David Cohen

Two prominent members of the UK’s governing Conservative Party, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and London mayor Boris Johnson spent a week in Beijing, signing a package of deals that will considerably open the British economy to China—and give London a stake in China’s gradual liberalization of its currency. Agreements reached during the visit include:

- Allowing Chinese state companies to invest in British nuclear power plants, with two state-owned enterprises (SOE) taking an estimated 30% share of a new \$22 billion plant (BBC, October 17).
- Creating a streamlined visa application process for Chinese nationals, including a pilot program to accept the European Union’s unified Schengen visa form, a 24-hour rush service and expanding a “VIP mobile visa service” that currently allows Beijing and Shanghai residents to pay for consular officials to come to their homes or offices (gov.uk, October 14).
- Inking a currency deal that will allow limited trading of the largely closed *renminbi* (RMB) in London and permit up to \$13 billion in direct asset purchases from London to China (Bloomberg, October 15).

The nuclear investment deal is a win for UK Prime Minister David Cameron on a major policy priority, a push to raise capital for infrastructure overseas and especially in China that dates back to 2011 (UK *National Infrastructure Plan 2011*). The currency trading deal, while small, will make London the first Western financial

center to offer RMB trading and may position the City to develop this market if currency reforms continued, as suggested by the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (*South China Morning Post*, September 5). Speaking in Beijing, Osborne promoted the UK as a destination for Chinese investment, contrasting its policies to U.S. limits on Chinese investment. He highlighted the Chinese telecoms company Huawei, largely frozen out of the United States over national security concerns: “There are some Western governments that have blocked Huawei from making investments. Not Britain. Quite the opposite. That is why I was pleased to welcome Huawei’s opening of a flagship office in our country in June, and the £1.3 billion [\$2.1 bn] of investment that came with it” (*The Telegraph*, October 16). Huawei also announced plans this week to expand its UK operations with a \$202 million research and development center.

These deals come in the wake of a prolonged period of frosty ties, as China sought to punish Cameron for a May 2012 meeting with the Dalai Lama, canceling invitations to visit the country and suspending talks on investment deals. Such tactics have proved especially effective with European countries since the 2008 financial crisis—European austerity policies have made foreign direct investment extremely attractive to governments unwilling to spend their way out of recessions (for more on China’s investment diplomacy in the EU, see European Council on Foreign Relations policy brief “The Scramble for Europe”).

Europe’s hunger for foreign investment has allowed China to broker a number of one-way deals, while European access to Chinese markets remains fairly limited. The EU is currently negotiating an investment treaty with China. China’s willingness to scale back or temporarily break off diplomatic and trade ties over Tibet has been fairly effective in shaping the behavior of other states.

Examining previous disputes, in which China broke off regular relations with France and Germany over meetings with the Dalai Lama, it is possible to see a pattern—and to gauge the price China demands to settle these disputes. China successfully pushed France and Germany to disavow support for Tibetan independence in order to restore ties following similar incidents, although in different fashions. In 2009, China extracted a joint communiqué from France recognizing Tibet as an

“integral part of China” using much of China’s preferred language: “with due regard for the principle of non-interference, France objects to all support for Tibet’s independence in any form whatsoever” (French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, April 1, 2009).

In a similar case following a meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Tibetan religious leader, in 2007–2008, the dispute was resolved by an exchange of secret letters between the German and Chinese foreign ministries, followed by a minister-to-minister phone call in which Germany also promised to respect Chinese control of Tibet, as well as a speech in Beijing in which Merkel promised not to support to “pro-independence separatist forces in Taiwan” (Speigel Online, January 21, 2008; *China Daily*, August 29, 2007). The German foreign ministry told *Der Spiegel* that its letter did not recognize China’s favored principle of non-interference. The United States has also been influenced by this pressure, asking the Dalai Lama to change his travel plans in order to avoid Washington before important U.S.–China meetings (see Jeffery Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise*: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

Publicly, Cameron appears to have ended his dispute with China more cheaply than Germany, and certainly more cheaply than France: In public, he refused to apologize for the meeting and told British media that Beijing “can’t tell me who I can meet,” but allowed Osborne to say that “the Prime Minister is not planning to meet the Dalai Lama” and reportedly forbade members of his government from meeting him (*Daily Mail*, May 7; *The Guardian*, October 14). On an official level, the British government made what seems to be the standard disavowal of Tibetan independence in a June phone call between the two sides’ foreign ministers (*China Daily*, June 25). The last gesture has been cited by the Chinese press as the end of the dispute, with China’s perceived gains summed up in a widely-reprinted headline: “The UK is not for ‘Tibetan Independence.’” However, the German exchange of letters was also publicly described as a phone call, suggesting that a more formal promise may have been made behind the scenes (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) press release, April 15, 2008).

An October 17 commentary by the semi-authoritative *Zhongsheng* column declared China’s satisfaction with the British response. It commented that Cameron had

recognized his mistake, and declared this a prerequisite for restored ties, argued that this proved that a forceful posture had made China the “driver” of the relationship (*People’s Daily*). This has given Cameron’s critics at home an opportunity to criticize him as soft on China—UK media have described Osborne as a “Bambi” being manipulated by Beijing (*The Guardian*, October 19). In comparison with its European peers, however, it seems that the UK has paid no more than the going rate to settle the issue.

INDIA AND CHINA REACH BORDER PACT

By David Cohen

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) during a late October trip to Beijing (*The Hindu*, October 23). The agreement seeks to avoid confrontations between Chinese and Indian border patrols, with the two sides agreeing to notify each other in advance of patrols and not to “tail” patrols by the other. Furthermore, it includes a series of confidence-building measures such as the establishment of a military-to-military hotline and regular meetings along the border.

Pushed by China, the agreement appears to be a step toward Premier Li Keqiang’s promise to “find a fair, reasonable, mutually acceptable solution” to the border question, made in a May speech in New Delhi during Li’s first trip abroad as Premier (MoFA website, May 22). The speech came only weeks after an incident in which India accused China of a series of incursions into its territory. Since then, New Delhi has experienced a spate of relative quiet, on the border dispute, as well as over India-Vietnam energy cooperation in the disputed area of the South China Sea, another source of tension (see “India in the South China Sea: Commercial Motives, Strategic Implications,” in *China Brief*, Volume 13, Issue 20).

Li’s May visit, while it yielded little concrete progress, was an early example of the relentlessly positive tone in which China has recently sought to portray its external relations. It was described by a foreign ministry press release as a “milestone” visit, and the joint statement issued during the visit raised the theme of shared destiny that China has used more recently with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations):

China and India have a historic opportunity for economic and social development and the realization of this goal will advance peace and prosperity in Asia and the world at large. The two sides welcome each other's peaceful development and regard it as a mutually reinforcing process. There is enough space in the world for the development of China and India, and the world needs the common development of both countries (MoFA website, May 20).

The same document also recognized China's demand not to be criticized on human rights issues, mentioning "the right of each country to choose its own path of social, economic and political development."

In light of both the border agreement and China's charm offensive with its other neighbors, it may be worth reevaluating Li's May trip as the start of a campaign to mend the external environment for China's rise—at least, as far trade diplomacy will take it.

David Cohen is the editor of China Brief.

SOE Backgrounds of Rising Leaders Threaten Reform

By Willy Lam

The recent detention of senior executives of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) has highlighted a major question about China's economic plans: Whether the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration has finally decided to restructure the 110 or so *yangqi*, or state-owned enterprise (SOE) groupings. Li has also raised expectations that the economic-reform blueprint that is due to be endorsed by the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee next month will address the issue of allowing privately owned firms to enter into sectors that have been monopolized by these national champions. After all, one of the key reform initiatives associated with so-called "Likonomics" is the provision of a level playing field for both SOEs and non-state-sector enterprises.

The arrest of former CNPC president Jiang Jiemin on September 1 could become a watershed reversal of

the Chinese government's policy of nurturing "aircraft carrier-type" SOE giants, many of which have made it into the Fortune 500 List. Jiang, who spent the bulk of his career in the oil industry, was the patron of four other CNPC executives detained in the summer, including deputy general managers Wang Yongchun and Li Hualin (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], September 2; Radio Free Asia, September 2). Last March, Jiang was appointed Chairman of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a ministry-level department charged with overseeing the operations of all *yangqi*. After Jiang's ouster, SASAC Party Secretary and Vice-Chairman Zhang Yi indicated that units under the commission should "forcefully implement structuring adjustments and transformation" as well as "further strengthen the supervision of state assets" (*People's Daily*, September 4; China News Service, September 4). Given that Zhang is a former senior cadre in the CCP Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI)—which is China's highest-level anti-graft watchdog—his role seems to be to clean up the not only the mess in CNPC, but other SOE behemoths as well.

Much of the foreign and overseas-Chinese media reporting on the CNPC scandal has focused on the close relationship between Jiang, Li Hualin and former Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member Zhou Yongkang, who is a former general manager of the oil giant. Zhou is also to be an ally of the fallen former Politburo member Bo Xilai, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for alleged corruption and embezzlement last month (*Hong Kong Economic Journal*, September 22; *Ming Pao*, September 22). Zhou's public "reappearance"—he was seen inspecting his alma mater, the China University of Petroleum, in early October—seems to lend credence to reports that the former PBOC member would not face criminal prosecutions. Yet Jiang's removal—and the large-scale purge of CNPC cadres—also coincided with a series of talks by Premier Li, deemed the most reform-oriented member of the current PBSC, on the need to overhaul a host of unwieldy *yangqi*, which CNPC perhaps best exemplifies.

Premier Li underscored the imperative of reforming *yangqi* as well as other large SOEs controlled by regional administrations in a series of meetings of the State Council or cabinet the past few months. Li indicated at a regular State Council conference last month that

private firms should be gradually allowed into several sectors dominated by *yangqi*, which include finance, oil and gas, electricity, railways, telecommunications and the exploitation of mineral and other resources. At an earlier meeting, Li urged *yangqi* “to use reform-oriented methods and restructuring measures to solve existing problems.” “They should raise their management levels [and] make more efforts in strengthening innovative ability,” he added. “We should build up ‘sunshine yangqi’ so that they can boost the values of state assets and acquit themselves well of their social responsibilities” (*People’s Daily*, September 6; Xinhua, August 21). In an internal talk earlier this year, Li reportedly cited CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, China Telecom and China Mobile as the five *yangqi* that required the most thorough reforms. “If we do not restructure [these enterprises] and bring about major changes, there might be serious consequences for which nobody would want to bear the responsibility,” Li said (Hebnews.cn [Shijiazhuang], October 11; Sina.com, January 27).

Private entrepreneurs and advisers to Premier Li have been pushing for a speedier pace in reforming SOE groupings. At a Forum on Non-state Enterprises held in Beijing earlier this month, Peking University economist Li Yining argued that “SOEs should become real enterprises” and not adjuncts of the state. Li argued that SASAC should stop exercising direct control over the *yangqi*. “Everything should be done according to laws and regulations,” said Professor Li, who supervised Li Keqiang’s doctoral thesis when the latter was a part-time Peking University student in the 1980s. “Private enterprises should compete with SOEs in an environment of equality.” Beijing-based real estate mogul Ren Zhijiang, a vocal advocate of the rights of private enterprises, also accused SASAC cadres of “failing to supervise [SOE] enterprises [due to] their lack of knowledge about running businesses.” (CNTV.com, October 11; Ifeng.com [Beijing], October 11).

Yet it is apparent that there is a divergence of views within the CCP’s highest echelons as to the extent to which the SOE conglomerates should be reformed or even privatized. This is evidenced by a plethora of articles in the official media that reflect the views of top-level cadres who support the continuation of the *yangqi*’s privileged status. The day after news broke about Jiang’s detention, CCTV came out with a commentary defending the *yangqi* system. The article claimed that the CNPC scandal “has

nothing to do with its monopoly status” and that there are many industries that could only be handled by state-controlled conglomerates. “It’s not as though anyone can get into the oil business,” the commentary said (CCTV News, September 2). Equally significant was a series of five commentaries carried by the conservative *Economic Daily*. The articles warned advocates of privatization that weakening SOEs was tantamount to shaking up the foundation of the socialist state. “The purpose of SOE reforms is not to abolish them but to make them better,” it said. The paper praised President Vladimir Putin for re-nationalizing Russia’s oil and gas operations “so that petroleum has once again become the pillar and foundation of the revival of Russia” (*Economic Daily*, August 13).

A closer look at the backgrounds of Central Committee members endorsed at the 18th CCP Congress suggests that there will be no lack of *yangqi* supporters at the upcoming plenum. A record number of serving or former CEOs of SOE conglomerates were picked as Central Committee members last November. In addition to then-president of CNPC Jiang, a former president of Bank of China, Xiao Gang, made it to the party’s ruling council. So did three former *yangqi* CEOs who were recently appointed as provincial governors: Fujian Governor Su Shulin, who is a former Sinopec president; Shandong Governor Guo Shuqing, who used to run China Construction Bank; and Hebei Governor Zhang Qingwei, who headed the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd (COMAC). Also inducted into the Central Committee were the chief executives of four defense-industry and aerospace giants: Lin Zuoming of China Aviation Industry Corporation; Xu Dazhe of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC); Ma Qingrui of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp (CASC); and Zhang Guoqing of China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO). Last April, Norinco’s Zhang, whose company is China’s largest importer and exporter of weapons and firearms, was appointed Deputy Party Secretary of the directly administered city of Chongqing (China News Service, June 5; *People’s Daily*, April 24).

Equally significant is the fact that a number of Sixth-Generation (6G) cadres (meaning those born in the 1960s) who have risen to top positions in SOE conglomerates also joined the Central Committee as alternate or second-

tier members. While alternates members cannot vote, they will be allowed to join the debate on economic reform at the upcoming plenum. Sixty or 35 percent of the 171 alternate Central Committee members are 6G officials—and at least seven of them have close affinities with *yangqi* or regional SOE giants (Ce.cn [Beijing] December 10, 2012; Ifeng.com December 10, 2012).

These 6G rising stars include Zhang Qingwei's successor as COMAC president Jin Zhuanglong, 49. A much-decorated aerospace engineer, Jin became deputy general manager of CASAC, a major contractor for China's space programs, in 2001, when he was barely 37 years old (*People's Daily*, September 14; Ce.cn [Beijing], January 21). The mammoth China Shipbuilding Industry Corp (CSIC), a *yangqi* with 46 shipbuilding-related enterprises and 28 research institutes, is represented by naval engineers Jin Donghan, 52, and Ma Weiming, 53. Jin, who is Chief Engineer at CSIC's 711th Research Institute, and Ma, a top professor at the Naval Engineering University, are credited with having invented state-of-the-art propelling systems for a range of warships and submarines (CAS.cn [Beijing], March 28; Cnki.com.cn [Beijing], March 1).

In his now-famous internal speech last December, General Secretary Xi attributed the demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to the fact that the military “stood idly by” as “traitors” such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin plotted to overthrow the party (*Ming Pao*, July 1; BBC Chinese Service, February 16). Conservative cadres such as Xi seem also convinced that in addition to the military, the CCP needs to maintain control over key sectors of the economy so as to ensure its status as China's “perennial ruling party.” Since early this year, a number of official media have run commentaries on the imperative of “the CCP running the economy” or “the party imposing tighter control on cadres” working in enterprises. At another forum on private enterprises held in August, tycoon Ren laid into the concept of the CCP controlling the economy. “If the party is managing the economy, it will not be possible for Likonomics to exist,” he said (*Chinaairn.com* [Beijing] August 26; *Caijing.com.cn*, August 24). Chinese and foreign observers interested in the future of China's economic reform will no doubt scrutinize next month's Third Plenum communiqué for clues about the degree to which the party-state apparatus is ready to retool some of the biggest companies in the

world.

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Soft Power Meets Social Management: New Tourism Law to Punish Unruly Travelers Overseas

By Nicholas Dynon

Passed last April, the new *China Tourism Law* came into effect on October 1, in time for this year's Chinese National Day “golden week” holiday. While the main thrust of the legislation is greater regulation of the domestic and outbound tourism industry and squeezing out unscrupulous operators, the law breaks new ground by legislating requirements for civilized tourist behavior.

Following a long run of bad international press about poorly behaved Chinese tourists, the new law comes as a decisive move by Beijing to reign in its unruly globetrotting citizens. It also serves as implied official acknowledgement that the negative press has hurt China's “soft power” efforts to bolster its reputation among the world's publics.

Furthermore, the law includes an ambitious effort to extend China's social control strategies beyond its borders, providing a legal basis for Beijing to manage its citizens abroad just as does at home. Failure to tow the official line overseas can now land a tourist in hot water back home.

Bad Guests: China's Outbound Tourism

In the several years since the Beijing Olympics, China has emerged as the world's largest source of international tourists. From just over 20 million outbound tourists in 2008, over 70 million Chinese undertook international

travel in 2011. For the past decade, China has been the fastest-growing tourism source market in the world. And the numbers have been matched by spending. Chinese travelers spent a record \$102 billion on international tourism in 2012, making China the highest ranked country in terms of tourism expenditure.

As the number of Chinese nations touring the world has increased, so too has concern about their poor etiquette and bad manners, a topic which has engaged media both abroad and at home. Despite this, Beijing has been slow to respond to the educational and public relations challenge posed by its travelling citizens. While official sources have paid lip service to the idea of outbound tourists as “image ambassadors,” their reputational role has been largely overlooked. Outbound tourism has thus constituted a major “soft power” blind spot as the poor international reputation of Chinese tourists increasingly undermines official international public relations gains.

When a Nanjing schoolboy etched the words “Ding Jinhao was here” (*Ding Jinhao dao ci yi you*) on a 3,500 year-old Luxor temple sculpture, he could not have imagined the magnitude of the backlash he would provoke. Just hours after an image of the graffiti was posted on micro-blogging site Sina Weibo on May 24, it had been forwarded more than 83,000 times and had received over 11,000 comments (*Qianjiang wanbao*, May 26). Within a day, Ding’s school’s website was breached by vigilante hackers and subsequently rendered inaccessible, and his parents approached national media to offer an unreserved apology. With merciless speed, the controversy quickly entered Chinese lexicon as the “Ding Jinhao incident.”

Widely reported in the international media, the act of vandalism received heavy criticism from social media users globally. But the heaviest criticism was from outraged Chinese netizens. The incident also sparked an online firestorm of criticism aimed more broadly at the “uncivilized” behaviors of Chinese tourists (*Modern Express*, May 26). Social media users and press outlets were quick to list other incidents that had reflected poorly on China’s tourists. There was the case of the Chinese cigarette butt floating in the waters off Palau, coral stealing in the Maldives, foot bathing in the Louvre pool, photo scrums in the lavender fields of Provence and countless incidents involving public urination and other indiscretions (Xinhua, July 24). According to one Chinese

online survey, respondents voted the six most uncivilized tourist behaviors as littering, disrespecting local laws and customs, being loud, queue jumping, removing shoes and socks in public and getting into disputes (Xinhua, August 20).

On August 19, leading Chinese travel service Ctrip published the results of its survey of 90 million users into uncivilized tourist behavior. The findings showed that respondents believed that the behavior of individuals and the state was important in shaping a good national image and enhancing the country’s soft power (Xinhua, August 20).

Much of the recent media and online chatter argued that China’s tourist etiquette problems are damaging the country’s international image (Xinhua, August 31). Just two weeks before the Ding Jinhao incident dominated news headlines, Vice Premier Wang Yang slammed the poor behavior of China’s tourists as a soft power liability.

Good Hosts: China’s Inbound Tourism

In time for the implementation of the new law, China’s National Tourism Administration (CNTA) in September issued an illustrated 64-page *Guidebook for Civilized Tourism*. It had been seven years since the publication of the previous edition. The 2006 guidebook had been published as part of a massive campaign to promote etiquette and politeness in time for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when a wave of international media and tourists were expected to expose China to the world like never before. At that time, the focus was squarely on the behavior of citizens within China’s borders rather than those travelling beyond them.

Years before the first foreign guests took up their seats in Beijing’s Birds Nest stadium, “Welcome the Olympics, stress civilization and cultivate a new style” (*ying aoyun jiang wenming shu xinfeng*) had become the catchcry of preparations for the games. Indeed, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Beijing Committee publication had called for raising moral standards and implementing of an “Olympic Action Plan” as far back as 2001 (*Beijing Evening News*, December 27, 2001). Hosting the Olympics created a need—or, as Anne-Marie Brady has argued, an excuse—for a sustained public morality propaganda campaign (*The China Quarterly*, March 2009).

As the Olympics drew near, a proliferation of propaganda

activities promoted civilized behaviors such as queuing, placing rubbish in bins, volunteerism and not spitting. At the neighborhood level, community “compacts” provided enforceable guidelines stipulating correct behaviors not otherwise covered by the state legal apparatus, such as looking after the environment, stressing hygiene, and avoiding “unhealthy” tendencies such as feudal superstitions. The “Civilized driving compact,” for example, launched January 2008 and endorsed by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, called on Beijing’s drivers to “create a good environment” for the Games (*Shenyang Daily*, January 23, 2008). Another, the “Construction workers Olympics civilization compact,” prescribed behavioral standards for migrant workers involved in the pre-Olympics building boom (People.com.cn, March 6, 2007). In the lead-up to and during the Games, compliance with these compacts was monitored and enforced like never before.

For the duration of the Olympics, Beijing’s migrant workers were packed off back to their hometowns, and tougher visa restrictions kept out potential foreign troublemakers. City blocks surrounding the Olympic Park were sanitized of nightclubs and other venues of questionable repute. Beijing’s remaining residents and visitors were kept under watch by an army of over 600,000 Olympics security/surveillance volunteers. It was, writes Jules Boykoff, “a Foucaultian fantasy, a panoptic web whereby people policed themselves while also policing each other” (*Celebration Capitalism and the Olympic Games*: Routledge, 2013). Even while attending Olympic events, spectators were urged to modify their behavior by shouting an officially endorsed “civilized cheer.”

A similar approach to promoting civilized behavior would be reprised in Shanghai as it prepared to host the 2010 World Expo. The “World Expo civilization compact” (*Shibo wenming gongyue*) promoted civilized driving, stopping and queuing and attempted to persuade residents not to wear their pajamas in public, aiming to put forward a civilized image of the World Expo host city (Xinhua, April 1, 2010). Activities such as “customer service day” (held on the 5th of each month) carried out under the “Welcome the Expo, stress civilization and cultivate a new style” banner stressed the importance of playing the good host.

Both the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World

Expo were widely regarded as qualified soft power wins for China, and both events have contributed to China’s rapid rise as an international tourist destination. In 2012, China received 57.7 million tourist arrivals, up from 31.2 million in 2000, making it the third-most visited country behind France and the United States.

But playing host is one thing, and playing guest is evidently something quite different.

Extending the Long Arm of the Law Overseas

During a State Council teleconference on the new China Tourism Law, Vice Premier Wang Yang slammed the poor standing of China’s tourists, stating that their uncivilized behavior and poor “quality and breeding” was harming China’s image (Xinhua, May 16). As was the case with certain aspects of its pre-Olympics civilizing campaign, the new China Tourism Law constitutes a coercive shadow to Beijing’s international charm efforts.

Article 41 of the new law stipulates that tour guides are to “abide by professional ethics, have respect for tourists” customs and religious beliefs, inform and explain to them norms of civilized behavior, guide tourists” healthy and civilized travel and discourage them from violating socially ethical behavior” (National Tourism Administration, April 26). Elsewhere, the legislation places responsibility squarely on tourists’ shoulders: “Tourists shall observe public order and respect social morality, respect local customs, cultural traditions and religious beliefs, care for tourism resources, protect the environment and abide by the norms of civilized tourist behavior.” Article 66 states that travel agencies will be allowed to revoke their contracts with tourists who “engage in activities that violate social ethics.”

The title of a Xinhua media report, “Enhancing soft power depends on hard boundaries,” describes the new law in terms of its role in regulating Chinese outbound tourists (August 28). It suggests that with the law, Beijing is building clear strictures around the role that Chinese tourists abroad play as “image ambassadors” of their country. But while tourists are being called to account, it appears that the onus will be on tour guides and operators to ensure compliant behavior from their clients. Tour operators arranging activities that breach laws or public morality, for example, can be fined up to 200,000 RMB

(\$32,900) or have their business license suspended. According to National Tourism Administration head Shao Qiwei, implementation of the new law “requires travel agencies, tour guides, tour leaders and tourists to consciously abide by regulated civilized behavior and guide tourists’ travel civilization” (*Wenming wang*).

Just how the new law will work in practice and to what extent it will be enforced by relevant tourism authorities is yet to be seen. After all, prior to the law “s existence, expectations relating to tourist behavior had already been prescribed in outbound travel guidelines and the “Chinese citizen domestic tourism civilization compact,” albeit to little evident effect. But with the law comes penalties, which will serve to promote increased compliance. Accordingly, it is likely that we will see an emerging quasi-compliance and surveillance dimension to the role of tour operators as they seek to keep their noses clean.

There is also the issue of the catch-all nature of the term *wenming* (civilized) within the Chinese policy and social management setting. Within its official-use definition are several elements that make it distinct from how the English term “civilized” is commonly understood. The various civilization compacts and awards systems operating in post-Mao China have tended to stipulate requirements reflecting official policy preoccupations of the time. Consequentially, being “civilized” has invariably meant being patriotic, maintaining stability and national harmony, abiding by family planning (the one-child policy), working hard to get rich, loving the Party and changing established (“feudal” and “backward”) customs. “Civilization” is also closely linked to official discourse on “population quality” (*renkou suzhi*), which calls for “a correct political stand and correct lifestyle and consumption choices” (Pal Nyiri, *China Journal*, July 2006).

Given that “civilized behavior” and “civilized travel” are not defined in the new law, it may assumed that such terms inherit the catch-all characteristics of the term *wenming*, and will thus remain subject to shifting policy and political concerns about citizens’ behavior.

Conclusion

How enforceable will the new law’s vague behavioral stipulations be? What sanction would a future Ding

Jinhao, his parents or his tour guide most likely face under the legislation? If “civilized” means having a “correct political stand,” what might the law mean for those expressing contrary views abroad?

As a response to the issue of poor tourist reputation, the law is late coming, and Beijing now faces an uphill battle to change what have become hardened international perceptions. Nevertheless, the law may well benefit China’s international public relations offensive in the long term, allowing Beijing to more effectively manage this grassroots—and more unruly—aspect of soft power it had hitherto ignored.

For Chinese tourists interested in the temporary freedoms associated with overseas travel, the new law means increased surveillance and the possibility of punishment. What happens on tour won’t necessarily stay on tour.

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Beijing Unveils New Strategy for ASEAN–China Relations

By Prashanth Parameswaran

Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang embarked on high-profile trips to five Southeast Asian nations to attend the latest round of Asian summitry and commemorate a decade of the strategic partnership between China and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) (*South China Morning Post*, October 17). During their respective tours of the region, the two also revealed the new leadership’s policy declaration on Southeast Asia for the next decade, known as “the 2 + 7 cooperation framework”. But while Beijing’s diplomatic offensive provided a good window into the new leadership’s thinking about Southeast Asia and also produced some impressive initial results, there remain limits to ASEAN–China relations in both the economic and security dimensions that could continue to

bedevil ties for years to come.

ASEAN–China relations have improved dramatically over the past decade since the inking of their strategic partnership on August 29, 2003. Two-way trade increased more than six-fold over the last ten years to top \$400 billion last year, while investments exceeded \$100 billion during the same period (Xinhua, October 17). As of last year, China was ASEAN’s largest trading partner for the third year in a row, while the region was Beijing’s third largest trading partner (*China Daily*, September 4). More generally, ASEAN–China cooperation has grown to cover over 20 areas from agriculture to disaster relief, and the two sides have set up 12 ministerial mechanisms and a range of cooperative platforms like the China–ASEAN Expo and the China–ASEAN Business and Investment Summit (*The Jakarta Post*, November 19, 2012). Though differences still exist on some issues, most prominently over Beijing’s handling of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized that these should not overshadow what is otherwise a largely successful relationship.

At the ASEAN–China Summit in Brunei on October 9, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang put forward the “2 + 7 cooperation framework,” a new policy declaration on developing ASEAN–China relations over the next decade. It consists of a two-point political consensus and seven proposals for cooperation. The two-point political consensus held that the basis for promoting cooperation is deeper strategic trust and good neighborliness, saying that the key to deepening cooperation is focusing on economic development and expanding mutual benefit (Xinhua, October 10). The seven-point proposal included some interesting ideas for further cooperation, including inking a treaty on good-neighborliness, upgrading the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to raise trade to one trillion dollars by 2020, setting up an Asian infrastructure bank to finance mushrooming regional connectivity projects, and building a 21st-century “maritime Silk Road” (Xinhua, October 10).

While the specifics of these proposals are still unclear, Premier Li and President Xi have already begun to expand cooperation bilaterally with several ASEAN countries during their Southeast Asia trips. Premier Li’s three-country tour saw the birth of new cooperative endeavors with respect to joint exploitation of energy resources

in Brunei, high-speed rail technology in Thailand, and potentially even maritime exploration in the disputed South China Sea via a newly conceived working group in Vietnam (Xinhua, October 11). Meanwhile, President Xi’s visits to Malaysia and Indonesia resulted in an elevation of Beijing’s relations with the two countries to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership, with notable improvements not only in economic ties but defense and security cooperation and people-to-people links as well (Xinhua, October 9). The optics of the visits reinforced their substance, with Premier Li and President Xi delivering rare, high-profile addresses to the Thai and Indonesian parliaments respectively.

The initial reception of ASEAN states to the economic components of the 2 + 7 cooperation framework has been largely positive. In particular, both Indonesia and Brunei welcomed China’s proposal for an Asian infrastructure investment bank prioritizing ASEAN projects, even though it came a little earlier than expected. It was originally scheduled to be announced next year when China hosts APEC (Xinhua, October 3, October 11; *South China Morning Post*, October 11). That is no surprise, since China’s initiative dovetails with ASEAN’s effort to enhance physical connectivity among its members through a series of infrastructure projects (ASEAN Secretariat). As one seasoned ASEAN observer pointed out, as of late last year, the grouping was only been able to raise a few hundred million dollars for the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity, far short of the Asian Development Bank projections, which say the region needs a whopping \$60 billion a year over the next decade to make the proposal a reality (*Bangkok Post*, September 17, 2012).

The other two economic ideas in the cooperation framework have already been discussed previously and are considered important by Beijing and Southeast Asian states as they build on previous achievements in ASEAN–China relations. While CAFTA has been successful thus far in reducing tariffs, both sides agree that there is much room for improvement, whether through cutting non-tariff barriers or focusing more on the areas of services and investment (Xinhua, October 8). At the Special China–ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, Singapore’s foreign minister K. Shanmugam said that all ASEAN members supported the initiative (Xinhua, August 30). The proposal to further enhance ASEAN–

China financial cooperation, which initially grew out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has also been welcomed, particularly in the wake of economic uncertainty amid the European debt crisis and a slow U.S. recovery (Caixin Media, October 16; China Radio International, October 15).

But while Southeast Asian countries may laud some of Beijing's fresh initiatives, their view of the long-term trajectory of ASEAN–China economic relations is also tinged with caution, for two reasons. First, as the Singaporean commentator Simon Tay has noted, China's economic size and power has grown tremendously relative to Southeast Asia since the 1990s, and this asymmetry alone worries some in the region today (*Japan Times*, August 15). Second, and on a related note, ASEAN countries may worry that being overly dependent on China economically would allow Beijing to use its dominance to undermine their foreign policy autonomy. The consequences of overdependence on China were on full display during ASEAN deliberations in Cambodia in July 2012, when Phnom Penh was pressured by its largest trading partner and investor to shape the agenda which eventually resulted in the organization's unprecedented failure to issue a joint communiqué (*Asia Times*, July 27). Given these fears, some Chinese commentators and diplomats have emphasized that boosting economic ties with ASEAN requires more than just new economic proposals, but “enhancing political mutual trust” as well (*Global Times*, October 15; Xinhua, October 8).

ASEAN's reaction to some of the political-security initiatives in the 2 + 7 cooperation framework has been more cautious. Its response to the newly proposed Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation exclusively between China and ASEAN in the ASEAN–China Summit joint statement was a nuanced one, noting it with appreciation but also signaling a preference for a more open and inclusive agreement by mentioning Indonesia's hope for a similar pact that includes “a wider Indo-Pacific region, beyond ASEAN and China” (ASEAN Secretariat). ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh also later told *The Straits Times* in an interview that the Chinese proposal “has to be studied carefully first” (*The Nation* [Thailand], October 15). ASEAN also appeared cool to Beijing's proposal for an informal ASEAN–China defense ministers meeting in China, choosing to leave this to “a convenient time in the future” in the statement

(*The Straits Times*, October 11). And while the Chinese proposal to strengthen exchanges and relations in the security field may be a good idea in general, experts noted that even the recent enhanced defense ties Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to with Beijing during President Xi's trip represent more continuity than change in what is still nascent cooperation (*The Diplomat*, October 16).

ASEAN's caution is not surprising. Greater economic cooperation with Beijing since the 1990s has failed to spill over into the political-security realm, and Southeast Asian states continue to be concerned to varying degrees about China's growing military capabilities and its lack of transparency about its intentions. Beijing's renewed assertiveness over territorial and maritime disputes with ASEAN countries in the South China Sea since 2009, including the imposition of unilateral fishing bans, harassment of vessels from other nations, and its saber-rattling at sea with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, has only compounded these fears (see M. Taylor Fravel, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, December 2011). This unease has manifested itself in various forms over the last few years, from Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew's speech in October 2009 urging the United States to balance a rising China to investments in naval capabilities by South China Sea claimants Vietnam, the Philippines, and most recently Malaysia (Lee Kuan Yew, speech at U.S.–ASEAN Business Council Anniversary Gala Dinner, October 27, 2009; *The Economist*, March 24, 2012; *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, October 15).

Meanwhile, totally absent from China's new framework was any mention of dealing with the South China Sea with ASEAN as a region, although this dispute has been the main irritant in Beijing's relations with Southeast Asia. Instead, Chinese officials at the recent round of Asian summitry repeated their mantra: that the disputes should be addressed bilaterally and that other external actors should not interfere (*The Straits Times*, October 11). Beyond the rhetoric, Beijing's actions on the issue over the past few weeks have been worrying to say the least. Beijing disinvited Philippine president Benigno Aquino from the ASEAN–China Expo in Nanning, in apparent punishment for his government's decision to turn to the United Nations to challenge China's extensive maritime claims (*South China Morning Post*, August 2). More generally, experts say China has continued its foot-dragging on a binding code of conduct with ASEAN.

Chinese officials continue to say that consultations should only be pushed forward in a step-by-step fashion, even as they work to delay meaningful progress by insisting that the issue be tackled by lower-level officials within the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group and proposing the establishment of an experts’ group to address technical issues (*The Straits Times*, October 1). But as one Chinese commentator correctly noted, distrust of China will linger in Southeast Asia unless Beijing demonstrates its willingness to address key security issues head-on rather than hoping that economic cooperation will spill over into other areas (*Global Times*, October 15).

While these are serious obstacles to better ASEAN–China relations, they are not insurmountable and the new Chinese leadership is at least trying to overcome them. One way to mollify concerns about China’s economic might, for instance, is to grant partners generous and customized concessions like the early harvest program Beijing offered to Southeast Asian states before the initial conclusion of the CAFTA. Premier Li appeared to employ a similar tactic on his visit to Thailand when he said Beijing would buy Thai rice and rubber—both of which the government has been struggling to sell (Associated Press, October 11). And in the security realm, progress on Beijing’s proposed working group on joint exploration in dispute areas with Vietnam could at least demonstrate that there are alternative ways to approach the South China Sea issue aside from confrontations at sea or contentious arbitration the United Nations.

Ultimately though, if Beijing truly wants to forge an ASEAN–China “community of common destiny,” as President Xi told Indonesia’s parliament, then it will require much more. The two-point political consensus embedded in the new leadership’s cooperation framework holds that promoting cooperation should be based on strategic trust and good neighborliness, while deepening cooperation should be focused on advancing joint economic development. The problem for China, simply put, is that its relationship with ASEAN lacks strategic trust due to lingering security concerns, while prospects for joint economic development are limited by ASEAN’s fear of domination by its larger neighbor. At the ASEAN–China Expo earlier this year, Chinese premier Li Keqiang described the past decade of ASEAN–China relations as a “golden decade” and said both sides have the power to create a “diamond decade” in the next ten years (*The*

Jakarta Post, September 6). But all that glitters is not gold. Indeed, China’s diamond decade may quickly lose its shine if Beijing does not address ASEAN’s concerns in a comprehensive fashion.

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Learning by Doing: PLAN Operational Innovations in the Gulf of Aden

By Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange

Chinese planners were seriously concerned about logistical and operational challenges associated with anti-piracy missions near Somali waters long before the first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships were deployed in 2008. In particular, trends in PLAN Far Seas logistical support and surface platform deployment demonstrate how China has gradually streamlined the underpinnings of its anti-piracy missions. As a result of becoming more efficient, China’s calculus vis-à-vis the costs and benefits of these distant sea nontraditional security missions continues to evolve.

China’s Anti-Piracy Engine

China’s anti-piracy task forces rely on a combination of underway replenishment and port visits for fuel and stores. When escort duties are handed off to an incoming task force, the outgoing group transfers “materials, equipment and spares” to its relief, such as in the twelfth/thirteenth task force handover (*Liberation Army Daily*, November 23, 2012).

Sustained overseas deployments are difficult and require multiple skills that the PLAN had not developed prior to the Gulf of Aden (GoA) deployment. While the most advanced navies may consider these routine, the PLAN is learning them incrementally. Executing replenishment at sea is far more difficult than logistics, which can be planned in advance, or ship handling and cargo

transferring, which can be simulated and practiced in the Near Seas. It requires maintaining schedules, planning stores distribution, and exercising the supply system—repeatedly—as well as improvising, e.g., when a ‘just in time’ delivery to a transfer port fails to occur. Unlike during training simulations at home, poor performance in the Far Seas generates real consequences, often before the eyes of other navies or nations.

PLAN anti-piracy task forces rely partially on underway replenishment to supply critical fuel and stores. When task forces transfer escort duties, outgoing PLAN warships usually convey materials and equipment to incoming vessels. The PLAN is learning the craft of blue water at-sea replenishment, albeit gradually. One U.S. Navy helicopter pilot whom the authors consulted has witnessed Chinese ships conducting at sea replenishment in the GoA by halting and tying up. U.S. ships, by contrast, usually maintain 13 knots.

Refueling and maintaining ample stocks of high-quality water, food, and medicine on board have also been enduring challenges. Food supplies often spoil and maintaining ample water supply is apparently a particular problem. According to a June 2011 article in *Modern Navy*, in the PLAN all drinking water for the duration of five- or six month-escort deployments is obtained from shore, sometimes via replenishment ships, as water purified from saltwater tastes bad and is used only for bathwater.

One major trend in logistical support has been the PLAN’s growing reliance on foreign ports where its ships can moor temporarily for maintenance. For example, during the inaugural anti-piracy deployment, only the supply ship *Weishanbu* made two brief stops, for replenishment, at Port Aden; while destroyers *Haikou* and *Wuhan* received only at-sea replenishment and made no port visits, apparently because Chinese decision makers were concerned about the possibility of local opposition. [1] This unusual initial approach surprised some American naval observers with whom one of the authors spoke, who had expected that the destroyers would enter port repeatedly.

Warships within escort task forces are now, in contrast, relying increasingly on overseas ports for supply and replenishment. For this reason, some Chinese scholars are calling for a more systematic overseas replenishment mechanism for PLAN escort operations. [2] One

driver of this trend is the extended duration of recent operations—the inaugural task force was at sea for 124 days, whereas the most recent deployments task have averaged roughly half a year away from their home ports.

Of course, an underlying, pragmatic rationale for increasing the frequency of PLAN port calls is that Beijing uses anti-piracy missions to pursue broader diplomatic objectives along the Indian Ocean littoral and in the Middle East, such as enhancing bilateral ties with important energy suppliers. Since 2011 the “normalization” (*changtaihua*) of PLAN port calls has occurred rapidly; warships in recent escort task forces have stopped in foreign ports an average of once per month, typically staying in port for five days. While on land in other countries, crews often participate in group shopping, sightseeing, and other collective activities.

A third option for resupplying task forces in the GoA has been to rely on Chinese SOEs whose vessels operate out of coastal-state ports. As *People’s Navy* explained in 2010, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), the PRC’s largest shipping company, has working relations with husbanding agents and suppliers in most foreign coastal states (Xinhua, January 6, 2011). Apparently a COSCO subsidiary, COSCO West Africa, Ltd., has become the PLAN’s largest partner in procuring supplies for escort ships (*Global Times*, December 24, 2012). According to COSCO’s website, at the close of fiscal year 2011 the company operated a fleet of 157 vessels, which were active at 159 ports in forty-eight countries. These preexisting relationships have helped facilitate coordination between PLAN ships at sea and suppliers in littoral states. They also embody the PRC’s growing comprehensive overseas presence in regions viewed as critical to China’s future economic and energy security.

Surface Platform Trajectories

Nearly all PLAN task forces have employed some combination of Type 052 *Luyang*-class destroyers and Type 054 *Jiangkai*-class frigates, some of China’s most advanced primary surface combatants. Considering the lack of other opportunities to deploy naval platforms in the Far Seas, it is understandable that the PLAN is eager to send elite platforms to the GoA.

Meanwhile, the largest platforms used in China’s anti-

piracy operations have been those performing supply and replenishment functions. With displacements of twenty-three thousand tons, Type 903 *Qiandaohu*-class replenishment ships were the PRC's most experienced replenishment ships at the outset of the anti-piracy mission. In 2007, for instance, *Weishanbu* participated in both the *Sino-British Friendship* and *Sino-French Friendship* 2007 exercises in the English Channel and Mediterranean Sea, respectively. [3]

Three *Yuzhao*-class Type 071 LPDs, the PLAN's largest vessels aside from the recently commissioned aircraft carrier *Liaoning*, remain the most formidable platforms available for supporting PLAN anti-piracy operations in the GoA. Type 071 flagship *Kunlunshan* participated in the 6th escort task force. It was deployed to the GoA in 2010, shortly after being commissioned in late 2008, reflecting the PLAN's eagerness to deploy its best platforms in the Far Seas. *Jinggangshan*, a 200m-long Type 071 commissioned into the South Sea Fleet in October 2011, engaged in joint training with PLAN helicopters in February 2012 and is likely to participate in future task forces (*Liberation Army Daily*, February 8, 2012). As several analysts have noted, Type 071 ships, in addition to supporting the PLAN's current anti-piracy missions, move China's navy closer to an ability to assemble a comprehensive carrier group (*South China Morning Post*, April 16, 2011). Type 071 LPDs provide anti-piracy task forces with unprecedented capacity—one ship can hold fifteen to twenty amphibious armored vehicles, a number of landing craft, and helicopters for extended voyages. As Dennis Blasko points out, these features give the PLAN “its first true ‘blue water’ amphibious capability.” [4]

The commissioning of China's first aircraft carrier, *Liaoning*, on September 25, 2012, coupled with the present lack of overseas bases, begs the question of whether the PLAN might eventually use that carrier to support anti-piracy efforts and collect experience in the process. A PLAN officer told one of the authors in 2011 that the naval platforms China then possessed were “still not enough” to achieve its security goals: “The majority of our ships are small, and can't navigate on the high seas. Even the GoA task groups had a very hard time. In the future, China will have three or four carrier groups, with one operating at a given time.” Similarly, Chinese naval expert Li Jie believes China should possess a minimum of three

aircraft carriers “to accomplish sea combat missions and fulfill international obligations” (People's Daily Online, November 30, 2012). The same article suggests a greater role for larger PLAN warships in future nontraditional security operations, such as anti-piracy: “As a responsible major power and one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China will shoulder more international responsibility in various fields such as disaster relief and combat against terrorism and piracy. Therefore, the country's naval force, particularly large warships, will become more and more useful.”

Initial Chinese scholarly reactions describe China's first aircraft carrier, the 990-foot-long then-*Varyag*, purchased for twenty million dollars from Ukraine in 1998, as a necessary step in China's self-defense-based military modernization and not as a resource for winning bilateral regional disputes (*Outlook Weekly*, September 9, 2012). Chinese carriers may add substantial value when deployed abroad for contemporary noncombat operations, such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and anti-piracy, at least in the near term (People's Daily Online, September 25, 2012). Indeed, when *Liaoning* was delivered to China's navy, *People's Daily* noted the carrier's importance for developing Far Seas cooperation and the nation's ability to respond to nontraditional security threats. Even so, deploying a carrier out of area would not simply entail “showing the flag” but reflect China's arrival as a blue-water naval power (*Beijing Youth Daily*, September 26, 2012).

Regarding the benefits of deploying a carrier near the GoA, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) researcher Wang Hanlin wrote in 2009 that “the rotation of warships sent to the region has also revealed the necessity of an aircraft carrier for China. . . . It will be much easier for an aircraft carrier combat unit to safeguard merchant vessels in such a remote area” (Xinhua, April 2, 2009). Similarly, a *China Daily* op-ed stresses the relationship between carrier deployment and nontraditional security: “The increasing threat from nontraditional elements like terrorism and piracy also require China to have its aircraft carrier to ensure the security of its transportation in the sea” (*China Daily*, September 27, 2012). Of course, rather than simply enhancing global maritime security, CCP and PLA officials may view this option as a convenient way eventually to gain invaluable operational experience under

the legitimate mandate of promoting SLOC security and making an even greater contribution to the fight against regional piracy.

Moreover, if China fields a fixed-wing, carrier-deployed aircraft or an unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in operating it *Liaoning* would provide the Chinese anti-piracy mission with much greater aerial coverage, in addition to alleviating the limitations imposed by limited deck space of other surface vessels. Additionally, anti-piracy operations could also represent an excellent opportunities to learn important lessons on logistics, training, and operations. Relatively low-risk missions against pirate crews could serve as effective training. Carrier crewmembers at all levels would benefit substantially from participation in PLAN efforts off the Horn of Africa. Already, GoA deployments allow experimentation with PLAN task group composition, as will be necessary when new vessels enter the fleet, particularly in preparation for a carrier group.

Although *Liaoning* has dominated Chinese and international media coverage of China's naval modernization, the reported development of the Type 081 landing helicopter dock (LHD) is another advanced platform suitable for GoA and other anti-piracy missions. As was revealed at the International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX) in May 2007, China is developing a LHD landing ship. A *Global Times* article reported that the ship was identified as the rumored Type 081 and that it will be comparable in displacement and size to the Type 071 LPDs, which carry helicopters and transport and deploy ground forces, but with a flat, or "flush," helicopter deck (*Global Net: Military*, March 28, 2012). The same article, citing *Jane's*, suggests that the Type 081 will possess greater aviation capabilities than its Type 071 predecessor and that the PLAN may construct from three to six of them. According to *Jane's World Navies*, the Type 081 will be able to transport twelve helicopters and a crew of over a thousand uninterrupted for approximately one month. Chinese analysts such as Ye Qi have suggested that further development of amphibious ships would make great contributions to anti-piracy operations (*Modern Navy*, November 11, 2011).

Logistical and Operational Trends: Costs and Benefits

Despite valuable opportunities related to logistical and operational innovation, Chinese planners are keenly aware of the immense costs of sustained Far Seas anti-piracy missions. In May 2011 PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde suggested that China's navy may not be able to support the GoA mission much longer. Referring to deploying naval power to protect the maritime commons, Chen acknowledged, "if the situation continues like this, it will create great difficulties for us to continue with such operations." He added, "Then we have this dilemma: on the one hand, if we continue to build new ships we will have constraints of national defense budget. And what is more, it will lead to the issue of hype of the 'China threat' again because of our growing capabilities. On the other hand, if we stop building those new ships, we will not only be unable to send more ships to GoA, but we will find it even difficult to protect and maintain our own maritime interests. So I think we still need a long-term solution to that." Not to mention, as Somali piracy has plummeted since 2012, high profile PLAN deployments of larger platforms may hardly be desirable since they might be viewed as excessive rather than helpful.

It is understandable that Beijing was initially willing to pay a premium to send forces to the GoA given the invaluable experience and operational benefits accrued during anti-piracy missions. After all, absent these operations there would have been virtually no other near-term opportunities to project military power outside China's immediate maritime periphery. However, the PLAN's learning curve has flattened progressively. High-ranking PLAN officials are quickly becoming more proficient in shipboard diplomacy, and China's navy has a growing list of completed joint exercises and anti-piracy operations with foreign navies. Similarly, many of the PLAN's modern surface platforms have accumulated Far Seas experience. All of this begs the larger questions: Do the benefits of future escort task forces outweigh the costs, and, if so, to what extent, using which metrics?

Direct costs include fuel, food, and health supplies, and the ammunition and equipment used in training exercises and live fire, as well as PLAN vessel and equipment depreciation. Additionally, Chinese naval planners are surely calculating the opportunity cost of deploying supply

and landing ships to the GoA when these ships could be preparing for more regionally based operations, such as a potential Taiwan contingency or, even more likely, a militarized South China Sea dispute or an escalation in the East China Sea. Some basic operational procedures applicable to the GoA mission may be transferrable to these hypothetical regional initiatives, but amphibious vessels like the *Yuzhao*-class Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD) could derive more strategic benefits from specialized training in regional waters.

That said, Beijing may view its GoA cost structure quite differently. The PLAN may well desire to continue spreading experience and operational gains from GoA mission farther through its ranks. China is clearly using its GoA mission to provide learning experiences for its most advanced surface vessels.

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Notes

1. You Ji, "PLA Navy's Gulf of Aden Mission as Capability Building against NTS Threats," in Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., *Not Congruent but Quite Complementary: U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Nontraditional Security*, Naval War College China Maritime Study 9 (July 2012), p. 38.

2. Jing Aiming, "Zhongguo haiwai junshi jidi jianxing jianjin" [China's Overseas Military Basing Proceeding Gradually], *Wanxia* [Sunset], no. 2 (February 2012), p. 25.
3. Huang Li, "*Jian zhi yadingwan: zhongguo haijun yuanyang liangjian*" [Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden: The Chinese Navy's Bright Far Seas Sword], Guangzhou, China: (Zhongshan University Press), 2009, pp. 214–16.
4. Dennis Blasko, "China in 2012: Shifting Perspectives—Assessing the PLA from the Ground Up," *China Brief*, Volume 12, Issue 2.

Corrections

- In the last issue of China Brief, the name of the author of "China and the SCO: Dead Wood but a Good Platform" was given incorrectly as Jacob Wood. The author's name is Jacob Zenn.

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