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IN A FORTNIGHT

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Beijing has sought to cultivate ties with a rising generation of Taiwanese politicians, such as Sean Lien (left).

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In a Fortnight

MIXED MESSAGING SURROUNDS LATEST SOUTH CHINA SEA MOVES

By David Cohen

On January 1, new fishing regulations for the South China Sea, issued by the province of Hainan, went into effect, prompting objections from China's territorial rivals in Southeast Asia, as well as the United States and Japan (Xinhua, January 10). Chinese spokespeople have sought to defuse this criticism by depicting the new rules as consistent with the status quo, and by insisting that they do not presage greater enforcement or efforts to expand effective control of disputed territory. Taken together with November's announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea (see *China Brief*, November 27, 2013), China appears to be following a peculiar strategy: issuing rules about disputed territory that raise fears of aggression among its neighbors, not visibly enforcing them, and, at the same time, strenuously denying that it is making progress toward realizing its territorial claims.

The foreign ministries of the Philippines and Vietnam vowed to ignore what both described as an "illegal" move, with the Philippine Foreign Affairs Minister Alberto del Rosario further promising to raise the issue at the January 15–18 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers (*South China Morning Post*, January 11, *Philippine Star*, January 17). Meanwhile, U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki called the move "a provocative and potentially dangerous act," and Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera said that "not only Japan but the international society as a whole

has a concern that China is unilaterally threatening the existing international order” (U.S. State Department daily press briefing, January 9; Japan Update, January 15).

As Isaac Kardon writes in this issue of *China Brief*, the new regulations appear to contain only minor revisions to language that has been on the books for years, and neither extend nor clarify China’s territorial claims. Emphasizing this interpretation, China’s communications strategy has stressed that the new regulations do nothing to change the status quo. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying described the regulations as “technical amendment to a local fishery regulation that has been implemented for years,” and said that “that there is no difference between the measures and the Fisheries Law enacted in 1986 in terms of provisions on the entry of foreign fishing boats in the waters under China’s jurisdiction” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, January 10). Hua did also suggest that China’s critics “either lack common sense or [have] ulterior motives.”

The tone of these remarks echo the efforts of Chinese spokespeople to defuse international criticism following the late November announcement of the new ADIZ over the East China Sea. It is most likely that the ADIZ and the new fishing regulations were conceived or at least approved as a package—although they did not attract international attention until going into force this year, they were passed by Hainan’s legislature on November 29, the day after the ADIZ was announced, and reported immediately in the Chinese press (Xinhua, December 1, 2013).

Predictably, commentary in the Chinese press was somewhat more pointed. While official statements did not take note of the Philippine and Vietnamese response, a widely reprinted *Global Times* article complains that the Philippines “ignores Chinese law” (*Global Times*, January 13). The most widely distributed commentary appears to be an op-ed picked up by Xinhua from the *Guangzhou Daily*, titled “America Should Not Always Stir up Trouble in the South China Sea,” blaming the row on meddling by the United States (Xinhua, January 11). Meanwhile, China is commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Battle of the Paracels, in which China took full control of the islands from Vietnam (Xinhua, January 20). China’s navy began a naval drill, including amphibious landing exercises, on the anniversary of the battle.

Taken together, the two incidents raise a pair of interlocking conundrums: First, if the new regulations do not strengthen China’s claims to disputed territory, what about them makes them worth weathering international criticism? Second, if China does genuinely fear the emergence of a U.S.-organized balancing coalition, why does it regularly “play into the hands” of such a coalition by taking actions that raise fears among its neighbors and thus appear to undermine the strategy of “consolidating friendly relations” laid out by Chinese President Xi Jinping last October (see *China Brief*, November 7, 2013)?

Although such subtleties may be lost on China’s neighbors, China does appear to be attempting to draw a distinction between states with which it hopes to work past disagreements, such as Vietnam, and countries it has written off as rivals, such as Japan and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines. Wu Shicun, the President of the MOFA-affiliated National Institute for South China Sea Studies, has appeared several times in Chinese media to reassure Southeast Asian countries that China does not plan to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea, nor to introduce other elements of its relatively aggressive policy toward Japan. Writing in the *Global Times*, he frankly described the establishment of the ADIZ as “answering blows with blows,” but argued that China’s claims in the south are still too ill-defined to be defended in the same manner, noting that China has not established a territorial sea baseline for its claim to the Spratley (Nansha) Islands or defined the legal status of the nine-dashed line (*Global Times*, January 14). Furthermore, he wrote that trade, and the establishment of a “maritime silk road,” take precedence over territorial disputes, and might preclude one. In an interview on January 19, he also claimed that, owing to “current law-enforcement capacity and technical limitations” the new regulations will be enforced only in the Paracel (Xisha) Islands and the area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal (Zhongsha), over which China already has effective control, and not the divided Spratleys (Nansha) (*Global Times*, January 19).

It is unlikely that such moves are aimed at placating a constituency of hard-line nationalists—on the contrary, by insisting that China is not strengthening its control of disputed territory and tolerating its neighbors’ ignoring its rules, the government is surely providing fodder for nationalist criticism.

More likely, it seems that China is trying to establish legal frameworks to be called upon later, either in justifying novel actions and practices, to defend the legitimacy of its actions in an unplanned incident, and to consolidate the changes in the status quo that have taken place over the past few years. This may already be happening with the ADIZ: On January 23, Air Force spokesperson Shen Jinke announced that Chinese aircraft have been regularly patrolling the zone, and have “beefed up China’s effective control over the ADIZ,” according to a Xinhua report (Xinhua, January 23).

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Hainan Revises Fishing Regulations in South China Sea: New Language, Old Ambiguities

By Isaac Kardon

On November 29 of last year, Hainan’s legislature approved revised measures (*banfa*) for implementing the PRC Fisheries Law. Unlike earlier provincial fisheries regulations, the new measures single out “foreigners and foreign fishing vessels” as requiring special permission to operate within Hainan’s jurisdiction, effective January 1 of this year (*Hainan Daily*, December 7, 2013). Following controversy over China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS) (see *China Brief*, November 27, 2013) and amid a broader pattern of Chinese “assertiveness” in prosecuting their disputed claims to islands and maritime zones in the ECS and South China Sea (SCS), this announcement elicited critical comments from several foreign governments. Such concern is not warranted from the regulations alone.

Analysis of the text of the new *banfa* in comparison to previous iterations of the provincial rules and the national fisheries law it implements reveals that these measures do not expand China’s claims to maritime jurisdiction, nor do they impose new restrictions on foreign fishing vessels. They may, however, signal an intention to more fully enforce existing law in areas claimed as Chinese Exclusive

Economic Zones (EEZs). In addition, by failing to clarify the extent of waters under Hainan’s administration—and, in fact, being *less* precise about restricted zones in the Paracels (*xisha*) and Macclesfield Bank (*zhongsha*)—the revised measures carry on a policy of deliberate ambiguity about China’s jurisdictional claims in the SCS.

A War of Words

The new *banfa* became public when Xinhua announced the new measures on December 1, 2013, and called specific attention to an article requiring State Council permission for foreigners and foreign fishing vessels to engage in fishing activities in Hainan’s area of jurisdiction, covering two million square kilometers (Xinhua, December 1, 2013). The article went on to warn of confiscations, fines, and criminal liability for violators. The regulations did not provoke international reaction until after the *banfa* went into effect in the new year. On January 9, a U.S. State Department spokeswoman issued a strongly worded criticism of the new law as a “provocative and potentially dangerous act” (US State Department Daily Press Briefing, January 9). The following day, the Vietnamese foreign ministry declared that the Chinese act, and related infringements on Vietnamese fishing in disputed zones, were “illegal, null and void, and represent serious infringements on Vietnam’s sovereignty” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, January 10). A Philippine foreign ministry statement that day also expressed “grave concern” and called on China to “immediately clarify” the new law; the Philippine foreign minister pledged to raise the issue in ASEAN ministerial meetings, which began on January 15 (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, January 10; *Philippine Star*, January 17). Related commentary in the international press strikes similar notes, but little attention is devoted to the content of the new Hainan regulations, nor have any reports identified changes to China’s enforcement practice. The analysis below addresses both issues.

Analysis of Banfa Text

The measures at issue are the second revision (*xingai*) of the original 1993 provincial *banfa*, first revised in 2008. [1] Each iteration represents an attempt to bring provincial practice into line with national legislation, specifically the 2004 PRC Fisheries Law. [2] As regulation rather than law, “legally, it cannot regulate more than the fisheries

law prescribes,” according to Professor Zhang Xinjun of Tsinghua University Law School (Email conversation with author, January 15, 2013). The principal regulation at issue is Article 35 of the new *banfa*, which stipulates that: “foreigners and foreign fishing vessels entering the waters under the jurisdiction of this province to engage in fisheries production or fisheries resource surveys must obtain permission from the relevant department under the State Council ... [such individuals and vessels] must abide by national laws and regulations governing fisheries, environmental protection, entry and exit administration and related regulations of the province.” Comparison with previous Hainan regulations and the national legislation they implement demonstrates that this restriction is not new. Certain omissions and rewordings, however, are reason for close attention to Hainan’s enforcement of the new measures.

The language used in Article 35 is almost identical to that used in Article 8 of the 2004 PRC Fisheries Law, the legislation that the *banfa* is designed to implement. Neither the 1993 nor the 2008 versions of these measures used this exact language, though they place comparable restrictions on foreign vessels. The new article is much more specific about foreigners and foreign vessels (*waiguoren*, *waiguo yuchuan*) than prior regulations, which in article 21(3) impose a similar requirements on vessels not originating from provincial ports (*waishen*, *qu huozhe jingwai*). The new article differs primarily in singling out foreign individuals as well as vessels in a separate article, though in this respect it mimics the national legislation.

Several changes to the *banfa* are still notable. First, it does not mention an annual moratorium on fishing in protected areas around the Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank, as the previous regulations did in Article 31. Second, it is less precise about the “relevant organs under the State Council” who could, in principle, authorize foreign fishing activity in areas under Hainan’s jurisdiction; both prior measures indicate the competent office (fisheries and ports) under the Ministry of Agriculture (also Article 31). Third, Article 39 in both previous *banfa* specify penalties for violating provincial fisheries regulations, including confiscation of catches, fishing gear, and illegal income, as well as fines and possible prosecution in accord with Chinese criminal law; similar provisions are found in Article 46 of the national fisheries law. Article 9 of the new law gives fisheries officials authority to inspect

vessels, their equipment, and cargo, but makes no mention of confiscation. Only interference with fisheries law enforcement is indicated as a cause for initiating criminal procedures. The Xinhua announcement cites penalties (seizure, fines, criminal prosecution, etc.) drawn from the national legislation, which requires local implementation measures as stipulated in previous versions of the *banfa*. Their omission is another unexplained ambiguity in the new document, and will need to be judged according to subsequent enforcement practice.

These relatively minor differences do not warrant expectations of drastically revised fisheries law enforcement. The thrust of the measures is to better regulate the vast but still undefined maritime zone under Hainan’s jurisdiction on issues ranging from the size of allowable catch to the types of outboard motors permitted in protected areas. Depleted fish stocks, environmental degradation, marine pollution, rampant overfishing, and national plans to develop deep-water fisheries production are all factors that plausibly justify further reform and rationalization of Hainan’s fisheries law enforcement. The technical and precise language intended to guide provincial authorities in implementing national policy does not, however, provide any greater clarity on where and to what extent these regulations are to be enacted.

Hainan’s Maritime Jurisdiction: Unclear Boundaries

However unimportant the new regulations may be, Chinese responses to the wave of criticism concerning the Hainan regulations do not address the crucial question of where those rules (or any other domestic maritime law enforcement) are to be effective. The Chinese foreign ministry stresses the continuity of its fisheries law enforcement with respect to foreign vessels, and accused critics of “ulterior motives” in lodging complaints against the new measures (Chinese Foreign Ministry Press Briefing, January 10). The bulk of PRC media commentary evinces the same attitude (First Financial Online (Yicai Wang), January 14; China News Online, January 14; Xinhua, January 10). Despite the validity of the basic claim that there is no substantive change to China’s law regarding foreign activity in waters under its claimed jurisdiction, there remains a glaring omission: China has still not clarified the geographical scope of those waters and their status under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Xinhua press release announcing the new *banfa* asserts that Hainan is responsible for some 2 million square kilometers of relevant maritime area (*xiangguan haiyu*). The only official document citing this figure is the relatively obscure Twelfth Five-Year Plan of the Hainan Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) (Hainan Maritime Safety Administration, July 7, 2012). The Hainan MSA document claims that the province administers roughly two thirds of China's overall maritime space (*woguo haiyu*), sets basepoints for the northern tier of waters under Hainan's administration, and extends a line south-east at 140 degrees from the Qiongzhou Strait as the north-eastern boundary of that zone (see Figure 1 below). By inference, this line encloses the Macclesfield Bank, and then intersects the now-infamous U-shaped, or "nine-dashed," line, thus including the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands as well as areas claimed as the EEZ of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. In short, the new measures make negligible revisions to China's restrictions on foreign activities while missing another opportunity to remove ambiguity about the precise extent of the PRC claim to maritime jurisdiction.

The Proof is in the Practice

Nothing in the text of the *banfa* implies any necessary change to China's fisheries law enforcement, but comments from knowledgeable Chinese commentators hint at possible reasons for the new measures and likely implications for how and where the regulations will be enforced in disputed waters. In general, the expectation is that the regulations signal ramped-up enforcement moving forward. Shen Shishun, director of the department of Asia-Pacific security and co-operation at the China Institute of International Studies, argues that "our navy and law enforcement forces have not patrolled the disputed areas often enough. Now, given the strengthening of their capabilities, they will step up surveillance ... That's why we now require foreign fishing vessels to get permission" (*South China Morning Post*, January 10). Such comments validate foreign concerns that these measures represent one more in what appears to be a series of steps to consolidate Chinese effective control in disputed zones. The emphasis on requirements and punishment for foreign vessels in the original Xinhua announcement reinforces this interpretation. Still, enforcement will bear close monitoring moving forward to judge whether the regulations will practically affect

what has been an irregular pattern of arrests of foreign fishermen and confiscations of foreign fishing catch and vessels. [3]

The measures may also mean only more targeted law enforcement in critical areas close to disputed territory. Wu Shicun, a delegate to the Hainan National People's Congress and also President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, suggested that the new measures are intended to sharpen enforcement around the Paracels. "The goal is to make them not dare to come back...If you violate the rules, you will pay a high price" (*Wall Street Journal*, January 10). He added that enforcement activity would be focused on China's territorial seas, which which extend only 12 nautical miles from coastal baselines. China has not officially stated which features in the SCS are entitled to the full complement of maritime zones (i.e., EEZ and continental shelf), but in drawing straight baselines around the Paracels in 1996, they controversially elected to treat the area as though it were an archipelago and therefore accessible only to foreign vessels engaged in "innocent passage" and no other navigational or operational activity. The omission of the protected area around the Paracels in the new measures makes this prediction somewhat confusing, but the trend towards enhanced effective control of this area in particular is established and may be expected to continue.

Another possibility is that the *banfa* will further complicate the already difficult balance of responsibilities shared by the several state and provincial agencies responsible for administering China's maritime periphery, maritime law enforcement entities. These are: the State Oceanic Administration, under the Land and Resources Ministry; the China Coast Guard, under the Public Security Ministry; the Transport Ministry's MSA; Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) under the Ministry of Agriculture; and the General Administration of Customs (GAC). According to Lin Yun, director of legal affairs for the Hainan Department of Ocean and Fisheries, the recent reshuffle of China's civilian maritime bureaucracy is not yet complete, meaning Fisheries Law Enforcement Command and China Marine Surveillance vessels would continue to do work ultimately intended for a unified coast guard under the State Oceanic Administration (*South China Morning Post*, January 11). Such an interpretation is consistent with last year's similarly-scrutinized revision to Hainan's Regulations for the Management of Coastal

Border Security and Public Order, the 2012 upgrade of Sansha City's administrative status from county-to prefecture-level, and broader national priorities to enhance the development of China's maritime economy.

[4]

Lin also noted that the ambiguity over the scope of the waters under Hainan's administration cannot be determined by provincial regulations—only an act of national legislation could delimit the area in question. China's 1998 Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf announces China's intention to claim the maximal entitlement (200nm) from its coastal baselines, but none have been fixed in the Spratlys to date, and the U-shaped line lacks precise coordinates. [5] If the new *banfa* leads to heightened activity from any or all of China's maritime law enforcement agencies, it may well clarify the content of the Chinese claim to jurisdiction by providing further evidence of what activities it will restrict in which areas. This incremental, "creeping jurisdiction" may not establish the exact parameters of the Chinese claim but will place growing obstacles in front of claimants seeking to assert their sovereign rights in zones increasingly regulated by Chinese domestic agencies.

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Notes

1. 1993 text available at < http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=23536 >; 2008 revision at < <http://www.hainan.gov.cn/data/law/2008/08/1157/> >.
2. This law was promulgated in 1986, and amended in 2000 and 2004. Full text at: < http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-07/18/content_15802.htm >
3. M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33(3) (2011), p. 305.
4. See M. Taylor Fravel, "Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: An Update," *The Diplomat*, January 3,"

and Dennis Blasko and M. Taylor Fravel, "Much Ado About The Sansha Garrison," *The Diplomat*, August 23, 2012.

5. Text of law available in English at < http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf >.

Lunar Rover Marks Another Advance in China's Space Programs

By Cristina Garafola

On December 2, at approximately 1:30 AM local standard time, an enhanced Chang Zheng-3B rocket carrying the Chang'e-3 lunar probe lifted off from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan, China. On December 14, China became only the third country to complete a lunar soft landing, following the United States and the former Soviet Union. The next day, Chang'e-3 released the lunar rover Yutu onto the moon's surface, and both the rover and the lander have begun conducting experiments and sending visual information and data back to Earth. According to official state media, Yutu will explore the moon's surface for three months and the lander has the capability to run for one year (Xinhua, December 23, 2013).

While China's recent achievements are still roughly 40 to 50 years behind advances made during the U.S.-Soviet space race, the Chang'e-3 lunar probe landing marks another significant accomplishment in a period defined by China's 2011 space white paper as "crucial" for "bring[ing] new opportunities to China's space industry." Moreover, China's space programs have enjoyed a string of successes that have put China on track to becoming one of the world's most advanced space-faring nations within a decade. The PRC has created and supported such programs to reap the benefits of conducting space-based scientific research as well as opportunities for international recognition and improving its popularity

Figure 1. China Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP)/Chang'e Missions, 2007-2030

| Project Phase | Program Name | Date | Salient Attributes/Notes |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|---|
| Phase One: Orbiting | Chang'e-1 | October 2007-March 2009 | First lunar mission; detailed 3D mapping of moon; first lunar probe to use microwave radiator to conduct remote sensing; intentional crash onto moon's surface |
| | Chang'e-2 | October 2010-present | Tested preparations for Chang'e 3; improved cameras, measuring and tracking equipment; first Chinese mission to an asteroid; currently conducting deep space exploration mission to test tracking and control capabilities |
| Phase Two: Landing | Chang'e-3 | December 2013-present | Soft landing; rover and lander conducting surface exploration; withstanding extreme heat and cold on lunar surface; has conducted optical and ultraviolet-imaging experiments and arm flexing test; lander and rover successfully awoken after powering down for 14 day lunar "night" |
| | Chang'e-4 | Not known | Described as a back-up probe for Chang'e-3 in official media |
| Phase Three: Returning | Chang'e-5 | Est. 2017-2018 | Chang'e-4 will be used as a prototype for Chang'e-5 technologies; expected to gather lunar soil samples |
| Manned Lunar Missions | Future missions | Est. 2025-2030 | |

Sources: The eoPortal Directory [1]; Xinhua coverage from May 24, 2009, December 18, 23, and 26, 2013.

domestically with Chinese citizens. As a result of this testing, research, and development, China's lunar and deep space programs have already begun to spur advances in dual-use technologies that will shape China's military and civilian use of space.

Recent Developments in Lunar and Deep Space Programs

The China Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) has three phases: 1) orbital missions; 2) soft landing missions; and 3) "return" missions in which samples are sent back to Earth. A fourth possible phase is future manned lunar missions. In 2009, Ye Peijian, the chief designer of the Chang'e lunar probe, stated that China was studying the feasibility of conducting a manned lunar mission between 2025 and 2030, but little more is known about

a prospective lunar mission. Figure one, above, provides a synopsis of completed and future missions.

The Chang'e-2 is China's first deep space explorer, having already ventured over 37 million miles from Earth and potentially traveling nearly 196 million miles before it loses functionality (Xinhua, November 26, 2013; Taikong Tansuo [Space Exploration], June 1, 2013). Since leaving lunar orbit, Chang'e-2 has achieved two milestones for China's deep space exploration so far. First, in August 2011, it became the first spacecraft to exit lunar orbit and then enter the orbit of the Sun-Earth L2 Lagrange Point, a complex feat because at L2, the gravity of both the sun and Earth balance a spacecraft's orbital motion. Second, in December 2012, the Chang'e-2 conducted a successful flyby of the asteroid 4179 Toutatis, coming within two miles of the asteroid and becoming the fourth space

agency in the world after the United States, Europe, and Japan to conduct close flyby operations with an asteroid (Xinhua, December 15, 2012). Chinese scientists have also discussed plans for an independent Mars mission, after a Chinese Mars probe in November 2011 launched on the back of a Russian rocket that burned up in the Earth's atmosphere and fell into the Pacific Ocean.

Motivations for Space Programs

Chinese motivations for space program development primarily fall into four main categories: domestic prestige, international recognition, scientific advances, and national security needs. First, the space program is frequently portrayed as popular with Chinese citizens, particularly the Shenzhou manned missions, which are described as having captured the Chinese imagination as a mark of modernization and development (Xinhua, June 16, 2013). Particularly after the Shenzhou manned missions began in 2003, government officials have consciously highlighted the success of the programs as a component of overall Chinese development efforts. For example, after the recent Chang'e-3 launch, Zhang Zhenzhong, director of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, said, "We will strive for our space dream as part of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation," a reference to the "Chinese dream" promoted by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping beginning in late 2012 (Xinhua, December 2, 2013).

Second, China has made efforts to publicly contribute to a "peaceful" space realm that all countries can use and share. China first became a partner with other countries during the late 1980s when it developed a satellite-launching service for small countries that lacked the capability to produce rockets with sufficient lift capability by themselves. In 1992, China, Thailand, and Pakistan jointly proposed the development of a regional space collaboration mechanism, and China hosted the Asia-Pacific Workshop on Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA) in Beijing later that year. The workshop evolved into the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO; in Chinese *yatai kongjian bezuo zuzhi*) in 2008 and is headquartered in Beijing. Member and signatory states currently include Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. [2] APSCO has proposed and begun implementing collaborative satellite projects as well as education and training programs for scientists

from member countries and cooperation on Earth observation, disaster management, and environmental programs. One project begun in 2011, the Asia-Pacific Ground Based Optical Satellite Observation System or APOSOS, aims to develop a regional space observation network by linking existing observatories through a shared data center and building new ones in APSCO's member countries and other participating countries. A presentation prepared by the National Astronomical Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) noted that APOSOS would facilitate tracking, including a collision early warning service, as well as other services like orbit determination and cataloguing, predicting space objects' re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, and providing further opportunities for technical consultation and training among member countries. [3]

Third, a key component of China's space program efforts featured prominently in the 2011 space white paper and elsewhere is the opportunity for scientific advancement. So far, hundreds of innovations are reportedly coming from the space program; for example, a People's Daily Online article on the Shenzhou-10 launch noted that "80 percent of more than 1,100 kinds of new materials China has developed recently are completed under the aerospace technology department" (June 14, 2013). Some of these technologies include life support systems, the Feitian astronaut suits, thermal paint, insulation and anti-obstruction window materials, improvements in solar cell conversion efficiency levels, new types of lubricant oils, and a Payload Data Management System (PDMS) to transmit video, imagery, science and other data back to Earth (eoPortal Directory; People's Daily Online, June 14, 2013). The Shenzhou and Chang'e missions have also facilitated hundreds of experiments, including animal research, microgravity crystallography (examining the arrangement of atoms in solids), ray and particle detection, the first permanent Moon-based telescope, and the possibility of extracting natural resources from the Moon (eoPortal Directory; Xinhua, September 4; conference; China Daily Online, December 23, 2013). [4] The missions have additionally tested upgrades to radio transmissions, weather and other sensors, videography and imaging, Earth observation, and space environment monitoring. Data from the lunar launches is being distributed to universities and academies throughout the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau to expand academic research and analysis on space issues (eoPortal Directory).

Finally, the 2011 space white paper acknowledges the value of China's space exploration, including satellite systems and the lunar and other programs discussed in this paper, for national security purposes. China's space program is run by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the national security apparatus. Though China has a NASA equivalent called the China National Space Administration (CNSA), China's space programs are primarily managed by the PLA's General Armament Department (GAD). GAD oversees R&D, launch sites, spacecraft, and programs, including the human spaceflight program, while CNSA manages international agreements, exchanges with other countries, and space technologies and industries (Kevin Pollpeter, "Competing Perceptions of the U.S. and Chinese Space Programs," *China Brief*, March 5, 2007). Furthermore, CNSA is closely integrated with SASTIND, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, a civilian agency that works with GAD to coordinate which defense firms may undertake R&D and production of weapons systems. Many of the technologies and experiments performed during Chang'e and Shenzhou manned missions feature dual-use components highly relevant for military systems and platforms as well as space-based military operations. Some examples are below:

- **Telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C):** One purpose of the Chang'e-2's extended mission was to test spacecraft tracking and command capabilities, particularly given that China recently built two new measuring and control stations in Xinjiang and Heilongjiang (eoPortal Directory). TT&C capabilities are also needed to track the whereabouts of other countries' spacecraft, such as C4ISR satellites.
- **Data transfer:** Components of the Payload Data Management Systems (PDMS), including its S-band transmitters, are also used in Chinese satellites such as the SJ-5 and the SJ-9A to relay information back to Earth (eoPortal Directory). Improvements in data transmission quantity, speed, and duration could enhance a satellite's ability to relay data on, for example, the location of relevant military targets back to the PLA.
- **Civil-military space missions:** The Shenzhou-7 mission's launch of the BX-1 and the satellite's

subsequent ISS approach are perhaps the most obvious example of the dual-use nature of space missions, as the mission featured China's first extra-vehicular activity (EVA) and a manned space mission of three astronauts in addition to carrying the BX-1. The BX-1 performed formation-flying experiments with the discarded orbital module, and with its two optical cameras and on-board communication equipment, the BX-1 could take pictures of satellites in orbit and relay them either to other spacecraft or down to Earth (eoPortal Directory).

- **Rocketry:** The Chang Zheng (Long March) rocket family is used to launch dual-use satellites as well as modules and equipment for the Shenzhou and Chang'e missions (Kevin Pollpeter, "Competing Perceptions of the U.S. and Chinese Space Programs," *China Brief*, March 5, 2007). The greater weight of the multi-module Tiangong-3 space station, which will be roughly the same size as the International Space Station, has necessitated the development of a more powerful rocket to launch it into orbit. During the summer of 2013, the next-generation Long March 5, which will be used to launch the Tiangong-3, moved into the testing phase—although its slated launch date of 2015 is two years later than originally planned due to difficulties with constructing its larger diameter (China Daily Online, March 4, 2013; iFeng, August 14, 2013). The medium-sized Long March 7 for lighter launches is expected to come online in 2017 (Xinhua, March 6, 2012), and China is also developing the Long March 11, a solid fuel launcher with short-notice launch capability that is expected to make its first launch before 2016 (China Daily Online, March 4, 2013). Though space rockets and strategic rockets generally have different requirements (the former to maximize lift capacity and the latter to maximize launch speed while maintaining first strike survivability), advances in telemetry, navigational and guidance, for example, could spill over to improve development of strategic rockets. As a solid fuel rocket, the Long March 11 may lead to cross-development with Dong Feng-class military rockets, the majority of which in service today use solid fuel.

Conclusion

Although details from the experiments conducted by both rover and lander have not yet been released, the relatively long duration of Chang'e-3 mission should provide opportunities for better assessing how this most recent space mission advances China's space program priorities. First, new scientific advances beyond earlier Chang'e missions should provide some clues regarding the priority of research interests being explored in current lunar-based experiments. Second, official and other media coverage should give some indication of how the government perceives the mission as fulfilling broader motivations for the overall space program.

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Notes

1. The eoPortal Directory is affiliated with the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT).
2. Huang Yan, Maqbool Ahmad Chaudhry, and Zhang Wei, "Introduction to the Project of Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Objects Observation System," *Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers* (June 12, 2013), p. 1027.
3. Guo Xiaozhong, "Asia-Pacific ground-base Optical Satellite Observation System: APOSOS," (October 2011), < http://swfound.org/media/50867/Guo_APOSOS.pdf >

Beijing Copes with a Weakened Ma Administration: Increased Demands, and a Search for Alternatives

By Parris Chang

Introduction

For almost a decade, Beijing has pursued a "soft" approach to Taiwan, cultivating economic ties and political exchanges. While the effort has produced significant benefits for Taiwan in terms of increased immediate security and trade, Beijing has not abandoned its pursuit of re-unification. Following the end of President Chen Shui-bian's term in office, which was marked by constant tensions and several crises with the mainland, Beijing has helped his successor, Ma Ying-jeou to pursue a policy of economic integration with the mainland.

During his second term, however, efforts to use ties with President Ma to bring Taiwan farther into PRC orbit have backfired, resulting in a weakened presidency that cannot deliver the mainland's goals. Thus, Beijing appears to be looking ahead to next two elections, trying to make as much progress as possible before Ma leaves office, while simultaneously trying to establish ties with possible successors.

Sources of Chinese Influence in Taiwan

Beginning with the administration of Hu Jintao, the PRC has eschewed the threat of force and placed greater emphasis on other means. Hu's strategy was put forth in a major policy speech in December 2008, which provides guiding principles to promote the normalization of overall cross-strait relations. The speech outlined a six-point program, including the "One China" principle; strengthening economic ties; fostering cross-strait spiritual links and personal visits; expanding Taiwan's "reasonable" participation in international organization; and ending cross-strait hostility and concluding a peace agreement, objectives also advocated by President Ma.

[1]

On the top of the publicized program, Hu is said to have confided to his inner circles that it is both easier

and less expensive to “buy” Taiwan than to conquer the island (*Formosa Weekly* #82, January 2011). Beijing’s implementation of this strategy has employed both economic means and a united front operation to make inroads among corporate leaders, ruling and opposition parties, the media and the public.

Economic integration

In 2009, China and Taiwan signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), including 18 specific agreements, to normalize economic relations and liberalize Taiwan’s trade and investment relations with China. There are now 670 cross-strait flights weekly, and Taiwan’s sight-seeing sites are now crowded with mainland tourists—2.8 million visited Taiwan during 2013 (Taiwan Tourism Bureau, < admin.taiwan.net.tw >).

PRC municipal and provincial procurement missions have been dispatched to southern Taiwan, the political stronghold of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to buy fruits, vegetables, milk, fish and other local products (Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council). The mainland is overwhelmingly Taiwan’s largest export market, consuming more than 40 percent of all Taiwanese exports. President Ma believes that closer economic ties with China will invigorate Taiwan’s struggling economy and stabilize cross-strait relations, but Beijing does not offer a free lunch. Chinese leaders’ ultimate goal is unification—ECFA, for example, is modeled on China’s special economic arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region since 1997.

Ties with Business Elites

Reinforcing this gradual shift toward Beijing are ties with Taiwan’s large enterprises and business leaders, who have benefited from the liberalization of cross-strait trade and investment made possible by the ECFA. Moreover, Beijing has utilized economic for a, such as the Bao-Ao Forum and Nanjing Forum, to reach out to and co-opt Taiwan’s business elite.

Most of the business elite have become staunch supporters of cross-strait rapprochement. During Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012, for example, quite a few Taiwan business tycoons campaigned for President Ma’s reelection, and tens of thousands of Taiwanese businessmen chartered special

flights to return to Taiwan to cast their votes, presumably for Ma and the parliamentary candidates of his party, the Kuomintang (KMT).

United Front Work

As part of Beijing’s political, information and united front operations in Taiwan, Taiwanese merchants sympathetic to China have acquired major Taiwanese newspapers and TV stations (including the *China Times*, *Want Daily*, CTV and CTi TV, all owned by the WantWant Group) (*Taipei Times*, September 10, 2009). Beijing now can influence these media outlets, and others that have received Chinese funding, to propagate politically “correct” information. Thus, when Chen Guanzheng, a Chinese human right lawyer, made a week-long trip to Taiwan in June 2013, local media gave little attention to his visit and activities. At the same time, a large entourage of foreign reporters followed him and covered his trip. [2]

Dangling Invitations

For some time, President Ma has been angling for a trip to China to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing in October 2014, and for what would be a historic meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. So far, President Ma and his two predecessors have been barred from the APEC leaders’ annual summit due to objections from the PRC. Although cross-strait ties have improved dramatically since Ma took office in 2008, most Taiwan analysts think a China trip and meeting with Xi unlikely for Ma, as both sides are still far apart on sovereignty and several other key political issues. (*Taipei Times*, January 12).

Responses from Beijing, however, leave room for an about-face if certain demands are met. Beijing has hinted that “right” conditions must exist beforehand. Ma has already taken steps in what appears to be an effort to meet Beijing’s demands. For example, he dispatched former KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung to Beijing in June to deliver the message that he accepts the “One China framework” (*Taipei Times*, June 12, 2013). In his October 10 National Day speech, Ma also proclaimed that Taiwan–China relations are not international relations (*China Times* [Taiwan], *Taipei Times*, October 11, 2013).

Xi's Demands Push Ma into a Corner

Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu Jintao as China's top Party and state leader in November 2012 and March 2013, has continued Hu's overall approach toward Taiwan, but he has been pushing harder and faster to implement Beijing's policy agenda on Taiwan. [3] Xi has placed Ma in a difficult position, repeatedly forcing him to choose between the demands of Beijing and of the Taiwanese public—and his attempts to navigate these demands have contributed to declining poll numbers and a widespread perception that he is a “lame duck” president.

In the political sphere, Beijing is exerting immense pressure on the Ma regime to move toward a cross-strait political dialogue that will lead into a peace agreement. President Ma has so far stuck to a formula of “economics first, politics later,” limiting cross-strait interaction to economic relations. At the Bao-Ao Forum in early April 2012, Vice President-elect Wu Tung-yi stated flatly that the time was not yet suitable and three conditions must be met before the cross-strait political dialogue can be held: The two sides must accumulate sufficient sincerity and good will; establish a stronger and more solid domestic consensus within Taiwan; and there must be clear public support (*China Times*, April 3, 2012).

In remarks widely interpreted as evincing impatience with Ma's refusal to engage in cross-strait political dialogue, Xi Jinping reportedly told President Ma's special envoy to the APEC, former Vice-President Vincent Siew, on October 6, 2013 that “The issue of the political divide that exists between the two sides must step by step reach a final resolution and it cannot be passed on from generation to generation” (*China Times*, October 7, 2013).

“Peace Forum” Sidelined the KMT

Beijing does not take no for an answer, and has been doing what it can to pressure, push and prod Ma's regime to change course. Beijing invited several non-KMT think tanks, chief among them the 21st Century Foundation and the pro-independence Taiwan Braintrust, to Shanghai to attend the newly-inaugurated “Peace Forum.” However, the forum was boycotted by research organizations affiliated with the KMT and the government. According to media reports, the Shanghai Peace Forum was unable to reach consensus on key issues, as the participants

of different political beliefs expressed divergent views on future political relations between Taiwan and China (Chinanews.com, October 12, 2013; BBC Chinese service, October 13, 2013).

Nonetheless, the participants agreed to hold the Forum again in Taiwan in 2014, which would allow Beijing to get more non-KMT groups involved and to put the issues of cross-strait political relations directly to the Taiwanese people, going around the Ma government.

Ramming Through the Services Trade Agreement: A Political Fiasco

In the economic arena, Beijing was hoping to move further toward cross-strait economic integration in 2013 by concluding first a trade service agreement, then a commodities trade agreement and other agreements on banking and financial cooperation. Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation Chairman Lin Join-sane initialed the Service Trade Agreement (STA) in Shanghai in June, but its ratification has been blocked by Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (LY), causing much displeasure in Beijing.

From Beijing's perspective, the STA is also intended to perform vital political and united front functions in Taiwan. As shown by the experience of Hong Kong, the STA will provide legal cover for China's agents to live and work throughout Taiwan. Through Chinese enterprises and shops, China's operatives will be able to use the STA to continue to build up resources and capabilities to influence Taiwan's political process and strive for peaceful unification.

Beijing was in a hurry to get Taiwan to approve the STA, and made several attempts to lobby the LY. It conveyed its “concern” to Speaker Wang Jin-pyng through an intermediary, but Wang was unable or refused to railroad the ratification of the STA. Likewise many Taiwanese merchants in China were also instructed to visit and put pressure on the LY members of their constituencies, but to no avail. Ma attributed the delay to Speaker Wang, and believed that a new speaker would be able to engineer a speedy and smooth passage of the STA and other pending cross-strait bills. From September, Ma sought to strip Wang of his KMT membership to remove his speakership (see *China Brief*, October 10, 2013).

The campaign to purge Wang backfired badly, although it alone does not account for Ma's political troubles: he has also had to contend with failure to deliver on several major campaign promises in his first term; political fallout from fuel and electricity price hikes and a new capital gains tax on stock transactions; and his own abrasive leadership style. Ma is faced with record-low approval ratings at 9.2 percent and growing criticism within the KMT (Eranews TV, January 17). Although two more years remain in his term, he is already widely seen as a lame duck president.

Beijing Seeking Alternatives to a Weakened Ma?

With the seven-in-one municipal and local elections to be held in December 2014 and the presidential/parliamentary elections in 2016, many KMT leaders—and Beijing—are apprehensive that voters could reject KMT candidates in 2014 and vote the KMT out of national government in 2016. Beijing has much at stake, and appears to be seeking alternatives to the Ma government.

Sean Lien

Most significantly, Beijing is attempting to hand-pick a candidate to run for the mayor's office in Taipei. Sean Lien has formidable credentials: he is quite popular in Taipei and enjoys the support of pro-Beijing media, leading the polls before officially announcing his candidacy (*China Times Weekly*, November 22, 2013). Lien comes from a wealthy and well-connected family, and is the son of ex-KMT chairman Chan Lien, who is Beijing's principal interlocutor in Taiwan and enjoys Beijing's confidence, having met several times with Hu Jintao. Moreover, Xi Jinping has met Sean Lien and appears to be fond of him, joking about his height during a meeting at the Great Hall of the People (Tung-shen TTV news, February 25, 2013). As mayor of Taiwan's capital, Sean Lien would provide Beijing not only a direct link to the KMT leadership, but also a strategic power base to counter-balance President Ma (and post-Ma leaders).

Overtures to the DPP

Another measure is to manipulate the selection of the mayoral candidate of the DPP and the opposition camp. Beijing and pro-Beijing media appear to have endorsed Dr. Ko Wen-je, a famed physician and an independent candidate, who leads most opinion polls, but has been accused of soliciting Beijing's support during trips to the

mainland, including visits to Mao Zedong's former base at Yen'an, a sacred site for the Communist Party (*Taipei Times*, December 16, 2013).

At the same time, Beijing has also cultivated links with the higher echelons of the DPP. Frank Hsieh, once a Prime Minister and DPP Chairman, was the most prominent DPP figure ever to visit China in 2013, and Beijing also is reported to have sought a visit from Tsai Ing-wen, a former chair of the DPP and presidential candidate in 2012.

Conclusion

In short, Beijing's strategy toward Taiwan under Chairman Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao has yielded positive results. The approach not only avoids possible military conflict with the United States, but receives support from Washington.

As the preceding pages have shown, Beijing's economic means, such as the ECFA, have enhanced Taiwan's economic integration with China and greatly increased the PRC's control over Taiwan's economy and society, helping to lock Taiwan into the mainland's orbit. Likewise, Beijing has developed tools that allow it to intervene directly in Taiwanese domestic politics.

In 2012, Beijing's intervention assisted the reelection of President Ma. It is sure to try again in Taipei's mayoral election in 2014 and the presidential/parliamentary elections in 2016.

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Notes

1. Full text of Hu's six points: < <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-31/132716956875.shtml> >
2. Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng was scheduled to receive Mr. and Mrs. Chen at his office, but he cancelled the appointment after he

received a message from Beijing to “do a favor” to the Chinese leadership (author’s conversation with Sen-Hong Yang, Chairman of Taiwan Association for China Human Rights).

3. This is surmised from an October 2012 article in the party journal *Qin Shi* in by Wang Yi, former Director of the CCP Central Committee Taiwan Affairs Office and presently Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he extolled five major achievements of Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan on the eve of the 18th CCP Congress (*China Times* [Taipei], October 17, 2012).

The China Factor in India-Japan Relations

By Rup Narayan Das

New Delhi has invited Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to be the chief guest at its annual Republic Day parade, which celebrates both Indian democracy, but also showcases its military. One country in particular that will be keenly watching the visit, which will commence on January 26, is China. The invitation is extended after careful consideration, in recognition of the country’s strategic significance to India. Although the visit must have been planned long in advance, its timing is fraught with speculation in the context of the spat over China’s unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on November 23 last year, with the visit of Abe to the war memorial Yasukuni Shrine exacerbating the strained relationship between China and Japan. Abe’s visit is taking place close on the heels of a visit by Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera earlier this month, and the visit of the Emperor Akihito in November and December last year, not to mention the recent adoption of Japan’s National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines.

Although the India-Japan relationship has its own driving forces in terms of robust economic ties and shared values, China is the elephant in the room in the strategic

parleys between the two countries. The current Japanese leadership has been very proactive in attempting to forge a strategic partnership and to deepen the defense and security relationship with India, seeking to hedge China. Prime Minister Abe has been most active in this regard. India has, however, been very circumspect in response to Japanese overtures, out of concern for Chinese sensitivity. India and Japan signed the joint statement towards Japa-India Strategic and Global Partnership during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in 2006, when Shinzo Abe was the Prime Minister (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA-J], December 15, 2006, text at < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pdfs/joint0612.pdf> >). Later, the two countries signed the Joint Statement Vision for Japan-Indian Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade, during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in October, 2010 (MOFA-J October 25, 2010, text at < http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pm1010/joint_st.html >). It is no coincidence that India and Japan elevated their relationship to a strategic level at the time of rising Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

As John Garver and Fei-Ling Wang wrote in “China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” a prime “objective of Chinese diplomacy has long been to prevent China’s neighbors from moving into alignment with the United States, and with one another to counter China’s rise” (*Asian Security*, Volume 6, Issue 3 (2010)). As such, China’s strategy has aimed to dissuade India from partnering with Japan to oppose China. Thus, its rhetoric on India-Japan strategic partnership has been very conciliatory, while at the same time being critical of Japan. For example, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan in October last year, after the incursion of the Chinese into the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control in the in Depsang in Ladakh region on April 15, and described Japan as India’s “indispensable and natural ally,” an article in the *Global Times* said, “...Unlike Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu islands in which Japan is determined to escalate the situation, Sino-Indian border issues generally been peaceful and stable since the first round of border talks in 2003, which did not solve the whole issue but showed a mutual willingness to talk” (*Global Times*, October 22, 2013). Addressing the skewed nature of Sino-Indian bilateral trade in favor of China, which has

been an issue of concern to India, the article further said, “Some might quote stagnating bilateral economic ties for gloomy future relations, but economic ties are never the determining factor on bilateral political relations. Japan and China have strong economic ties, but these cannot prevent their political distrust and worsening relations.” The Chinese message to Japan is very clear: Sino-Indian relations will remain good in spite of the border dispute and ballooning trade deficit, as long as India does not side with Japan in its dispute with China.

It may also be noted in this context that in order to preempt any kind of Indian support to Japan, PRC spokespeople said within few days of its ADIZ declaration that there was “no question” of its establishing a similar zone near its border with India. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said, “I want to clarify on the concept of an ADIZ, that it is an area of airspace established by a coastal State beyond its territorial airspace.” (*The Hindu*, November 29, 2013). India maintained a studied silence on China’s ADIZ during the visit of Japanese Emperor Akihito. Of course, the visit of the Japanese emperor by its very nature was symbolic. A report in the *Hindustan Times* quoted senior officials on conditions of anonymity saying that New Delhi didn’t have to “join the issue” on the ADIZ or “make its position known” (*Hindustan Times*, December 3, 2013). The report further quoted its sources saying, “We have been managing our differences with China, and we both focus on many areas of cooperation that exists between us. The issue [of the ADIZ] is not something we think we are compelled to respond to.” The Japanese Defense Minister, during his recent visit to India ahead of Abe’s visit, explained the security implications of the Chinese move to create the ADIZ over the disputed island. The joint statement issued after the visit is, however, conspicuously silent on the issue. It simply said that the two ministers “frankly exchanged ideas regarding regional and global security challenges, as well as bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges between India and Japan” (“India and Japan hold Defense Talks,” Indian Press Information Bureau, January 6).

India has shown no sign of endorsing Japan’s hardening posture towards China, as can be gauged from a statement made by India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid about Abe’s visit to Yashukuni Shrine. While was speaking with Natsuo Yamaguchi, the leader

of the New Komeito Party in Japan’s ruling coalition, he said that Japan should learn from history and move on (*Xinhua*, January 8).

Taking a cue from Khurshid’s utterance, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Wei Wei, used an article in the *Indian Express* to allude to the seminal role played by an Indian medical mission under the legendary doctor Dwarkanath Kotnis, whom Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had deputed to China during the Sino-Japanese war in 1936 (*Indian Express*, January 10) to treat the wounded soldiers. The article further said “With assistance from the US and the United Kingdom, Indian and Chinese soldiers together fought against Japanese aggression in India,” urging India not to forget this shared history.

Given the degree of security distrust between Japan and China, and being conscious of Chinese wariness, New Delhi has been sensitive to Chinese anxieties, and has sought to avoid being seen as teaming up with Japan to balance China. But if the signals of strategic depth and security and defense cooperation between India and Japan are decoded, China-oriented intent comes through loud and clear in terms such as “maritime cooperation,” “freedom of navigation” and “sea-lines of communication.” The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan signed in 2008 during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan is the only such document that India has ever signed with any other country. It recognizes “that a strong and prosperous India is in the interests of Japan and that a strong and prosperous Japan is in the interests of India” (Indian Press Information Bureau, October 22, 2008). It then adds that “India and Japan share common interests in the safety of sea lines of communications.” Regarding the mechanisms of maritime cooperation, it says, “The two Coast Guards will continue to promote cooperation to ensure maritime safety, maritime security and protect the marine environment through joint exercises and meetings between the two Coast Guards.” It is true that the bulk of the trade of Japan and that of India are sea borne. Also energy security entails safety of sea lines of communications. But maritime cooperation is omnibus, and it signals more than what meets the eyes. Although India has not directly articulated that China poses threat to the freedom of navigation in the South-China Sea, its endorsement for freedom of navigation and Sea Lines Of

Communications (SLOCs) has riled China (See *China Brief*, October 10, 2013). The expectations from the Japanese side are high, but India does not plan to ruffle feathers with its mighty northern neighbor, with which it shares a reasonably good working relationship. What brings India and Japan together is not only the complementary economic interests, but also the convergence of security and strategic concerns in the context of an assertive China. Japan's adversarial relationship with China, and India's security dilemma toward China, provides glue to defense and security cooperation between India and Japan. India, however, is not inclined to forge any security policy that targets a specific country. As Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh during his recent visit to China in October, while addressing the Central Party School in Beijing said, "Old theories of alliance and containment are no longer relevant. India and China cannot be contained ...Nor should we try to contain others... Our strategic partnerships with other countries are defined by our own economic interests, needs and aspirations. They are not directed against China or anyone else. We expect a similar approach from China" (*The Hindu*, October 24, 2013). India expects that defense cooperation with Japan will improve its military capabilities. Besides, India's 1 trillion dollar infrastructural projects including the possibilities of introduction of high speed rail also offers very good opportunity to Japan for a robust economic engagement.

India's trust deficit with China puts Japan in an advantageous position in this respect. As far as defense cooperation between the two countries is concerned, as of now, it is by-and-large limited to joint naval exercises between the Coast Guards of the two countries. India's defense modernization and procurements can offer opportunities for Japan to forge a closer partnership, depending on the extent to which Japan liberalizes its defense exports and transfer of technology and joint-production. As Japan attempts to form common cause with India in the region, arms sales will be a crucial area to watch.

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