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Protesting what they called undemocratic procedures to pass a trade pact with Beijing, Taiwanese students occupied the Legislative Yuan for three weeks.

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In a Fortnight

'A PEACEFUL, FRIENDLY AND CIVILIZED LION': XI EXPLAINS CHINA'S RISE IN EUROPE

By David Cohen

During an 11-day tour of Europe, Chinese President Xi Jinping stuck to familiar themes. In a series of speeches and op-eds published in European newspapers, he delivered a message of peace, cooperation and friendship—and of minding your own business. The visit was accompanied by the resolution of a long-running trade dispute over solar panels, and followed by the release of a policy paper on EU-China relations that called for speedy negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement (China.org, April 4).

Xi's statements centered on the idea of a relationship between two great civilizations. He articulated an argument that China's rise will benefit Europe as long as European governments learn to live with and respect China's system of government. This argument illuminates the content of the idea of "mutual respect," one of the three pillars of Xi's "new type of great power relationships," and reflects Beijing's growing willingness to demand respect for one-party rule from other nations.

The argument began with a speech at the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris on March 27 (China.org, April 1). Xi spoke about the diversity of different civilizations, framing the acceptance of differences as a fount of creativity and a prerequisite to peace. With this respect, he said, “Greater exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations can further enrich the colors of various civilizations and the cultural life of people, and open up still greater alternatives in the future.” Without it, however, nations will only make enemies, “Taking a condescending attitude toward a civilization can not help anyone to appreciate its essence but may risk antagonizing it.” Nor should civilizations seek to copy one another: “Every civilization is unique. Copying other civilizations mechanically or blindly is like cutting one’s toes just to fit his shoes, which is not only impossible but also highly detrimental.”

Speaking on April 1 at the College of Europe in Bruges, Xi tied the idea of respect for civilization to respect for China’s political system, explicitly rejecting liberal democracy as unsuitable for China: After reviewing two of China’s key historical ideas—those of 5,000 years of history and a “century of humiliation,” he turned to China’s revitalization in the 20th century, framing the current system as the successful result of a series of political experiments that began with Sun Yat-sen (China.org, April 4). China, he said, “experimented with constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, multi-party system and presidential government, yet nothing really worked. Finally, China took on the path of socialism.” Despite some missteps along the way, “The uniqueness of China’s cultural tradition, history and circumstances determines that China needs to follow a development path that suits its own reality. In fact, we have found such a path and achieved success along this path” (For more on this reading of modern Chinese history, see “Old Wine in an Ancient Bottle,” *China Brief*, March 20).

According to this narrative, European countries—and the world—will gain from China’s rise, as long as they do not try to undermine Party rule (For more on China’s concerns about foreign ideology, see “China’s Ideological ‘Soft War,’” *China Brief*, February 20). Respect for China’s unique qualities is a prerequisite to receiving economic benefits, such as participation in the trans-Eurasian Silk

Road Economic Cooperation Belt proposed last year. It is also necessary to avert the danger of war—a connection Xi drew in his UNESCO speech, referring to World War II and praising the organization’s role in promoting peace through mutual understanding. But understanding China should also be an end in itself: Chinese civilization and historical experience, he said, make it a uniquely attractive strategic partner, committed to peace and capable of achieving great power status without seeking hegemony. As Xi said at an event commemorating the 50th anniversary of relations between France and the PRC, “Napoleon once said that China was a sleeping lion, and that when it woke it would shake the world. This lion has already woken, but it is a peaceful, friendly and civilized lion.” The policy paper on EU-China relations, released as Xi returned from his trip, describes the relationship as a way of building a “multipolar” world order and emphasized China’s commitment to strengthening international organizations (China.org, April 2).

To obtain these benefits, however, other countries must demonstrate respect for China by keeping out of contentious issues like Tibet, Taiwan and human rights. China has made it clear that its willingness to tolerate such interference is diminishing: Norway remains locked out of trade talks with China three years after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo (*South China Morning Post*, October 29, 2013). The policy paper includes numerous such demands: European countries must not sell weapons to Taiwan, nor support its membership as a state in international organizations. They must “properly handle Tibet-related issues,” avoiding meetings between European officials and the Dalai Lama and preventing him from visiting Europe to “engage in separatist activities.” The EU “should lift its arms embargo on China at an early date.” And, on human rights, “The EU side should attach equal importance to all forms of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, view China’s human rights situation in an objective and fair manner, stop using individual cases to interfere in China’s judicial sovereignty and internal affairs, and to create a good atmosphere for human rights dialogue and cooperation between the two sides.”

Xi’s visit to Europe, and the accompanying statements, have fleshed out his view of the terms of China’s current position in the world. There has been little

change in China's "peaceful development" messaging, which disavows military ambitions and participation in "great game"-style geopolitics in favor of "win-win cooperation." But at the same time, Xi believes that China is ready to carve out a space of its own in which it can dictate the terms of its relationships.

David Cohen is the editor of China Brief.

New High-Level Groups Threaten Line Between Party and Government

By Willy Lam

The Xi Jinping leadership is concentrating more powers in secretive leading groups and commissions at the apex of the Chinese Communist Party. These top-level decision-making and coordinating agencies—the Central National Security Commission (CNSC), the Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, and the Central Leading Group on Internet Security and Informatization—are run by Xi confidants who report mainly to the supremo. This raises questions about a lack of transparency and checks and balances, despite a pledge made by Premier Li Keqiang at the National People's Congress (NPC) that the State Council would undergo a "self-revolution," meaning that central government departments would be streamlined and their powers curtailed in the interest of giving a bigger role to the market and society (China News Service, March 5; *People's Daily*, March 5).

First established by the Third Central Committee Plenum last November, the CNSC and the leading group on deepening reform have already swung into action. Yet little information has been released regarding the staff, composition and objectives of the CNSC, which is billed as a platform for coordinating party, government and military units dealing with domestic stability and threats originating from "hostile foreign forces." Only the three top officials have been identified: Chairman Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairmen Li Keqiang and NPC Chairman Zhang

Dejiang. All three are members of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Some reports have included lists of organizations that will be represented in the CNSC, but these have not been confirmed. They include units such as the People's Liberation Army, the People's Armed Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security as well as the CCP's International Liaison Department and Propaganda department (*Wen Wei Po* [Hong Kong], March 7; Global Times Forum, January 25).

Both official and Hong Kong media, however, have cited senior NPC members as saying that Politburo member Li Zhanshu, a Xi crony who runs the Central Committee General Office (CCGO), has become Secretary-General and overall troubleshooter of the CNSC. Deemed the nerve center of the entire party apparatus, the CCGO relates instructions of the top party organs including the Politburo Standing Committee to central and regional-level party organs; it also issues documents on major policies that are periodically circulated nationwide. The CCGO will double as the general office and clearing-house for the Commission (*China Business News* [Shanghai], March 10; *Ming Pao* [Hong Kong], March 10).

That Li, a former Xian party secretary and core member of the so-called Shaanxi Gang led by Xi, has no foreign affairs experience seems to lend credence to the theory that the CNSC is primarily focused on internal security. Given Li's close ties with his patron Xi, it will not be difficult for the supreme leader to make use of the quasi-police state apparatus under the Commission for tasks ranging from clamping down on dissent to attacking political foes of the fast-growing Xi Jinping Faction (*Ta Kung Pao* [Hong Kong], March 7; *South China Morning Post*, March 7). Xi's dominance of this committee may give him extensive, independent control of China's internal security apparatus, threatening the system of collective leadership established by Deng Xiaoping.

The authorities have been more forthcoming about the membership of the even more gargantuan leading group on reform. Its chairman is Xi, and its three vice-chairmen are Premier Li, ideology and propaganda tsar Liu Yunshan and Executive Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, all of whom are Standing Committee members. Below them are ten ordinary Politburo members, including the three other premiers—Liu Yandong, Wang Yang and Ma Kai—as

well as Heads of Party departments. The latter group comprises CCGO Director Li Zhanshu, Central Policy Research Office Director Wang Huning, Propaganda Department chief Liu Qibao and Organization Department chief Zhao Leji. Also represented are NPC Vice-Chairman Li Jianguo, Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman General Xu Qiliang and Central Political-Legal Commission Secretary Meng Jianzhu (*China Youth Daily*, March 13; *Ming Pao*, January 23).

Wang Huning, a former Fudan University professor and political adviser to ex-presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, has been appointed secretary general of this central leading group. He is also the director of the Central Policy Research Office (CPRO). An opaque outfit whose activities are seldom reported in the official media, the CPRO is China's highest-level think tank on domestic and foreign policies. It now serves the addition function of being the general office and clearing house of the Group. The leading group also has two deputy secretary-generals, CPRO Vice-Director Pan Shengzhou and Vice-Chairman of the State Council's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Mu Hong. Pan is an agricultural expert, while Mu's NDRC portfolio includes fixed-assets investment and auditing of major projects (Finance.12cn.com, March 10; *Hong Kong Economic Times*, March 10).

As in the case of the CNSC, the reform leading group has manifested two traits of Xi's style of administration. First, a nebulous party organ is taking over major responsibilities from the State Council apparatus, which until the 18th Party Congress had played a major role in the formulation and execution of policies such as economic reform. Moreover, given that Xi's instructions will be relayed to a dozen-odd party and government departments by the loyal Wang, he will be able to exercise personal power, possibly avoiding even the oversight of his colleagues in the collective leadership. Even more than with the CNSC, the towering structure of the reform group could result in a top-down chain of command that is underpinned by multiple layers of bureaucracy. (See "Xi's Power Grab Towers over Market Reforms," *China Brief*, November 20, 2013).

Few details have been publicized about the latest superagency formed by Xi, the Central Leading Group on Internet Security and Informatization, which is in charge

of enhancing Internet-related security and nurturing the country's IT industry. Its chairman is Xi, and the two vice-chairmen are Premier Li and Liu Yunshan. The Secretary-General of the Leading Group is Lu Wei, who heads the State Internet Information Center (SIIC). Together with the Internet Division of the Ministry of Public Security, the SIIC's main task is to ensure that the Internet is purged of "destabilizing materials." Prior to his SIIC appointment, Lu was a senior executive at the Xinhua News Agency and the State Council Information Office. Party and government units represented in the leading group will likely include the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, State Council Information Office, the SIIC, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the party's Propaganda Department (Xinhua News Agency, February 28; Guancha.cn, February 28; *Ming Pao*, March 28).

The establishment of the three top-level decision-making and coordinating organs have testified to Xi's preoccupation with "top-level design" in the course of rolling out reform measures. Yet this top-down approach to reform carries inherent risks. As Jiang Zhiyong, an expert at the State Information Center pointed out, "the momentum for reform this time is coming from the very top [of the party]." "Initiatives from the top are being implemented layer by layer by central and regional [administrations]," he added. Jiang said that since mid-echelon and grassroots cadres are already very familiar with this top-down approach, new reforms could be adulterated by foot-dragging officials. He cited "going through the motions and putting on shows" as typical strategies adopted by regional cadres to water down orders from on high (People's Daily Forum, March 25; *Ta Kung Pao*, March 17).

It is significant that the only major party and state institution that Xi has not touched is the anti-graft establishment, which consists of the party's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) and the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) of the State Council. The two units, which share the same website, operate under the system of "one office, two name plaques." CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan, one of two PBSC members who are not involved with the CNSC or CLGCDR, has expanded the scale and scope of the CCP's anti-corruption operations since he became top graft-buster in late 2012. For example, the number of Disciplinary and Inspection Offices—each of

which is responsible for a specific number of party and government units at the central and regional levels—has been increased from ten to twelve. Wang, a princeling and former vice-premier who is deemed a close ally of Xi's, has added an office that is tasked with supervising the staff of the CCDI and MOS. Equally significant is the fact that Wang has expanded the staff and authority of inspection work groups that are regularly deployed to the regions to root out local-level corruption (*Ta Kung Pao*, March 18; *China Daily*, January 15). While Wang's CCDI has nabbed more than 20 cadres with the rank of vice-ministers or above, at least half these “tigers” are related the patronage group of former PBSC member Zhou Yongkang, who is one of Xi's major political foes. While Xi is resorting to the familiar tactic of wielding the “anti-corruption card” against his enemies, an empowered CCDI can also crack the whip on regional cadres who have proved to be inefficient in carrying out orders from the top. (United Daily News [Taipei] February 10; BBC Chinese Service, November 4, 2013).

Apart from challenging Deng's principle of collective leadership, President Xi's ruling philosophy has also run counter to two other precepts laid down by the Great Architect of Reform: the separation of party and government and the “five lakes and four seas” (Xinhua Forum, July 2, 2011; *People's Daily*, September 3, 2010). Separation of party and government, which was enshrined in the Political Report to the 13th Party Congress of 1987, refers to the fact that party authorities should focus on broad issues such as long-term planning, while day-to-day administration of the country should be left to the government. Moreover, senior cadres should come from the “five lakes and four seas,” a reference to the personnel principle of striking a balance among officials of different backgrounds and affiliations. The establishment of the new top-level groups, however, testifies to Xi's preference for a Mao-style centralism that is predicated upon personal networks functioning without oversight or checks on their power. It remains to be seen whether this dramatic centralization of power will speed up or retard the realization of Xi's Chinese Dream.

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Sunflowers in Springtime: Taiwan's Crisis and the End of an Era in Cross-Strait Cooperation

By J. Michael Cole

With two years left in the second and last term of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency, Taiwan has been embroiled in a political crisis since March 18 that will have serious, and possibly long-lasting, repercussions on the dynamics within Ma's Kuomintang (KMT) and the island's relationship with China. After a nearly three-week-long standoff at Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, a surprise intervention by Speaker Wang Jin-pyng—who has promised to meet one of the key demands made by the Sunflower Movement—has led to an announcement by the activists that they would vacate the legislature on April 10 and bring to an end one of the island's most serious political crises in recent years. Despite the apparent success of Wang's move, his intervention risks reigniting a factional feud within the KMT and is no guarantee that the government will proceed in a way that meets the expectations of the movement, which has vowed to punish the KMT in future elections if the Ma administration fails to deliver.

At the heart of the controversy lies the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) signed between Taiwanese and Chinese negotiators in Shanghai in June 2013 (Xinhua, June 21, 2013). Reached after several rounds of what critics have described as non-transparent talks between the two sides, the CSSTA, a successor to 2010's landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), opens various sectors—including commerce, telecommunications, construction, distribution, environment, health, tourism, entertainment, culture, sports, transportation and finance—for investment and preferential access. Under the agreement, China would open 80 service sectors to Taiwan, while the latter is to

open 64 to China.

Debates in the Legislature

Soon after negotiators from Taiwan's semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) returned to Taiwan with the text of the agreement, representatives of civil society, business and academia, as well as some legislators, were taken aback by its breadth and scope. Many Taiwanese feared that the pact would elbow them out of the market, while others pointed to the national security implications of an agreement that exposes sensitive sectors, such as construction and telecommunications, to China. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) overwhelmingly supported calls for a thorough evaluation of the agreement before it could be implemented. A number of KMT legislators also expressed reservations about the pact. For example, KMT caucus whips Lin Hung-chih and Lai Shyh-bao protested that they did not even know what had been negotiated and signed, while KMT Legislator Hsu Hsin-ying said that "They [Executive Yuan] shouldn't think that whatever they send us, we will just accept the whole package." For his part, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, also a KMT member, complained that the Mainland Affairs Council had not notified or consulted the legislature as negotiations were being conducted with China (*China Times*, June 22, 2013).

On June 25, the KMT and the DPP reached an agreement stipulating that the CSSTA should be reviewed clause-by-clause in the Legislative Yuan (LY). On September 25, the two parties agreed to hold a total of 16 public hearings—eight organized by the KMT and eight by the DPP—to gather input from various sectors and to give the administration an opportunity to better explain the ill-understood contents of the agreement.

It was around that time that a crisis within the KMT emerged as President Ma sought to oust Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng over allegations that the speaker had improperly used his influence to interfere in breach-of-trust probe against DPP caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (BBC, September 11, 2013). Wang was eventually cleared of all accusations and retained his KMT membership (*SCMP*, October 6, 2013). Political analysts observed at the time that Ma's attempt to sack Wang may have been intended as a warning to other party members who were not toeing the party line on several policies, including the

CSSTA (*SCMP*, September 14, 2013).

As with the ECFA, the Ma administration argued that the CSSTA would be beneficial to Taiwan's stagnant economy and that it was essential for the island's ability to sign similar agreement with other economies, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Also like ECFA, both Taipei and Beijing have argued that the agreement was skewed in Taipei's favor (Xinhua, June 26, 2013; Central News Agency, March 22, 2014).

The process soon ran into difficulties after the KMT held all of its eight hearings within the space of a week, sparking criticism that the expedited process had been little more than show. For its part, the DPP resorted to various tactics to stall the process, blocking the goal of passing the pact by the end of December. Efforts in the legislature resumed in March, and once again skeptics used legislative tactics to prevent progress. Following days of clashes on the legislative floor, on March 17 KMT Legislator Ching-chung, the presiding chair of the legislature's Internal Administrative Committee (who by then had taken over from the aforementioned Lin Hung-chih), declared that as the 90-day review period had expired, the pact, which he likened to an "executive order," should be considered to have been "reviewed" and be sent directly to a vote later in the week—a vote that the KMT, which enjoys a majority of seats at the legislature, was certain to win, especially as the party's Central Committee had threatened suspension for any member who voted against the party line. Soon afterwards, the Executive Yuan congratulated Chang for successfully completing the review of the pact (*China Post*, March 18; *Liberty Times*, March 18).

Moving the Debate to the Street

The stage was set for escalation, and on the evening of March 18, after two days of protests, a group of students from the Black Island Youth Alliance slipped past the light security at the legislature and stormed into the legislative chamber. By the following morning, several thousand activists, mostly university students, were surrounding the legislature, while approximately 300 of them remained inside. With that, the Sunflower Student Movement was born, and in the following days several tens of thousands of people participated in the occupation, which at the time of writing was continuing.

The Movement accused Ma of intransigence and of bypassing democratic procedures, and in return demanded that the KMT commit anew to a full clause-by-clause review at the legislature and that a legal mechanism be established and institutionalized to monitor any future agreements with China and that such a mechanism be created before a full review of the CSSTA (Sunflower Movement press release; *Wall Street Journal*, March 30). Those demands were mirrored by the DPP, which rallied to the students' cause but had not helped to organize the occupation. For several months, the leaders of Black Island, aided by academics, had been organizing protests against the pact, keeping their distance from members of both political parties (author's interviews with student leaders).

As the occupation continued and with no signs that the government was relaxing its stance, the Movement changed one of its demands. Prior to negotiations with Premier Jiang Yi-huah, who went over to the legislature for talks with student leader Lin Fei-fan, the movement now requested that the CSSTA be sent back altogether and renegotiated, a departure from the initial demand that it be subjected to a line-by-line review. The Lin-Jiang talks quickly foundered and the standoff intensified. By then, public polls showed 70% support for a clause-by-clause review, against 8% who sided with the government and wanted an expedited vote (TVBS, March 21). Meanwhile, 48% of the public supported the students' occupation, against 40% who disagreed. Support for the agreement dropped 11 points to 28% from a poll in October 2013, while opposition rose 5 points to 48%, with 69% of respondents saying they were not clear about the contents of the CSSTA.

Then, on the night of March 23, thousands of protesters, many of them associated with the Sunflower Movement, burst into the nearby Executive Yuan (EY), the seat of the nation's Cabinet, prompting the quick deployment of several hundreds of riot police. By 6 a.m. on March 24, the eviction was completed, leaving as many as 174 people injured. Many people deplored the occupation of the EY, or regarded it as a tactical mistake on the part of the movement (author's interviews with sources within the movement, March 23, 2014). However, these responses were overwhelmed by revulsion at the harsh tactics of the police, who used truncheons and water cannons against the unarmed protesters. As the dust settled, a

new opinion poll showed that 68% of respondents now supported cancelling the pact and renegotiating with China, against 18% who supported it as is. Furthermore, 58% supported the occupation of the LY, against 38% who opposed it, an increase of 3% and a drop of 2% respectively. While 58% disagreed with the movement's occupation of the EY (against 30% who agreed), 56% disagreed with the police's handling of the situation, against 35% who agreed (TVBS, March 25).

A Rift in the KMT

By then, it was becoming evident that the standoff at the LY was starting to have an impact on politics within the KMT, with a rift between President Ma and Legislative Speaker Wang, created in late 2013 when Ma sought to have Wang expelled from the KMT over allegations of "influence peddling," widening considerably. Moreover, days after the students had stormed the LY, the Taipei District Court had found chief prosecutor Huang Shyh-ming guilty of illegally passing classified information to President Ma during the investigation, and sentenced him to one year and six months in prison, later commuted to a fine (Central News Agency, March 21).

Increasingly, a more secure Wang emerged as the voice of compromise within the KMT, and the legislative speaker made no secret of his annoyance with government and KMT intransigence. This was highlighted by his decision to skip a meeting called by President Ma to discuss the government's response to the crisis (*Taipei Times*, March 22). As attempts to secure talks between Ma and the student leaders collapsed on March 26 (*Taipei Times*, March 27). In a move that could well have resolved the impasse, the KMT then proposed returning the CSSTA to a legislative committee for a clause-by-clause review, with the condition that Speaker Wang chair the committee. But the DPP, citing possible violations to legislative procedure in having Wang chair the meeting, turned the offer down. Both camps seemed bogged down, with no resolution in sight.

On April 2, the movement rejected an offer by President Ma to hold a national affairs conference on economics and trade instead of a citizens' constitutional conference (one of their demands) calling the move "typical Ma tactic of superficial promises and substantial lies" (*Taipei Times*, April 3). The next day, the Cabinet announced that

it had agreed to set up an oversight mechanism and would submit draft legislation for the “Statute for the Processing and Monitoring of Agreements between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” (Central News Agency (CNA), April 3). However, at President Ma’s request, the CSSTA was to be exempt from that oversight, which goes counter to the movement’s demands (*Taipei Times*, April 3).

In a surprise announcement, the leadership of the Sunflower Movement said on April 7 that they could vacate the legislature on Thursday 10 April, a move that was understood to reflect a understanding to work with Speaker Wang in resolving the crisis (*SCMP*, April 7). President Ma invited Wang to work out the differences between the DPP and the KMT so that the oversight bill can be passed during the current legislative session, scheduled to end in late May. However, Premier Jiang raised concerns about awaiting the passing into the oversight mechanism sought by the movement and supported by Wang, saying the opposition could use the process to once again stall implementation of the CSSTA, raising questions about the government’s willingness to meet that crucial demand (CNA, April 7).

No matter how the crisis is resolved, it is likely that President Ma’s reputation, along with that of his administration, has suffered, which might impact the seven-in-one municipal elections in late 2014. Although those elections are predominantly contested over local considerations, there is a possibility that the hit that the KMT has taken over the CSSTA crisis could trickle down to affect voters’ decisions. This could further be exacerbated by the local impact of the CSSTA should it be implemented by then, as many of the local KMT constituencies are among those who fear deleterious consequences, for which the KMT would be blamed.

The crisis has also highlighted and widened the gap between existing factions within the KMT. With presidential and legislative elections in 2016, and with Ma barred from running for a third term, the CSSTA controversy will likely force future KMT candidates to distance themselves from Ma’s policies and to adopt positions that better reflect the wishes of the public. The willingness of Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin, a presidential hopeful on the KMT ticket, to defy the Cabinet by refusing to use force to expel the movement from the legislature was widely regarded as a sign that Hau was distancing

himself from the administration (*Taipei Times*, March 23). Other aspirants, including former vice president Lien Chan’s son, Sean Lien, who will be running for Taipei mayor at the end of 2014, has been largely silent on the matter. Meanwhile, New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu, another possible candidate for the presidency, has praised the movement for their “very honorable achievement” in raising public awareness about an ill-understood issue (*China Post*, March 29).

Conclusion

As the Sunflower Movement has made clear, tens of thousands of Taiwanese—including Taiwan’s youth, which has acted with protests nationwide—will take action if they perceive that their interests and way of life are threatened by China. Although there is a practical and economic component to the protest, it is first and foremost predicated on maintaining—or as they see it, reinstating—functioning democratic mechanisms. Perceptions of an erosion of democracy and freedom of expression in Hong Kong since Retrocession in 1997 and the adoption of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between the territory and Mainland China in 2003 have also played a key role in raising apprehensions about closer economic and cultural ties with China (author’s observations and interviews with activists; see *Taiwan News*, March 30).

The CSSTA has awakened public fears of China, which cannot be dissociated from increasingly unfavorable perceptions of China within the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, a future KMT candidate who fails to address those fears and to promise policies that are not seen as threatening Taiwan’s sovereignty will stand a good chance of being defeated by the DPP, which has made sovereignty a cornerstone of its policy platform. During the 2014 and 2016 campaigns, there is likely to be a correction in the KMT’s China policy, one that will impose further friction on the pace of cross-strait liberalization.

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Facing Grain Shortfalls, China Asserts Self-Sufficiency Policy

By Karla W. Simon, George W. O’Conor, Mark A. Christopher and Michael C. Brown

Demand for food in China is increasing at an unprecedented rate, as the Chinese become wealthier. In 2011, China became a net importer of rice, and imports of soybeans overtook domestic production in 2004. Changing Chinese appetites for grains and meats coupled with losses of farmland to urbanization, pollution and desertification mean that China will need to look abroad for an increasing share of its grain, likely resulting in increased commodity prices world-wide, and thus to changes to trade balances between China and the rest of the world.

China has, through its demand for food, water, and other resources, become the single most important factor in the structure of global markets, and food imports into China will likely result in price rises and other reverberations in global markets. China is the largest producer of agricultural products in the world, primarily producing pork, rice, wheat, potatoes, sorghum, peanuts, tea, millet, barley, cotton, oilseed and fish. Although accounting for only 10% of arable land worldwide, it produces food for 20% of the world’s population. Thus, it may seem like good news that the most recent comprehensive survey of national land use in China has reported a healthy surplus. Some 135 million hectares of the country are classed as planted with crops, including rice paddy fields, irrigable land and dry farms. Simultaneously, total grains production hit a record 602 million tons in 2013, after a decade of continuous growth (NewsChina, April 10, 2014). But the true picture may be worse than these numbers suggest.

The Lianghui and Subsequent Developments

As the *Lianghui* (two meetings—the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC)) approached in March, the State Council announced some major developments: The Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Printing issued the Outline for the Development of Food and Nutrition in China (2014–2020) and the Outline for the Development of Food and Nutrition in

China (2014–2020) (Guo Ban Fa [2014] no. 3, January 28). The agenda for the NPC sessions included the government work report, implementation of the annual plan on economic and social development in 2013, a draft plan on national economic and social development in 2014 and budget documents released by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

The 2013 report and 2014 draft plan on economic and social development address major issues of concern related to food and water security. Land reform is one example: According to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “We basically completed the work of determining, registering and certifying rural collective land ownership nationwide and extended the trials of determining and registering contracted rural land-use rights to 105 counties, county-level cities and districts” (NRDC report, March 5). In addition, Premier Li Keqiang, in his 100 minute-long Work Report, declared a “war on pollution.” The MoF budget also included details on money spent and money to be spent on agricultural projects, including combating pollution.

On March 26, NDRC secretary general Li Pumin announced that the central government’s 2014 budget for investment in agriculture would reach RMB 220 billion (\$35 billion): More than 50% of total domestic investment (SAA, March 31). Analysts, such as Smart Agriculture Analytics (SAA), are now predicting that China’s largest agribusinesses will see record-setting growth in profits of 30–50% this year. These companies have better access to government funding, higher capacities for managing large-scale government projects and established reputations, so they are most likely to benefit from subsidies and win government contracts. Secretary Li also addressed water issues, noting that in the 2014 budget RMB 70bn (\$11 billion) is devoted to installation of water-conserving irrigation systems, upgrades to existing outdated facilities and cleanup of water resources. This high-level interest reflects the importance of the issues, but investments and attention do not guarantee that problems will be solved. Indeed, the challenges remain daunting.

Food Self-Sufficiency

Grain self-sufficiency has been a goal of the Chinese state since antiquity, enshrined by the PRC with Mao Zedong’s self-sufficiency (*zili gengsheng*) policy. It was important

even during times when the staple food, generally rice, was seldom supplemented by meat or even by eggs and milk. But the impact of a growing middle class population, and demand for eggs, milk and meat, has made this goal significantly more difficult to achieve.

Late last year, the Central Rural Work Conference said that China would adhere to the principle of self-sufficiency based on domestic production capacity, moderate imports and national scientific and technological support of food security strategies (*China Daily*, December 25, 2013). In mid-February, the deputy director of the Development Planning Department of the Ministry of Agriculture denied a *Financial Times* report that China had abandoned the policy of self-sufficiency. He promised that by continuously enhancing overall grain production China would ensure that the domestic food supply and demand situation would remain stable, with a bottom line quantity of 550 million tons (China Economic Net, February 19). These figures were based on the agricultural plan released by the State Council on January 28 (Guo Ban Fa [2014] no. 3, January 28).

Beijing's commitment to this issue is doubtless real, but the degradation of China's farm land and the growing demands of a more prosperous population mean that these goals are unlikely to succeed. At the most basic level, plants need water, sunlight and soil to grow. As Beijing recognizes, continued environmental degradation has made much of China's land and water unable to support agriculture. Chinese researchers have even suggested that smog threatens agriculture by blocking sunlight (*South China Morning Post* [SCMP], February 25). In a December press briefing, Land and Resources Vice Minister Wang Shiyuan said that nearly 3.33 million hectares (eight million acres) of Chinese farmland had been declared too polluted to sustain farming (*China Daily*, December 31, 2013). Wang noted that this represents nearly 2% of the country's arable land. China's most recent arable land survey counted about 135.4 million hectares (334.6 million acres) of farmland—but after removing from that count land reserved for “forest and pasture restoration” as well as land too polluted for crop-growing, the “actual available arable land was just slightly above the government's red-line” of 120 million hectares (296 million acres) of usable farm land (Xinhua, December 31, 2013).

Grain Imports

To cope with the heightened demand and falling domestic production, Beijing has in recent years been attempting to secure sources of food by investing in food assets overseas and buying farms in agricultural regions like Latin America and Eastern Europe.

China's shift to a protein-rich diet is clearly changing global trade flows (SCMP, February 19). For instance, China is already the world's largest consumer of corn, and its rising food demands have turned the nation from being a net exporter of corn three years ago to the world's fifth-largest importer, according to financial-services firm Rabobank. China imported record volumes of corn in December 2013, with the United States accounting for a still-dominant but declining share of shipments to the massive grain market as imports from other countries rise. (*China Daily*, December 11, 2013).

To address the problem of grain demand, Beijing is going beyond straightforward imports of wheat and corn. In late February it was announced that Chinese state-owned food giant COFCO Corp. is buying a 51% stake in Nidera NV, a major grain trader. Some analysis has suggested this is a bid for better access to major grain-growing regions as Beijing tries to feed its increasingly wealthy citizens. Food industry observers can expect further acquisitions of this kind in the future as Chinese companies continue seeking business opportunities that will give them more direct access to agricultural producers.

In addition to grain shortfalls, Chinese food imports can also be driven by water shortages. Although there is very little direct international trade in water as a commodity, trade of grain and other foodstuffs serves as something of a proxy for water trade, given water's role as a factor of production in agriculture. In this way, when China imports grain it is also importing the embedded water required to grow it and freeing up water in China for other uses. China is already a relatively water-poor country in terms of freshwater per capita, and the pollution issues discussed above only exacerbate this problem. Going forward, we can expect grain and food imports from water-rich countries to be part of the solution as China grapples with water shortages that will likely grow in intensity.

Contradictions with Respect to GM foods

While heartier and more productive crop strains are obviously a necessary part of enabling China to grow more food on a shrinking base of arable land, the PRC's behavior has been contradictory with regard to genetically modified (GM) foods.

On the one hand, China has resisted the import of many genetically modified foods. On March 2, *China Daily* reported that since last October China has returned 887,000 tons of U.S. corn shipments tainted with a GM strain not approved by the country's agriculture ministry. The corn shipments were found to contain unapproved MIR162, a strain of insect-resistant transgenic corn. There have also been issues with imported GM rapeseed oil (*China Daily*, March 2).

At the same time, however, Chinese companies have also been implicated in the theft of intellectual property from U.S. agricultural companies, including the theft of GM strains. This industrial espionage suggests the possibility that China is interested in introducing GM strains to its own agriculture.

U.S. federal prosecutors have alleged that two groups of Chinese nationals separately conspired over several years to steal advanced seeds from U.S. companies. The charges, filed in U.S. courts in Des Moines, Iowa and Kansas City, Kansas, outline efforts by the Chinese nationals to target DuPont Co., Monsanto Co. and Ventria Bioscience Inc., according to court documents and industry officials. In one case, an employee of a Chinese seed company was discovered on a seed test farm in Iowa and a few months later was observed near a separate seed test farm, a court filing said. The complaints cite Chinese citizens living in the United States and elsewhere but do not allege involvement by the Chinese government. [1]

While the Chinese state has not been officially implicated, the facts of the case suggests that the defendants were tied to the government. Both defendants made trips to China, where U.S. authorities allege they discussed research they had performed in the United States with Chinese scientists. The men then arranged for a group from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science and the Crop Research Institute in China to travel to the United States last year.

Most recently, at the *Lianghui*, Minister of Agriculture Han Changfu said that genetically modified food is safe to eat. His statement is the most public effort yet to dispel doubts on GM produce (*SCMP*, March 7). It points toward a likely future wherein China tries to use GM crops as part of an agricultural modernization program aimed at addressing domestic food shortages. But if Beijing is behind the theft of intellectual property in this space, this plan puts China and the United States on a collision course over who owns the crops being grown.

Conclusion

China's leaders continue to place great emphasis on the ability to maintain a surplus in domestic food production, especially of rice and other cereal grains. On the other hand, the combination of China's growing population, shrinking productive land (due to urbanization, desertification, water shortages and pollution) and increasingly meat-heavy diet make food self sufficiency less and less possible as time goes on.

While maintaining domestic food independence could be possible for China, it would require the government to impose changes that it is likely unwilling or unable to execute. As a result, we should expect China to become a more significant importer of foodstuffs, from grain to meat to processed foods. This will have a significant impact on world food markets, possibly similar to the worldwide increase in base metal prices over the past decade. Precisely how these effects are felt will depend on how China enters the markets for particular commodities and whether the CCP and Chinese companies play by existing rules or seek to change the structure of the marketplace.

The implications for U.S. agricultural and export policies are manifold. For example, China recently announced that it will continue to ban imports of U.S. beef until it can have greater assurances that it is safe (*China Daily*, March 11). And with strictures in place vis á vis GM, U.S. exporters face limits on access to the Chinese market. China seems willing to negotiate over these differences, which will open its markets more fully to U.S. imports. But moves toward diversifying sources of imports will also reduce China's reliance on the United States.

The effects in China are also profound. Current levels of

air, water and soil pollution in China are unsustainable, and food and water security requirements mean that all forms of pollution must be addressed. Although Premier Li announced a “war on pollution” in his Work Report at the *Lianghui*, this militant language must be backed up by concrete action by the government and the Party if the food needs of China’s people are to be met.

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Notes

1. Complaint at 3, U.S. v. Mo Hailong, No. 4:13-cr-00147-RP-CFB (S.D. Iowa. Dec. 10, 2013), ECF No. 1.

PLA Joint Operations Developments and Military Reform

By Kevin N. McCauley

During recent high-level political meetings, Chinese leaders have made repeated calls for “military reform.” While these speeches have given little detail about the content of such reform, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in particular PLA academics and theorists, appears to have a well-developed, complex and challenging concept of the future modern military force that is required to meet China’s security requirements

and to fight and win future conflicts, although the devil is in the details. Many concepts have been proposed in the past, but more ambitious changes have never been implemented, apparently due to resistance from the established military hierarchy. Now the log-jam impeding some of the more far reaching reforms appears to be breaking, as indicated in the recent push in the Third Plenary Session for significant military reform and the creation of a leading group to push forward some of the more bureaucratically painful command, force structure and organizational changes required to create a modern military force.

The recent Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed military reforms and modernization efforts, including reorganizing the command system, force structure, education and training, modernization process. Many of these modernization goals are related to implementing and advanced joint operations capability. The development of an integrated joint operations capability is one of the most important issues for the PLA, demonstrated by the extensive PLA academic research effort. Once realized and operationalized throughout the PLA, an integrated joint operations capability, and the supporting system of systems operations, would provide advanced capabilities to detect long-range targets and conduct long-range precision strikes; provide a real-time common operating picture; coordinate the combat actions of dispersed joint forces; and achieve air, sea and information superiority over enemy forces in potential conflicts at increasing distances from China’s borders.

This article examines key PLA joint research issues, areas of disagreement and self-assessments. Joint areas that are discussed include the joint operations command, coordination and force groupings.

Creation of Joint Operations Commands

The recent Third Plenary Session proposed to reform the joint operational command structure, including establishing theater (military region) joint operations commands (Xinhua, November 16, 2013). Although discussed for some time, this is perhaps one of the more difficult changes to implement as it challenges the dominance of the ground forces and the current military region structure. In addition, there is disagreement on the organization of the joint headquarters. *A Yomiuri*




Figure 1: Example of a Theater Flat, Mesh Command Structure [3]

Shimbun article, repeated in the Chinese press, claimed that joint commands would be created in Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MR) over a five-year period, followed by a consolidation of the remaining four MRs into two joint commands (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 2). The Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) denied the details of these press articles. The MND press spokesman also stated that establishing a joint operations command system was necessary to meet the requirements of modern warfare and that the PLA was conducting research into joint operations command system with Chinese characteristics (China Military Online, November 29, 2013; January 6; Xinhua, January 6). On the basis of this clarification, it appears that at some point in the future joint operations commands will be established after further research to work out the details of the commands, which could include a reduction in military regions.

A National Defense University (NDU) book argued strongly for creating joint operations commands on strategic directions in peacetime to meet the requirements of future joint operations and ease the transition from a peacetime to wartime posture. However, difficulties to reforms include institutional impediments, as well as divergent views on the organization of the joint operations commands. There are entrenched interests in the current military region system, making a reduction potentially difficult, although announcements related to military reform suggest these impediments have been

overcome and significant military reforms are planned. The last military region reduction occurred during the 1985 force restructuring. The NDU publication also notes divergent views on a future joint operation command system of systems, with organizational and functional structures proposed (China Military Online, March 16). [1] Various PLA sources appear to support the MND spokesman's statement that research into the issue is ongoing, leading eventually to the establishment of a theater joint operations command system necessary for future integrated joint operations.

Joint Command

The PLA plans on establishing a flatter, mesh-type command system of systems structure which will drive changes to the command structure and procedures through all echelons of the PLA as well as C4ISR modernization requirements. New command relationships and procedures will require improved joint education and training to perfect and operationalize new concepts, which will take time. This flatter, mesh command will better support the accelerated operational tempo, intense confrontation, and high requirements for information access, processing and transmission than the traditional hierarchical "tree" command structure. The PLA also believes that this flat, mesh (see figure 1) joint command system of systems will be less vulnerable to destruction of individual command nodes, provide real-time information sharing and horizontal and lateral




Figure 2: Command Information System [4]

communications and coordination functions. [2]

The PLA hopes to improve command efficiency, accelerate decision-making and reduce operational planning time as advanced command information systems are deployed widely throughout the force. The command information system is a key component of the military information system (see figure 2) and a fundamental requirement for achieving an efficient joint command. The command information system will provide enhanced battlefield information sharing, a common operating picture to units at all echelons, and allow for remote synchronization of planning between units at dispersed locations (*Joint Operations Research*, pp. 166-170).

Joint Coordination

Along with command procedures, future joint operations will require changes to the predominantly centralized and planned coordination methods currently employed. Again, changing coordination methods and training staffs, combined with differences in opinion in academic circles, indicate that implementation of new coordination methods will take time. Coordination requirements are higher and more difficult during joint operations. PLA academics are continuing to research coordination issues in order to resolve differing points of view. Coordination is based on the joint commander's intent as expressed in the overall operational plan and the coordination plan, while taking into account transitions in operational phases. Initiative, adaptability and flexibility are required for subordinate commanders to quickly make adjustments in reaction to changing battlefield conditions and react

to an accelerated operational tempo, within the context of the joint commander's intent. Joint coordination requirements include the following: Precision combat actions, particularly with long-range precision strike weapons systems, to ensure the desired destruction effects and minimize collateral damage; reconnaissance, target acquisition and identification; and rapid maneuver of joint operational system of systems (*zuozhan tixi*—a highly integrated force grouping) in a dynamic, multi-dimensional battlespace. Coordination includes joint commanders conferring with and considering the opinions and suggestions from subordinate commands, if the situation and time permits (*Joint Operations Research*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2013) pp. 178-189; *Military Terms*, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) pp. 86 and 180-181). [5]

Joint operations coordination content includes coordination between the following: joint operational forces; various operational directions; operational phases; combat actions; and combat and support. Currently, joint operations coordination includes primarily planned coordination (*jibua xietong*), supplemented by improvised coordination (*linji xietong*), and can also be based on operational objectives, time and space, and other considerations. Planned coordination, currently considered the main coordination method, is based on the pre-war plan's instructions for adjusting combat actions during the operational preparation and implementation phases. Improvised coordination provides for operational flexibility to meet emergency and unforeseen fundamental changes in the battlefield situation, or seize battlefield opportunities. [6]

Joint Force Groupings

The PLA views integration of joint forces down to the tactical level as an important joint operations requirement which will stress command and coordination measures in future operations. As in other research areas on joint operations, there are divergent views on forming joint operations forces, ranging from traditional service-based force groupings to more unconventional concepts that will need to be sorted out before moving forward. The PLA considers three general methods for joint operational force groupings. The first method has the services each forming operational groups (*jitian*), including a SAF operational group and logistics units forming an operational rear group. However, the PLA notes the lack of joint integration of the forces and poor independent operational capability with this method. The second method is integrating joint forces into functional groups. For example, an air operations group would consist of naval aviation and PLAAF forces, while a missile assault group would consist of SAF and ground forces tactical missile units. An island offensive operation could contain a landing operations group, air operations group, naval operations group, missile assault group, special operations group, operational reserve, coastal defense group, and operational rear group. This functional form breaks service boundaries improves operational capabilities and independent operational capabilities of the groups, although the PLA believes that this method breaks service support relationships and makes command and coordination more difficult. The preference moving forward is to form modular groupings combining multiple functions—firepower, information, aviation and support for example—based on mission requirements, which the PLA believes, is the better solution even though command and support will be complex. This modular grouping approach remains in the research and development phase, with exercises experimenting in the employment of both joint campaign formations (*juntuan*—sometimes translated as large formation) and joint tactical formations (*bingtuan*) (*Joint Operations Research*, pp. 123-125).

In general, joint operations forces are divided into strategic, campaign and tactical joint operations forces, although campaign forces are considered primary. Joint campaign formations would be formed at three levels as follows: theater (large-scale), theater direction (medium)

and at group army-level (small). Joint forces would be dispersed over a wide area including in depth, requiring a strong joint command structure but improving survivability (*Joint Operations Research*, pp. 105-113 and 125-126).

PLA Progress Assessments

The PLA has stated that it is in the research and demonstration stage of joint operations development (Jiefangjun Bao Online, March 26, 2009). The following assessments of the current status of several joint capabilities combined with the divergent opinions on multiple joint issues, lend credence to this appraisal.

In the area of joint operations ground-air coordination for aviation firepower support, the PLA currently relies primarily on planned firepower support, noting that it is difficult to request the dispatch of an aviation attack group, which requires several hours of preparation. The current solution appears to be better advanced planning (*Joint Operations Research*, p. 192). Good planning could provide a degree of flexibility depending on how PLA planning is conducted. However, it is surprising that the PLA has not advanced further in ground-air coordination since it has been a research topic for the last two decades with some experimentation in exercises.

The PLA states that long-range precision strike targets are predetermined (*Joint Operations Research*, pp. 225-227). The PLA does have the capability to address newly discovered targets, which includes target identification, assessment of target damage requirements, and passing the information to combat units. However, the sensor-to-shooter time is unknown (*Joint Operations Research*, p. 267). This reliance on planned targets could lead to difficulties in providing timely firepower support as unforeseen battlefield situations lead to changes in the planned operation.

Currently, the PLA does not believe most units could conduct tactical level joint operations due to technology and capability limitations. The PLA has conducted experimental exercises with modular joint tactical formations (*bingtuan*), however difficulties with integrated joint communications have been cited in the Chinese press as impediments to jointness (*Joint Operations Research*, p. 113-114). While these assessments are likely true for

the PLA force wide, there are likely units conducting advanced experimentation, such as the 38th Group Army in Beijing Military Region, that are further ahead in practicing more advanced operational theories.

Conclusions

Ongoing debates both within the PLA and in academic circles, and limited current joint capabilities, indicate that development of an integrated joint operations capability along with supporting operations theory will be a long process, perhaps taking several decades. This is not to say that the PLA could not conduct joint operations during a conflict. Currently, the PLA would conduct coordinated joint operation, which lacks the close service integration and the command and coordination flexibility and agility of the more advanced integrated joint operations.

It appears likely that the PLA will establish theater joint commands at some point in the future, which also could lead to a reduction in the current seven military regions. The creation of peacetime joint commands will represent a significant signpost in the PLA's advance towards an integrated joint operational capability, breaking down barriers between the services, and will speed up a transition to a wartime posture in the event of a crisis. However, organizational issues need to be decided, although it appears that institutional impediments and vested interests might have been overcome. An integrated command information system forms the foundation for joint operations and the recent attention to standardization and high-level direction are in part intended to resolve integration issues between the services and regions.

Future PLA military reforms represent a significant reorganization and transformation of all aspects of the force. The goal is to build a modern military organization. This requires restructuring the command at all echelons and rebalancing the force structure, establishing new type forces, standardizing equipment modernization, policies and procedures, deciding on new operational methods, and improving and education and training. The complexity and vastness of the project, combined with past impediments to some of the more dramatic changes, will require a new degree of high-level direction. The renewed emphasis at the Third Plenary session and establishment of a leading group to manage the vast modernization program indicate that the log-jam is

broken, or in the process of breaking up.

The pace of significant military reforms over the next few years could provide an indication whether change is accelerating. However, despite comments about seizing a strategic opportunity to promote comprehensive reforms, reports also indicate that the PLA will take a slow and deliberate approach to change. Reporting states that prior to the reforms, repeated demonstrations and scientific assessments must be conducted to ensure that the reforms are sound, as major initiatives can affect the entire military system. Therefore, it is likely that the PLA will undergo significant change, but through the process of “unceasing little steps” forward to reform (*China Military Online*, March 16).

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Notes

1. *Information System-Based System of Systems Operations Study*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2012) p. 244; *Information System-based System of Systems Operational Capability Building in 100 Questions* (Beijing: National Defense University Press, Jun 2011) pp. 196-197.
2. *Joint Operations Research*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2013) pp. 163-173; *Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability Study, Volume 2: Operational Command*, (Beijing: Nanjing Army Command College Printing, 2010) pp. 13-15 [Hereafter *Operational Capability Study*].
3. *Joint Operations Research*, p. 166.
4. *Command Information System Course of Study*, (Beijing, Military Science Press, 2013) p. 22.
5. *Joint Operations Research*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2013) pp. 178-189 ; *Military Terms*, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) pp. 86 and 180-181.

6. *Military Terms*, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 174, 178, 182; *Joint Operations Research*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2013) pp. 189-197; *Joint Operations Command Organ Work Course of Study*, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2008) pp. 259 -263.

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