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In a Fortnight

VIRTUAL ESPIONAGE CHALLENGES CHINESE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

By Peter Mattis

Official media publicly credited Guangdong elements of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) with breaking open an espionage case last week in which the chief suspect received a ten-year prison sentence. An unnamed foreign intelligence service reportedly recruited the suspect, one “Mr. Li,” in an online chat room, and he provided the foreign intelligence service with a variety of classified military documents and publications (*People’s Daily*, May 5; *China Daily*, May 5; China News Service, May 4). The espionage case publicized within two weeks of a new set of Central Military Commission directives on security and developing security consciousness highlight another aspect of China’s insecurity over cyber. Despite Chinese authorities’ successful investigative efforts of individual cases, they cannot seem to staunch the creative approaches foreign intelligence operations and the leak of information online. Old tenets of secrecy no longer seem as effective as problems multiply with increasingly reliance on information technology (*Outlook Weekly*, May 6, 2012).

As the Guangdong State Security Department (GSSD) investigated “Mr. Li” and his online contact “Feige,” they discovered that “Feige” had more than 40 other contacts—12 in Guangdong—spread over 20 provinces and provincial-level cities. Additionally, “Feige” had been an active online persona since 2007, collecting information off of military enthusiast (*junmi*) discussion boards and using services like QQ to meet others like “Mr. Li.” Those who “Feige” recruited collected military information through friends and contacts, subscribed to sensitive and internal military publications, and even took pictures of local military installations (*People’s Daily*, May 5; China News Service, May 4).

Interestingly, Chinese authorities did not identify the foreign intelligence service behind the theft of military secrets. Beijing is generally tight-lipped about the perpetrators of espionage, unless the culprit is Taiwan, which has had repeated successes against mainland targets as well as dozens of caught spies. The publicizing of such cases serves a deterrent function, putting people on notice that they can and will be caught no matter innocuous the crime might appear—an approach that has been advocated rather than trying to hide embarrassment (*Global Times*, September 1, 2011). “Mr. Li” collected only a few hundred renminbi per month and, now, ten years in prison, because the GSSD is as present as “air and water” with “information on everyone” (China News Service, May 4). If “Feige,” however, was operating for years, it gives lie to MSS capabilities and indicates that the ministry has trouble tracking the flow of information.

For a state known to be as controlling of information as China, the amount of sensitive information that is publicly accessible is a bit staggering. The GSSD’s involvement in the investigation suggests “Mr. Li” was civilian, because most military espionage cases are handled internally. This raises the question of how a civilian could obtain access to sensitive, internal military documents. The People’s Liberation Army has made novel use of Internet-enabled technologies and communications for such things as political education—however, it still faces prolonged pressure on security, despite efforts to crack down on Internet usage and mobile devices (“PLA Puts Political Education Online,” *China Brief*, February 3, 2012). According to security officials, more than 70 percent of state secrets cases involve information being leaked or passed to a foreign intelligence service online

(*China Daily*, May 6). This situation exacerbates Beijing’s sense of siege in the face of what it calls U.S. Internet hegemony, the ubiquity of foreign-made communications technology in sensitive Chinese systems, and the alleged U.S. exploitation of Huawei’s equipment (Xinhua, April 22; *Seeking Truth*, September 5, 2013).

Two weeks ago, the Central Military Commission under Xi Jinping’s signature issued a new opinion “On Efforts to Conduct Confidential Work under the New Conditions.” The opinion placed emphasis on new standards for secure computers and communications as well as efforts to develop security consciousness among leading cadre, who need to take greater responsibility for protecting secrets (*PLA Daily*, April 22). As a commentator article noted the next day, security always has been a matter of survival for military organizations. The rapid modernization process, however, had left a lot of loopholes at the same time—contrary to Western perspectives—the value of secret intelligence is going up (*PLA Daily*, April 23). The commentary also tied Xi’s objective of combat preparedness and preparing “to fight and win” wars to the military’s ability to rejuvenating the confidential work (*baomi gongzuo*) system, suggesting that the effort to bolster security will get folded into Xi’s wider military reform program (“Newest Small Leading Group to ‘Deepen Reform of National Defense and the Military,’” *China Brief*, March 20; “Restructuring the Military: Drivers and Prospects for Xi’s Top-Down Reforms,” *China Brief*, February 7).

The wide-ranging activities of just one online case officer provide a telling case study about the challenge of information control in a modern authoritarian state. Compared to uncovering previously unknown activity, investigation is easy. “Mr. Li” and “Feige” demonstrate the Chinese authorities are capable of building up a sophisticated profile of the online activities of individuals; however, the MSS and supporting agencies still have a long way to identify espionage in the offing. The vulnerability that the Guangdong case exposes—an ordinary individual can access classified materials and could be willing to work with a foreign intelligence service for years with low compensation—highlights the uncertainty of life in China and concerns about the party’s public legitimacy that Major General Jin Yi’nan drew attention to in a leaked video presentation (“General’s Spy Comments Reveal More Than Just Espionage,”

China Brief, September 2, 2011). If China cannot stop such intelligence efforts, what confidence can leaders in Beijing have that expert foreign intelligence services can be held back?

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Terrorism Fears Push Muscular Approach to ‘Overall National Security’

By Willy Lam

Xi Jinping’s new concept of “overall national security” (zongti guojiaanquan) was put to the test on April 30, when two alleged terrorists struck at the Urumqi Railway Station just a few hours after the President and Commander-in-Chief left Xinjiang after a four-day inspection trip. At least three people were killed and 79 injured in the bombing and stabbing incident. Xi immediately vowed to take “decisive actions” against the suspects, adding that “the battle to combat violence and terrorism will not allow even a moment of slackness” (Xinhua, May 1; CCTV, May 1). Big questions, however, are being asked about the efficacy of Xi’s muscular approach to improving security and law-and-order.

On at least four occasions the past month, Xi indicated his administration would devote maximal resources to maintaining state security in the following eleven areas: politics, territorial, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, resources, and nuclear. “Upholding national security is of utmost importance to consolidating the party’s ruling status,” said Xi at the first meeting of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC)—the country’s highest policy-making organ on state security—on April 15. While preserving stability (*weiwen*) has been a central concern to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the past decade or so, Xi has argued that his new concept of “overall national security,” which is also known as “total security”

or “mega-security,” is a “road [map] on national security with Chinese characteristics” that fits the growing challenges of the 21st century (Xinhua, April 15; *Global Times*, April 15).

What is new about “overall national security”? First of all, the CNSC takes a holistic and all-embracing approach to different aspects of security. As Xi put it, Beijing would “pay utmost attention to both external and internal security; territorial security as well as citizens’ security; traditional and non-traditional security.” Moreover, Xi said, the authorities would strike a balance between “the question of development and that of security.” “The security of not only individual [citizens and units] but also that of the collective will be emphasized,” Xi added (*People’s Daily*, April 16; *Legal Daily*, April 16).

More significant is the fact that it is the first time since 1949 that the authorities have devoted so much in the way of resources to tackling the interconnected tasks of boosting security on eleven fronts. Led by three Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members—Chairman Xi and Vice-Chairmen Premier Li Keqiang and National People’s Congress Head Zhang Dejiang—the CNSC is a much more powerful organ than the Central Political-Legal Commission (CPLC) that late patriarch Deng Xiaoping set up in the early 1980s to look after internal security. The current CPLC secretary Meng Jianzhu is an ordinary Politburo member. And while the CPLC controls the police, state security as well as the courts and procuratorate, the CNSC has oversight over these and other departments and units including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the CCP International Liaison Department (“Xi’s Power Grab Towers over Market Reforms,” *China Brief*, November 20, 2013). As CNSC Chairman Xi put it, the pursuit of “overall national security” will manifest the five principles of “concentration [of powers] and unity; scientific planning; synthesis of comprehensive and individual [efforts]; well-coordinated actions; and having a lean and high-efficient structure” (China News Service, April 15).

Qu Xing, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated think tank China Institute for International Studies, has used the theory of the “butterfly effect” to explain the interconnectivity of domestic and foreign security as well as the linkages across different security

fronts. He gave as example the activities of the Central Asia-based “Eastern Turkestan movement” as inflaming ethnic violence in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). “The concept of total national security has five major elements,” Qu wrote in *PLA Daily*, “The security of the [Chinese] people is the goal, while political security is the basis and economic security is the foundation...Security in the military, cultural and social arenas are the safeguards and the promotion of international security is the support.” Qu specifically cited the importance of a strong army to maintain territorial integrity, the need to ward off “cultural invasion” from abroad, and the imperative of socio-political security to satisfy the people’s livelihood (*PLA Daily*, April 27; *Ta Kung Pao* [Hong Kong], April 27).

Perhaps because of its sensitive nature, the authorities have given little away as to how the CNSC will dictate and coordinate a policy of “total security.” Although official news agencies have released fairly detailed information about the organizational make-up of the Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—which, like the CNSC, was a superagency set up at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee last November—little is known about CNSC membership or its functioning (“New High-Level Groups Threaten Line Between Party and Government,” *China Brief*, April 9). Last March, Xi transferred a key protégé and former Zhejiang Executive Vice Governor Cai Qi, to Beijing to serve as deputy for another confidant, Politburo member Li Zhanshu, who directs the commission’s General Office. The two will be responsible for coordinating multiple party, government, and military elements to raise security standards across the board (*Ta Kung Pao*, March 28; *Ming Pao* [Hong Kong], March 27).

Redoubled efforts to counter terrorism throughout China, which are being personally supervised by Xi, will give an indication about how the battle regarding “overall national security” will be waged. The CCP General Secretary and President since early March has made at least 15 references to fighting terrorism or “violent and terrorist crimes” that allegedly are being perpetrated by parties including ethnic separatists, hard-core criminals as well as Chinese who harbor severe grievances against the authorities (*Global Times*, April 29; *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, April 29). While conducting a Politburo Study Session on national security last month, Xi called on

responsible cadres to rely on the people to “perfect anti-terrorist work systems and to strengthen anti-terrorist capacities.” “We must uphold [the principle of] the synthesis between professionals and the people as well as relying on the masses,” Xi said. The supremo indicated Beijing would devote more resources to the area of “the masses putting up defenses [against terrorism] and the masses taking part in countering terrorism” so that “perpetrators of violent and terrorist crimes will be like rats on the street which will be beaten up by everybody” (Xinhua, April 27; China News Service, April 27).

One method is simply upgrading existing facilities as well as boosting training. While visiting Xinjiang in late April for the first time since the 18th Party Congress, Xi toured units of the police and PAP, telling local law-enforcement officers “The situation is grim and complicated and police stations are fists and daggers [in fighting terrorism].” Xi added “You must have the most effective means to deal with violent terrorists...Sweat more in peacetime to bleed less in wartime” (*Legal Daily*, April 29; Reuters, April 29). In the wake of a rash of Uighur-related terrorist acts, including the stabbing incident in March at the Kunming Railway Station in which 29 people were killed, more PAP and police are believed to have been moved to the XUAR. Eventually, up to 100,000 soldiers serving in the ground divisions of the PLA could be converted to PAP officers, many of whom will then be deployed in the restive Xinjiang and Tibet regions (*Oriental Daily News*, March 6; Sina.com, March 6).

Xi’s emphasis on “relying on the masses” in the campaign against violent and terrorist crimes harks back to Chairman Mao Zedong’s famous “people’s warfare” concept. The idea of recruiting ordinary Chinese as vigilantes and spies was used to good effect in maintaining law and order during international events such as the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and the 2010 World Expo in 2010. Han Chinese in Xinjiang have been asked to serve as informal informants. Police and state security units in Xinjiang are offering rewards from 50 to 50,000 yuan for information leading to the arrest of suspected criminals and terrorists. The part-time spies are told to be on the lookout for “people wearing beards and those who spread information about toppling the [Chinese] regime.” Also on the list of suspicious activities are Uighurs conducting activities deemed to be linked to the “three evil forces” (*san gu shih*) of separatism, terrorism

and religious extremism (*Ming Pao*, April 26; Al Jazeera, April 26).

Another example of the “people’s war” approach to security is to encourage units running famous monuments and tourist spots to set up their own self-defense organizations to help local police guard against violent and terrorist mishaps. One example that has received much publicity is the Anti-Terrorist Defense and Protection Group newly established within the world-famous Ling Yin Monastery near the West Lake, Hangzhou. The group, which includes 20 monks, drills every evening on the use of martial arts and simple weapons. According to Monk Jueheng, who is responsible for the unit, “we want to be better prepared against emergency terrorist attacks so as to ensure the safety of the 10,000 or so people who visit Ling Yin every day” (China News Service, April 2; *Wen Wei Po*, April 2).

Chinese specialists in Xinjiang, however, have raised the question of whether merely emphasizing police action could defuse the decades-odd contradiction between Uighurs and central authorities. According to Pan Zhiping, formerly a researcher at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, “the authorities should win over the heart of the people.” “Friction [with Uighurs] over ethnic, cultural and religious issues should be resolved in an atmosphere of tolerance,” he said. Beijing-based Xinjiang expert Jiang Zhaoyong also pointed out that Han-Chinese officials must “recognize the special social conditions of Xinjiang as well as the psychology of ethnic [minorities]” (*Ming Pao*, May 2; *Lianhe Zaobao* [Singapore], May 1).

It is significant that in his talks about bolstering law-and-order, Xi also has attached importance to placatory gestures such as improving relations between cadres and the masses as well as safeguarding the rights of underprivileged social sectors. While addressing a national conference on political-legal work in January, Xi called upon officials working in units under the CPLC to “handle well the relations between preserving stability and guaranteeing the rights of the people.” “We must do a good job of resolving the reasonable and legal demands of the people...so that the masses will feel that their rights and interests have been handled fairly,” said the President. (*Urumqi Evening News*, January 9; China News Service, January 9).

Tough tactics employed by the police and state security agents, however, have cast doubt on whether Xi’s “overall national security” game plan relies on the state’s naked power of suppression while paying lip service to the prospect of reconciliation. Some of those silenced include those scholars, lawyers, and NGO activists who are helping disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities, to air their views peacefully. Recent arrests of potential intermediaries between the government and the masses—including the Uighur intellectual Ilham Tohti and rights defense lawyer Xu Zhiyong—seem to suggest that, despite Xi’s pledge that “putting people first” is foremost in his national security strategy, his ultimate preoccupation is preserving the unchallenged power of the CCP and himself (BBC Chinese Service, April 11; *South China Morning Post*, January 18). Silencing the moderates, after all, is a time-tested tactic for allowing the extremists to become the voice of opposition in preparation for a crackdown.

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U.S.-China Security Transparency Highlights Divergences

By Richard Weitz

The two high-profile visits by senior Obama administration officials had a major impact on U.S.-China relations last month. From April 7 to April 10, Chuck Hagel made his first official visit to China as U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was given unprecedented access to China’s aircraft carrier and engaged in some frank public exchanges with his Chinese hosts. Subsequently, President Barack Obama traveled to four East Asian countries of importance to China—Japan, South Korea,

Malaysia, and the Philippines. Although Obama did not visit China, Chinese commentators noted how U.S.-China relations were a major subject of his trip. They also offered comprehensive critiques of the “Asia Pivot”—the rebalancing of U.S. attention and other assets toward East Asia—and its implications for China. Chinese analysts thought the U.S. visits failed to thread the needle between reassuring allies of U.S. commitment and assuring Beijing that Washington is not trying to contain China.

Mil-Mil Ties on the Upswing?

China-U.S. military-to-military relations have grown in size, broadened in the subjects covered, and continued without interruption despite the inevitable disputes that invariably plague such a complex relationship. The sustained momentum in the defense relationship has been evident since Xi Jinping conducted a successful visit to the Pentagon in February 2012, when he was preparing to become China’s new president. He later told Obama at their June 2013 informal summit in Sunnyland California, that he wanted to see “a new pattern of military relations” compatible with the overarching “new type of great power relations” he sought with the United States (China Military Online, May 5). Since then, their militaries have engaged in many China-U.S. military exercises, exchanges, and other joint activities that have continued despite public clashes over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a near collision involving the U.S. guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) and a ship accompanying China’s sole aircraft carrier in international waters of the South China Sea as well as Obama’s meeting the Dalai Lama in the White House, and the Asian Pivot, which many Chinese commentaries depict as designed to contain China’s rising power and influence (China.org, April 17).

Chinese commentators now more readily agree with their U.S. counterparts that these cooperative defense activities could help their militaries understand one another’s tactics, techniques, and procedures better and that the resulting insights could help prevent miscalculations, miscommunications, and other problems that could lead to unsought military confrontations (China.org, April 1). They also have applauded the frank tone of recent exchanges as having the same salutary effect of making clearer both sides interests and concerns: “The verbal sparring between Hagel and top Chinese military officials

reflects the making of a new type of relationship between the two countries and means a straight question will be given a straight answer” (Caixin Online, April 15).

Defense Minister Chang Wanquan explicitly told the Chinese media last month that his dealings with Hagel aimed to “implement the consensus reached by Chinese president Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama to develop a new model of military-to-military relations based on the new model of China-U.S. relations [in which they would] work together to push forward steady and healthy bilateral military ties” (Xinhua, April 9). During his four-day stay, Hagel became the first senior foreign official to tour the Liaoning, spending two hours on the aircraft carrier while the vessel was docked at the Yuchi Naval base in Shandong. The Pentagon had explicitly requested the tour and described the Chinese decision to provide it as “an honest, genuine effort to be open about this brand new capability that they’re trying to develop (Reuters, April 7). The Chinese media said that the gesture was “both a sign of a new openness in the Chinese military and of the importance it attaches to Sino-U.S. military relations” (Caixin Online, April 15).

Hagel also met with the leaders of China’s national security establishment in Beijing and engaged in detailed and frank discussions with his Chinese hosts. One excursion brought him to the Changping Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) School in Beijing, where he had lunch with the cadets (China Military Online, April 10). According to Chang, who was meeting Hagel for the third time, the Pentagon and the PLA agreed to create a new maritime notification mechanism and establish standards of behavior for their major navy and air force activities in international waters. They also committed to expand discussions to include a dialogue on anti-terrorism and how “to strengthen military-to-military cooperation on regional and international issues to maintain the peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region” (Xinhua, April 9). Chinese commentators claim “The two militaries have reached a seven-point consensus, which has set the tone for the future of bilateral military relations. Both sides agreed to implement the consensus of developing the new model of China-U.S. military-to-military relationship, to advance the process of establishing a military notification mechanism of major military activities, to further strengthen military exchanges and expand areas for practical cooperation, and to further strengthen

cooperation on international and regional issues” (China.org, April 17). When the biennial Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) met later that month in Qingdao, China removed its earlier objections to the proposed Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), allowing for the unanimous adoption at the conference of what one Chinese scholar termed “a win-win option for all” (China-U.S. Focus, April 26).

Welcomed Frankness

Nevertheless, Sino-American differences were evident during Hagel’s visit and after, in U.S. policies towards China’s territorial disputes with its Asian neighbors as well as their cyber security approaches. Regarding the former, while Hagel emphasized that Washington would accept whatever substantive outcome to these disputes Beijing and its neighbors agreed to, he had earlier in his 10-day trip insisted that the parties refrained from applying coercive measures, singling out China’s sudden declaration last November of an air-defense identification zone over waters administered by Japan. Chinese experts, such as professors Zhang Qingmin at Peking University and Zhu Chenghu at China’s National Defense University, said that Hagel had disappointed those who thought his aversion to the Iraq War and experience in Vietnam would lead him to demilitarize U.S. policies towards China. Instead, they alleged that Hagel had criticized China more aggressively and sided with Tokyo in its territorial dispute with Beijing than any recent U.S. defense leader (*Beijing Review*, April 14). General Chang attacked what he called “the false remarks and actions by some U.S. defense and government officials recently on the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea issue” and urged “the U.S. side to correct their mistakes and safeguard regional peace and stability with concrete actions” including fulfilling “its commitment on taking no position and not taking sides on territorial disputes, so as to avoid sending wrong signals” (Xinhua, April 9). In responding to Hagel’s implied warning to Beijing, made shortly before his arrival in China, that, “You cannot go around the world and redefine boundaries and violate territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations by force, coercion and intimidation whether it’s in small islands in the Pacific or large nations in Europe,” General Fan Changlong, deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission, bluntly complained that, “The Chinese people, including myself, are dissatisfied with such remarks” (*South China*

Morning Post, April 15).

Another noticeable gap was the Chinese disinterest in accepting the U.S. offer for a more comprehensive dialogue on cyber security. In a joint press conference with Defense Minister Gen. Chang, Hagel said that he “emphasized in our meetings this morning the need for both the United States and China to be more open with each other about our capabilities and our intentions in this critically important domain [of cybersecurity].” Echoing the more general U.S. view regarding military transparency, Hagel said “Greater openness about cyber reduces the risks that misunderstanding and misperception could lead to miscalculation. More transparency will strengthen China-U.S. relations” (U.S. Department of Defense, April 8). Before the trip, a U.S. delegation had provide China with a compressive briefing on U.S. cyber defense policies in the hope, thus far unrealized, that China would shed more light on its own cyber defense doctrine and practices (*New York Daily News*, April 7). The last few years have seen a welcome Chinese effort to become more transparent in its defense activities and capabilities, but the NSA scandal and other developments have limited mutual openness in the cyber domain (“Cyber Transparency for Thee, But Not For Me,” *China Brief*, April 18).

Chinese commentators applauded the tough public stance taken by Chinese leaders in these public exchanges. To take one example, one editorial in a party-run newspaper observed “Although it seems very rare for China to respond so strongly and openly to Hagel’s remarks, in fact, it makes sense. Because Hagel’s many remarks about [the United States], Japan and China, which distorted facts and deviated from consensus, have touched China’s core interests and contributed to some countries’ arrogance, bringing threats to peace and stability in Asian-Pacific region” (*Guangming Daily*, April 13). Some writers also acknowledged China’s “selective transparency” in which the Chinese deliberately reveal new capabilities at opportune or embarrassing moments, a practice that could serve as a deterrence (China Military Online, May 5). In his speech at the WPNS, General Fan said “No country should expect China to swallow the bitter pill of our sovereignty, national security or development interests being compromised” (Reuters, April 23).

Obama and the Pivot

Although President Obama did not visit China on Asia trip and U.S.-China relations were not a key agenda item, Chinese writers called China the “elephant in the room” of his Asian trip (Xinhua, April 24). At the start of his trip, *The People’s Daily* called on Obama not to be a “troublemaker” and to cease “conniving with” Japan and the Philippines “and obscuring the distinction between right and wrong” (April 24). Observing that “it is impossible for the United States to skip China,” Chinese authors noted that Obama acknowledged Beijing’s help was indispensable for managing North Korea (Xinhua, April 24). Nonetheless, they also emphasized Obama’s unusually strong affirmation that all territories administered by Tokyo, including the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, came under the protection of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty (Xinhua, May 1). The Chinese government did not especially welcome Obama’s presence or message. In his regular press conference, Foreign Minister spokesperson Qin Gang depicted the United States as a meddling external power stirring up trouble among Asian countries: “We will tell the world that security in Asia should be determined by Asian countries, and countries are able and wise enough to safeguard and promote security in Asia through cooperation” (*Global Times*, April 30).

In general, the Chinese media cited experts who saw the Obama administration torn between two directions as the United States pivots to Asia—one drive is to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance to boost U.S. regional power against China, while the other is to work with Beijing to establish a new type of great power relationship (China Military Online, May 5). “Throughout his four-nation trip in Asia,” wrote a Xinhua reporter, “Obama is trying to strike a delicate balance between its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy and its ever-expanding relations with Beijing” (Xinhua, April 28). A balance, most commentators suggested, Obama failed to strike. Noted analyst Wang Fan, Assistant President of China Foreign Affairs University, observed “Because of its economic woes at home, the US is finding it hard to meet various demands of its alliances... To maintain its dominance in East Asia, it has to rely on its alliances. And to get its allies to do their part, the [United States] has to act as their advocate in regional hotspots and potential crises” (China-U.S. Focus, April 30). Wang’s assessment was widely echoed

elsewhere (*Global Times*, April 30; *China Daily*, April 30; Xinhua, April 28). Another opinion piece stated “From Tokyo to Manila, Obama has tried to pick his words so as not to antagonize Beijing. But from the U.S.-Japan joint statement to the new U.S.-Philippines defense agreement, it is increasingly obvious that Washington is taking Beijing as an opponent” (*China Daily*, April 29). Obama’s balancing act also failed, according to Chinese analysts, because the trip did not yield major economic, political, or strategic gains and exposed contradictions in the president’s Asia policies (China-U.S. Focus, May 5; *Global Times*, May 3; Xinhua, May 1).

Enduring Differences

China’s mixed response to both visits underscore how major differences with Washington persist over the value of the U.S. military presence in East Asia and stabilizing effect of U.S. Asia policy. Despite progress in Chinese transparency, the information Beijing releases still pales in comparison to that made public by the Pentagon. U.S. efforts to discuss cyber security issues continue to meet stiff Chinese resistance, while Chinese transparency is often selectively targeted for deterrence rather than reassurance. Chinese and Americans acknowledge that the underlying factors that sustain China-U.S. strategic competition—their regional rivalries, military buildups, different geopolitical environments, and contrasting political systems—will not soon vanish. Ni Lexiong, director of a defense policy center at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, observed that “it’s a good thing the two countries are talking things out, but this will not change the course that will see a rising nation clashing with the existing hegemony” (*South China Morning Post*, April 15). Another commentator attributed the shifting course of China-U.S. defense relations to the “largely unspoken nature of the antagonism between the two countries: the United States wants to maintain its hegemony while China wants to expand its security position” (Caixin Online, April 15). Bilateral ties are unlikely to see more than evolutionary improvements as long as the underlying security relationship between both countries remains so potentially adversarial.

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Tactical Pause in China's Economic Engagement with North Korea

By Mathieu Duchâtel

There is no consensus in the Chinese expert community regarding the time frame of the next North Korean nuclear test. However, the policy debate that started with the rise of the “abandonment school” after the third nuclear test, which occurred in February last year, has now dried up (“Is Enough Finally Enough for China and North Korea,” *China Brief*, March 15, 2013). The debate, however, paved the way for a relative adjustment of China's policy. Beijing no longer provides political support for greater trade and investment exchanges with North Korea, and Chinese customs and financial authorities have improved the implementation of UNSC sanctions. This rebalancing act—less support for economic ties, more emphasis on sanctions enforcement—came in combination with visible rapprochement with Seoul and a near freeze of political communication with Pyongyang with the exception of Chinese diplomatic activity to support resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

All signs, however, point to tactical adjustment rather than a fundamental break; China is not abandoning North Korea, but raising the stakes for Pyongyang's proliferation activities through indirect economic pressure. The view that economic engagement is the only long-term viable approach to revive the disarmament process and achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is still mainstream in China. At the same time, the purge of Jang Song Thaek—a key architect and advocate of deepening economic ties with China who was exerting control over many of the bilateral projects on the North Korean side—sent the wrong signal to Chinese entrepreneurs, even if it did not prompt a Chinese response beyond the Foreign Ministry's comment that these were “the internal affairs of the DPRK” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2013).

Diplomatic disaffection in Beijing and entrepreneurial wariness in China combine to put into doubt the feasibility of Kim Jong Un's “byongjin line”—pursuing

simultaneously economic development and nuclear deterrence—and especially its strategy of promoting growth in special economic zones and tourist areas. To regain Chinese support for economic development policies that Beijing supported between the second and the third tests, North Korea would need to offer guarantees on the nuclear front. Although these guarantees have yet to be detailed, nuclear tests clearly appear to be Beijing's bottom line.

Available Data on Bilateral Economic Relations after the Third Test

Statistics published both by China and the ROK point to a continuous growth of trade after the third nuclear test. According to Chinese Customs statistics, bilateral trade grew 6.2 percent in the first ten months of 2013 (*Xinhua*, December 4, 2013). The Korea International Trade Association (ROK) reported a growth of 10.4 percent in 2013 with the trade volume reaching \$6.45 billion (*Yonhap*, February 2). Some Chinese traders have reported last minute cancellation of transactions immediately following the purge of Jang Song Thaek (*Global Times*, January 7). These appear, however, to be isolated incidents. During interviews conducted in Dandong and Yanbian prefecture last month, all interlocutors agreed that the impact of 2013 events on bilateral trade had been minimal—including on barter trade, which is not included in official statistics—because commercial exchanges rely on networks, patterns, and interests that are not dependent on high-level politics, at least on the Chinese side.

The impact of sanctions on legitimate bilateral trade has been insignificant. Beijing's commitment to enforce UN sanctions is limited to the targets specifically defined in the UNSC resolutions, namely, military products, specific companies and individuals, financial entities as well as a number of luxury products. Contrary to most other states, China has a restrictive definition of luxury products; it excludes, for example, cosmetics, an important export item at the border. China has resisted U.S. diplomatic pressure to adopt a more comprehensive approach to sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear weapons program by curbing bilateral trade. A good indicator is China's oil exports, which remain stable at 500,000 tons per year as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Chinese government and an unnamed state-

owned enterprise [1].

Tourism and investment, however, have been affected by politics in the aftermath of the third nuclear test, although not in ways that suggest a clear-cut Chinese intention to punish North Korea beyond UNSC sanctions for its proliferation activities.

Local agencies in Yanbian autonomous Korean prefecture offering tours to Rason and other places in North Korea considerably reduced their tours in 2013 as a result of “tensions in the peninsula,” some even to the point of bankruptcy (China News Service, December 10, 2013). The ferry cruise from Rason to the scenic Mount Kumgang also was interrupted. There is no record of a political decision in Changchun or Beijing that would have intensified a logical drop on the demand side in a prefecture extremely sensitive to risks of nuclear pollution. In Liaoning province, the traditional point of departure for accessing Pyongyang by train, a minority of interlocutors suggested instructions existed to decrease the tour offerings. A normal situation resumed this year, with the first train liaison from Ji’an to Pyongyang opening in April and the Jilin provincial government planning future routes with the DPRK Bureau of National Tourism (Jilin Province Tourism Bureau, April 21; Xinhua, April 13).

A direct casualty of the interruption of China’s economic engagement policy was the construction of special economic zones at the borders with Jilin and Liaoning province. Opposite the city of Dandong, the special economic zone of Hwanggumpyong has not made any visible progress since the construction of the customs building began in the second half of 2012. The new Yalu River Bridge is expected to be completed in October 2014 and the Shenyang-Dandong High-Speed Rail in 2015, but transportation infrastructure construction progresses only on the Chinese side of the border. In Rason, there was no record of new Chinese investment in 2013. The shipping of Jilin coal to Shanghai has not proceeded on a regular basis through the North Korean port.

The Jang Song Thaek Effect

Since the end of 2009, Jang Song Thaek played a pivotal role in implementing Kim Jong Il’s policy of developing economic ties with China. During his August 2012

Beijing leading a 50-member delegation, he discussed the future of economic cooperation and signed an agreement creating a management committee for the two special economic zones of Hwanggumpyong/Wiwha and Rason (Ministry of Foreign Commerce, August 15, 2012). Jang was widely seen in China as a strong advocate of deepening trade and investment relations and the only North Korean politician with sufficient clout to carry out ambitious bilateral projects, such as the special economic zones.

Jang’s execution committee points to his revisionist promotion of market reforms and international opening and accuses him of having sold land in Rason to a “foreign country” in order to pay debts contracted in the coal trade—two allusions to his activities with China (KCNA, December 13, 2013). The Chinese consensus, however, is that the struggle that led to his execution was driven by competition over economic resources rather than ideology. At the same time, his purge raised the question of the sustainability of a policy supporting greater trade and investment relations with China.

A concrete short-term effect of the purge was the disappearance of a number of China’s business counterparts in North Korea (*Global Times*, January 17). The replacement of mid-level cadres in charge of managing exchanges with China reinforced the widespread sentiment among Chinese entrepreneurs that the “investment environment, which was not particularly good, has deteriorated” (BWChinese.com, December 17, 2013).

The purge of Jang also created additional uncertainties regarding the future of Rason and Hwanggumpyong/Wiwha. The North Korean government sent a signal of economic policy continuity in announcing the establishment of 14 special economic development zones, including one covering Hwanggumpyong, just before the public arrest of Jang (Yonhap, October 23, 2013). The move, however, also was interpreted in China as evidence of inconsistency in Pyongyang’s thinking regarding bilateral cooperation.

The Chinese press has speculated that a successor to Jang Song Thaek would be put in charge of spearheading the development of economic relations with China during the first half of this year. The names of Prime Minister

Pak Pong Ju as well as the current Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong, the former ambassador to Switzerland and close associate of Jang Song Thaek, have circulated (*Oriental Morning Post*, February 27).

China's Tactical Adjustment

Without political support in Beijing to improve the legal framework within which entrepreneurs operate, North Korea is unlikely to attract Chinese investments in its special economic zones. Before the third nuclear test, the Chinese government engaged in diplomatic efforts to institutionalize business relations and reduce unexpected costs and political risks. The issue topped the agenda of the August 2012 Jang Song Thaek delegation—the last high-level visit to address economic cooperation. There was no high-level visit until May 2013 and, ever since, China's diplomacy towards North Korea focused exclusively on the nuclear issue and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

At the same time, Chinese policy adjusted on two important fronts: sanctions enforcement and relations with the South Korea. After the vote of UNSC Resolution 2094, China took visible steps to fulfill its international obligations. The most significant were the release by Ministry of Foreign Commerce of a list of items banned for export and the interruption of ties with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank shortly after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned it. There have also been reports of stricter custom inspections (NK News, 29 August 2013).

A second significant development has been the visible rapprochement between Beijing and Seoul in the context of their common opposition to some of the policies of the Abe administration. Of all foreign heads of states, President Park Geun-Hye received the highest diplomatic treatment during her state visit to Beijing in June 2013. The final joint statement praised her approach of security in the Korean peninsula. In a telephone call in April, President Park specifically asked President Xi to “advise” North Korea not to conduct a fourth nuclear test (*China Daily*, April 26). Tsinghua University professor Yan Xuetong, an advisor to the newly-established National Security Commission, recently underlined in a conference in Seoul the strategic interest of a China-South Korea partnership in the face of three common national interests: “the Japan threat, North Korea's nuclear program, and

peace in East Asia” (*Ta Kung Pao* [Hong Kong], May 2). He suggested that the two countries should establish a “formal alliance” (*jiemeng*). A minority view, it nonetheless underlines a shift from Pyongyang to Seoul that occurred in 2013 in China's policies.

Conclusion

Between 2009 and 2012, China conducted a policy of economic engagement that was partly conceived as a tool to promote North Korean nuclear disarmament [2]. A return to economic engagement would require political commitment at the highest level in Beijing and summit diplomacy, which under the current circumstances necessitates, at minimum, no fourth nuclear test.

Although economic engagement is not conditioned to North Korean concessions on the nuclear front, the tacit message appears to be that economic cooperation will be off the agenda as long as Pyongyang continues provocative proliferation activities. While political passivity differs significantly from economic punishment, the current interruption of economic engagement is nonetheless a pause rather than a shift.

Finally, the shift from Pyongyang to Seoul in China's approach of security in the Korean peninsula has been extremely fast, given Beijing's reluctance to support publicly the South Korean version of the Cheonan incident in 2010. As tactical and reversible as it might be, it nonetheless suggests that some of the keys to stricter enforcement of UNSC sanctions or support for a more ambitious sanctions regime might be in Seoul. Of all parties to the Six-Party Talks, South Korea now appears in the best position to shape China's response to North Korean proliferation activities.

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Notes:

1. Author's Interview with a Senior Chinese Expert, Liaoning Province, April 2014.
2. Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell, *China's Policy on North Korea, Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*, SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 40, December 2013 <<http://books.sipri.org/>>

[product_info?c_product_id=470>](#).

Conceptualizing ‘New Type Great Power Relations’: The Sino-Russian Model

By Paul A. Mancinelli

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed establishing “New Type of Great Power Relations” (NTGPR) between the U.S. and China, many have been discussing the true meaning of the phrase for Washington [1]. However, the NTGPR concept is not purely Xi’s policy invention, but a slightly refined version of a phrase long used in Beijing’s relations with Moscow. With attention on Sino-Russian relations during the recent Crimea crisis, many analysts raised questions regarding actual Chinese and Russian strategic alignment. What was overlooked in the ensuing analysis is the very relevant twenty-year history of Sino-Russian agreement on core strategic principles that govern their NTGPR (*Seeking Truth*, April 16, 2013). Careful analysis of this strategic concept illuminates two broad themes.

First, NTGPR is a well-developed, coherent outgrowth of Chinese foreign policy with a history of use and refinement in Sino-Russian relations since the mid-1990s. Sino-Russian joint statements articulate the concept as a means to stabilize their relationship and establish a “new international order” to shape U.S. international behavior.

Second, China views Sino-Russian NTGPR as the “paradigm” for a concept that allows Beijing to orient itself and interact with other great powers within the post-Cold War international order. With U.S. adoption of NTGPR at last year’s Sunnylands summit, China seeks to apply the same concept to the Sino-U.S. case, with the same expectations – expectations the U.S. has not fully understood and likely could not accept.

This paper will explain the main principles of NTGPR articulated as framing Sino-Russian relations and discuss the implications for Washington.

Words Matter

The phrase “New Type Great Power Relations” is not simply rhetorical flourish, it is loaded with established meaning. In fact it is one of many Chinese terms of art—words or phrases with a specific meaning in a given context, a meaning usually different from common usage. These terms undergo extensive internal vetting before surfacing in Beijing’s diplomatic discourse as policy concepts. China seeks to gain foreign acceptance of such terms to establish “consensus” and legitimize China’s view of the world. Because these terms have meaning, the context in which they appear is critical to discerning that meaning.

“New Type Great Power Relations” in Theory and Practice

Development. Chinese analysts cite the end of the Cold War and the “profound and complex changes” in the international system since the mid-1990s as an opportunity allowing China to readjust its historically troubled relations with Russia through a “New Type of Relations” (NTR). For both, NTR offered a framework for stability in the relationship and a chance to refocus on development issues (*Seeking Truth*, June 16, 1995). Considering China’s strategic goal of “national rejuvenation” and Russia’s own post-Soviet recovery, China’s 14th Party Congress reaffirmed the need for a stable international environment to achieve those ends, and NTR became essential to foster those conditions (*People’s Daily*, October 21, 1992).

While Chinese analysts cite Gorbachev’s 1989 landmark visit to China as the beginning of NTR, they highlight Soviet acquiescence on China’s “three obstacles” in the preceding years as critical to setting the conditions for this development (*International Studies*, July 3, 1999) [2]. Chinese analysts cite Boris Yeltsin’s 1992 visit to Beijing as “laying the foundation” for NTR and were using the phrase prior to Jiang Zemin’s first use in a 1995 speech in Moscow declaring, “this New Type of Relationship is viable and will benefit not only the Chinese and Russian peoples, but also world peace and development” (*Beijing Review*, November 13, 1995; *Xinhua*, May 9, 1995).

The first codification of NTR was in the 1997 “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the

Establishment of a New International Order” stating, “no country should seek hegemony, engage in power politics or monopolize international affairs,” and that NTR were “important to establish a new international order” (Xinhua, April 23, 1997). The core principles of NTR codified in that joint statement (and many to follow) reflected growing concern of a post-Cold War order dominated by the United States as well as the downturn in their respective relations with the U.S. resulting from events such as the Tiananmen massacre, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, U.S. military interventions, NATO expansion, and the war in Chechnya, among others.

NTR remained in official Sino-Russian statements until “Great Power” was added and adopted by both China and Russia in March 2013 -- three months before use by President Obama at Sunnylands (Xinhua, March 22, 2013; White House, June 8, 2013). However, the language change did not accompany a change in meaning, and so an ongoing consensus on the core principles of NTGPR has helped Sino-Russian relations weather nearly twenty-years of policy disagreements.

These core principles align with the broad contours of Chinese foreign policy writ large, and are persistent throughout Sino-Russian leadership joint statements which reaffirm bilateral “consensus.” or “shared view.” What follows is a discussion of the explicit and implicit linkages and interactions between these core principles as articulated in Sino-Russian policies and rhetoric.

Accept multipolarity. Sino-Russian statements promote multipolarity as a means to facilitate a global distribution of power more suitable to their interests. Their leaders state a desire for their nations to rejoin the ranks of the great powers (the EU, United States, and possibly other BRICS nations) as geographically oriented “poles” in a new “just and rational” multipolar system *absent* U.S. hegemony (*PLADaily*, September 1, 2003). As articulated, this principle reflects a desire for multiple great powers to jointly replace U.S. unipolarity through the exercise of greater authority in the conduct of international relations in this new system.

Acknowledge spheres of influence. Implicit in NTGPR is recognition of the right of great powers to a peripheral area of interests commensurate with their status as “poles” in the new multipolar order. President Medvedev’s

2008 proclamation of a Russian “sphere of privileged interests,” and China’s objective of a “Harmonious Asia” (highlighted by last year’s Peripheral Diplomacy Work Forum) all reflect impulses toward achieving regional preeminence and the importance of peripheral interests in their respective policies (“Xi Steps Up Efforts to Shape a China-Centered Regional Order,” *China Brief*, November 7, 2013). In fact, Chinese commentary discussing Beijing’s ambiguous non-position on Russian intervention in Crimea acknowledged the “historical facts and complexity” surrounding the issue and explained, “major powers are undergoing a period of adjustment in the distribution of capabilities in their spheres of influence”—a clear nod toward Russian peripheral privilege (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 4; *People’s Daily*, March 1). For China, this aspect of NTGPR suggests that, on balance, great power peripheral interests seem to trump the touted principle of “noninterference.”

Defer to UN authority. Sino-Russian statements consistently portray their nations as fully supporting the UN as the touchstone for legitimacy in international affairs, and U.S. unilateralism as a threat to international stability. Sino-Russian statements tout this principle as essential to “equality” and the “democratization of international relations” and explicitly oppose the use of force or threat of force without prior approval of the UN Security Council—allowing them final say on political and military interventions counter to their interests (Xinhua, July 5, 2000). Chinese commentary asserts this principle as a means to counter “New Interventionism” (*xinganshe zhubuyi*)—perceived Western involvement in “Color Revolutions” under the “cover” of human rights that could foster instability in China (*Seeking Truth*, April 16, 2013; *Study Times*, January 21, 2013). Last, Beijing consistently highlights what it deems to be U.S. “hypocrisy” of admonishing China for violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in maritime disputes, yet unwilling to ratify UNCLOS.

Accommodate core interests. The fundamental basis of NTGPR is to “safeguard one’s own national interests while respecting the national interests of the other country” (Beijing Review, April 7, 2006). This is reflected in explicit Sino-Russian support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and development path of the other, and refrain from condemning statements or demands regarding the other’s humanitarian practices or treatment

of minorities in restive provinces (Xinhua, April 25, 1996). Each side also reaffirms the others chosen socio-economic development path and political system particular to their national condition, while rejecting the promotion of a “universal” value set or particular political system.

Enhance cooperation. China has sought to legitimize NTGPR through the expansion of and focus on areas of cooperation and more frequent high-level, bilateral exchanges to facilitate the joint management of key issues by the two powers. In the Sino-Russian case, this includes strategic coordination on regional issues and crises, alignment in the UN Security Council and other multilateral venues, and mutual support on affairs related to their core interests. It has involved regularizing high-level visits, creating strategic dialogues, and broadening cooperation on a spectrum of issues as well as eliminating “discriminatory practices” in these areas (Xinhua, March 22, 2013).

Adhere to a “New Security Concept” (NSC). In contrast to the post-WWII global collective security order where national interests are largely subordinated for the collective good, the NSC is articulated as a construct that subordinates customary international law to the accommodation of national interests. In this light, the NSC is a concert-like framework for great power security interactions in the new multipolar order absent exclusive alliances (Xinhua, August 1, 2002). Following Soviet acquiescence on China’s “three obstacles,” China and Russia developed new security dialogues, agreements on military confidence-building measures (CBM), delimited borders, and expanded military exchanges as part of the implementation of the NTGPR under the NSC (International Studies, July 3, 1999). Sino-Russian statements explicitly reject alliance politics and instead tout the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the model of security cooperation under NTR (Xinhua, August 1, 2002).

Lessons for the United States

The conceptualization of Sino-Russian NTGPR has implications for how the U.S. approaches NTGPR with China. While a bilateral framework to avoid conflict is in both sides’ interests, reaching agreement on the core principles of NTGPR is problematic.

Common desire for stable relations. Agreement on NTGPR core principles has consistently and unambiguously been a prerequisite to stability in Sino-Russian relations. Russian acceptance of NTGPR was in Moscow’s interest in order to stabilize their borders, foster trade, and deflect what they saw as U.S. interference in their internal affairs during the post-Cold War transition. Beijing currently touts the relationship with Russia as being at historically high levels due to continued consensus on those core principles – this despite periods of friction and disagreement not reflected in their joint statements (Xinhua, March 22, 2013). However, where one side is perceived to defect from the core principles—as with Russian arms sales to, and energy exploration with Vietnam in the South China Sea (considered by Beijing as meddling within its sphere)—true problems begin to emerge in the relationship (The National Interest, April 7).

For the United States, Beijing is applying the NTGPR model consistently and for the same reasons: stability in bilateral relations. Similar to Beijing’s calculus following the Soviet collapse, China senses an accelerated power shift in Beijing’s favor relative to the United States since the 2008 financial crisis and is attempting to readjust relations with Washington (CICIR, February 28, 2013). In fact, NTGPR was first floated to a U.S. audience by State Councilor Dai Binguo speaking at the Brookings Institute in late 2008, but the phrase did not appear again for the U.S. until 2012 when NTGPR was first raised by Xi during his visit to Washington (Xinhua, December 12, 2008).

In the Sino-U.S. case, both sides consistently acknowledge the likelihood that instability in relations could lead to conflict, and NTGPR is meant to avoid that outcome. For China, U.S. adoption of NTGPR is preferable over conflict as a solution to rectify the “contradiction that exists between a U.S. preference for unilateralism and China’s strategy” of establishing a new international order (China Business News, December 27, 2013). At Sunnylands, Xi was explicit: “China and the United States must find a new path— one that is different from the *inevitable* (emphasis added) confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past...the two sides must work together to build a New Model of Major Country Relationship” (White House, June 8, 2013).

For Beijing, U.S. acceptance of NTGPR translates into expectations regarding U.S. acceptance of the underlying principles— acceptance that is necessary to avoid conflict.

Differing views on core principles. A look at some persistent Chinese policy objectives illustrates Washington's difficulty aligning with the core principles of NTGPR absent major changes to its foreign policy. While Beijing has not explicitly asked for U.S. agreement on all the NTGPR principles discussed here, China's policy objectives with the U.S. are clearly derivative. To begin, Beijing seeks treatment as a peer great power through the elimination of "discriminatory" restrictions on U.S. technology exports, and U.S. respect for Chinese sovereignty by refraining from statements, policies, or demands regarding Chinese internal rule of law, human rights, or religious freedoms (Xinhua, June 10, 2013).

However, security issues are the greatest hurdle for Sino-U.S. NTGPR. In the near-term, Beijing seeks progress on the military confidence-building measures (notification of major military activities and standards of behavior for maritime safety) proposed to Washington, along with the elimination of what it views as "discriminatory" restrictions on broadened security exchanges. China also seeks to leverage U.S. influence over what China now calls "third parties" in sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas (CICIR, February 24).

But long-term, Beijing expects U.S. recognition of a privileged Chinese sphere in Asia and assurance that Washington will not intervene in the region—politically or militarily—contrary to China's interests (*People's Daily*, April 15, 2013). This requires U.S. concession on the "three obstacles" and dissolution of alliances that Beijing feels threaten China. Most importantly, this involves U.S. deference to Chinese security interests and sovereignty claims over the promotion of customary international law along China's maritime periphery.

Last, Beijing's idea of multipolarity could require U.S. acquiescence to more than a simple diffusion of global power to other "poles" in a multipolar system. Instead it could lead to increased rivalry and greater instability as other "poles" attempt to organize parts of the global architecture exclusively around themselves as China is already doing with the BRICS and SCO through the promotion of "New Type International Relations" ("Out

with the New, In with the Old," *China Brief*, April 25, 2013).

Conclusion

NTGPR is a well-developed, coherent outgrowth of Chinese foreign policy meant to stabilize great power relations and establish a "new international order" to shape U.S. behavior. While the both Washington and Beijing acknowledge the need to avoid conflict, there are significant difficulties regarding the principles framing NTGPR. Despite consensus on broadened areas of cooperation, security is still paramount in international relations, and is the issue where U.S. and Chinese interests are at significant odds.

For Beijing, rhetorical adoption of NTGPR limits Washington's options, and so outright U.S. rejection now could cause deepening mistrust and a sharp downturn in relations due to unmet Chinese expectations. As Washington holds its policy line, Beijing's frustration will grow, and it will increasingly accuse the U.S. of violating the "consensus" established at Sunnylands.

Provide an alternative. Henry Kissinger recently reminded us that "the test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins," and so the U.S. must articulate its own vision for the evolving international order, one that is acceptable to both countries (Washington Post, March 5). As global power becomes more diffuse, Washington can no longer afford to be portrayed by Beijing as acting outside the international system it created and enforced in the decades since WWII. Instead, the U.S. should place the full weight of its authority in support of the rules and institutions Washington itself put into place to help the liberal order adapt peacefully to changes in the international system. But it must start with directly engaging China regarding the principles on which *Washington* envisions building the foundation of a New Type Great Power Relationship with Beijing.

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Notes:

1. “New Type” is sometimes translated in English as “New Model,” and “Great Power” is sometimes translated as “Big Power” or “Major Power,” but the Chinese is consistent (*xinxing daguo guanxi*).
2. Those obstacles were Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and Soviet troops in Mongolia.
3. Three of four points proposed by Xi at Sunnylands resemble the “four-point proposal” raised by Hu Jintao with Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 and are clearly derivative from the same core principles (Xinhua, June 10, 2013; May 23, 2008).

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