Brief:
A Mass Line for the Digital Age
David Cohen

At an April 19 conference on “internet work,” Chinese President Xi Jinping instructed cadres to listen to “constructive criticism” from the public online, calling for changes to the way the Chinese government manages online public opinion and criticizing the practice of broadly censoring comments on sensitive issues (Xinhua, April 25). In a literal application of the “mass line” concept he has emphasized as General Secretary, Xi said that the Party should actively solicit public opinion online in order to “clarify misunderstandings” and mobilize consensus around political priorities. Continuing a series of speeches on the role of media, Xi’s comments do not fit into the familiar cycle of crackdown and thaw. Instead, he is asking the Party to study the tools it used to mobilize mass enthusiasm under Mao and apply them to a new era. While this approach so far does not appear to have delivered solid results, understanding it illustrates Xi’s intentions and the extent to which his approach is grounded in the orthodox thought of the Party.

Shen Yi, an official at Fudan University’s Cyberspace Governance Study Center and a speaker at the conference, told Xinhua that “Officials should not ignore public concerns vented online but respond to them; otherwise the issue will spiral out of control… When an issue draws great attention online, deleting criticism is certainly not a solution” (Xinhua, April 20). However, he warned against the danger of following rather than shaping public opinion: “They should not become online ‘yes men’ but remember their basic roles and responsibilities.” “Xinhua Insight” coverage of the conference linked this concept to the mass line, describing the theory as “a ‘key weapon’ in China’s revolutionary days and an effective governance tool in the past decades” (Xinhua, April 20). A Guoping commentary (a pseudonymous column that has focused on explicating Xi’s ideas) on the theme of accepting criticism online further castigated the “delete-first” approach, accusing cadres of self-deception. Although online critics may lack a “comprehensive view” and are in fact often simply wrong, it is the cadre’s job to deal with them patiently until they can be satisfied or brought around to the government’s position (Zhongguang Wang, April 29).
While Xi’s mass line campaign attracted considerable attention during its year-long run, almost none went to the content of the theory itself. The mass line is not simply a populist slogan—it is a theory of policymaking and implementation that emphasizes building public consensus around “correct” policy. The Mao-era theory provides a formula for creating policy that is both doctrinaire and democratic. First, officials should interact with the masses to learn their views and desires. Second, applying the Party’s unique understanding of history, Party leaders were told to “distill” or “condense” raw opinions into a single, correct consensus view. In the final step, they return to the people to explain their own choice to them, patiently correcting any misunderstandings. In contrast to more familiar understandings of politics that recognize different opinions associated with interest groups, the mass line recognizes the possibility of only a single correct point of view, and credits the Party, which has been properly informed by contact with the masses, with the exclusive ability to identify it. [1] In theory, this approach to governance both facilitates oversight—meaning any citizen with a “correct” viewpoint is encouraged to come forward against “incorrect” officials—and legitimacy. If the Party fulfills its leadership role, its constituents will come to realize that its decisions represent their own interests. Of course, public group meetings also encourage conformity, and cadres learned to apply group pressure to achieve consensus. During the Mao era, this method was widely and literally followed in making policy of all kinds—local governments are documented citing ideas proposed in constituent meetings for everything from the construction of new water supply systems to the divisions between ethnic groups. [2] While this theory was widely accepted during the Mao era as the Chinese Communist Party’s distinctive approach to policy—differences over its proper application were a major point in the split between Mao and his rival Liu Shaoqi—it has largely disappeared in the wake of the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, experiences which led Party elites to view mass mobilization with suspicion.

Xi’s comments on information control propose a digital version of the mass line cycle. At the internet work conference, as repeatedly during the past four years, he simultaneously called for increased public participation in governance and for the strict control of a host of forms of undesirable speech, emphasizing the tasks of soliciting popular input and guiding public opinion. Using classic terminology, he said “Condensing public opinion into consensus is no easy task [凝聚共识工作不容易做]; we must all strenuously work together.” Whereas post-Tiananmen Chinese leaders have been content with a public that does not mobilize against them, Xi now expects the Party to rediscover the art of mobilizing the people on its behalf.

Xi has spent years worrying about the Party’s ability to inspire belief. In 2006, he wrote in his regular column in the Zhejiang Daily that “Even if the people are in the wrong, it is the job of cadres to persuade them and educate them on the right answer.” He noted in a 2003 column that “Under the conditions of a socialist market economy... cultural products can only maximize and realize their propagandist and educative functions when they have become the natural choices of mass consumption.” Shortly after taking office, he launched a series of posters promoting the “China Dream” concept featuring modern designs, breaking with the staid norms of propaganda posters. More recently, his statements that Chinese media should remember that “their surname is Party” have emphasized the role of the media as a link between Party and people.

Xi’s rhetoric on the mass line has yet to be matched by concrete policies. The Xinhua Insight story for example, was able to produce only the skimpiest of examples of the digital mass line in action, listing three short cartoons explaining Xi’s policies to the public and an increase in the number of citizens submitting allegations to anti-corruption bodies. If the mass line were in fact being revived, we would expect to see policies put forward on the basis of “condensed” public input, as well as efforts to demonstrate public understanding and support of policy. However, despite both a year-long effort to educate Party members in mass line theory and repeated efforts to put forward a vision of a modernized version of the mass line, the only visible result is an old-fashioned crackdown.

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Notes


2. Harding; also Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China. University of California Press, 2011, pp. 96–100. Mullaney describes the use of group meetings to persuade representatives of a number of southern tribes that they belonged to the newly-coined Zhuang ethnicity, demonstrating the effectiveness of group meetings at eliciting buy-in.

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The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the Zhejiang Clique

Willy Lam

Power struggle is not a dinner party. Internecine bickering and back-stabbing among rival factions and personalities are intensifying as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares for its 19th Congress next year. Apart from constructing a Maoist-style personality cult around himself, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pulling out all the stops to remove a major threat to his consolidation of power—the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction (tuanpai; 团派), which is still one of the CCP’s biggest cliques in the Chinese Communist Party.

Cadres affiliated with the CYL Faction, which is led by former President Hu Jintao, form the biggest bloc within the 25-member Politburo that was endorsed at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Hu, a former First Secretary of the CYL, is generally considered a timid, bureaucratic politician. But he served in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) for 20 years until his retirement in 2012, during which he had ample opportunity to boost the clout of his clique and advance the careers of his fellow travelers. CYL alumnus were particularly strong in the regions, leading to the saying that Hu was following the tactic of “the regions surrounding the center” (包围中央) in countering the authoritarian tendencies of his boss, former president Jiang Zemin, who headed the Shanghai Faction (VOA Chinese, January 12; Oriental Daily [Hong Kong], July 4, 2015).

President Xi’s tough tactics for elbowing aside the CYL Faction were summed up by his widely-circulated internal assessment of the League, that it was “paralyzed from the neck down.” At a mid-2015 national conference of cadres working in mass organizations such as the CYL, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the All-China Women’s Association, Xi warned that the CYL ran the risk of “being marginalized by young people and being marginalized by the party-state [apparatus]” (VOA Chinese, April 29; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], October 25, 2015). The CYL was also lambasted for being too “bureaucratic, procedurally minded, aristocratic and entertainment-oriented” (机关化，行政化，贵族化，娱乐化). Since late last year, the Central Commission on Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) has stationed a work team in the CYL to look at problems of corruption and infractions of party discipline (South China Morning Post, February 9; New Beijing Post, July 7, 2015).

In a recent article on the website of the CCDI—which has been interpreted as a full-scale confession of guilt—the CYL Party Committee admitted that League members suffered from “weak party leadership, aberrations in party construction, and failure to run [CYL units] strictly.” The League leadership vowed to uphold the “Four-fold Consciousness,” (四个意识) meaning “political consciousness, consciousness about the whole situation, consciousness about following the “core” [of the leadership] and consciousness about remaining in unison [with the
The Ling affair—and Xi’s heavy criticism of the CYL—has cast a shadow over the political fortunes of PBSC member and Premier Li Keqiang as well as ordinary Politburo members such as Li Yuanchao; Vice-Premiers Liu Yandong and Wang Yang; Director of the CCP Department Liu Qibao; and Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua (unrelated to former president Hu). Premier Li has been sidelined by Xi and no longer has authority over economic policy. While he might retain his PBSC membership at the 19 Party Congress, it is possible that he would move over to head the National People’s Congress. It is likely that Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong and Liu Qibao will be given post-retirement jobs at the NPC or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In theory, Wang Yang, the only CYL Faction member with solid reformist inclinations, should be promoted to the PBSC. But it is not certain whether Xi wants two CYL Faction members in this inner most sanctum of power especially when there is a possibility that the membership of the PBSC may be reduced from the current seven to five (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], November 29, 2015; United Daily News [Taiwan], August 29, 2015).

Of perhaps more significance is the political fortune of Hu Chunhua. Hu and Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai, both born in 1963, were put into the Politburo by the out-going PBSC led by former president Hu Jintao and former premier Wen Jiabao. They are the only two Sixth-Generation cadres (those born in the 1960s) in the current Politburo. Similar to the older Hu, Hu Chunhua served as First Secretary of the CYL; like Hu, a former party secretary of Tibet, the younger Hu built up his career in the autonomous region. It is well understood, however, that Xi has a low assessment of Hu’s ability. And the possibility of Hu Chunhua making the PBSC next year is deemed very slim (Radio French International, Chinese Service, November 29, 2015; Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2015).

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**Leverage Against Rival Factions**

In their battle against the CYL, Xi and his allies such as Head of the CCDI Wang Qishan, have benefited from graft-related crimes committed by prominent League member Ling Jihua, who used to be the right-hand-man of former president Hu. Investigations into Ling’s alleged misdemeanors, which began in late 2012, have exposed similar economic crimes of a number of top CYL Faction affiliates who reportedly included Vice-President Li Yuanchao. The wives of Ling Jinhua and Li Yuanchao were said to be close business partners. Ling’s demise has also smothered the voice of former president Hu, who has lost substantial influence due to the perception that he failed to rein in the excesses of Ling and other CYL officials (Radio Free Asia, August 25, 2015; BBC Chinese, December 23, 2014).
Zhejiang Clique is a major component. Similar to what Jiang Zemin did in grooming the Shanghai Faction, Xi has bent over backwards to elevate officials who had served under him when he was Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007 (See China Brief, February 7, 2014). Other components of the Xi Jinping Faction include the Gang of Prince-lings; the Shaanxi Clique—officials who served in Xi’s home province, including Director of the General Office Li Zhanhu and Director of the Organization Department Zhao Leji; and Xi’s cronies including schoolmates Chen Xi, who is Executive Vice-Director of the Organization Department and chief economic advisor Liu He, who heads the General Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics (South China Morning Post, March 2; World Affairs Journal [Washington], May 1, 2014). It is evident that Xi wants his Zhejiang Clique to be as powerful as the Shanghai Faction under former president Jiang, one of his major political foes.

Foremost among serving and former Zhejiang Province officials who already possess ministerial status—and are tipped for further promotion at the 19th Party Congress—are Party Secretary of Zhejiang Xia Baolong (born 1952) and Zhejiang Governor Li Qiang (1959). Also prominent are Acting Tianjin Party Secretary Huang Xingguo (1954), who is a former Zhejiang vice-governor; Executive Vice-Director of the Propaganda Department Huang Kunming (1956), who used to head Zhejiang’s Propaganda Department; and Guizhou Party Secretary Chen Min’er (1960), another former Zhejiang vice-governor. (BBC Chinese, July 31, 2015; Apple Daily, December 31, 2014; China Brief, December 31, 2014; South China Morning Post, March 27, 2015).

Particularly significant is the fact that a disproportionately large number of Zhejiang officials close to Xi have been picked to staff key Central Leading Groups or Central Commissions such as the Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CLGCDR); the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics (CLGFEC) and the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). For example, former deputy secretary-general of the Zhejiang Party Committee Shu Guozeng (1956) is now Deputy Director of the General Office of CLGFEC. Former executive vice-governor of Zhejiang Cai Qi (1955) has been promoted Executive Vice-Director of the General Office of the CNSC. Late last year, former member of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Party Committee (SCZPC) and party secretary of Wenzhou Chen Yixin (1959) was named Vice Director of the General Office of the CLGCNR (Chinad.org.cn [Beijing], December 3, 2015; Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], December 3, 2014; South China Morning Post, March 24, 2014).

Moreover, Xi has tried to emulate former president Hu’s tactic of installing protégés in key provincial slots. Two former SCZPC members and party secretaries of the cosmopolitan city of Ningbo have been elevated to leadership posts in the regions. They are Jilin Party Secretary Baiyu Chaolou (1955) and Jiangxi Deputy Party Secretary Liu Qi (1957). Similarly, Lou Yangsheng (1959), a former head of the Zhejiang’s Organization Department and United Front Department, was in 2014 promoted Deputy Party Secretary of Shanxi Province. Gong Zheng (1960), a former member of the SCZPC and party secretary of the provincial capital of Hangzhou, was last August promoted Deputy Party Secretary of Shandong Province. Last month, SCZPC member and Head of the provincial Organization Bureau Hu Heping (1962) was made Governor of Shaanxi Province (People’s Daily, April 28; Ming Pao, March 3).

President Xi’s Zhejiang protégés have also been assigned to senior military posts. The best example is Zhong Shaojun (1968), who was a right hand man to Xi when Zhong served as Xi’s personal secretary and vice-director of the Zhejiang Organization Department. In 2013, Zhong, who had had no military experience, was parachuted to the People’s Liberation Army in the capacity of Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission (GOCMCC). The power of the GOCMCC has been immensely raised in the wake of military structural reforms undertaken in late 2015 (China Brief, March 7).

Particularly noteworthy among Zhejiang Clique neophytes are members of the Six-Generation (6G) leadership, a reference to officials born around 1960 or slightly afterwards. They include Chen Min’er, Li Qiang, Zhong Shaojun, Hu Heping, Gong Zheng, and Chen Yixin.
Conclusion

While none of these 6G upstarts has achieved either a national stature or solid achievements particularly in economic reform. Moreover, establishing power blocs within the party goes against his own injunctions against cadres forming tuantuanhuohuo (团结伙伙; “factions and cliques”) (China News Service, February 16; People’s Daily, January 12, 2015). However, Xi seems convinced that as the putative “leadership core,” he has the requisite authority to emulate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao by protecting his legacy through anointing his protégés as successors.

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Addressing Rising Business Risk in China
Matthew Brazil

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) celebrated its first-ever National Security Day, anti-foreigner sentiment appears to have been made an official part of the Chinese state’s increased vigilance. A widely circulated cartoon depicted a stereotyped Western man seducing an unwitting Chinese woman into espionage (Weixin, April 17). Meanwhile the National People’s Congress enacted a new law further restricting non-governmental organizations (many of which have foreign funding or employees). This new legislation follows other laws on cyber security and terrorism that offer additional broad powers to the government to oversee and manage foreign companies invested in China (China Brief, January 25; China Brief, December 21, 2015).

Over the last several years, the risks associated with doing business in the PRC have risen due to Chinese suspicion of foreign business people and assets in China and escalating tensions with its major trading partners (China Brief, October 5, 2012). In the meantime, foreign investment appears to be cooling off as the Chinese economy shifts away from double-digit growth, though the PRC remains a compelling foreign business priority. However, stricter regulations and a seemingly desperate anti-espionage campaign may have led to detentions of foreigners, including the recent beating by State Security agents of an American diplomat. A review of how Chinese governments have dealt with foreigners on its soil in the past and a survey of recent developments indicate that a sea-change in how China treats foreigners may be underway.

The Usual Suspects

Western business people must first understand that the friendly and professional English-speaking Chinese who staff their enterprises in the PRC are representative of neither the broader population nor Communist officialdom. Among ordinary people in China, suspicion of foreigners remains strong. In the early 19th Century, foreigners brought unwelcomed and uncontrolled commerce to China, most prominently dangerous drugs, which led to the First Opium War (1839–42). The “Century of Humiliation” (百年国耻, 1842–1949) followed: foreign nations invaded China, established colonies and “spheres of influence,” and sent thousands of Christian missionaries. [1]

In response, Chinese governments have restricted the number of foreigners on Chinese soil and circumscribed their movements. But as the “Century” droned on, China lost control of its sovereignty. The period ended with the Communist victory in 1949 when, as Mao Zedong famously said, China “stood up” against foreigners. The new People’s Republic became a mostly closed nation.

Communist Entrepreneurs Meet Foreign Capitalists

Mao’s death in 1976 and the ascent of Deng Xiaoping led to opening and reform, bringing a new wave of foreigners to see the sights, do business, study, and even spread Christianity in the guise of learning Chinese or teaching English. [2] In 2011, the total number of foreigners living in China passed 650,000 (Figure 1), a historic peak, though growth may finally have begun to slow. A 2016 survey of American businesses indicated that 77 percent feel less welcome in China as immigration restrictions, bilateral tensions, restrictive regulations, intellectual property rights concerns, pollution, and economics combine to
discourage investment. At the same time, the upcoming Bilateral Investment Treaty and the expansion of China’s middle class encourage U.S. businesses to stick it out (Confucius Institute Mandarin House, August 27, 2013; Amcham China 2016 Business Climate Survey Report).

China last saw comparable numbers of foreigners and foreign companies during the 1930s. At that time, the central government was not in control of its borders, Japan carried out a series of devastating invasions, and other foreign interference was legion. Historically, large numbers of foreigners in the country are not associated with a strong China. This places extra pressure on the present-day host government to keep them under surveillance. Chinese people tend to more easily grasp these realities than foreigners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Foreigners Resident in China</th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
<th>Most Prominent Nationality</th>
<th>Other Prominent Nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>American, German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>20,404</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>153,522</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>240,769</td>
<td>9,511</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>6,473</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Russian, British, American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>370,393</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>468,200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While foreign presence in China shot up since the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party also expanded by almost 3 percent per year, from 64.5 million members in 2000 to 82.6 million in 2011 (CPC.org: Sina.com, June 6, 2012). Many new communists came from the business world under the “Three Represents” program to expand membership beyond workers, peasants and soldiers, a purposeful effort to keep the Party relevant. [4] But there was an unintended consequence: corruption. With more “entrepreneurs” or business people in the Party, much more money to be made, and so many foreign business people in China, a rise in corruption seems, in retrospect, inevitable. This situation—the CCP’s membership bulging with ideologically unreliable new members now under investigation—carries strands of similarity with a previous time: an influx into the CCP of urban intellectuals fleeing from enemy areas to the communist redoubt of Yan’an in the late 1930s. Their entry into Party ranks was followed by movements for “cadre checking” and other, sterner measures, led by the CCP’s Organization Department and its nascent intelligence organ, the Social Affairs Department. [5] Chinese President Xi Jinping’s late father, Xi Zhongxun, supported these efforts, and undoubtedly described them to his son.

Not Your Father’s Anti-Corruption Campaign

Even though Xi Jinping’s close allies seem exempt, today’s anti-corruption campaign and the wide-ranging purges of errant officials are popular in China. In addition to high ranking “tigers” like former Politburo members Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai, thousands of “flies”—Chinese officials at the lower levels of the Party, military and government—have been examined and imprisoned. This has changed their behavior in previously unimaginable ways and engendered an abundance of caution. In the military, hard
liquor is officially banned at social gatherings in favor of beer. Officials in customer-facing positions interacting with foreigners have been more hesitant than usual to meet or dine. [6] The climate of paranoia is extending to beyond Chinese officialdom. “Foreign hostile forces” are widely cited as being behind numerous ills. [7] Foreign companies such as Astra Zeneca, GM and Microsoft and have either been visited in “dawn raids” or their executives have been detained for questioning, often on suspicion of monopolistic activities (Huffington Post, May 1, 2015; NY Times, August 13, 2014; The Independent, July 22, 2013).

Other groups that had previously been tacitly ignored, such as foreigners in China who worship in unregistered English-language fellowship groups, are now experiencing greater scrutiny. [8] Last April, Xi Jinping told a CCP conference on religion in Beijing to “resolutely guard against overseas infiltration via religious means” (Xinhuanet, April 23). Xi reportedly aims to close all unregistered churches in China by 2017. China is now home to over 80 percent of East Asia’s total Christian population. Within China, the percentage of Christians as a percent of the population rose from 1.2 in 1970 to 8.1 in 2010 (or 106 million worshippers), with projected growth to 10.5 percent by 2020. [9] As an essentially foreign ideology, it is possible that many ordinary Chinese non-believers, and PRC officials, find this growth of Christianity alarming.

**Chinese and American Responses**

Beyond the measures described above, a series of investigations against senior Ministry of State Security (MSS) officials (Caixin, January 16, 2015) appears to have contributed to an “anti-spy” (反间谍) campaign as the Ministry struggles to justify its existence (China Brief, April 21; Xinhuanet, November 2, 2015; War on the Rocks, July 22, 2015). Signs of the campaign have been evident since 2014, and appear partly focused on foreign business people. Corporate security activities that were previously tolerated, such as routine TSCM work (sweeps for audio and video devices) designed to detect low-tech, competitor-planted devices, now risk detention of the technicians and confiscation of costly equipment. Business people with intelligence and security backgrounds—or those mistaken for the same—have been detained and questioned by the MSS or Chinese Customs. At worst, they are asked to establish cooperative long-term relationships. At best they are required to explain their backgrounds and describe their duties. Residence visas for U.S. business people are now harder to obtain for those without backgrounds in desired technologies, probably also due to counterintelligence concerns. [10]

More ominously, two reliable sources have described the November–December 2015 detention and severe beating of an unidentified U.S. State Department consular officer in Chengdu by the local State Security Bureau. MSS agents also roughed up the Consul General (i.e.: the head of mission) when he visited the Bureau to recover his officer. The State Department Press Office could provide no information but did not deny the story after checking with the regional bureau. [12] While ordinary foreign visitors and journalists are sometimes treated badly by security forces, this incident would be highly unusual and indicates that the gloves may be coming off on the Chinese side.

In the U.S., a spike in announcements and leaks of spy cases, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s economic espionage awareness program, show that Americans are ratcheting up their efforts to stymie Chinese espionage in general, and illegal technology acquisition efforts in particular (USNI, April 13; Department of Justice, March 30 and April 14; FBI.gov, July 23, 2015).

**Take Steps to Mitigate Risk**

It is important to reject the widely held idea that taking normal security precautions in China will “offend the Chinese” or somehow be a breach of trust. In reality, standard security programs have been encouraged by Public Security Bureaus for years. If handled properly by well-trained security professionals and explained by your communications team, standard programs will reassure your Chinese employees that the company is not an easy target for technology theft and ordinary crime (contact the author for details). In addition, for U.S. companies, do not reject the possibility of advocacy by the American Chamber of
Commerce (Amcham) in China, the U.S. China Business Council, or U.S. Commerce Department’s diplomats in embassies and consulates. The track records of all three are good in helping U.S. companies achieve acceptable conditions.

Conclusion

The environment in China for foreign companies is now more sensitive than in recent memory. Added to historical irritants are developments that have generated more than the usual official suspicion of foreigners, possibly more surveillance and other scrutiny, and a harder line as an apparent tit-for-tat struggle grinds on between China and at least the U.S., if not other trading partners like Japan, Taiwan and Australia. The risks should not be ignored, and cannot be mitigated by relying on “connections” when so many bigger forces are at work. In the threat-risk calculations widely used in the security industry, risk is controllable but not “threat”—in this case the behavior of state actors who are beyond the control of business (Pinkerton, 2014).

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Notes


2. Author’s numerous interviews with American Christian missionaries in various Chinese cities, 1996-2010.


6. A web search on “foreign hostile forces” (境外敌对势力), yields over 23,000 results

7. Author’s interviews, January–April 2016.

8. Author’s interviews, 2008-15. Search of “Christian fellowship” and any major Chinese city name for a sampling. See also sites promoting missionary work in the PRC, such as www.gospelinchina.com and http://www.projectchina.org/.
The Human and Organizational Dimensions of the PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems

Elsa Kania and Kenneth Allen

PLA theorists see unmanned operations (无人作战) as integral elements of future warfare. For instance, in a January 2016 article, Xiao Tianliang, editor of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University’s 2015 edition of The Science of Military Strategy, alluded to “unmanned systems autonomous operations” (无人机系统独立作战) and “unmanned systems and manned systems joint operations” (无人机系统与有人系统联合作战) as likely to have a “huge impact” on traditional operational models (PLA Daily, January 5). As such, China’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and in particular, the organizations, as well as educational and training programs, established to support these systems are worthy of attention.

The PLA’s “Golden Launcher” of Military UAVs

When Xi Jinping met the PLA’s delegation to the National People’s Congress in March 2016, one of the military personnel who received particular notice was Master Sergeant Class One (一级军士长) Ju Xiaocheng (巨孝成), the director of a UAV launch site subordinate to the Army Artillery Academy (炮兵学院无人机发射站站长), which was renamed the Army Officer Academy (陆军军官学院) in 2011, in Hefei, Anhui Province (Baike, [Accessed May 7]). Based on his record of a 100 percent success rate in UAV launches, Ju has been praised as the PLA’s “golden launcher” of military-use UAVs (军用无人机“金牌发射手”) (China Military Online, March 14; China Military Online, March 15).

At the time, Xi declared to Ju, “UAVs are important operational forces for the modern battlefield. You must carry out your duties well and cultivate qualified personnel” (China Military Online, March 14). The career trajectory of this UAV team’s technician (无人机技师), who has personally trained the majority (as of 2009, approximately 80 percent) of the entire PLA’s UAV specialty cadre (无人机专业干部), offers an interesting illustration of the process through which the PLA has developed these personnel thus far (Xinhua, May 26, 2009; PLA Daily, April 4).

Understanding the Human and Organizational Component

Although the media and analysts have focused primarily on the technical aspects of the PLA’s various UAVs, there has been less extensive analysis of the human and organizational dimensions thus far. [1] Therefore, this initial attempt to assess the education and training for the PLA’s UAV operators and maintainers, as well as how UAVs are organized within the order of battle, seeks to contribute to analysis of the PLA’s actual operational capability with these systems. While the information available is limited, it is notable that the PLA appears to have progressed substantively in its institutionalization of education and training programs, as well as a career track for UAV officer and enlisted operators. Thus far, UAVs seem to have been deployed across all four services of the PLA at multiple levels and are also likely assigned to units under the Joint Staff Department (former General Staff Department) and perhaps also the newly-created Strategic Support Force. Despite continued challenges, the PLA remains focused on enhancing its UAV forces’ operational capabilities,

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10. Author’s interviews, 2014–16.
11. Author’s interviews, 2016; correspondence with State Department Press Office, April 28–29.
while engaging in more sophisticated training exercises with unmanned systems.

The PLA’s History with UAVs

A review of the PLA’s history with UAVs is helpful to contextualize its recent advances. After the PLA acquired its first unmanned systems from the USSR (Lavochkin 拉-17, La-17) UAV, the PLA Air Force decided to develop its own indigenous unmanned systems after the withdrawal of Soviet aid (China Youth Daily, January 23, 2015). This resulted in the development of the PLA’s first supposedly indigenous UAV, the ChangKong-1 (“Vast Sky,” 长空一号, CK-1) UAV, a radio-controlled target drone, based on a reverse-engineering of the La-17, which was first successfully tested in December 1966 (China Youth Daily, January 23, 2015). In the 1960s, the PLA also recovered a U.S. AQM-34 Firebee UAV in North Vietnam and reverse engineered it to create the Wu Zhen-5 (无侦-5, WZ-5), also known as the Chang Hong-1 (“Long Rainbow,” 长虹). [2] By the 1980s, China had introduced the Cai Hong-1 (“Rainbow,” 彩虹一号, CH-1), a high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAV. In 1994, China imported a number of Israel’s Harpy UAVs, but its attempt to have them upgraded by Israel in 2004 was blocked due to U.S. pressure (Haaretz, December 22, 2004). While China’s capability to develop UAVs has progressed beyond an initial legacy of reverse engineering, the PLA has engaged in persistent efforts to acquire advanced drone technology through cyber espionage.

Although a comprehensive cataloguing of Chinese UAVs is beyond the scope of this paper, China has developed a variety of increasingly advanced military-use UAVs in recent years. A range of UAVs, from the hand-launched to taxiing models with extended loiter times, are capable of multiple missions, including conducting reconnaissance and communications, engaging in electronic interference, serving as launch platforms for various weapons, and also acting as targets (China Youth Daily, January 1, 2015). [3] Some of these systems have been sold to militaries worldwide, including to Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt (Global Times, April 28).

Among the most advanced of these unmanned systems are the Caihong (Rainbow, 彩虹), an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) similar to the U.S.’s MQ-9 Reaper, which recently released an advanced CH-5 model; the BZK-005 / HY-01 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV, used by the PLA Navy for reconnaissance; the Wing Loong (or Yilong, Pterodactyl, 翼龙), a MALE UAV similar to the Predator; and the Xianglong (Soaring Dragon, 翔龙), a HALE UAV similar to Global Hawk (DoD, 2015). There are at least three Chinese UAVs designed to carry precision strike weapons: the Wing Loong/Yilong, Sky Saber, and also the Lijian (Sharp Sword, 利剑), the PLAs first stealth drone (China.com, August 3, 2015; DoD, 2015). In addition, the Shen Dia (Divine Eagle, 神雕), reportedly was first tested in 2015, is a twin-fuselage HALE UAV with long-range surveillance and strike capabilities that could advance China’s A2/AD capabilities (Jane’s, May 28, 2015). China has also tested an amphibious UAV, the U-560 (PLA Daily, December 11, 2015).

The PLA’s Education and Training of UAV Personnel

Given the uncertainties associated with the PLA’s deployment and future employment of UAVs, an examination of its evolving approach to educating and training UAV operators (无人机操作手) and UAV team technicians (无人机队技师) could inform assessments of the PLAs actual operational capability with UAVs. Notably, the available information on the PLA’s development of relevant education and training reveal that these programs have advanced in their development, yet certain gaps and shortcomings in training apparently persist across the PLA.

The PLA’s education and training of UAV personnel dates back to 1994, when the former Army Artillery Academy created the first course for cadets (Xinhua, May 26, 2009). Its educational and training programs appear to have spread to other services in the years since. At least the following PLA academic institutions were found to have UAV-related programs that train future UAV officers and enlisted specialists:[4]
Air Force Early Warning College (空军预警学院) in Wuhan, Hubei Province, has undergraduate and graduate courses for officers, as well as an associates degree program for enlisted personnel;

Air Force Engineering University (空军工程大学) in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province;

Armored Force Engineering College (装甲工程学院) in Beijing;

Army Officer Academy (陆军军官学院) in Hefei, Anhui Province;

Naval Aviation Engineering Academy (海军航空工程学院) in Yantai, Shandong Province has a UAV Teaching and Research Office (教研室) that is responsible for teaching technical officers for offensive UAVs (攻击无人机技术干部);

PLA Institute of International Relations (解放军国际关系学院) in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province has specialties in UAV reconnaissance intelligence processing technology (无人机侦察情报处理技术);

PLA Ordnance Engineering College (军械工程学院), located in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province has a specialty training program in UAVs and an undergraduate program in UAV-use engineering (无人机运用工程);

and PLA Special Operations Academy (解放军特种作战学院) created in 2011 in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province.

Ju Xiaocheng provides a good example of the program at the Army Officer Academy, which enrolled the military’s first class of UAV-use undergraduate engineering officer cadets (无人机应用工程本科学员) in 1994. Ju, who was initially conscripted as an enlisted member in 1991 with only a junior middle school education, was assigned to the Artillery Academy’s UAV team (无人机) at that time. Despite initially struggling with the technical aspects of his work, he ultimately became the PLA’s first “UAV Specialty non-commissioned officer” (无人机专业士官) with the ability to both operate and maintain UAVs, (Xinhua, May 26, 2009; China Military Online, March 15). In 1997, Ju was assigned to act as an instructor in a course on launch operations (发射操作课), seemingly reflecting a lack of more experienced instructors for UAV operations at that point (Xinhua, May 26, 2009). Since the Artillery Academy was training prospective officers to operate UAVs as of 1994, it appears that there was a shift to develop a more educated UAV cadre. In addition, at some point, the Artillery Academy also incorporated a UAV training course for enlisted personnel. [5]

In 2001, the PLA drafted its first “UAV Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” (UAV OMTE, 无人机训练与考核大纲), with Ju contributing to the process as a “soldier expert” (兵专家) (China Military Online, March 15). The development of a formal curriculum for operational units at that surprisingly early stage suggests that the PLA was already starting to focus on advancing its UAV capabilities and training the appropriate personnel at that time. However, even though the PLA implemented a completely updated series of OMTE in 2009, there have been no reports thus far about an updating or systematic revision to this UAV OMTE. Given that Xi has mentioned training personnel for unmanned operations as a key area of focus, the future issuance of a revised OMTE would not be surprising (PLA Daily, May 16, 2014).

**Challenges and Advances in the PLA’s Training of UAV Personnel**

Despite continued challenges for the PLA’s UAV specialization (无人机事业), there do seem to have
been appreciable advances in the sophistication of the PLA’s education and training programs. At this point, it is unclear how extensively best practices have been adopted across the PLA, but there is apparently recognition of those shortcomings and ongoing efforts to enhance and perhaps also expand existing programs. The review of two case studies within the PLA illustrates these challenges and progression.

According to a 2007 account, an unidentified Nanjing Military Region (MR) ground force brigade’s UAV team (某旅无人机队) had been notified two years previously that it would receive UAVs. Despite lacking prior experience with the system, it engaged in extensive advance training (PLA Daily, March 14, 2007). As such, the UAV team’s personnel all completed theoretical and operational training on UAVs, as well as “all-military UAV specialty officer training classes” (全军无人机专业军官集训班), which implies this was not just limited to ground force officers, as well as later engaging in online simulation training (网上模拟训练). To “fill the gaps in specialized theories and teaching for this type of UAV,” the members of that UAV team reportedly decided to write an “Introduction to Certain New-Type Unmanned Weapon Systems” (某新型无人机武器系统概述) (PLA Daily, March 14, 2007). Although this UAV team appeared to have the opportunity to undertake relatively comprehensive training, this perceived need to take the initiative to develop its own training materials suggests that the training and resources available were apparently lagging behind the needs of UAV operators expected to pilot and maintain increasingly advanced systems.

Despite subsequent progression in the PLA’s educational and training programming, the experience of a UAV battalion (无人机营) within a brigade of the former Guangzhou MR’s (now Southern Theater Command’s) 42nd Group Army (第 42 集团军) offers another illustration of how such “gaps” have apparently often been filled only through personal initiative. By the characterization of Major Li Changyong (李长勇), who was the UAV battalion commander (无人机营营长), “that the UAV specialization (无人机事业) has gaps isn’t frightful, perhaps it is that everyone is waiting for someone else to come fill in the gaps” (China Military Online, August 15, 2014). Li himself, a member of the PLA’s first class of UAV specialist undergraduates and master’s students, had graduated from the Ordnance Engineering College (军械工程学院) in 2008 (China Military Online, August 15, 2014). At the time, due to the lack of standardized operations regulations (规范的操作规程), instruction regarding UAVs was often “reliant on a single person’s experience.” However, when he took on the post of UAV battalion commander in 2012, Li compiled the 200,000-word “Regulations for the Operation of a Certain Model UAV” (某型无人机操作规程), based on extensive engagement with local UAV manufacturers and technicians (PLA Daily, August 10, 2014). As of 2016, Li’s UAV battalion had also introduced its own simulation training room for UAV operators (PLA Daily, March 2). However, it is unclear how extensively such new regulations and best practices for training have been implemented across the PLA.

Notably, this particular UAV battalion appears to be engaging in increasingly sophisticated, combat-oriented training. Through “confrontation training events that closely adhere to actual combat” (紧贴实战的对抗演练) between “Red Force” (PLA) and “Blue Force” UAVs (PLA Daily, March 2), Li has sought to enhance these forces’ operational capability, including in reconnaissance and jamming (PLA Daily, August 15, 2014). Under Li’s leadership, this UAV battalion has experimented with new tactical approaches, ten of which have reportedly been promoted by the former General Staff Department and perhaps disseminated across multiple former MRs (PLA Daily, August 10, 2014). In April 2015, a new UAV specialty training program (无人机专业集训) was established in the Guangzhou MR, likely co-located with this battalion, as part of a move toward a “base-sized training model” (基地化训练模式) (PLA Daily, April 13, 2015). This shift in the PLA’s approach to training reflected the recognition of existing challenges, including the shortage of talent and lack of standards and regulations, and an effort to consolidate resources in order to engage in more advanced operational training (PLA Daily, April 13, 2015). Although it is too early to tell whether this recent shift in the PLA’s approach to training with
UAVs will prove successful, the PLA clearly realizes the importance of improving upon its existing training system and is actively seeking to do so.

Unknowns About PLA UAV Personnel

Within the PLA’s UAV specialty cadre (无人机专业干部), there are seemingly both officer and enlisted UAV operators (无人机操作手) and also UAV technicians (无人机技师), depending on the type of system. While officers serve as both operators and technicians, it is not clear if enlisted personnel serve as operators for any systems other than small target UAVs. However, although the terms could imply a division of labor between operators and technicians, as well as between officers and enlisted personnel, the boundaries between these roles might be somewhat blurred. Ju Xiaocheng, for instance, was known for his skill in both operating and repairing UAVs, but, as one of the PLA’s earliest UAV specialists, he could have predated a more formal differentiation of roles.

The PLA’s Organizational Structure for UAVs

Although there is only limited information available about the PLA’s organizational structure for UAVs, UAVs appear to have been deployed across all of the PLA’s services, as well as within the newly formed Joint Staff Department and Strategic Support Force. Depending on the type of UAV and unit, they are organized into teams (队), companies (连), battalions (营), flight groups (大队), regiments (团), and brigades (旅). Although there are no authoritative estimates of the total number of UAVs that are currently deployed, the PLA could field at least 1,000 medium- and large-sized UAVs, according to a retired Deputy Chief of the PLA’s General Staff Department. In addition, the PLAAF was said to have been using over 280 UAVs as of the beginning of 2011. [6] The included table (see end of the article) provides available information concerning the types of UAV units identified under the former General Staff Department, as well as the newly formed PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).

Conclusion

The PLA’s expanding deployment of unmanned systems for multiple missions will probably result in the establishment of new UAV units, while further increasing the demand for qualified UAV operators and technicians. Since the PLA has developed its cadre of UAV personnel in peacetime, without the pressures associated with combat operations, it has apparently avoided certain challenges that the U.S. military has faced in terms of recruitment and retention. However, the PLA’s existing programs for the education and training of UAV operators and technicians will certainly face increasing demands and could be expanded. Between 2014 and 2023, China could reportedly produce an estimated 41,800 or more land- and sea-based unmanned systems, and thousands of these systems will probably be deployed by the PLA (DoD, 2015). Although the remaining “gaps” in the PLA’s UAV career track might be progressively filled in, the development of appropriately educated and qualified personnel to operate and maintain these advanced UAVs will remain a critical determinant of the PLA’s actual operational capabilities with these systems.

Looking forward, the men and women behind the PLA’s unmanned systems could play a critical role in future crisis and conflict scenarios, and evidently their training preparing them to do so. As the U.S. military’s experience has demonstrated, the capacity to recruit, educate, train, and retain an adequate number of UAV operators and maintenance personnel can be a critical element of a military’s capability to engage in high-tempo operations with unmanned systems in a conflict scenario. The deployment of UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance missions in the East China Sea, as well as perhaps eventually in the South China Sea, could reinforce China’s ability to maintain a persistent presence in these disputed waters. UAVs could be utilized extensively for counterterrorism operations, potentially in Xinjiang, and for also border defense. In a conflict scenario, there are concerns that the PLA would use multiple refurbished J-6 fighters as UAVs to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defenses or against a U.S. aircraft carrier. [12] Ultimately, the PLA’s realization of such ambitions for unmanned systems will remain inextricable from the underlying human and organizational dimensions.
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Notes


4. See: 中国人民解放军空军预警学院; 中国人民解放军海军航空工程学院本科专业; 中国人民解放军工程学院; China Science and Technology Network, September 15, 2009; and PLA Encyclopedia, Military History volume, 2007; People’s Daily, December 10, 2013; 考研, April 22, 2015; War on the Rocks, January 1, 2015; Baike, 中国人民解放军特种作战学院; 中国素质体育网, April 24, 2016.


11. The 808 Brigade had been based in the area of Chuxiong, and has relocated to Yuxi within the last two years. The brigade, previously equipped with the DF-21A, is most likely transitioning to a new missile variant, such as the DF-21C. Relocation of brigade often is linked with integration of new missile variant. New underground facilities appear to be constructed north of Yuxi.


PLA Organizational Structure for UAVs
### Joint Staff Department

Intelligence Bureau, Information and Communications Bureau (former 2nd Intelligence Department and Informatization Department)

Various long-range reconnaissance and communications UAVs were apparently assigned to these departments (*Yuntongmeng*, March 18). [8]

### PLA Army

**Eastern Theater Command**

The 1st Group Army (陆军第1集团军) has one or more UAV battalions (无人机营), as well as several UAV companies (无人机连) (*PLA Daily*, May 5, 2015).

The 12th Group Army (陆军第12集团军) has a battalion-level UAV flight group [*dadui*] (无人机大队) (*PLA Daily*, April 12).

**Southern Theater Command**

The 42nd Group Army (陆军第42集团军) has a UAV battalion (*China Military Online*, August 15, 2014).

The 41st Group Army (第41集团) has at least one UAV team. (*China Military Online*, June 15, 2013)

There were also one or more UAV teams in the former Guangzhou MR (*PLA Daily*, March 14, 2007; *PLA Daily*, November 2, 2007; *PLA Daily*, January 13, 2014).

**Western Theater Command**

The 47th Group Army (陆军第47集团军) has at least one UAV team (*PLA Daily*, March 31).

**Northern Theater Command**

The 39th Group Army (陆军第39集团) has at least one UAV team (*PLA Daily*, May 31, 2015).

### PLA Navy

**Eastern Theater Command**

The Eastern Theater Command’s East Sea Fleet’s Naval Aviation has one UAV regiment (无人机团) and also a UAV reconnaissance flight group (*People’s Daily*, December 27, 2015). [9] This regiment has deployed the HY-01/BZK-005 MALE UAV, which has been sent on reconnaissance missions in the East China Sea, near the Senkaku Islands, since approximately September 2013. As of 2015, there were at least three BZK-005 UAVs stationed off the coast of the East China Sea according to an analysis of the satellite imagery. [11]

### PLA Air Force

The PLAAF reportedly has multiple UAV regiments and other units at various levels, which have reportedly been equipped with the GJ-1 and/or BZK-005 UAVs (*中国青年网*, September 2, 2015). It is likely that the PLAAF is equipped with advanced UAVs across all five theater commands.

In the near future, the PLAAF could have at least five “UAV flying regiments” (无人机飞行团), each armed with at least a hundred attack UAVs, likely the “Attack-1” type UCAV (攻击-1型无人机), according to less authoritative reporting (*科罗廖夫*, April 7).
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<tr>
<th>Theater Command</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Theater Command</td>
<td>There is potentially a combat UAV brigade (作战无人机旅) in this theater command, based on reports from Russian experts repeated in Chinese media. (Sina, February 28, 2014; 米尔网, April 28, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Theater Command</td>
<td>There is potentially a combat UAV brigade (作战无人机旅) in this theater command, based on reports from Russian experts repeated in Chinese media. (Sina, February 28, 2014; 米尔网, April 28, 2015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Theater Command</td>
<td>There are at least several UAV units [budui] and subunits [fendui] (无人机部队/分队) in this theater command (China Military Online, April 7; China Military Online, April 21; PLA Daily, May 4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Theater Command</td>
<td>Since the PLAAF units who operated the GJ-1 UAV in Peace Mission 2014 were from the former Beijing Military Region, it is likely that there are UAV units at multiple levels within this theater command as well (China Military Online, November 4, 2014; Xinhua, November 13, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA Rocket Force</td>
<td>Although there are fewer references to dedicated UAV units within the PLARF, a number of UAVs have been deployed within this service (e.g., Sina, February 2, 2015):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indications exist that a missile brigade formerly subordinate to the former Nanjing MR and possibly equipped with UAVs has been incorporated into the PLARF’s Base 52 in Anhui Province, where they can cover the East China Sea and Taiwan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are also indications that a missile brigade that was formerly subordinate to the former Guangzhou MR and possibly equipped with UAVs has also been incorporated into the PLARF’s Base 53 in Yunnan Province, which could cover a variety of potential targets, including locations in India and Southeast Asia. [12]</td>
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