



MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR

Personalities Behind the Insurgency

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VOLUME XII, ISSUE 11 | November 2021

Are Illiasou Djibo and Moussa Moumouni Emerging as Islamic State in Greater Sahara's New Leadership Duo?

Jacob Zenn

Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) has suffered a number of setbacks since it surged in late 2019 with a series of massive attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. By January 2020, ISGS was on the verge of superseding its rival, al-Qaeda-loyal Group for Supporting Muslims and Islam (JNIM). However, after French president Emmanuel Macron held a meeting in Pau, France with Sahelian heads of state and designated ISGS as the Sahel's number one security threat, ISGS began facing more intense military pressure ([France24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20200115-isis-sahel-security-threat), January 15). Within months, ISGS had been weakened and JNIM gained the upper hand on ISGS in the Sahelian militant landscape.

ISGS has also begun losing leaders in French-led military operations. In July, France announced that ISGS' deputy leader, Abdelhakim al-Sahrawi, had died two months earlier, reportedly due to a sickness that befell him while he was on the run. France also asserted that several other ISGS commanders had been arrested and killed (lefigaro.fr, July 2). More recently, in September, Macron announced that French counter-terrorism forces had also killed ISGS leader, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, weeks earlier (France24.com, September 16). His death was acknowledged in an Islamic State (IS) al-Naba newsletter editorial in October (dakaractu.com, November 1).

Where these two al-Sahrawis were the main figureheads of ISGS, there had been no clear “number three.” One possible militant to assume the leadership role after their deaths, however, is Illiasou Djibo (alias Petit Chafori), who was designated as a terrorist by the U.S. on June 28 ([state.gov](https://www.state.gov), June 28). As a commander in

Nampala, central Mali in 2017, Djibo operated among Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, who deputized Djibo as a commander for his fellow Fulanis (maliactu.com, January 6, 2017). Before then, Djibo had been captured, but released secretly in 2016 in exchange for 85-year old Australian, Jocelyn Elliot, who was kidnapped along with her husband, who was a doctor in Djibo town (jeuneafrique.com, December 14, 2016).

However, on October 13, ISGS published an unofficial video that was not released through IS' centralized media apparatus perhaps because of disruptions in communicating with IS after the deaths of the two al-Sahrawis. In this video, the commander of the ISGS brigade appeared to be Moussa Moumoni ([Twitter.com/@menastream](https://twitter.com/@menastream), October 13). Moumoni, who is from Niger, participated in ISGS's attack in Koutougou, Burkina Faso in August 2019 that killed 24 soldiers and preceded the series of other ISGS attacks that resulted in France labeling ISGS as the region's number one security threat (jeuneafrique.com, September 30, 2019). Although Moumoni was subsequently reported killed in 2020, his apparent emergence in this video shows he is still alive and in a leadership role (nordsudjournal.com, March 17, 2020).

It is not uncommon for jihadist leaders, including from ISGS, to be reported as deceased, only to reemerge. This had occurred with Abdelhakim al-Sahrawi in 2020 until such reports were disproven and he was killed one year later (Sahelnews.info, August 21, 2020). With Moumoni likely alive and Djibo released from prison, this duo is likely to take up the mantle of ISGS leadership and succeed the two al-Sahrawis. Moreover, their being nationals of Mali and Niger, as opposed to

Western Sahara like the two al-Sahrawis, will further embed ISGS in the Sahelian militant landscape. After more than a year of ISGS seeing its influence wane relative to JNIM, this new ISGS leadership could help the group regain its strength and reassert IS' presence in the Sahel.

Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor.

Boko Haram's Nemesis: A Post-Mortem of Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) Leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi

Jacob Zenn

In September, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)'s leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, was reported killed (saharareporters.com, September 15). Although details remain unclear, his death either came at the hands of rivals in Boko Haram commanded by Bakura, who operated around Lake Chad, or possibly by al-Barnawi's internal rivals in ISWAP. The Nigerian military has acknowledged al-Barnawi's death, but has claimed no involvement (premiumtimesng.com, October 14).

Al-Barnawi's death at the hands of Bakura would not be surprising considering al-Barnawi's hostility to Boko Haram. In August 2016, for example, Islamic State (IS) named al-Barnawi as ISWAP's leader, which meant original Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was unceremoniously expelled from ISWAP (al-Naba, August 3, 2016). Shekau later resurrected Boko Haram, which had been dormant while Shekau led ISWAP, and commanded Boko Haram from his Sambisa, Borno State

base. Three years later, in 2019, Bakura began commanding fighters loyal to Shekau around Lake Chad ([Terrorism Monitor](#), January 28).

Al-Barnawi was ultimately dethroned by internal rivals in March 2019, who sought to steer ISWAP in a more brutal “Shekau-like” direction when it came to killing vigilantes loyal to the Nigerian army, kidnapping and executing aid workers, and raiding Christian villages ([punchng.com](#), March 5, 2019). The commanders who overthrew al-Barnawi, however, like al-Barnawi himself, still opposed Shekau. In fact, some of al-Barnawi’s greatest levels of brutality were seen in ISWAP’s confrontations with Shekau’s loyalists in the weeks after August 2016, which led to more killings of Shekau’s loyalists than ISWAP fighters in their battles ([al-Haqaiq](#), June 2018).

The face of al-Barnawi has never been exposed. He first appeared veiled in a Boko Haram video interview in January 2015, which was coordinated with IS, posted on a Twitter account that IS set up with Boko Haram, and presaged Boko Haram’s impending pledge to IS by Shekau in March 2015 (Boko Haram was renamed ISWAP after Shekau’s pledge) ([al-Urwa al-Wutqha](#), January 27, 2015). Al-Barnawi’s other major appearance was not visual, but through a book that he wrote in June 2018 that detailed a litany of Shekau’s abuses of power, including killing sub-commanders, committing mass executions of youths who did not join the jihad, and rejecting theological advice from IS ([al-Haqaiq](#), June 2018). Thus, al-Barnawi’s somewhat secretive life, at least to an outsider, is matched by a similar level of mystery surrounding his reported death.

Al-Barnawi’s Legacy of Leniency

Part of al-Barnawi’s legacy will be his reputation of leniency towards civilians and not labeling any Muslim an ‘infidel’ just because they did not wage jihad, unlike Shekau ([issafrica.com](#), September 22, 2016). In addition, when more than 100 Muslim schoolgirls were kidnapped from Dapchi, Yobe State in February 2018, the girls reported that they were brought to al-Barnawi’s base near Lake Chad and that he promised to not harm them. This proved true when they were returned to their homes weeks later through an undisclosed deal between ISWAP and the Nigerian government (the lone Christian schoolgirl, however, remained “enslaved” by ISWAP) ([theguardian.com](#), March 30, 2018). Al-Barnawi’s lenient treatment of young schoolgirls can be compared with both ISWAP’s execution by al-Barnawi’s internal rivals of two young Muslim female aid workers, weeks before al-Barnawi was overthrown by those adversaries in March 2019, as well as Shekau’s bombastic claims of “enslaving” the more than 200 abducted Chibok schoolgirls in 2014, including several dozen Muslim schoolgirls among them ([saharareporters.com](#), April 9, 2018; [Youtube](#), May 5, 2014).

Despite that, al-Barnawi was seemingly more moderate than Shekau and his internal rivals in ISWAP. By the end of his life, he showed little sympathy towards al-Qaeda, which is usually seen as a relatively more moderate group than IS. Although al-Barnawi managed a few words of praise for al-Qaeda’s small Nigerian affiliate, Ansaru, in his book, al-Barnawi also noted that he only welcomed Ansaru members into ISWAP after they defected from that group ([al-Haqaiq](#), June 2018). Further, in May, when al-Barnawi regained leadership of ISWAP from his internal rivals, he released

a series of audios to condemn Shekau in advance of the offensive that led to the events of ISWAP's near-capture of Shekau and Shekau's suicide by self-detonating a bomb. In those audios, al-Barnawi condemned al-Qaeda and Shekau's initial outreach to al-Qaeda liaisons in 2010 (eeradicalization.com, August 30).

While ISWAP has released an audio acknowledging al-Barnawi's passing, IS itself has not commented on his death ([Telegram](https://t.me/ISWAP), September 13). Moreover, while al-Barnawi had claimed that IS had reinstated him as ISWAP leader in May and ordered him to launch the offensive that led to Shekau's death, IS only explicitly mentioned al-Barnawi in August 2016 when it first named him as ISWAP leader (the January 2015 video featuring al-Barnawi was still two months before Boko Haram became ISWAP) ([Telegram](https://t.me/ISWAP), May 18). One reason why IS may not honor al-Barnawi in passing is that al-Barnawi was not well known among global jihadists, nor would IS want to mention circumstances surrounding al-Barnawi's death, such as the internal turmoil in ISWAP causing his death or the late Shekau's loyalists gaining retribution against al-Barnawi for his role in Shekau's demise.

The End of An Era

More locally, the death of al-Barnawi coming only months after Shekau's death marks an end of an era. Al-Barnawi's father, Muhammed Yusuf, had led Boko Haram from 2004 until his death in 2009 and cultivated Shekau as his deputy. In addition to Yusuf's third-in-command and al-Barnawi's ally, Mamman Nur, being executed by ISWAP internal rivals in September 2018, the three most important Nigerian jihadists with ties to the movement's foundational leader, Yusuf,

are now deceased: Shekau, al-Barnawi, and Nur himself (saharareporters.com, September 14, 2018).

This means that ISWAP and Boko Haram are both increasingly distanced from the movement's origins, and Yusuf himself rarely is mentioned by either group in their videos or literature. ISWAP and Boko Haram are also increasingly distanced from any association with Nigeria itself. This contrasts with Yusuf, Shekau, Nur, and, to some extent, the younger al-Barnawi, who all were raised in Nigeria and interacted with Nigeria's government, religious scholars and society before waging jihad against them from 2009 onwards. ISWAP and Boko Haram now only encounter the Nigerian army, but little else of "Nigeria." This makes either group's ability to reconcile with the Nigerian government and reenter Nigerian society all the more unlikely.

Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor.

Salim Rashid Mohammed: The Kenyan Prodigy Who Became an Islamic State Fighter in Mozambique

Sunguta West

Salim Rashid Mohammed, a former Kenyan university student who became a jihadist, is now the latest concern for security agencies in East Africa. The 27-year-old has been maturing as a militant and has attained leadership status since joining Islamic State (IS) in Mozambique. Mohammed had studied computer science in Kenya and abroad. However, his career saw change when his father enrolled him in a Turkish university around 2010. Between

then and now, he joined the ranks of the Mozambican wing of Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP) as a jihadist ([The Citizen](#), September 8, 2021).

Disappearance from Kenya

Mohammed vanished from Kenya in October 2020. His disappearance was announced after he skipped a court trial for a case in which he had been charged with being an al-Shabaab member. He had been released on bond before fleeing the country. The details of the disappearance remained scanty until Kenyan security agencies reported a video emerging that showed Mohammed beheading a victim in Mozambique. His presence in Mozambique had been further confirmed by security agencies' forensic analysis of another ISCAP suspect's phone calls, which showed communications between Mohammed and the suspect, Richard Kivatsi. According to the security agencies, Kivatsi had been communicating not only with Mohammed but also another terrorism suspect, Ali Alfani Juma, from their mutual hideouts in Mozambique ([The Citizen](#), September 8).

Back in Kenya, the police have been warning that Mohammed is armed and dangerous, and a warrant of arrest has been issued for him. According to some sources, in late August, Mohammed briefly sneaked into Kenya, but escaped a police ambush to slip back into Tanzania and then Mozambique. He was apparently one among other militants planning attacks on the anniversary of the death of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, an al-Shabaab ideologue who was assassinated on August 27, 2012 in Mombasa City. Two other suspects, netted in the operation intended to capture Mohammed, had an AK-47 rifle and material used to make Improvised

Explosive Devices (IEDs) ([The East African](#), August 28).

“Chotara’s” Youth: Following the Trendlines of East African Jihadism

Mohammed's metamorphosis is the key to understanding how the bright youth of East Africa can be radicalized and recruited into Islamist militancy. With exceptional skills and good education, many others like him have become targets of IS and al-Qaeda recruitment in the region ([Daily Nation](#), June 29, 2015). In the recent past, terrorist networks have sought to recruit students with science backgrounds, including chemical, electrical and mechanical engineering, and Mohammed's case is no different ([Terrorism Monitor](#), January 7, 2015).

Mohammed's life story begins in Mombasa, a predominantly Muslim coastal city of Kenya, where he was born in 1986. Local friends nicknamed Mohammed “Chotara,” a Swahili word for a person born of a white father and a black African mother, because of Mohammed's mixed looks. His family was middle income and resided in the Kizingo area of the city, which is a prosperous and secure part of Mombasa.

Growing up on the Kenyan Swahili coast with the customary traditions of Muslims there, Mohammed started his early education in Qubaa Muslim School, a private institution in the Majengo area, where he completed his nursery and basic education. However, Majengo has since become the focus of local and international security agencies for emerging as a breeding ground of Islamist militancy. At the center of radicalization was Musa Mosque, which was associated with the late Sheikh Rogo, among other fiery preachers. Before Rogo was gunned down by unknown

assailants suspected of being Kenyan security forces, his ideology most certainly transferred to the young Mohammed ([The Standard](#), February 3, 2014). Indeed, when Rogo was killed, Mohammed was 17 years-old and in high school, but it can be inferred that activities around the mosque, which was near his school, had much influence on him. The mosque's radical preaching and distribution of extremist Islamist literature is why security agencies shut it down.

Leaving the University for Turkey and Syria

For his high school education, Mohammed attended Abu Hureira Academy, a non-profit Muslim community school in the Mvita area of Mombasa. At the academy, he received a good score on the final high school examination, with the government offering him admission at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, a public university near Nairobi. Mohammed turned down the offer and instead enrolled at the Mombasa Technical University for Computer Engineering studies. After one year, he dropped out of the university and joined a private college for computer studies, however ([The Citizen](#), September 8).

It was after this that Mohammed's father decided to send him to Turkey to complete his studies at Kultur University in Istanbul. It is believed that while in Turkey, Mohammed snuck into Syria for militant training. In 2016, Turkish authorities arrested Mohammed alongside Nasra Hyder Faiz, a Kenyan woman, as they both crossed back into the country after training with IS in Syria. The two were deported from Turkey and arrested by Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police (ATPU), but were soon

released for lack of evidence in 2017 ([Capital News](#), February 18, 2017).

Since 2017, Mohammed has been linked to several failed terror attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa. In 2019, he was arrested at the Moi International Airport in Mombasa and charged with being an al-Shabaab member ([Africa News](#), June 11, 2019). Furthermore, Mohammed had been found with material used to make Improvised Explosive Devices, including twin stranded wires, batteries connected in a series, an inductor coil and white explosive powder. After securing his release and paying a 1.5 million Kenyan shilling (US\$15,000) bond, Mohammed attended every court hearing of his case until October last year when he vanished. The disappearance was recorded by the police on December 12, 2020 ([The Citizen](#), September 8).

Conclusion

The rise of Mohammed is an indicator of how East Africa is losing its dependable youth to Islamist militancy. While his case is one of the latest to reach the security services' radar, some evidence suggests that there are many more. Seemingly, local and international security agencies need to tighten their focus on Mozambique, which has become the latest battleground for jihadists from East Africa, including Mohammed.

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A Profile of Bonomado Omar: The Religious, Business, and Kinship Networks of Islamic State's Leader in Mozambique

Arnold Figueira

On August 6, 2021, the U.S. announced the terrorist designation of Bonomado Machude Omar alongside four other terrorist leaders in Africa. According to the designation, Omar is the leader of the Military and External Affairs Departments for Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP)'s Mozambique branch. In addition, he serves as the senior commander and lead coordinator for all attacks conducted by the group in northern Mozambique. He is further a facilitator and communications conduit for the group ([U.S. State Department](#), August 6).

The Islamic State (IS)-loyal insurgents in northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province remain one of the least known jihadist groups. Despite occasional media releases through IS's centralized media apparatus, the Cabo Delgado insurgency's communications strategy has remained mostly localized and delivered overwhelmingly through "local channels." Based on recently published research and other available data, this profile takes a closer look at one of ISCAP's main leadership figures in Mozambique, Bonomado Machude Omar.

Bonomado Machude Omar's Background

In August 2018, Mozambican security authorities revealed the names of six leading figures of the Cabo Delgado militants, including "Ibn Omar" ([Militant Leadership Monitor](#), October 4, 2018). Mozambican journalists similarly noted

Bonomado Machude Omar's alias was Ibn Omar and that he was one of the key leaders of the Cabo Delgado insurgents in late 2020. According to the Centro Journalismo Investigativo (CJI), Omar himself is a Mozambican who was born in the Palma district of Cabo Delgado province, with part of his childhood spent in Mocímboa da Praia. Omar was characterized as "the brains behind the insurgents' attacks" who "defined all targets and the necessary operational logistics" ([Centro de Journalismo Investigativo](#), September 29, 2020).

Recently published research, conducted by a Mozambican researcher from the NGO Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), also provides additional details on Omar's childhood and path to head of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Similar to the CJI article, OMR concluded that Omar is a native of Cabo Delgado, born in 1988 in the village of Ncumbi in Palma and has three wives and multiple children ([OMR](#), August 10).

There seems to be some discrepancy between the CJI report and OMR research concerning Omar's childhood: while the CJI report stated that Bonomado Omar's father was a "retired teacher and a local politician," the more recent OMR report states that Omar became fatherless at the age of five. Omar's family then moved to Mocímboa da Praia and his mother married another man, locally known as "Mze Tchidi."

Where the CJI report and OMR research concur is that Omar excelled in school. He finished tenth grade at the Januário Pedro Secondary School in Mocímboa da Praia and, according to former teachers, "was a calm young man, a good student and a good football player." Due to his tall stature

(roughly six feet) and the fact that he played midfield in soccer, he acquired the nickname "Patrick Vieira" after a famous Senegalese-French football midfielder.

After coming of age, Omar performed his military service in the Mozambican navy in Pemba. After his military service, Omar returned to school, residing at the "boarding school of the African Muslim," where he finished twelfth grade. In school, Omar "became a charismatic figure with the other young people, where he was known for his sense of justice and protection of the younger ones" ([OMR](#), August 10). This assessment was also reflected by the earlier CJI report, which stated that as a student Omar had been hardworking and dedicated, scoring high marks in school. At the same time, Omar seems to have been already seriously practicing his faith because "he did everything based on Allah's commands; he never got involved in fights and knew how to navigate his school colleagues" ([Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo](#), September 29, 2020).

Sometime around the years 2008 and 2009, Omar worked at the Maringué market in Pemba, where he sold vegetables and Muslim clothing on behalf of a foreign trader, described as Tanzanian or Somali. Business travels then took Omar to Tanzania and South Africa. It seems that Omar tried to combine his religiousness and business activities because after returning from his business travels and settling to Mocímboa da Praia, he ran a mosque and a stall selling trinkets bought in Tanzanian markets or in Pemba itself.

Omar's path to radicalization, however, is unknown. It is said that his stepfather introduced him to Islam, which he studied and perfected ([OMR](#), August 10). Other

sources have claimed that Omar was seen as a "great Islamic scholar, clever and very intelligent" ([Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo](#), September 29, 2020). Whatever the case, by 2017 Omar had already become radicalized.

At the Cabo Delgado Insurgency's Helm

The Cabo Delgado insurgency started on October 5, 2017, when the first insurgent attack took place. An estimated 30 armed men opened fire on police posts in the coastal town and surrounding area of Awasse. The town was besieged while the shootings continued for more than 24 hours, with a total death toll of around 15 attackers, two policemen and one civilian. [1] The attackers, who were mostly from the town of Mocímboa da Praia itself, were ultimately defeated by the security forces and retreated into the bush. Omar participated in these attacks from the beginning as a key figure in acquiring weapons for the group and planning its operations ([Cabolidado.com](#), October 12).

After the initial attack, the insurgency gathered pace until culminating in March 2020 with the capture of Mocímboa da Praia. ([Terrorism Monitor](#), May 17, 2019). Omar then became the central figure in a video filmed during the invasion of the town, wearing an IS-style black headband with the writing "La Ilaha Illallahi (There's no deity but Allah)" and giving a pep talk in KiSwahili and KiMwani (languages spoken in Cabo Delgado) to his fellow jihadists ([Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo](#), September 29, 2020).

However, some doubt existed about whether the aforementioned commander in the video actually was Omar. He has

otherwise avoided media attention and there continues to be uncertainty about his names. The OMR report counts no less than six *nom de guerres* for Omar, including not only "Ibn Omar," but also "Abu Sulayfa Mohammad", "Omar Saíde", "Sheik Omar", "Nuro Saíde," and "Abu Surakha". Similarly, some doubt remains if an insurgent leader featured in a BBC documentary using the names "Abusuraca", "Nuro" and "Ibn Omar" is indeed Omar himself ([BBC Africa Eye](#), October 4). In July 2020, Mozambican authorities erroneously claimed that Omar had even been killed ([Twitter.com/@nrogeiro](#), July 7, 2020).

Omar has been characterized as someone with "commanding capacity, charisma and leadership," who dictates the rules and decides where and how to attack, as well as who to kill. Allegedly, it is also Omar who handles the group's "most delicate situations" ([OMR](#), August 10). However, while Omar undoubtedly is a key leader of ISCAP in Mozambique, it is unclear what his exact responsibilities are. The actual distribution of responsibilities between Abu Yasir Hassan, who the U.S. also designated as an ISCAP terrorist in Mozambique, and Omar is uncertain, but based on the available information, Omar seems to combine the roles of a religious leader and frontline commander. According to the U.S. designation, during the March 2021 Palma attack, for example, Omar led a group of fighters attacking the Amarula Hotel, where a group of foreign workers had sought refuge, while Abu Yasir Hassan led another fighter contingent ([iol.co.za](#), March 28).

In the Rwandan Army's Crosshairs

In July 2021, Rwanda made a surprise announcement that it would send its forces

to assist the embattled Mozambican forces in Cabo Delgado to liberate areas that had come under the insurgents' control ([mq.co.za](#), September 14). A month later, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced that it too would send its troops to Mozambique ([timeslive.co.za](#), October 5). Since July, military progress accelerated, with Rwandan and Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) forces regaining control of the main towns of Cabo Delgado and most significantly liberating Mocímboa da Praia on August 8. Since then, Rwandan and Mozambican forces have dismantled known insurgent strongholds and training camps.

While the Rwandan intervention in Cabo Delgado has turned the tide against the insurgents, Omar remains at large. In mid-August, the then commander of Mozambican National Army, Cristovão Chume, stated that "persons close to Omar" had been arrested and that Omar at that point was still alive ([Club of Mozambique](#), August 12). In late September, the brother-in-law of Omar, Ali Buana Aiuba, was also captured by SADC forces after a battle with insurgents in Chitama, Nangade district ([Carta de Mozambique](#), October 5).

The commander of Rwandan Special Forces in Cabo Delgado, major Steven Kuraba, stated in late September that Omar had escaped the recent joint Rwandan and FADM military operation against the insurgents' stronghold near the village of Mbau. According to Kuraba, Omar had been "in that part of the country," but had managed to escape ([Carta de Mocambique](#), September 24). Omar is now suspected to be hiding along the forest banks of the Messalo river. The river serves as a boundary between the Rwandan forces, operating to the north of the river, and the

SADC forces in the south ([Carta de Mocambique](#), September 24).

Conclusion

The available information on Omar points to a socially capable, and even charismatic, leader, who is familiar with the local terrain of Cabo Delgado. Several details on Omar's path to the helm of the insurgency are notable. His background as a successful trader connects him to East and Southern African transnational business, religious, and political networks. Omar's regional connections and existing networks point to a possible role in explaining Omar's current position as a key leadership figure in ISCAP in Mozambique, and should not be disregarded.

The claim of Omar's religious upbringing and the arrest of his brother-in-law further underscores the importance of kinship

networks in insurgency mobilization. With his background and networks, Omar seems to have become what is called a "jihadist entrepreneur," who has been able to formulate a jihadist discourse that resonates well with the local social and political climate. This entrepreneurialism has carried Omar to the top of the leadership of ISCAP in Mozambique.

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Note

[1] Eric Morier-Genoud, "The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: origins, nature and beginning," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 14:3, 369-412, 2020.