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Insani Joy Samla's Arrest and the Annihilation of Abu Sayyaf's Courier Network in the Philippines

Jacob Zenn

On March 2, Abu Sayyaf courier Insani Joy Samla was arrested by Philippine security officers on the island of Basilan near Mindanao (akhbaralaan.net, March 2). His arrest disrupted the remaining linkages between Abu Sayyaf's increasingly small and dispersed cells across Mindanao, which have been degraded as a result of the surrender of many militants and a series of successful counter-terrorism operations. However, his arrest will also undermine the legacy of one of the country's longest lasting jihadist families (manilatimes.net, January 24).

Samla is the uncle of former pro-Islamic State (IS) Abu Sayyaf leader Isnon Hapilon, who was killed during the battle of Marawi in 2017. In this battle, Hapilon's fighters occupied Marawi for several months, as seen in several video releases by IS at the time (philstar.com, October 16, 2017). Samla, however, escaped that battle and, according to the Chief of

Operations of Western Mindanao Police Command (Wesmincom), he "served as a carrier of food, medical supplies, and ammunition for the Abu Sayyaf bandits stationed in Basilan province" (pna.gov.ph, March 1). After his recent arrest, he was taken to Isabela City, de jure capital of Basilan province, where he will be detained until he stands trial.

Samla is unlikely to find much sympathy at trial, due to his involvement in multiple murders and attempted killings in Isabela City in May 2017 (manilatimes.net, January 24). This occurred during the final week of the siege of Marawi and suggests that those murders were revenge attacks by Samla in the aftermath of the jihadist defeat. Yet, from 2017 until his arrest he had been conducting courier work for Abu Sayyaf cells, which were scattered in southern Mindanao after they lost in Marawi.

Samla's arrest weakens Abu Sayyaf's courier network in Mindanao. Another Abu Sayyaf financial courier, Nursita Mahalli Malud (also known as Kirsita Ismael), the second wife of Abu Sayyaf commander, Mundi Sawadjaan, was arrested a year before Samla in Jolo (gmanetwork.com, March 6, 2022). She reportedly specialized

in transferring finances between Sawadjaan and other commanders in Mindanao. Malud was further in charge of obtaining medical supplies and bomb components for Abu Sayyaf, which means she likely had interacted with Samla (philstar.com, March 6, 2022). With the arrest of her and Samla, Abu Sayyaf's logistics network for food, medical supplies, ammunition, and finances have all been severed.

Prior to Samla and Malud, another key Abu Sayyaf courier had been arrested in 2015. This courier, Edeliza Ulep (also known as Gina Perez), was an Australian national, rather than a Filipino/Filipina (mindanaogoldstardaily.com, August 14, 2015). She had been a courier involved with obtaining ransom money for former Australian soldier, Warren Rodwell, who was kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf for 18 months until he was ransomed for roughly \$100,000 in 2013 (smh.com.au, October 10, 2014). Her arrest coincided with reduced Abu Sayyaf abductions over the next decade.

Notable also about these three couriers is that two of them—Malud and Ulep—were women. Other women have been suicide bombers in Abu Sayyaf. Thus, the group is one example of a number of jihadist groups that employ women in more than “domestic” roles. And, as evidenced by the arrest of Malud, Ulep, and Samla, couriers' impact on the ability of Abu Sayyaf to sustain itself amidst army offensives was significant. Their absence from the battlefields and logistics routes is coincides with more limited Abu Sayyaf operations.

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The Mysterious Assassination of a Former al-Badr Commander in Karachi: The Case of Syed Khalid Raza

Farhan Zahid

On the evening of February 26, two gunmen riding on a motorcycle assassinated Syed Khalid Raza (Khalid) in the Gulistan-e-Johar neighborhood of Karachi (Dawn, February 27). Khalid was known as an educator, but formerly was an Islamist militant commander in the al-Badr militant organization. His killing was targeted, preplanned, and premediated, as the gunmen waited until the moment Khalid left his house to execute the operation.

The assassination was claimed by the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), which is a Sindhi nationalist-separatist militant group that is active in rural districts of Sindh Province. The SRA has also been involved in scores of sporadic attacks against government infrastructure and Chinese citizens working in Pakistan at China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project sites. The assassination of Khalid was of such a serious nature that the Chief Minister of Sindh Province Murad Ali Shah personally directed police to take immediate action against the SRA assassins (News International, February 27).

Khalid's Militant Connections

The 55-year-old Khalid was a former member and activist of Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Pakistan during the 1990s in Karachi. JI was founded by Abul Ala Maududi in 1942 and although it did not see much success at the polls, it managed to send thousands of its followers to Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89). The group has also maintained close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al-Nahda in Tunisia, and Hamas.

Khalid later joined the JI-linked Islamist militant group al-Badr, which was active in the Islamist insurgency in Indian Kashmir. He gained fame among Islamist circles of Pakistan because of his jihadist activities, while also remaining active in student politics; all the while, Khalid remained a high-ranking member of JI's student group, Islami Jamiat-e-Talba in Karachi. [1] Al-Badr itself was one of the splinter groups of Hibz-ul-Mujahedeen (HM), but in 1998, HM's Emir Bakht Zaman parted ways with HM and founded al-Badr as a separate entity. [2]

Despite the fact that working relations between HM and al-Badr persisted, the latter became the more active Islamist militant group in Indian Kashmir in 1990s, and Khalid led the group there for more than eight years. Both HM and al-Badr, however, were designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department ([Op India](#), February 27). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Islamist insurgency in Indian Kashmir subsided and attacks dramatically decreased. Thus, Khalid retired from active militancy and joined the Darul Arqam schools network, becoming its Deputy Director in Karachi. Because of his educational credentials, he also became the vice chairman of the Federation of Private Schools in Pakistan ([Express Tribune](#), February 27). Khalid's links to such Islamist organizations and charities remained until his assassination.

Causes for Khalid's Assassination

The SRA declared on its Twitter account that they "[claim] responsibility for the killing of Khalid Raza, terming him as an operative of the religious extremist terrorist organization 'al-Badr' and an instrument of Pakistani agencies, in Gulistan-e-Jauhar Karachi last night" ([Twitter/@Bahott](#), February 27). This was the first time that the group decided to target an Islamist militant and activist.

The SRA possibly sought to gain some sympathy in international circles and public

attention in western media outlets through the assassination of designated terrorist. Alternatively, the group also sought to curry favor with Pakistan's *bête noire*—India. Moreover, it is one way of hurting the interests of Islamist terrorist organizations that are at odds with local nationalist-separatist groups due to their competition with one another during recruitment drives.

Conclusion

The assassination of Khalid was unusual, but may represent the onset of a trend. For example, on February 21 another former Islamist militant Bashir Ahmad Peer of Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen was assassinated in the same manner in Rawalpindi city of Punjab province ([tribuneindia.com](#), February 20). That killing was not claimed by any terrorist group, however.

In Pakistan, the Islamist militant landscape is much larger than the nationalist-separatist scene and it is likely that the Islamist militants will strike back. Nonetheless, these two assassinations showcase the growing footprint of nationalist-separatist militant groups in Pakistan. It appears that they are now in a turf war with Islamic groups, the outcome of which remains uncertain.

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Notes:

[1] Author's telephonic discussions with a senior journalist in Islamabad, April 29, 2023.

[2] Discussions with a senior Islamabad-based journalist, April 29, 2023.

Akram al-Kaabi: The Anti-American Iraqi Shia Militia Leader Who Went to Moscow

Rami Jameel

In late November 2022, Iraqi Shia militia leader Akram al-Kaabi visited Russia and met with the Russian deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Russian officials. During his visit, al-Kaabi, who is the leader of the Iranian-backed al-Nujabaa (“The Noble Ones”) Shia militia, condemned the US and called for resisting what he described as the US “occupation” of Iraq’s land and wealth. He also praised Russia and its role in the world and called for the end of US “hegemony” (shafaq.com, November 27, 2022). Al-Kaabi’s anti-American conviction is not new, but this was his first visit to Russia on the record and it is thus far the clearest indication of his militia’s support for Russia since the Kremlin launched its invasion of Ukraine.

The visit to Moscow by al-Kaabi also indicates the increasingly important role he has been playing within the Shia militia movement in Iraq and the Middle East more broadly. It further highlights Russia’s potential interest in relations with Shia militias, which have gained experience and strength after years of fighting in Iraq and Syria. These militias could benefit Russia by consolidating Russia’s military positions in the Middle East, with the possibility of deploying some militia fighters to support Russian troops in Ukraine, where paramilitary forces like the Wagner Group already play a prominent role.

Al-Kaabi’s Background and Early Career

Al-Kaabi is one of the most prominent militia leaders in Iraq. He, for example, played a key role in the Shia insurgency against the US in the years that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, al-Kaabi’s militia has been fighting for years in Syria alongside other Iranian-backed militias, supporting the government of

Bashar al-Assad (rozana.fm, January 9, 2017). Al-Kaabi was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2008 for plotting and leading attacks on US and Iraqi forces. Furthermore, in March 2019, the US State Department declared al-Kaabi and his militia Specially Designated Foreign Terrorists (state.gov, March 5, 2019).

Born in 1977, al-Kaabi was one of the young men who joined the movement that late Shia cleric Muhammad Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr established in Iraq in the 1990s. He was imprisoned when Saddam Hussein’s government launched a wide scale crackdown on the movement following the assassination of al-Sadr in 1999 (al-khanadeq.com, March 5, 2021). Anti-American sentiment was essential in the Shia Islamist ideology that al-Sadr introduced, and his legacy was carried on by followers and operators like al-Kaabi.

When Moqtada al-Sadr revived his father’s network after his death, he founded the Mahdi Army militia and launched an anti-US insurgency in 2003. Al-Kaabi became one of his most prominent aides, although he lacked a military background. Nevertheless, he became a senior commander of the Mahdi Army. Al-Kaabi would go on to be a leading figure when a split occurred in the militia.

In opposition to al-Sadr’s perceived flexibility in dealing with the US-backed Iraqi government, al-Kaabi and Qais al-Khazali, who was another senior aide of al-Sadr, split from al-Sadr and formed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Al-Khazali became the leader of AAH while al-Kaabi took the role of second-in-command (alakhbar.com, September 30, 2015). Both al-Kaabi and al-Khazali then received significant support and training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which was led at the time by General Qassim Soleimani (middleeastonline.com, October 30, 2019).

Forming al-Nujabaa

The conflict in Syria significantly elevated al-Kaabi. Instead of being a top lieutenant in a militia, he became the leader of his own group. This shift happened when a group of Iraqi Shia militias began to fight in the civil war in neighboring Syria. The al-Assad government was facing a challenge from multiple rebel groups, mostly Sunni Islamists motivated by both religious fervor and anti-al-Assad nationalist sentiment. Al-Assad's depleted and demoralized forces in the regular Syrian Arab Army (SAA) struggled to fight these types of opponents. Iran, which was al-Assad's main regional ally, had an answer to this crucial challenge, however.

Iran mobilized Shia militias from across the Middle East to fight on the side of al-Assad (alaraby.co.uk, April 7, 2016). Al-Kaabi was one of the first to join the fighting in Syria, and the civil war there gave him the opportunity to advance his ambitions within the Iran-backed militia movement. He ultimately split from AAH, however, to form al-Nujabaa and become its military and political leader. Al-Nujabaa quickly became a sizable force with an estimated 10,000 fighters and remained on good terms with AAH, despite their split. Both groups enjoyed continued support from Iran (sawtbeirut.com, September 23, 2017).

Shia militias saw fighting in Syria as a fight for the survival of the Shia community and faith. Al-Nujabaa and other Shia militias were first deployed in Syria in the Saida Zainab neighborhood (site of an eponymous holy Shia shrine) to defend against a perceived threat from Syrian rebels. Defending Shia holy shrines like Saida Zainab was a standard that al-Nujabaa and other militias raised in the face of criticism. Uproar came from both Sunni Muslim countries that condemned the deployment of non-Syrian militias into Syria, as well as from Iraqi Shia Muslims who objected to sending Iraq youth to fight outside of the country (iranwire.com, May 8, 2020).

Al-Kaabi, however, expanded his cause to defending Shia communities on the whole throughout Syria. For example, he justified his militia's deployment into Syria's second largest city, Aleppo, by highlighting the plight of small Shia villages that had come under siege by the anti-government Syrian rebels. However, al-Kaabi went even further by promoting the notion that fighting beyond the borders of Iraq was a manifestation of a new and more powerful Iraq.

Al-Kaabi did not see a contradiction between his Iraqi identity and efforts to build a strong Iraq on the one end and his allegiance to Iran and its Shia theocratic leadership—to say nothing of fighting in other countries at Iran's request—on the other end (alaraby.co.uk, September 3, 2016). This was a controversial viewpoint, as many Iraqis (to include those in the Shia community) denouncing fighting outside Iraq, as it is thought to be unpatriotic to fight in foreign wars while Iraq recovers from decades of military conflict ([YouTube/@Dijlahtv](https://www.youtube.com/@Dijlahtv), August 29, 2019).

Shadow Militias

In summer 2014, most Shia militias returned to focusing on Iraq after advances of the Islamic State (IS) in the country. Paradoxically, they found themselves fighting on the same side as the US, which led a coalition to fight IS and support the Iraqi government. This did not, however, induce the Shia militias to become any friendlier with the US, though it did cause them to enjoy increased popularity from the anti-IS public.

Indeed, when tensions flared up again with the US after IS's defeat, Shia militias started to launch attacks on US targets in Iraq. After the US killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani—the most influential figure in the Shia militia movement across the Middle East—the militias escalated their attacks on US troops and increased their demands for a complete US withdrawal from Iraq. Al-Kaabi, for his part, vowed to launch a war of revenge and attrition

against US troops in Iraq and Syria (independentarabia.com, February 17, 2020).

However, almost all the attacks in recent years on US targets in Iraq were claimed by unknown groups using new names, albeit clearly still using Shia symbols and pro-Iran rhetoric (hafryat.com, May 5, 2020). It was nevertheless obvious (considering the degree of control of Iraqi government and the Shia militias) that these new groups were actually components of established and recognized militias. Instead, they needed to avoid embarrassing the Shia-led Iraqi government that was itself supported by the US. Although the US has logically considered these new groups a part of the wider Iranian-backed Shia militia movement, key details about the composition and decision-making processes of those militias have remained unclear (almahayid.com, November 6, 2021).

Once again, al-Kaabi appeared a step ahead of other militias in terms of not hesitating to reveal his anti-US activities when he gave the clearest indication yet of the identity of the shadowy anti-US Shia groups. In December 2021, al-Kaabi appeared in a video speaking with members of those militias in which he reiterated his views to an approving audience of militants. Flags and logos of the groups were well presented, but all faces except al-Kaabi's were blurred or kept out of the camera shot.

In the video, al-Kaabi accused the US—which has deployed troops in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government—of continuously occupying Iraq. He went even further by pledging to target those he described as “tools” that the US implanted in Iraq. The loose term, “tool,” could apply to any party or individual whom al-Kaabi accused of being pro-American. This was also the first and only time that a previously identified and officially recognized Iraqi Shia militia leader appeared on a platform with the shadow

militia groups (almayadeen.com, December 9, 2021).

Conclusion

As it turns out, al-Kaabi's militia is not the largest of its type, but al-Kaabi himself has been the most defiant and outspoken militia leader in Iraq. While some militia leaders tend to sugarcoat their relationship with Iran and emphasize the professed Iraqi identity of their militia, al-Kaabi has been very clear in his views. He has embraced the pan-Iranian Shia ideology of *Vilayet al-Faqih* (the authority of the Iranian Supreme Leader on Shia Muslims everywhere).

Shia militias in Iraq have faced a shocking challenge from their own religious community since the end of the war against IS. The militias organized themselves politically and joined the government, controlling departments and offices that gave them access to valuable state resources. This has, however, led to them receiving backlash from an increasingly angry population; civilians now blame them alongside politicians for the endemic corruption that undermines the Iraqi government and results in poverty, unemployment, and a lack of basic services.

Al-Kaabi has avoided running for parliament or other public offices. Despite having a political arm for his militia, al-Kaabi's group does not field candidates in elections or join like-minded Shia parties in local or federal government coalitions. Al-Nujabaa is still part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) an official umbrella group for militias. Still, al-Kaabi maintains the claim that he and his group are not part of the government.

There is, however, an inarguably distinct nature to al-Kaabi's militia. Al-Nujabaa was always more enthusiastic in embracing the fight in Syria than other militias. By contrast, other militants hid or explained away their involvement in the Syrian conflict in order to avoid political

embarrassment or blowback from Shia populations, who derided the war as illegitimate. In addition, al-Kaabi's trip to Russia would not have occurred without his history of coordinating with Iran. The visit, meanwhile, showed that while al-Nujabaa might be smaller than other militia groups, al-Kaabi's initiatives and his leadership style will always serve as an indication of the real, evidently pro-Russian, and unswervingly pro-Iranian direction of the Iraqi Shia militia movement as a whole.

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Escaping Justice Through Geopolitics in Pakistan: Jaish-e-Mohammed Leader Abdul Rauf Azhar

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Mufti Abdul Rauf Azhar (Abdul Rauf) is the deputy leader of the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which was proscribed by Pakistan in 2002. The group is most notable for targeting Indian forces in Indian-administered Kashmir and claiming such attacks in the name of the "Kashmir jihad" (alJazeera.com, May 1, 2019). Abdul Rauf is also the younger brother of JeM founder and leader Maulana Masood Azhar, who is a UN-designated terrorist.

While Maulana Masood Azhar operated in Pakistan, India, the United Kingdom, and Somalia, Abdul Rauf has mainly been involved in militant activities only in India, and especially Kashmir (Economic Times, August 12, 2022; WION, September 19, 2022). One day after the country report on terrorism in Pakistan was released by the US State Department in February—which urged Pakistan to dismantle terror groups working against India—the Indian government sent a message to its Pakistani counterparts asserting that the perpetrators of terrorism should be tried

for crimes against humanity. The US report specifically noted that "Pakistan successfully prosecuted JeM founder Masood Azhar in absentia and JeM leader Abdul Rauf Azhar; however, LeT (Laskar-i-Taiba) and JeM continue to operate within the country" (India TV, March 1).

Although JeM was founded by Massood Azhar, it was Abdul Rauf who played the key role of carrying the group's ideological goals forward vis-à-vis Kashmir jihad. Indeed, from 2007 onwards, Abdul Rauf acted as the supreme commander of JeM in the absence of his brother. In that role, he revived the group by carrying out high-profile attacks on targets in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Early Life and Career

Born in January 1974 in Bahawalpur, a city in Punjab province, Pakistan, Abdul Rauf belonged to a middle class family (CNBC TV18, August 11, 2022). He was the son of Allah Bakhsh Shabir, a teacher and the headmaster of a government school in Bahawalpur (WION, September 19, 2022). It is, therefore, ironic that a government teacher who rendered services to the state saw his sons become involved in anti-state activities.

After JeM leader Maulana Masood Azhar went underground following the suicide attacks which targeted former president General Perez Musharraf in 2007, Abdul Rauf took command of JeM and carried his brother's jihadist mission forward. In this role, Abdul Rauf reorganized JeM and made Islamabad a base for the group's propaganda campaign. He focused his efforts on Pakistan's north-western tribal areas and distributed JeM's jihadist pamphlets there. The message inside urged the local population to wage jihad against anti-Muslim actors both within and outside of Pakistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal, August 17, 2009).

While remaining associated with JeM's political wing, Abdul Rauf played a key role in setting up training camps (CNBC TV18,

August 11, 2022). Further, as JeM's intelligence coordinator and the group's senior commander, Abdul Rauf relocated to operate in India itself. According to the US Treasury Department, he was assigned to organize suicide attacks in India in 2008 ([The Week](#), August 11, 2022).

Crackdown on Abdul Rauf

In 2010, the US designated Abdul Rauf as a terrorist for being a senior leader of JeM, accusing him of inspiring Pakistanis to engage in militant activities against India ([Dawn](#), August 12, 2022). Nearly a decade later, in 2019, he was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities based on a decision taken by the National Security Committee (NSC), after India mentioned his name in a dossier shared with Pakistan. Pakistani authorities, however, declared that all detainees in the dossier, including Abdul Rauf, would be released if they were not found guilty after interrogation ([The News](#), March 5, 2019).

Pakistan was also compelled to detain Abdul Rauf due to a crackdown on members of proscribed militant groups a month after the Pulwama suicide attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which raised tensions between India and Pakistan. The US mounted further pressure on Islamabad to crack down on individuals and organizations listed by the UN Security Council. Moreover, the country was pressed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to deliver on its commitments to curb terror financing. On the other hand, however, Pakistani officials denied any external influence on their decision-making and claimed that the crackdown was of the country's own initiative, in order to prevent the use of Pakistani soil for attacks against any country ([Times of India](#), March 5, 2019).

Abdul Rauf was also labelled among the top five most wanted terrorists by India ([Economic Times](#), March 6, 2019). Some of the high-profile attacks in India in which he was involved included:

- The 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC814, which was flown from Kathmandu to Kandahar in Afghanistan and forced India to release Abdul Rauf's brother, Maulana Masood Azhar, from an Indian prison in exchange for the more than 150 hostages held on the flight ([Economic Times](#), March 6, 2019);
- The 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in which a group of militants attacked the Parliament complex in New Delhi and killed nine people ([The Print](#), December 13, 2022);
- The 2016 targeting of the Indian Air Force installation in Pathankot in which seven military personnel were killed ([Asian Age](#), January 16, 2016);
- A second attack in 2016 on Nagrota military camp in Jammu and Kashmir, which killed seven Indian soldiers ([Hindustan Times](#), November 30, 2016); and
- The 2019 suicide attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama (also in Jammu and Kashmir) that killed 40 Indian soldiers ([WION](#), February 15).

Following the 2016 Pathankot attack, Pakistan launched a massive crackdown on JeM, shutting its madrasas and detaining several JeM members, including Abdul Rauf, who was kept in protective custody for 30 days pending investigation ([Asian Age](#), January 16, 2016). Abdul Rauf had issued a threat to India just nine days before the 2019 Pulwama attack, which made him a key focus of the investigation. While addressing a gathering inside a mosque in Bahawalpur, he had stated as a forewarning that "people will again remember Pathankot and Nagrota" ([The Quint](#), June 3, 2019).

The effort by the US and India to list Abdul Rauf as a global terrorist was, however, blocked by China at the UN Security Council. With the designation of global terrorist, Abdul Rauf would have faced a global travel ban and asset freeze ([Hindustan Times](#), August 12, 2022). In defence of its decision to block the listing, a spokesperson for China's mission to the United Nations stated: "We placed a hold because we need more time to study the case. Placing holds is provided for by the committee guidelines, and there have been quite a number of similar holds by committee members on listing requests" ([Dawn](#), August 12, 2022). China's objective in blocking the designation was to rescue its ally and strategic partner, Pakistan, by easing pressure on the country from the FATF. The timing of the move also reflected a geopolitical motivation by weakening the case by India for Pakistan's designation at the FATF, where Pakistan was under scrutiny for insufficient efforts to stop terror financing.

Conclusion

Abdul Rauf served in JeM as a planner, propagandist, and top commander after 2007. He contributed to the group's reorganization and the propagation of its ideology in the country's tribal areas, where he found recruits there to support the group's militant activities. India has, however, been his prime target, which reflects the ideological goal of JeM's "Kashmir jihad."

However, the influence of geopolitics—in this case China's support for Pakistan—in not designating him as a global terrorist has meant this label has eluded Abdul Rauf. Both Pakistan and India blame one another for funding terrorist groups, which ultimately provides space for the growth of militant groups on both sides. Abdul Rauf's success, therefore, exemplifies the way geopolitical rivalries and backers have allowed high-level militants to continue to operate in Pakistan.

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