Aman Abdurrahman: Indonesia’s Most Influential Extremist
Aman Abdurrahman: Indonesia’s Most Influential Extremist
Aman Abdurrahman has become arguably the most influential extremist ideologue in Indonesia today. A former Salafist preacher, Abdurrahman has become the foremost promoter of the Islamic State in Indonesia from his cell in the country’s so-called “super-maximum security” prison. His reputation among local Islamic State supporters exceeds that of Abu Bakar Bashir, the former amir of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who has also sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State. Supporters also see Abdurrahman as the most likely candidate to head an Islamic State province in the Indo-Malay archipelago, if one is ever established. However, his uncompromising support for the Islamic State and his combative nature have also earned him the ire of other jihadists in Indonesia.
From Salafist to Jihadist
Born in 1972, Abdurrahman was a top student at the state-owned madrassa in his hometown in Sumedang, West Java. He won a scholarship to train as an Arabic linguist at the Saudi-funded Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab—LIPIA), one of the primary disseminators of Salafist thought in Indonesia. In 2000, Abdurrahman was appointed as an imam at the Jakarta-based Salafist institute, al-Sofwah. He also ran religious classes at several mosques in Jakarta, where his followers grew steadily.
While “pure” Salafists in Indonesia mostly oppose violent Salafist jihadists on the grounds that there is no scriptural basis for their political activities, Abdurrahman took a different path. Around 2003, he started translating jihadist tracts from Arabic to Indonesian and sold printed copies to his students. He was particularly inspired by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, mentor of the late Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who founded the parent organization of the Islamic State. As Abdurrahman grew more militant and quick to label other Muslims as infidels (kafir), al-Sofwah became concerned and eventually fired him. Several of his students, however, shared his growing militancy, and together they formed a new study group called al-Muwahidun, which grew to at least 40 members (Millahibrahim, February 2013). [1]
Abdurrahman, however, was an intellectual leader with no international training or combat experience. He and his students sought assistance from an experienced jihadist, Harun, a Darul Islam member who had first recruited the suicide bomber who carried out the Australian Embassy attack in 2004. Harun had also previously recruited and trained jihadist fighters in the 2000-2002 Poso communal conflict. Harun taught Abdurrahman the importance of i’dad (physical and military training to prepare for jihad) and volunteered to run i’dad classes. Between January and March 2004, al-Muwahidun conducted a series of training sessions in self-defense, physical fitness and Molotov cocktail and pipe bomb making. In March 2004, explosive materials stored at a house near Jakarta, where training was underway, accidentally detonated, blowing the roof off. Abdurrahman was arrested, together with several of his followers, and sentenced to four years in prison. [2]
Rising Star
Imprisonment was a turning point, transforming Abdurrahman from an unknown jihadist cell leader to the most sought after jihadist intellectual in the country. He spent most of his time in prison translating hundreds of jihadist tracts, including the writings of Dr. Jamal Fadl, a former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri who later became a vocal critic of jihad. The handwritten translations were smuggled out of prisons, typed up by followers and then posted and widely circulated online as well as sold as printed books; cassettes of his sermons were also in wide circulation. Unlike other jihadist preachers like Bashir, Abdurrahman is not a firebrand; his appeal is that he is clear and easily understandable, as well as deeply knowledgeable about classical Islamic texts. Some of his followers said that he knew more about hadith than some of the Saudi shaykhs. [3]
In 2007, while in Sukamiskin prison in Bandung, Abdurrahman gave regular sermons via phone to his disciples outside and to jihadist inmates in other prisons, including the Australian Embassy bombers. His popularity grew. Shortly after his release in 2008, Abu Bakar Bashir invited him to share the stage at the inauguration of his aboveground Shari’a advocacy group, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), although Abdurrahman quickly left because of ideological disagreements. [4]
Abdurrahman renamed his group Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad (after al-Zarqawi’s group) and continued to expand his influence in parts of Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara and Kalimantan, as he took advantage of a leadership vacuum in the extremist community. He criticized JI for abandoning jihad in the face of persistent police pressure, but also lambasted Noordin Top’s splinter group, which was responsible for the major bombings in Jakarta and Bali from 2003 to 2009, over its counterproductive anti-Western terrorist campaign. Abdurrahman argued that Top had no strategy and had lost sight of the broader strategic goal of establishing an Islamic state. Nonetheless, Abdurrahman continued to advocate armed struggle to crush the secular regime that got in the way of Shari’a implementation. [5]
In 2010, Tauhid wal Jihad and eight other groups—minus JI—jointly organized a militant camp in Indonesia’s westernmost province of Aceh. The poorly organized camp was discovered and broken up by police in February 2010, and Abdurrahman was arrested again and sentenced to nine years. But yet again, he was able to expand his network from behind bars. [6]
De Facto Amir of Islamic State in Indonesia?
During his latest stretch in prison, Abdurrahman has come to play a leading role in promoting Islamic State thought in Indonesia. From 2013 onwards, the Syrian conflict began to generate intense discussion in the Indonesian jihadist community, especially following the split between al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State—then the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS. This fracture in the Middle East in turn provoked a falling out in Indonesia between al-Qaeda loyalists (mostly the older generation among JI who had pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and chose to postpone violent jihad inside Indonesia) and pro-Islamic State followers (mostly young jihadists impatient to take action). Abdurrahman took the unexpected step of turning against his idol al-Maqdisi, who came out in support of AQ, and instead pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a written statement uploaded to the internet in April 2014 (Millahibrahim, April 18, 2014). Following this, Abdurrahman’s followers held a number of public bay’ah ceremonies throughout the archipelago, extending support for the group, but also attracting harsh criticism from local pro-al-Qaeda jihadists.
In addition to writing frequent tracts online in defense of the Islamic State, Abdurrahman also mobilized his followers to join the group in Syria. Most of the approximately 300 Indonesians—including women and children—who have gone to Syria and Iraq, have joined the Islamic State. Abdurrahman and his students outside prison were able to take advantage of lax prison supervision to set up networks that facilitated the movement of these jihadists from Indonesia to Syria and Iraq. He also convinced prominent jihadist inmates in Nusa Kambangan prison, including Bashir, to throw their support behind the Islamic State. [7]
Abdurrahman’s prolific writings have made him known to the Islamic State leadership. He is so respected by those in the Islamic State that his recommendation (tazkiyah) essentially became a golden ticket for those who wished to be accepted into the organization’s ranks. One of Abdurrahman’s most trusted students, Bahrum Syah, is now the leader of the Islamic State’s Indonesian-Malaysian contingent (Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy) based in al-Shaddadi, Syria. There is also an expectation among Abdurrahman’s supporters that if the Islamic State were to declare a wilayat (province) in Indonesia, he would certainly be selected as its amir (Panjimas, September 29, 2014).
Making New Enemies
Abdurrahman’s influence has suffered setbacks recently among some Indonesian Islamic State fighters, which could derail his claim to lead the Islamic State in Indonesia—a group sometimes referred to as Anshar Daulah Indonesia (ADI). Since April 2015, Syah has apparently turned against his teacher, questioning his leadership credentials. Their falling out was sparked by a dispute between Syah and Salim Mubarak Attamimi (a.k.a. Abu Jandal), one of Abdurrahman’s disciple, in early 2015. Syah reported Abu Jandal to Abdurrah for disobeying his orders and expected the leader to discipline Abu Jandal. Abdurrahman, however, refused to take Syah’s side partly because he married the daughter of Abu Hamzah, the leader of an allegedly deviant sect in Indonesia who had joined the Islamic State with some of his followers in 2014. Abu Jandal and other dissidents subsequently moved to Homs, Syria, and formed a separate armed contingent. Feeling betrayed, Syah pushed the local Islamic State amir in Hassakah, Syria to release an official letter in May 2015 declaring that Abdurrahman has no special status either in the Islamic State-held territory in Iraq or Syria, or in Indonesia; the letter also states that his status will only be determined once he travels to Islamic State territory (Karawangbertawhid, July 22).
Abdurrahman is as divisive as he is unifying. Though he has now built up a dedicated following of thousands of individuals, all sworn to support the Islamic State, he is under attack from within (former followers like Bahrum Syah) and outside (pro-al-Qaeda jihadists). Abdurrahman has proved his ability to persuade and recruit, but his uncompromising attitude, lack of combat experience and quarrel with Syah might weaken him in any future battle for leadership of ADI. Because respect for Abdurrahman’s teachings was one thread linking the Indonesians from diverse backgrounds in Syria together, a push off the pedestal could also deepen the divisions among Islamic State supporters in Indonesia more generally.
Navhat Nuraniyah is an analyst at the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
Notes
1. “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 83, September 13, 2004, https://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/83_indonesia_backgrounder_why_salafism_and_terrorism_don_t_mix_web.pdf.
2. Interrogation Transcript of Aman Abdurrahman, March 21, 2004; Interrogation Transcript of Agus Kusdiyanto, May 17, 2004.
3. “Indonesia Backgrounder,” op. cit.; IPAC interview in Jakarta with anonymous prisoner, August 22, 2015.
4. “’Deradicalisation’ and Indonesian Prisons,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 142, November 19, 2007, https://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/142_deradicalisation_and_indonesian_prisons.pdf.
5. “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 189, April 20, 2010, https://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/189%20Indonesia%20-%20Jihadi%20Surprise%20in%20Aceh.ashx.
6. Ibid.
7. “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report No. 13, September 24, 2014, https://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.
