Securing Italy’s Assets in Libya: A Profile of Militia Leader Ahmad al-Dabbashi
Securing Italy’s Assets in Libya: A Profile of Militia Leader Ahmad al-Dabbashi
Italian Foreign Minister Marco Minniti reportedly recently reached an agreement with Katiba al-Shahid Abu Anas al-Dabbashi (The Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade), one of the most powerful Libyan militias profiting off of the trans-Sahara network involved in smuggling migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Based in the Libyan city of Sabratha, the group has agreed to police human traffickers in Libya before they can send their ships into the Mediterranean (La Stampa [Turin], September 18; Le Monde Diplomatique, September 14; Il Post [Milan], August 30). Sabratha, which is located approximately 70 kilometers west of Tripoli on Libya’s Mediterranean coast near the Libyan-Tunisian border, is the major staging point for the trans-Sahara migrant smuggling network (Asharq Alawsat, October 7; Le Monde Diplomatique, September 14). The city was one of the regions of Tripoli where the Islamic State (IS) group established an area of control. Despite the defeat of IS in Sabratha in February 2016, there continue to be sporadic clashes with the remnants of the IS units still operating in the area (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], September 19; al-Wasat [Sabratha], June 18; al-Hurra, February 26, 2016).
Background
Ahmad al-Dabbashi (a.k.a. The Uncle), 30, is a powerful militia leader and the head of a large security, trading and smuggling enterprise in western Libya based in Sabratha. The son of a Gadhafi-era government official at the local post office in Sabratha, Ahmad al-Dabbashi reportedly worked as a teamster and porter prior to the start of the Libyan civil war (Corriere Della Sera [Milan], August 9). However, despite his humble origins, al-Dabbashi also belongs to one of the largest and most prominent clans in Sabratha, a clan that has murky ties to IS and other militant Salafist armed groups (Corriere Della Sera [Milan], August 9; Libya Herald [Tripoli], July 30; Il Foglio [Rome], March 3, 2016). Al-Dabbashi rose to personal prominence among the people of Sabratha during the 2011 Libyan civil war, as he was an important and active armed opposition commander whose local stature and influence increased as a result of his leadership role in the rebellion against Muammar Gadhafi (TRT World [Ankara], February 1; TPI News [Sabratha], January 9).
He used the prominence and size of his family network in Sabratha, and his position within the armed opposition against Gadhafi in the city, to establish the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade in 2014, which has grown to around 500 fighters. Likewise, he has leveraged his stature to build influence over the allied militia group Katiba 48 Masha’ (48th Infantry Brigade), which is reportedly led by his brother and has around 350 fighters. Under his leadership, and despite rumors alleging he has ties to IS, al-Dabbashi supported the participation of the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade in the fighting against IS in Sabratha (The Times [London], September 2; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 12, 2016).
The Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade spearheaded the capture of the areas around the Libyan oil facilities near Sabratha, particularly near the large Mellitah Oil and Gas Facility, which is connected to the Italian energy firm Eni (Reuters, September 20; De Standaard [Brussels]. September 2; TRT World [Ankara], February 1). In the late summer of 2015, al-Dabbashi reportedly engineered an agreement with Eni whereby the Martyrs of Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade would provide protection for Eni’s facilities at Mellitah. The August 2015 abduction of Eni technicians near the facility spurred the agreement (AnalisiDifesa, May 11). The Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade’s control over the protection of the Sabratha-area oil and gas facilities had provided Ahmad al-Dabbashi with strong influence over the trade and smuggling of energy resources in western Libya (Middle East Eye [Sabratha], August 25). However, al-Dabbashi’s forces may not hold onto the area around Mellitah, as recent fighting between the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade and its opponents in Sabratha for control over the land around the facility has gone badly for al-Dabbashi’s forces (Erem News [Sabratha], October 7; Reuters, October 7).
Under his leadership, the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade had entered into an alliance with the Government of National Accord (GNA). Led by led by Fazyez al-Sarraj, the Tripoli-based GNA is officially recognized by the United Nations (UN) and is generally supported by the European Union and the United States (al-Wasat [Tripoli], September 30; Russia Today, September 30). However, despite his support for the GNA, al-Dabbashi is a controversial figure. Indeed, a United Nations Security Council report published in June 2017 accused al-Dabbashi of being one of the key facilitators for the trans-Sahara migrant smuggling network in Libya and for leading a force that was destabilizing Libya (United Nations Security Council, June 1). Reportedly, al-Dabbashi made the deal with the Italian government, according to which his forces would patrol the coast around Sabratha and stop the trade in migrants, out of a desire to achieve legitimacy with the European Union and the internationally-backed GNA (Reuters, September 29). It is also believed that al-Dabbashi made the agreement with the Italian government and the GNA out of fear that he would be listed as a war criminal for his role in the human trafficking routes through Libya and his reported connections to IS (De Standaard [Brussels], September 2). Due to these factors, the GNA under al-Sarraj seems intent on abandoning its alliance with al-Dabbashi (Asharq Alawsat, October 7).
Al-Dabbashi’s political alliance with the GNA has led to conflict between his forces and those of the Libyan National Army (LNA), which are led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who supports the House of Representatives government based in the eastern coastal city of Tobruk (Asharq Alawsat, October 7; Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], September 20; al-Wasat [Sabratha], September 19). The fighting between the two sides is nominally linked to the assassination of a Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade commander in the city, although multiple other causes, including the political split between the GNA and the LNA, and Ahmad al-Dabbashi’s decision to interdict the human trafficking business in and around Sabratha, are also likely causes of the fighting (Reuters, September 29; Libya Akhbar [Sabratha], September 26). The LNA-aligned militias are organized into the “Operations Room to Combat the Islamic State,” and these forces, with support of the LNA, have periodically engaged in heavy fighting against the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade and the 48th Infantry Brigade inside the city of Sabratha. Because of the recent conflict in Sabratha, al-Dabbashi is believed to have been weakened, with the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade battling strenuously to maintain its position in the city (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], October 2; Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], September 27; Sky News Arabia [Abu Dhabi], September 19). This fighting, which represents the first major clashes in the city since IS was expelled from it in February 2016, has reportedly killed 26 people, wounded over 170, displaced thousands of civilians and is threatening the city’s Roman ruins, a UNESCO World Heritage site (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], September 30).
Conclusion
Ahmad al-Dabbashi’s rise to prominence in Sabratha demonstrates the power that can be gained in post-Gadhafi Libya by an aggressive leader in command of a tight-knit militia mobilized from a clan network. The influence enjoyed by al-Dabbashi is a product of his environment, the strategic location of Sabratha and his intuition to direct his kinsmen to seize control over areas around the city that are contiguous with energy resources and major smuggling routes. Despite his current prominence due to his reported bargain with the Italian government, and his forces’ fight against those aligned with Libya’s would-be strongman Khalifa Haftar, al-Dabbashi has been a relatively obscure militia commander and local notable for much of the post-Gadhafi period.
However, the current conflict in Sabratha is for all intents and purposes a battle waged by al-Dabbashi’s local enemies, acting as a proxy for Haftar and his allies in Tobruk to cut al-Dabbashi and his militia down to size. A deal between al-Dabbashi and the Italians would give him and his forces a powerful foreign backer, unmatched by his local rivals, and a successful association with the GNA would give his militia legitimacy as the preeminent Sabratha security force. Yet even without the current wave of fighting against his militia, the crimes associated with the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade—human trafficking, oil smuggling, extortion, running inhumane detention facilities—raise questions about how long al-Dabbashi would be committed to honoring an agreement to aggressively curb human trafficking if it continues to expose his forces to attacks by their rivals.
Al-Dabbashi is also a potentially problematic partner due to the long-standing accusations that he and his clan tolerated Islamic State’s rise in Sabratha, and that they remain associated with local Libyan militant Salafist organizations and trans-Sahara and Sahel jihadist networks. Although these accusations are not fully substantiated, rumors that Boko Haram and Sudanese jihadist fighters are part of the Martyr Abu Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade’s military operations in Sabratha are a common charge against it by its rivals. Al-Dabbashi could choose to utilize his force’s connectivity to trans-Sahara smuggling networks to also serve as key facilitators of the movement of jihadist fighters into Europe, which is a reason for European countries like Italy to seek influence over him and his militia.
