A Critical Link Between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda: Abu Humam al-Suri
A Critical Link Between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda: Abu Humam al-Suri
Though far from a household name, Abu Humam al-Suri (birth name: Samir Hijazi) is a critical Syrian jihadist leader, important to both Jabhat al-Nusra and the broader al-Qaeda organization. Abu Humam is an al-Qaeda veteran and also Jabhat al-Nusra’s masul al-askari al-amm (general military official). This position makes him the equivalent of the group’s commander-in-chief and also gives him power over its administrative appointments pertaining to its military leadership and strategic planning. Indeed, one al-Jazeera journalist referred to Abu Humam as “the military brain behind” Jabhat al-Nusra, which contextualizes his role as the tactical and operational planner behind the group’s major successes (al-Jazeera, March 6).
A study of Abu Humam’s background and current role in Syria reveals two important details about contemporary jihadism. First, it shows the multiple links and points of connection that al-Qaeda relies upon to exert influence over its affiliate organizations. Second, it illustrates al-Qaeda’s deep bench of experienced veterans. While Abu Humam is almost completely unknown in the West, he has a long résumé that is indicative of the kind of experience and skills that al-Qaeda can draw upon, either as new theaters of war emerge or as attrition removes its leaders. In turn, this point suggests that the attrition-based strategy currently being employed against al-Qaeda may not be as effective as advertised, so long as the organization is still able to rely on its cadre of pre-9/11 veterans and the historical memory and contacts that they possess.
Biography
Much of the information in the public domain about Abu Humam’s life comes from a March 2014 video produced by Jabhat al-Nusra that provided an extensive overview of his jihadist biography (YouTube, March 23, 2014). According to the video, Abu Humam first went to Afghanistan in 1998 or 1999, where he attended three al-Qaeda training camps, culminating in special forces training at the so-called “airport camp,” a reference to Kandahar City Airport. Abu Humam finished second in his training class. He was then appointed amir of the airport area in Kandahar, a prestigious appointment, and also served as an instructor in al-Qaeda’s training camps. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Abu Humam made a face-to-face pledge of bayat (allegiance) to Osama bin Laden and was appointed by Muhammed Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs al-Masri, al-Qaeda’s military commander until November 2001) to manage the affairs of all of his fellow Syrians training with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
After 9/11, Abu Humam fled to Iran with several other top al-Qaeda leaders, including Saif al-Adel, who was one of al-Qaeda’s top military commanders and remains one of the organization’s preeminent leaders. Abu Humam was then deployed to Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, where he met with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) amir Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as well as Zarqawi’s future successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri). According to Jabhat al-Nusra’s account, Iraqi intelligence arrested Abu Humam before the U.S. invasion and deported him to Syria, where he was detained briefly before being released, reportedly because of a lack of evidence linking him to terrorist activities. His release should be understood in the context of Arab states’ permissive attitudes toward foreign fighters during the run-up to the Iraq war. Abu Humam operated out of Syria during the height of the Iraq insurgency, training AQI operatives in Syria before deploying them to the battlefield in Iraq (YouTube, March 23, 2014).
Abu Humam was on the move again in 2005, fleeing Syria for Lebanon before returning to Afghanistan at the behest of al-Qaeda’s central leadership. Upon returning to Afghanistan, Abu Humam was tasked with conducting al-Qaeda operations in Syria (YouTube, March 23, 2014).
Though the video does not mention it, Abu Humam’s areas of responsibility likely included Lebanon. In June 2009, Lebanese authorities detained Abu Humam and two other men—Muhammad al-Dosari and Muhammad Zahamur Tiyarov—and charged them with plotting terrorist attacks in Lebanon. Contemporary news accounts claimed that the three-man cell had been directly tasked by al-Qaeda’s central leadership with establishing an operational base in Lebanon and with conducting attacks against UN peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon. According to the Lebanese media, Abu Humam was given a five-year sentence, but was released in 2012 after only three years in prison (al-Safir [Beirut], June 3, 2014).
One source claims that, upon Abu Humam’s release from prison, he traveled to Afghanistan before returning to Syria and joining Jabhat al-Nusra. This is consistent with Syria-based al-Qaeda leader Sanafi al-Nasr’s public account of how al-Qaeda’s senior leadership stacked Jabhat al-Nusra with veterans associated with al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Little is known about Abu Humam’s career trajectory once he joined Jabhat al-Nusra. Some sources have suggested that Abu Humam assumed the position of masul al-askari al-amm after Abu Samir al-Urduni, a Jordanian commander, was injured in an assassination attempt in October 2013 that left him with limited mobility in his lower extremities (al-Safir [Beirut], June 3, 2014). Abu Humam’s role in Jabhat al-Nusra only became public knowledge in March 2014.
Several news sources reported that Abu Humam was killed by a March 2015 airstrike carried out by an unknown party. Since then, numerous jihadists have claimed online that Abu Humam is still alive, which appears to be the case. Thus, Abu Humam likely remains an important part of Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Jazeera, March 6).
Abu Humam and the Islamic State
Abu Humam’s emergence as a prominent figure within Jabhat al-Nusra came against a backdrop of growing acrimony between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State that culminated in the Islamic State’s expulsion from al-Qaeda’s network in February 2014. The mudslinging and tit-for-tat violence between the Islamic State and its pro-al-Qaeda jihadist rivals intensified after the former’s disaffiliation: In late February 2014, Abu Khalid al-Suri, the head of Ahrar al-Sham’s shura council, was assassinated, and the Islamic State was widely believed responsible (al-Jazeera, February 24, 2014). Furthermore, Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s head spokesman, unleashed a vitriolic rhetorical barrage against Jabhat al-Nusra, accusing a high-level official of “lying and slander.” [1]
In response, Jabhat al-Nusra’s media wing al-Basirah (which operated at the time under the Twitter handle @Albasira_jn) released a series of video testimonials from high-level al-Qaeda operatives embedded with Jabhat al-Nusra. These operatives articulated the perspective of both al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra on the schism with the Islamic State. [2] These rebuttals served two purposes. First, Jabhat al-Nusra sought to lay blame on the Islamic State for the fitna (strife) within the jihadist community. Second, by presenting a star-studded group of veteran jihadists—individuals who had fought in numerous campaigns dating back to the Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, some of whom had direct relationships with Bin Laden—Jabhat al-Nusra intended to demonstrate its credentials as the most legitimate jihadist group in Syria.
Abu Humam featured prominently in Jabhat al-Nusra’s propaganda appeal. On March 23, 2014, al-Basirah posted a video entitled “Testimonials Before the al-Mubahalah Deadline—The Testimony of Commander Abu Humam al-Suri,” in which Abu Humam outlined his efforts to mediate between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State prior to the latter group’s expulsion from al-Qaeda (YouTube, March 23, 2014). Abu Humam explained that he first attempted to reconcile the groups following inter-rebel clashes in Urum al-Kubra in northern Syria. He claimed to have met with a series of Islamic State military commanders, all of whom refused to accept a ceasefire with Jabhat al-Nusra due to the latter’s collaboration with secular and nationalist Syrian rebel groups. Abu Humam then discussed the prospects of a ceasefire with Abu Ali al-Anbari, a former major general in Saddam Hussein’s army who became the head of the Islamic State’s mukhabarat (intelligence service) in Syria, but al-Anbari also rebuffed Abu Humam’s mediation efforts. Abu Humam claimed that a ceasefire agreement he then reached with Abu Omar al-Shishani, who was the Islamic State’s highest ranking military leader in Syria at the time, was violated a day after the agreement was signed. This prompted Abu Humam to remark that “the agreement was merely ink on paper.”
Abu Humam’s video is emblematic of Jabhat al-Nusra’s efforts to depict itself as the just—and aggrieved—party in its dealings with the Islamic State. Abu Humam portrayed himself as a pragmatic leader concerned first and foremost with gaining the support of Syria’s populace and eliminating discord within the jihadist ranks. This portrayal stands in stark contrast to Abu Humam’s characterization of Islamic State leaders. In one telling example, Abu Humam claimed that when he warned al-Anbari that the Islamic State’s extremism had alienated the local population, al-Anbari said that the Islamic State would “annihilate” everyone who opposed its expansion (YouTube, March 23, 2014).
Abu Humam’s Ties to Lebanese Jihadists
Though Abu Humam’s video biography mentioned his activities in Lebanon only fleetingly, it is clear from numerous sources that he has close ties with Lebanese jihadists. News accounts detailing Abu Humam’s arrest in Lebanon in 2009 note that he and other members of the disrupted al-Qaeda cell had been in communication with Sunni jihadists in Ain al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp and hotbed of jihadist sentiment in Lebanon, and that he had interacted with members of Lebanese jihadist groups such as Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-Sham (al-Akhbar, June 30, 2009).
Abu Humam served his sentence in Rumaiyah prison, a breeding ground for Salafist-jihadists, and established further contacts in the Lebanese jihadist community during his imprisonment. One of those whom Abu Humam met at Rumaiyah was Jund al-Sham leader Khalid al-Mahmud, who became the amir of a Syrian rebel group following his release from prison in 2012 (al-Akhbar, March 6).
Abu Humam may have also been involved, either directly or indirectly, in the escalation of Sunni-initiated sectarian attacks in Lebanon in the summer of 2014. In early June 2014, Abu Humam issued a threat on Twitter that “hundreds of suicide bombers” would strike in Lebanon if the government executed Fatah al-Islam members, who had recently been given death sentences, and also called for attacks on Shi’ite towns in Lebanon (Twitter, June 1, 2014). Following Abu Humam’s exhortations, a group of Lebanese Islamists pledged their allegiance to him (Now Lebanon, June 5, 2014). Only weeks after Abu Humam’s Twitter threats, jihadists launched three suicide attacks in Lebanon, including an attack near a busy café in southern Beirut that wounded dozens (BBC, June 24, 2014; Daily Star [Beirut], June 25, 2014). Absent direct access to Abu Humam or his deputies, it is impossible to know whether he planned, ordered or inspired these attacks, but the attacks certainly comported with his strategic intent and may illustrate how he is viewed inside Lebanon.
Conclusion
Abu Humam’s longstanding connections to al-Qaeda’s South Asia-based leadership illuminate the robust relationship between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda’s senior cadre. Though numerous media outlets have reported an ongoing debate within Jabhat al-Nusra over the possibility of disaffiliating from al-Qaeda in an effort to win more support from Arab states, the prominent role that Abu Humam and other al-Qaeda veterans play in Jabhat al-Nusra’s ranks suggest that any public disavowal would be intended as no more than a convenient ruse. For now, though, Jabhat al-Nusra and its allies continue to make striking advances in Syria. Abu Humam likely plays an important role in the group’s evolving military strategy, and in turn how its victories play into al-Qaeda’s plans for the region.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the chief executive officer of Valens Global. Nathaniel Barr is a threat analyst at Valens Global.
Notes
1. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “Then Let Us Invoke the Curse of Allah Upon the Liars,” released by al-Furqan Foundation, March 8, 2014, available at https://abuziyaad.wordpress.com/2014/03/08/shaykh-adnanis-speech-isiss-spokesman/.
2. In addition to Abu Humam, other al-Qaeda veterans who appeared in these videos included Abu Firas al-Suri (YouTube, March 2014) and Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir (YouTube, March 2014).
