A Post-Mortem Analysis of the IMU’s Martyred Usman Odil

A Post-Mortem Analysis of the IMU’s Martyred Usman Odil

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) announced on August 4 that its leader Usman Odil had been martyred and his deputy, Usman Gazi, would replace him as Amir (commander) of the IMU (furqon.com, August 26, 2012). The announcement was preceded by press reports from Pakistan that said Usman Odil had been killed in a U.S. drone strike in April in the restive North Waziristan region of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Central Asia Online, August 6, 2012). Usman Odil had been responsible for the IMU’s strategic shift from combating Pakistani forces in FATA to opening a new front in northern Afghanistan to target ISAF and Afghan forces. 

Background on the IMU 

The IMU was established in 1998 in Kabul by Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, yet its history dates back to the Ferghana Valley on the onset of the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the Adolat movement was formed. Uzbek militants from Adolat, the Namangan Battalion and later the IMU participated in the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997 and caused tensions amongst the Central Asian states during the Batken Crises of 1999 and 2000. 

IMU militants withdrew to Afghanistan in 2000 where they fought against the Northern Alliance on the side of the Taliban. By this time the IMU had lost its exclusive Uzbek character as the movement accepted into its ranks Islamists from all Central Asian countries. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU presented the most combat efficient regiment within the forces allied with the Taliban. Namangani was appointed by Mullah Omar as commander-in-chief of the Taliban-led defense of northern Afghanistan. 

Following the defeat in Afghanistan, where the IMU suffered heavy losses and lost its military leader Namangani, the IMU withdrew to Pakistan’s South Waziristan Tribal Agency. While in Pakistan, the IMU under the leadership of Yuldashev engaged in intra-Pashtun politics, involved itself in several alliances and feuds with local tribal militiasand combated Pakistani forces operating in the area. 

Usman Odil 

In contrast to the previous leaders of the IMU, not much is known about the early life of Usman Odil. An ethnic Uzbek, he was born around 1975 and most likely resettled inAfghanistan and joined the IMU in 2000. [1] Odil, despite his relatively young age, quickly moved up through the ranks of the movement—already in 2001 he was seen delivering a sermon at an IMU meeting in Kabul. [2] Odil’s jumpstart into the hierarchy of the movement can be explained by his relation to Yuldashev—after joining the IMU Odil married one of Yuldashev’s daughters (Radio Ozodi, August 5, 2012). 

Until 2009 Odil was not in the leadership ranks of the IMU, yet remained in the close circle of Yuldashev’s trusted subordinates. [3] During this time, the IMU was located in the central part of South Waziristan and cooperated with Baitullah Mahsud’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The IMU-TTP alliance gradually became an increased nuisance for the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. In the spring of 2009 a military offensive on IMU and TTP strongholds, dubbed operation Rah-e Nijat, was announced, yet did not commence until November, when already both Yuldashev and Baitullah Mahsud were killed in U.S. drone strikes. 

Shortly before Yuldashev was killed in August of 2009 he had appointed Usman Odil as a deputy amir of the group (Furqon.com, August 17, 2010). Odil’s succession was peaceful, yet caused some controversy within the movement. Odil was inexperienced in combat, relatively young (about 34) and rose to his position by marrying into Yuldashev’s family. An IMU spokesman and close aide to Yuldashev, Abdur Rahim, also aspired to take over the leadership, yet as an ethnic Tatar, his chances were small. [4] What seemed to cement Odil’s reign in the movement was the support given to him by Abbas Mansour, a young Kyrgyz leader and one of the group’s top military commanders. [5] 

When Odil took the leadership, the movement found itself at a crossroads; Yuldashev’s strategy of involvement in the Pashtun politics of South Waziristan and focus on combating Pakistani forces failed. Yuldashev’s strategy seemed to underline a goal of safeguarding a continuous stay in Waziristan and local engagement of the movement. With 30,000 Pakistani troops assembling to attack the IMU safe haven in the central part of South Waziristan, relocation and the search for a new host was inevitable. 

There was a conflict of ideas within the movement. The younger generation of IMU leaders, including Odil, did not share Yuldashev’s goal, and instead desired to take an active part in the war against the United States and ISAF forces in neighboring Afghanistan and to increase the group’s integration with other terrorist organizations in the region. This was a significant change from Yuldashev’s focus on Pakistan at the cost of alienation from the main jihadi effort in Afghanistan. 

Usman Odil redirected the movement’s policies. In November, 2009 he decided to withdraw his forces to avoid a confrontation with the advancing Pakistani army and relocate the group to the Miram Shah and Mir Ali districts of North Waziristan. [6] Relocation coincided with realigned allegiances: Odil aligned the IMU with the Haqqani Network, an organization alleged to have close links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The movement stopped hostilities towards the Pakistani army and, maintaining its infrastructure and leadership in the safe havens in Pakistan, switched its main battleground to Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. There the IMU began to recruit local Uzbeks and attack NATO and Afghan forces, hence becoming a de facto Uzbek wing of the Taliban. The above can be illustrated in casualty figures published by the IMU in 2011—out of the 87 members of the movement that were killed in action, 64 were Afghan Uzbeks. [7] The IMU also increased its cooperation with other terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic Jihad Union, especially in regards to coordinated attacks inside Afghanistan, an example of which was the July 2010 attack against the highly fortified Bagram Airbase in Parwan Province. [8]

Such a significant change of strategy could mean that Odil did envision a potential return of the IMU into Central Asia. Possibly, it could also shed a light into Pakistan’s and ISI’s vision of a post-NATO Afghanistan, as well as their growing interest in Central Asia.

Apart from the above changes in strategy, during Odil’s rule the IMU retained many of the traits it had acquired during Yuldashev’s leadership. The IMU is still an Islamic organization where ethnic motives play a minor role. This could be seen in the movement’s reaction to the violence in the Kyrgyz town of Osh in June, 2010. The IMU condemned the killings, yet did not take the side of local Uzbeks, blaming instead the secular governments of the region. Internationalization of the movement under Odil intensified. The movement became increasingly focused on the recruitment of German Muslims. [9] Focusing on recruitment should be viewed as a tactical move, yet one which allowed for the IMU to strengthen its position inside the global jihad milieu. 

The death of Usman Odil comes after a long U.S. led campaign of targeting IMU leaders and facilitators in Afghanistan. It is still not clear how he died–the IMU statement does not specify the circumstances of his death, yet a Pakistani security official announced his death in April and media reports from Pakistan claimed that he was killed in a drone strike (Central Asia Online, August 6). 

Odil is succeeded by his deputy, Abdulfattah Ahmadiy (a.k.a. Usman Gazi). Though little is known about his past, he is older and more experienced than Odil, and served as Yuldashev’s deputy in 2005. [10] Regardless, it seems unlikely that Ahmadiy will significantly alter the strategy of the movement set by Odil. 

Notes

1. See: furqon.com/filmlar/jundullah/479-fbp32.html.

2. Odil was visible in Kabul delivering a sermon in 2000 in an IMU video Znamya Jihada, furqon.com/images/stories/videos/znamya_jihada.avi.

3. Ibid. 

4. See: 

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/BackgrounderIMU_28Jan.pdf.

5. For more information about Abbas Mansour see: 

furqon.com/filmlar/jundullah/178-vestiizpakistana.html.

6. Claim made by David Witter: 

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/BackgrounderIMU_28Jan.pdf, further supported in IMU publications: furqon.com/images/stories/videos/qaboilda-3.avi  

7. See the list published at: furqon.com/2011-09-16-11-34-50.html   

8. See: https://furqon.com/images/stories/videos/ali_mergan_russian.avi.

9. An example of this would be the failed attack in Germany in 2011 planned by Ahmad Wali Siddiqui and other German- born IMU operatives, Terrorism Monitor, May 4. The movement also produced 22  propaganda films in German: https://furqon.com/2011-09-08-02-37-00.html.  

10. See: https://furqon.com/images/stories/videos/tema-mujahida-1.avi.