Abdullah Öcalan: PKK Leader Key to Peace Process With Türkiye
Abdullah Öcalan: PKK Leader Key to Peace Process With Türkiye
Executive Summary:- Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), has urged his organization to disarm and pursue a negotiated settlement with Türkiye. His role and personal status remain central sticking points.
- The “terror-free initiative,” promoted by Devlet Bahçeli and President Erdoğan—both longtime PKK opponents—has created an unexpected opening for talks.
- Significant obstacles remain, particularly the refusal of PKK affiliates in Syria (SDF), Iran (PJAK), and elsewhere to disarm, which threatens to derail the process.
Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), has been imprisoned on Türkiye’s İmralı Island since his 1999 arrest in Kenya and subsequent deportation. After the failure of the PKK–Turkish peace process in 2015, the Turkish state imposed restrictions on his contact with the outside world. From 2020, Öcalan had no contact with the outside world until October 23, 2024, when he met his family and called for peace (Medya News, October 24, 2024). The end of Öcalan’s isolation was made possible by an unlikely ally: Devlet Bahçeli. Bahçeli is the leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and is a former leader of the party’s youth wing, the Grey Wolves. Bahçeli has called for Öcalan’s execution as well as banning legal Kurdish political parties. In October, to the surprise of many, Bahçeli suggested Öcalan address parliament—on the condition he called for the disarmament of the PKK (Medya News, October 22, 2024). He even suggested Öcalan be released through the European Court of Human Rights’s “Right to Hope” legal mechanism (BIAnet, October 26, 2024; Daily Sabah, January 14). The move appears to be a part of Turkish President Recep Erdoğan's ambitions to remain in power by gaining Kurdish support, bolstering his position in Türkiye’s 2028 elections (Voice of America, March 4). Bahçeli’s initiative has led to a peace process called the “terror-free initiative” by the Turkish state (Daily Sabah, January 14). This term is rejected by the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), which frames it as a “peace and reconciliation” initiative (Kurdistan 24, July 15). Öcalan’s Messaging On February 27, Abdullah Öcalan called on “all groups” to lay down their arms and for the PKK to dissolve itself (BIAnet, February 27). In response, the PKK held its 12th Congress in May, in which the group emphasized both that it would follow the directives of Öcalan, but also that there was a need for solid legal guarantees from Ankara. Moreover, the PKK expressed that the Turkish parliament, with the participation of all political parties, needed to be involved in the process and help establish a committee to oversee it (BIAnet, May 13). Likewise, the PKK renewed its calls for Öcalan’s release (BIAnet, May 14). In July, Öcalan released his first video message in 26 years. The video came out ahead of a PKK disarmament ceremony, which took place in Sulaimani (Sulaymaniyah), Iraqi Kurdistan, on July 11. Öcalan asserted that: The PKK movement and its ‘National Liberation Strategy’ which emerged as a reaction to the denial of the existence [of the Kurds] and thus aimed at setting up a separate state has been dissolved. The existence [of the Kurds] has been recognized; therefore, the basic aim has been achieved (BIAnet, July 9). After the ceremony, a parliamentary commission was formed, as per the PKK’s demands (Rudaw, July 25). Complications and Interpretations Despite apparent progress, complications are already arising in the new peace process. Turkish officials have ruled out Öcalan’s potential participation in the “right to hope” program, meaning he will face prosecution for the PKK’s past militancy (Medya News, March 18). In his video, Öcalan warned against an illogical “you first, then me” approach toward disarmament by the PKK (BIAnet, July 9). His statements may have been aimed at reducing tensions, but his life sentence remains a point of contention between Ankara and the PKK. In addition, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 (in the middle of the Türkiye–PKK negotiations) introduced further complications. PKK-affiliated groups, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), have vowed not to disarm for fear of Islamist violence—despite Öcalan’s calls for them to disarm in February (Reuters, February 27; Rudaw, May 20, July 11). Öcalan’s brother also claimed that Öcalan insisted that the Kurds in Syria should never lay down their arms, and labeled the new Syrian Interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as “the head of [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria]” (Serbestiyet, July 14). This all came amid negotiations and increasing tensions between the SDF and Damascus over the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian Army. Türkiye has called for the disarmament of the SDF as a direct PKK affiliate (Rudaw, July 26). The pro-Kurdish DEM Party’s reaction after Öcalan’s brother's statement underscored the risk of letting the narrative fall into the hands of individuals who do not officially represent the movement. Potential future clashes between the SDF and Damascus could also undermine the peace process in Türkiye. Conclusion The peace process has further cemented Öcalan’s central role as the cornerstone of Turkish–PKK relations, regardless of the final result. Any step made by the PKK and the Turkish state as a part of the peace process depends on Öcalan’s views and statements. Conversely, if the peace process fails, Öcalan could face isolation again, resulting in renewed fighting between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as tension between the Turkish government and the SDF, which complicates the former’s relationship with Syria.
