Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Husam Abd al-Rauf—Deaths of Top Leaders Raise Questions About the Future of al-Qaeda
Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Husam Abd al-Rauf—Deaths of Top Leaders Raise Questions About the Future of al-Qaeda
The global jihadist group al-Qaeda is experiencing an unprecedented crisis, having lost several key members of its central leadership this year. The latest prominent al-Qaeda figure to be killed is Abu Muhammad al-Masri, one of two deputies to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Reports about his death came just days after Husam Abd al-Rauf, the group’s chief propagandist, was killed in Afghanistan by U.S. and Afghan forces. Recent unconfirmed reports even suggest that al-Zawahiri himself is dead and the group has been without a leader for months.
This year also witnessed the death of several other top al-Qaeda officials, including Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Abdelmalek Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud), the chief of al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni and Abu Muhammad al-Sudani, its top commanders in Syria. Such back-to-back leadership losses and setbacks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (“Af-Pak”) region, Syria, and Yemen leave al-Qaeda in disarray and bring questions over the group’s future resilience.
Abu Muhammad al-Masri: A Strategic Loss for al-Qaeda
Perhaps the most severe blow to al-Qaeda is the death of Abu Muhammad al-Masri who was widely tipped to succeed the current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. According to reports, al-Masri was killed by Israeli agents in the Iranian capital Tehran last month. His death was initially reported by a jihadist channel on the messaging app Telegram. The channel claimed al-Masri and his daughter Miriyam were killed and that al-Qaeda leadership was covering up the news. The rumor gained greater credibility when, on November 14, Western media widely reported his death, citing government sources (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 15).
Al-Qaeda has yet to confirm or deny reports of al-Masri’s death, but key jihadist supporters have written eulogies in his honor even in the absence of official al-Qaeda communication on the development—a testimony to his status among loyal jihadist supporters. A notable tribute came from Nuruddin, a prominent al-Qaeda follower widely respected and trusted by jihadists online. In his eulogy, Nuruddin gave a brief biography of al-Masri, highlighting his lengthy jihadist career alongside the late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. He lauded al-Masri’s involvement in the deadly 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and said bin Laden had entrusted him with difficult and dangerous al-Qaeda missions (Al-Araby.co.uk, November 19; Telegram, November 17).
Al-Masri’s death is a significant strategic loss to al-Qaeda not least because he was considered by many to be the successor to al-Zawahiri. He was one of the few remaining founders of al-Qaeda and had lately taken on a renewed role to restore the group’s lost glory, with a focus on Syria. He was also among a handful of al-Qaeda veterans with vast jihadist experience and leadership skills.
Unlike al-Qaeda’s other senior members, al-Masri had barely featured in the group’s videos or publications. Al-Qaeda may have kept him out of its propaganda in order to keep his status and whereabouts secret for security reasons. However, the fact that al-Masri was killed in Iran—a country al-Qaeda allegedly views as a staunch enemy, but has cooperated with in the past—is indeed an embarrassment to the jihadist group and could be used by its rivals, such as Islamic State, to tarnish its reputation (Alhurra.com, November 15).
Husam Abd al-Rauf: Challenges to al-Qaeda’s Media Operations
Al-Masri’s death came on the heels of the killing of Husam Abd al-Rauf, a seasoned jihadist and an al-Qaeda central official who has served the group over the years in several different roles. Al-Rauf was killed by U.S. and Afghan forces in Ghazni province, Afghanistan, on October 24. As with al-Masri, al-Qaeda has not yet commented on his death, but influential jihadists online have widely mourned al-Rauf (Akhbarelyom.com, October 25; Telegram, October 25).
Until his death, al-Rauf was the second most public figure of the organization, with a profile in al-Qaeda’s hierarchy only less prominent than al-Zawahiri. Al-Rauf, apart from his primary role running al-Qaeda’s media machine, is believed to have been acting as a deputy to al-Zawahiri. He was involved in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the group.
Al-Rauf’s absence is likely to weaken al-Qaeda on two fronts. First, his demise is a major blow to al-Qaeda’s propaganda dissemination as it comes at a time when the group struggled to deliver timely messages on leadership. Al-Qaeda has recently faced issues with their media operations, often resulting in messages from al-Zawahiri being released only after a severe delay. Even al-Rauf had become less active in recent months, with his own messages experiencing delay on some occasions. His last contribution to al-Qaeda propaganda was an unremarkable article in August 2019 in the second edition of the group’s new Arabic magazine, One Ummah.
Second, al-Qaeda has lost a key man in its heartland of the ‘Khorasan’ region, where the group is looking at an uncertain future following the signing of a peace deal between the Taliban and the United States, under which the former pledged to sever its ties with al-Qaeda. Al-Rauf, a jihadist veteran who has spent most of his time in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was well connected with the militants in the region. He was responsible for working with the Taliban on operational cooperation and in finding safe havens for al-Qaeda fighters. Afghan authorities were quick to blame the Taliban for harboring al-Qaeda members following the killing of al-Rauf. Afghan Interior Minister Masoud Andarabi said Taliban fighters were protecting al-Rauf when he was killed and that his killing showed that both al-Qaeda and the Taliban still maintained close ties in breach of the peace agreement (Pajhowk News, October 25, Tolo News, October 26).
Whether al-Qaeda will officially name another central spokesperson to fill in the shoes of al-Rauf remains to be seen. It would not be a surprise if officials from al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the group’s South Asian branch, take the lead in managing the group’s central media operation. AQIS’ media operations appear to be on a strong footing. Al-Qaeda’s main website al-Sahab, apart from by al-Qaeda’s central command, has been heavily featuring content from AQIS, suggesting AQIS figures may already have some role in managing the platform. AQIS has recently ramped up its media campaign under a new media commission led by clerics such as Muthanna Hassan. Under Muthanna Hassan, AQIS has issued several propaganda messages, and more importantly streamlined the publication of the long-standing Urdu magazine, Nawa-i-Afghan Jihad.
It is also pertinent to note that the current leaders of most of al-Qaeda’s branches are all experienced in communication, meaning the group has a strong pool of charismatic members to deliver messages. For example, Khalid al-Batarfi, the leader of AQAP, has vast experience in his group’s media operations, appearing in several videos, including those calling for attacks in the West. AQIM’s newly-appointed leader Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Annabi has acted as one of AQIM’s media chiefs and regularly appeared in propaganda videos. AQIS’s presumed leader Osama Mahmoud is also a well-versed scholar, having delivered several messages and written several books on jihadism.
Saif al-Adl: Next in Line to Lead al-Qaeda?
If reports about the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Masri are confirmed, Saif al-Adl, one of the last remaining al-Qaeda founders, is the most likely candidate to lead the global jihadist group. Al-Adl is the sole survivor among five senior al-Qaeda heavyweights who were released from jail in Iran in 2015. While three of the freed leaders made their way to Syria, al-Adl and al-Masri reportedly stayed in Iran. He was detained in Iran after fleeing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Annahar al-Arabi, September 9).
Saif al-Adl is highly skilled in operations and is well-versed in al-Qaeda’s literature. He was reportedly in charge of bin Ladin’s security and was a key strategist within the group. Like Abu Muhammad al-Masri, al-Adl is believed to have played an important role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (Alhurra.com, November 16).
He has in the past written extensively on security, combat, and strategy for jihadists. His major work is a three-part book entitled “Conflict and the Winds of Change” in which he discusses a wide range of topics from uprisings to guerrilla warfare and armed jihad. He has kept a low profile in recent years and has barely featured in al-Qaeda propaganda (24.ae, February 20).
However, some recent developments point towards his presumed elevated position in the al-Qaeda hierarchy. For example, earlier this year, al-Qaeda supporters promoted a channel on Telegram dedicated to writings by Saif al-Adl. The channel refers to al-Adl as “al-Qa’id,” which translates to “commander” or “leader” and aims to promote his extensive knowledge of military and geopolitical affairs. In February 2017, al-Qaeda indicated al-Adl was alive and published an old lecture of his in which he incited attacks against the West. In August 2019, al-Qaeda supporters widely shared an undated document that included recommendations attributed to al-Adl about the state of jihad in Syria amid an offensive against al-Qaeda-affiliated militants in the country (Telegram, August 14, 2019).
The FBI has placed him on its list of most wanted terrorists and indicates he was born in 1960 or 1963. Like many al-Qaeda jihadists, al-Adl is believed to have started his jihadist career with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
What is Next for al-Qaeda Central?
An urgent task for a new al-Qaeda leader, such as al-Adl, would be restoring faith in the group’s central leadership, whose power has undoubtedly waned over the years. A lack of consistent messaging from the core leadership has frustrated the group’s supporters and strengthened doubts over the efficiency of al-Qaeda’s top echelon. Al-Zawahiri only appeared in two propaganda videos in 2020, that were presumably pre-recorded productions. His message on the anniversary of 9/11 primarily focused on criticizing a documentary released in July 2019 by Qatari-funded al-Jazeera TV. Strangely, the al-Qaeda leader did not discuss recent developments such as deals to normalize relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel despite the message being titled “Deal of the Century or the Crusade of the Century?” Such dated commentaries have given weight to speculation that al-Zawahiri may be incapacitated or dead. In the absence of al-Zawahiri videos, al-Qaeda has been communicating with its followers through written statements by the group’s “General Command” (Telegram, September 11; Akhbaralaan.net September 12; Sahabmedia.co September 11).
New leadership also faces the uphill task of reviving al-Qaeda’s franchises that have struggled in recent years. In Syria, al-Qaeda, represented by its local branch Hurras al-Din, has gone quiet, following a power struggle with the powerful jihadist alliance, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Several of Hurras al-Din’s key commanders, including Abu Muhammad al-Sudani, Abu Qassam al-Urduni and Abu Khallad al-Mohandis, were killed in recent months, furthering damaging al-Qaeda’s Syria project (Orientnews.net, October 27, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 15).
Similarly, al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch AQAP has also suffered severe blows recently, making it one of the least active al-Qaeda branches. AQAP, once al-Qaeda’s most lethal branch, lost its leader Qasim al-Raymi and suffered territorial setbacks when it was defeated by Houthi rebels in its stronghold of al-Bayda.
Perhaps the biggest of all challenges for al-Qaeda would be making a survival plan for its central leadership based in the Af-Pak region if the Taliban fulfills its promise to disown its ally. Several of al-Qaeda’s central command officials have been killed in the region over the past few years. AQIS’ role would be important in ensuring a haven for the jihadist group’s central figures in the region, but it remains to be seen how successful the group would be in this mission, particularly in the wake of a sustained military campaign by U.S. and Afghan forces. Last month, Afghan forces claimed to have killed another senior member of AQIS, Muhammad Hanif in Taliban-controlled territory (Dawn, November 11).
Another tricky act for al-Qaeda’s new administration would be controlling the actions of its strongest branches such as Somalia’s al-Shabaab and the Mali-focused Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which also operates in Burkina Faso and occasionally in Niger. These groups wage jihad based on local principles which could sometimes contradict their parent group’s rigid jihadist perspective. Ensuring their full loyalty could be a difficult task, particularly in the wake of the central command’s perceived weakness and its lack of a charismatic leader.