Abu Ubayda al-Anabi Possibly Dead with AQIM Weak

Abu Ubayda al-Anabi Possibly Dead with AQIM Weak

Executive Summary:

• AQIM under Abu Ubayda al-Anabi has become largely symbolic, eclipsed by the far more active JNIM; his possible death in recent Malian airstrikes would have little operational impact.
• AQIM’s decline reflects an aging leadership and loss of relevance within the jihadist movement, signaling the effective end of Algeria-based al-Qaeda influence in the Sahel.

Even before French special forces killed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leader Abdelmalek Droukdel (Arabic: عبد المالك دروكدال) in June 2020 in northern Mali, the organization had already become a shell of its former self (Al Jazeera, June 6, 2020). AQIM is no longer capable of executing massive attacks and is playing second fiddle to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Arabic: جماعة نصرة الاسلام والمسلمين,  “Group for Support of Islam and Muslims,” JNIM) in the Sahel. Abu Ubayda Yusuf al-Anabi (Arabic: أبو عبيدة يوسف العنابي), whose given name is believed to be Mubarak Yazid (Arabic:  مبارك يزيد), succeeded Droukdel in a new era where the organization was extremely weak.

Given AQIM’s malaise, Al-Anabi’s leadership style has been defined by him being more of a spokesman than a military commander, making statements and issuing threats while few attacks are carried out. In 2019, al-Anabi, in hiding at the time, responded to interview questions from a French journalist delivered through intermediaries. (France24, May 30, 2019). Consistent with AQIM playing a marginal role in the region compared to JNIM, one of al-Anabi’s most notable responses in the interview was about JNIM’s relation to AQIM (which spawned the former). At that time, al-Anabi claimed JNIM was under the “command of the Algerian emirate” and represented al-Qaeda’s model of “devolution,” implying that JNIM was an al-Qaeda affiliate. JNIM was formed only two years earlier in 2017 and was still a nascent group in 2019 (RFI, May 9, 2018). However, if al-Anabi’s statement was not blustered to inflate AQIM’s influence, his statement has now become obsolete, as JNIM is both far superior and hostile to AQIM.

Al-Anabi represents a generation of jihadist leadership on its way out. Although al-Anabi was not designated as a terrorist until September 2015, he was an AQIM “elder,” having fought with the group and its predecessors in the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s (Office of Foreign Assets Control, September 9, 2015). While this may also explain why he had the experience to succeed Droukdel, the lack of young leadership in AQIM, which the 56-year-old al-Anabi has been unable to provide, likely hindered the reinvigoration of the organization. Additionally, al-Anabi appeared to maintain relatively sympathetic feelings towards the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas other Salafi jihadists tend to hold the Brotherhood in disrepute. When Brotherhood-affiliated Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi died in 2019, al-Anabi recited a prayer for him (X/@thomasjoscelyn, June 20, 2019). While this represents a “moderate” position within Salafi jihadist circles, it may also have reflected AQIM’s outdatedness compared to the more extreme (or jihadist-mainstream) upstart JNIM, which had no comment or concern for the Brotherhood, which it rejects for the latter’s undertaking in modern democratic political processes that Salafism views as antithetical to Islam.

In September, U.S. officials reportedly hoped that Malian air strikes on AQIM’s leadership three months earlier had eliminated al-Anabi (X/@Werbcharlie, September 15). The Malian Air Force, for its part, claimed it killed several high-level leaders in Kidal in northern Mali, the same region where Droukdel had been killed six years earlier. It remains unclear whether al-Anabi was killed. However, given how operationally inactive AQIM is, and given its leader’s lackluster statements, there is little reason to believe his death would have any impact on the insurgency in Mali. If anything, his death may only formalize JNIM’s full takeover of the al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgency in the Sahel and lead to the final dissolution of AQIM itself as it loses ground to newer, more militant jihadist groups.