Al-Misbah Abuzaid Talha: Charismatic Islamist Militiaman in Sudan
Al-Misbah Abuzaid Talha: Charismatic Islamist Militiaman in Sudan
• Al-Misbah Abuzaid Talha rose from a little-known civilian Islamist activist to commander of the al-Bara’ bin Malik Brigade (BBMB), the most prominent Islamist militia fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in the civil war. He has leveraged charisma, media savvy, and ideological commitment rather than military experience.
• The BBMB has become a powerful, well-equipped force with Iranian-supplied drones and tens of thousands of fighters, creating mounting tension with the SAF as Talha and other Islamist leaders pursue political influence and challenge military authority.
• Regional governments—especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt—have detained Talha out of concern for an Islamist resurgence, while his growing prominence positions him as a likely political actor in any post-war settlement, potentially reviving the military–Islamist alliance that ruled Sudan for decades.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (Arabic: القوات المسلحة السودانية, SAF) have sought victory in the country’s ongoing civil war by welcoming Islamist battalions into their ranks to fight the Rapid Support Forces (Arabic: قوات الدعم السريع, RSF). Many of these Islamists, who fight alongside tribal militias and other armed organizations, were drawn from civilians active in Sudan’s civilian population sympathetic to rule by sharia and aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic: الإخوان المسلمين, or popularly the Ikhwan, الإخوان). Islamists have been one of the best-organized sectors of Sudanese society since the 1990s, effectively ruling Sudan in partnership with the military from 1989 until the revolution of 2019. The intensity of the war and the SAF’s need to maintain a degree of unity in a broad coalition of armed movements and militias has allowed some former civilians to emerge as new and influential leaders in the Islamist movement.
One such leader is al-Misbah Abuzaid Talha (Arabic: المصباح أبوزيد طلحة). Talha commands the al-Bara’ bin Malik Brigade (Arabic: كتيبة البراء بن مالك, BBMB), the most prominent of the roughly 17 Islamist militias allied with the SAF (Sudan Tribune, October 28). Before the war erupted, he operated a household goods store in Khartoum, little known outside Islamist circles (Al-Taghyeer, June 13, 2024). Comfortable on camera, Talha had graduated from a media training course in Khartoum a year before the war started (Al-Nilin, April 20, 2024). Despite lacking a military background, he was able to deploy charisma and a commitment to the Islamist project, going on to attain leadership of a militia drawn almost entirely from civilian sources.
The Islamist Movement in Sudan
The Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has a history of entrenchment within the country’s ruling authority. Though its creation was inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s, Sudan’s Brotherhood, also known pejoratively as al-Kezan (Sudanese Arabic: الكيزان, “the coffee-pots”) evolved quite independently from its northern neighbor, due to the very different social and religious conditions prevailing in the country (YouTube/سكاي نيوز عربية, November 19). Under the controversial leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi (Arabic: حسن الترابي), the movement found a place in government in the latter years of the regime of President Gaafar al-Nimeiry (1969–1985) and then as partners in the military Islamist regime of President Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019) before being ejected from power by the democratic revolution of 2019. The Brotherhood has deep and extensive roots, however, and foresees a return to power through a renewed relationship with the Sudanese military.
The RSF and their new rival Nyala-based government Tasis (Arabic: “تأسيس”, “Establishment”) place Islamist insecurities about maintaining control of Khartoum at the heart of the civil war. Tasis insists the Islamists feared losing control of the army and civil service through the democratic transition, blaming Islamists for starting the war as a means of ensuring their survival and return to power. RSF advisor Mohamed Mukhtar (Arabic: محمد مختار) remarked, “the Islamists are the ones who set off this war in order to return to power once again, and they are the ones managing this war” (Arab Weekly, July 26; Assayha, October 16). Muhammad Hassan al-Ta’aishi (Arabic: محمد حسن التعايشي), prime minister of the Tasis government, has accused General al-Burhan of supporting Islamists and deriving benefit from his association with them (Assayha, October 16). On October 21, RSF leader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, popularly referred to as Hemedti (Arabic: “محمد حمدان دقلو, “حميدتي), referred to the Islamists as “the satanic movement that has crippled our country for more than three decades” (Rhino News, October 22). Sudan’s foreign ministry has in turn, described the RSF as a “racist terrorist militia that relies on foreign mercenaries to erase Sudan’s identity” (Al-Estiklal, September 27). Tasis is largely seen as a parallel political entity to the RSF’s paramilitary structure.
The SAF and its Islamist allies have clashed before. In November 2024, General al-Burhan was attacked by Dr. Abdul Hai Yusuf (Arabic: ”عبد الحي يوسف, “ابو عمر) a prominent Salafi Islamist, broadcaster, and professor at the University of Khartoum close to former president Omar al-Bashir (IM Arabic, May 7, 2023). According to Abdul Hai, the mujahideen were responsible for the army’s victories while al-Burhan was nothing more than a “traitor without religion” (Ayin Network, March 25). An angry al-Burhan immediately ordered the dismissal of all Brotherhood-aligned personnel in the armed forces, but a crisis was averted when Sudan’s other leading Islamists publicly disavowed Abdul Hai’s statements.
Sudan’s Islamist movement is opposed internationally by Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. It has received a more supportive approach from Turkey, Iran, and Qatar.
The al-Bara’ bin Malik Brigade
The BBMB formed as a response to the 2019 revolution against President al-Bashir. Al-Bashir’s overthrow exposed the suppressed anger of many Sudanese against Islamist factions for their role in the repressive al-Bashir regime, as revolutionaries attacked Islamist-aligned gatherings. The BBMB formed to defend these gatherings, and further gained notoriety as a Khartoum-based battalion drawn from civilian Islamists after the military coup of 2021 (Al-Taghyeer, June 13, 2024).
The BBMB came to the fore after al-Burhan issued a general call for the popular mobilization of civilian volunteers at the start of the war. Newly-formed militias, including the BBMB, received arms and training from the SAF as part of the Popular Resistance Forces (Arabic: المقاومة الشعبية, PRF) (Radio Tamazuj, April 18, 2024; Al-Mujtama, July 9, 2024; Al-Araby, July 17, 2023). Beginning with a core of 2,000–3,000 fighters in the first year of the war, the Brigade took credit for training tens of thousands of fighters to support the SAF (Arab Weekly, July 26). General Shams al-Din Kabashi (Arabic: شمس الدين كباشي), the SAF’s deputy commander, was one of the first to point out the difficulty in maintaining political control over a disparate assembly of armed groups. He implied they might instigate further conflicts in pursuit of their own agendas, saying “the popular resistance groups will become the next danger if we continue in this way” (Radio Dabanga, March 29, 2024; Ayin Network, April 19, 2024).
The growing militia commanded by Talha is named after the companion of the Prophet Muhammad and renowned warrior Al-Bara’ bin Malik al-Ansari (Arabic: البراء بن مالك الأنصاري). Bin Malik’s readiness to face death on the battlefield made him a heroic role model for modern Islamic extremists. The Brigade operates as part of the SAF’s Central Reserves Forces (Arabic: قوات الاحتياطي المركزي) which belongs to the Ministry of Defense (Arab Wall, November 21, 2023). The BBMB retains sponsors throughout the Islamist community and the military, represented by Ali Ahmad Karti (Arabic: علي أحمد كرتي), secretary-general of Sudan’s Islamic Movement, and General Yasser al-Atta (Arabic: ياسر العطا), SAF assistant commander-in-chief (Rhino News, August 18).
There are three prominent leaders of the BBMB including Talha. The remaining two are Anas Omar (Arabic: أنس عمر), former Natiional Congress Party (Arabic: حزب المؤتمر الوطني, NCP) governor of Khartoum, and Hudhayfah Istanbul (Arabic: حذيفة اسطنبول) (Ayin Network, March 25). Omar has been in RSF detention since May 2023 (Arab Wall, November 21, 2023). The BBMB played a large role in the defense of the Armored Corps base in south Khartoum during battles between June and August 2023 (Ayin Network, March 25). Talha was wounded in the fighting and treated in Atbara (Arabic: عطبرة) before his return to duty (Arab Wall, November 21, 2023).
The BBMB is far more advanced in materiel than most of the other SAF-allied militias. It is reported to possess artillery, and is also the only Islamist unit equipped with its own Iranian-manufactured drones (Terrorism Monitor, December 11, 2024; Agenzia Nova, May 19; Rhino News, August 18). The BBMB is thought to field roughly 20,000 fighters of mostly Arab background operating in Kordofan (Arabic: كردفان) as well as Northern and Khartoum states (names in Arabic: الولاية الشمالية; ولاية خرطوم), though other sources suggest there may be as few as 5,000 (Arab Weekly, July 26; MadaMasr, August 9).
BBMB Activities in 2025
Talha headed BBMB fighters who flooded into the Republican Palace in Khartoum on March 21 after an intense three-day battle. The palace had been held by the RSF since the early days of the war. After the battle, Talha carried a Sudanese flag and posed for photos and videos that became widely circulated on social media (Ayin Network, March 25). The militia uses social media to publicize their activities and successes in preparation for post-war political operations.
The SAF addressed the issue of Islamist and other SAF-affiliated militias creating their own security units to carry out arrests, detentions, and even extrajudicial executions in early May. The provision of new weapons (although not ammunition) was suspended and a review of recruitment practices was instituted (Sudan Tribune, May 8).
The BBMB announced it was beginning a pivot to civilian activism following the full recapture of Khartoum in July. Talha announced the creation of a new civilian umbrella group, the Support and Development Coalition, to this end (Arab Weekly, August 7). The move provides the Islamists a political head-start in post-war politics.
General al-Burhan ordered all pro-government militias to leave Khartoum within two weeks in a July 18 move that many believed targeted the BBMB. Al-Burhan was incensed by videos released on social media that suggested the BBMB had led the army’s capture of the capital (Arab Weekly, August 7). Talha has already antagonized many of his SAF-aligned allies by downplaying the role of pro-democracy militias in the battle for neighboring Omdurman (Arabic: أم درمان) (Sudans Post, May 5). As tensions grew within the pro-government alliance through July, he threatened rival elements in the SAF and other pro-government militias whom he suspected of trying to sideline the BBMB, saying “we do not quarrel for power, seek no one’s approval, and fear none but God… silence is not weakness; it has limits, and we know when—and how—to speak” (Sudan Times, July 13).
An effort was made in August to rein in the militias operating alongside the SAF. Pro-SAF militias were brought under the Armed Forces Act and direct control of regional SAF commanders (Al-Estiklal, August 18; MadaMasr, August 22). In a message that same month, al-Misbah pointed to the military coups in Burkina Faso and its Sahel neighbors as examples of how “determined junior officers can lead their countries instead of those who act as agents for others in our homeland” (Arabic: “…يحتذى به في قيادة صغار الضباط لدولهم بدلاً عن الذين يعملون كوكلاء لغيرهم في وطننا.”) (X/@almisbahabo1, August 1, 2024). It is likely that SAF command found these comments disturbing, seeing them as a direct challenge to their authority.
U.S. sanctions were imposed on the BBMB on September 12 on the basis that “Sudanese Islamist groups have formed dangerous alliances with the Iranian regime… we will not stand idly by and allow them to threaten regional and global security…” (US Treasury Department, September 12; US Department of State, September 12). A source within the BBMB retorted that the sanctions were in effect directed at the U.S.-favored SAF, as the BBMB falls under its chain of command (MadaMasr, September 14).
Talha has called for a greater commitment to the war by citizens and officials in the midst of unsuccessful counter-RSF campaigns in Darfur and Kordofan (for more on the RSF’s activities in these regions, see Terrorism Monitor, November 20). He has further championed the institution of a war government, mandatory service, and the adoption of military uniforms by all government members and state employees.
Detention in Saudi Arabia and Egypt
Talha went to Saudi Arabia in June 2024 with the declared purpose of performing the umrah (Arabic: العمرة, the voluntary “lesser pilgrimage” that can be performed at any time of year) (Arab Weekly, August 7). He was arrested on June 4 by Saudi security forces for involvement in political and religious activities beyond the scope of participation in the umrah (Sudans Post, June 9, 2024; Al-Taghyeer, June 13, 2024). Declared a suspect on terrorism and sabotage charges, Talha’s arrest was announced as “a major victory for Saudi security forces in their fight against terrorism” (Elmanshar, June 5, 2024). Ultimately, however, he was returned quietly to Sudan—an early sign of his growing influence.
The al-Sisi government in Egypt is opposed to the revitalization of Islamist governance in Sudan in light of the unrest that rocked Egypt after the election of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. The Egyptian Brotherhood remains under a strict ban and many of its leaders are in prison or exile. While Egypt is a firm supporter of the SAF, it is wary of its Islamist affiliates and could pull its support if it feels the army is being used as a vehicle for an Islamist return.
Talha was arrested in Cairo for political disturbance after entering the country with authorization to seek medical treatment and visit his family. His family took refuge in Alexandria (Arabic: الإسكندرية) at the outset of the civil war, and his visit was meant to be routine (Al-Estiklal, August 10). At a gathering attended by many Sudanese at Ramses Station (Arabic: محطة رمسيس, Cairo’s largest rail hub), the young militia leader showed little discretion—behaving much as if he was leading a political rally in Sudan. This proved enough for Egypt’s security authorities, who stepped in and detained him (Al-Estiklal, August 10).
Talha adopted a conciliatory stance after his release on August 10. He thanked Egypt for his treatment and described his detention as a “routine procedure” before his “complete innocence” was determined. Elsewhere, Talha maintained that his arrest was caused by “false reports” generated by Sudan’s enemies to “break his will” (Sudan Tribune, August 10; Al-Estiklal, August 10; Sudan Echoes, August 10). The BBMB leader claimed his release was facilitated by the attention of General al-Burhan, Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta, Lieutenant General Mirghani Idris, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Sabir, director of military intelligence (Arabic names not already provided: ميرغني إدريس; محمد صابر) (Ultra Sudan, August 10; Al-Estiklal, August 10).
Conclusion
Al-Misbah Abuzaid Talha’s organizational, tactical, and leadership skills make the militia leader a strong candidate to shift into a political role in the future. The backing he carries within Sudan’s Islamist movement and the SAF’s unstable and motley collection of forces makes his rise to power even more plausible.
Sudan’s Islamist movement has demonstrated in the past that it is willing to take extreme measures to assume power. It has been suggested that the Islamist militias offer the SAF religious legitimacy, but they do not represent all Sudan’s Muslims, especially those aligned with the various and influential Sufi brotherhoods. Likewise, its history suggests it is highly unlikely to respect the democratic process in post-war elections.
All parties in the civil war fight with an eye for their post-conflict position. Islamist leaders like Talha insist they are not fighting to take power, but anticipate a post-war political role for the military as described by NCP leader Ahmad Harun (Arabic: أحمد هارون): “the Western model is not practical in Sudan. We must develop a model for the role of the army in politics given fragile security and foreign greed, as this won’t be the first or last war in the country” (Arab Weekly, July 26). It is clear that the Islamists and the generals of the SAF share a common ambition of squeezing out Sudan’s pro-democracy activists in favor of the military–Islamist alliance that ruled Sudan before the overthrow of President al-Bashir.
A new generation of Islamist leaders who lack historical baggage may prove fierce competition for al-Bashir-era Islamists in the post-war political arena. Talha, in particular, will likely be ready to use his short, unexpected, but successful military career as a stepping stone to assert power in Sudan’s SAF-supporting fray.
