An In-Depth Look at Hani Bin Burayk: The UAE’s New Master of Aden

An In-Depth Look at Hani Bin Burayk: The UAE’s New Master of Aden

In August, Hani Bin Burayk, the Salafist cleric and militia commander from southern Yemen, called for the full mobilization of his troops in order to take control of the city of Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government of Yemen since the Houthis pushed its forces out of the capital, Sana’a, in early 2015 (Whatsnewsye, August 7). Bin Burayk, who is the deputy head of the largest southern secessionist group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which enjoys significant support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), claimed that the guard of the presidential palace had opened fire on secessionist protesters. He led his men in the fighting that followed and lasted for several days. On August 11, the STC captured the presidential palace in the Ma’asheeq district, the last symbol of President Hadi’s government in Aden (AA, August 10). The STC’s seizure of Aden is a significant turning point in the ongoing Yemen civil war as the southern secessionists have gained full control of the city, the capital of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), or South Yemen. [1] The operation has also shown the power and influence of Bin Burayk, who has transformed the traditional Salafist movement in Yemen through controversial policies and made it—with the backing of the UAE—an essential component of the secessionist movement.

The STC takeover of Aden came just a few weeks after the UAE’s surprise announcement of withdrawal from Yemen (Adenalaan, June 28). It is still unclear if the UAE is going to leave behind some kind of residual military presence in Yemen, or withdraw its forces completely. Either way, the STC’s undisputed control of Aden puts both the UAE and STC in a stronger position to negotiate in the future. The recent events were considered an indication of serious divisions between the UAE and its ally in the Yemen war, Saudi Arabia. Yet Saudi forces did not interfere to stop the STC from gaining control of Aden. Instead, it called for negotiations and a ceasefire after Bin Burayk and his men gained full control of the city. A similar attempt to capture the city by Bin Burayk and the STC in February 2018 was stopped by a Saudi-UAE sponsored agreement (Yemen Shabab, February 1, 2018).

Clash of Commitments

In his victory speech, Bin Burayk greeted the rulers of both Saudi Arabi and the UAE and emphasized his commitment to the Saudi-led coalition (Nhadramout, August 11; YouTube, August 11). [2]

That was expected from a man seeking greater recognition and a larger role for his movement, but the coalition he paid lip service to has significantly disintegrated since the UAE announced its withdrawal. Bin Burayk said that he still recognizes President Hadi as a transitional president, but he condemned the Islah party of the Muslim Brotherhood, which dominates Hadi’s government. Exactly like their UAE backers, Bin Burayk and the STC at large despise al-Islah, although they have both been fighting the Iran-backed Houthis in the civil war. [3] The fall of Aden was not followed by a declaration of secession from Yemen, but the position of the STC and its deputy chief Bin Burayk is now more powerful than at any other moment in the four-year-old civil war. The group will be vital in any settlement of the Yemeni conflict.

Yemen has been one of the most important countries for the Salafi-jihadist movement. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has been based in Yemen since its inception in 2009 after the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda, is the group’s most active branch anywhere in the world. Islamic State (IS) has also started a Yemeni branch in 2014. But Yemen had a significant traditional Salafist following before the beginning of the civil war, which was largely apolitical and therefore enjoyed significant support from the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Hani Bin Burayk joined the Salafist movement in the 1980s after it was founded by Sheikh Moqbil al-Wada’ai. Along with thousands of Salafist students, he studied theology at the Ahl al-Hadeeth institute that was established in Dumaj in Sa’ada province. Dumaj was the hometown of Sheikh al-Wada’ai, but also the heartland of the Zaidi faith, the form of Shia Islam followed by the Houthis, and later the Houthi movement itself.

After the widespread upheaval of the 2011 Arab Spring, Yemen was plunged into civil war. Friction turned into hostilities between the Houthis and their neighbors. The Houthis, who gained a significant boost to their influence after the fall of Saleh, launched a siege on Bin Burayk and his fellow Salafists in Dumaj. The battle ended with the Houthis winning and forcing the Salafists out of the area completely, representing a major blow to the Salafist movement and a personal loss for Bin Burayk (Alomanaa, August 25, 2016).

The siege of Dumaj was also a sign of the early break in relations between Bin Burayk and the Salafist movement. He had remained loyal to the traditional Salafist approach of not meddling in politics, but he was also known for his support for Yemeni unity despite being from the south. Bin Burayk would later abandon both the Salafist movement and his commitment to Yemeni unity, joining the southern secessionist movement. He quickly became one of its most prominent figures.

Following the loss of Dumaj, he returned to Aden and joined the southern resistance council, which the southerners started after the war broke out. The group could not stop the advance of the Houthi and Saleh alliance, which overran Aden in 2015. But Bin Burayk had managed to strike an alliance with the UAE. Abu Dhabi chose him and other secessionist figures as local partners in Yemen. He played a key role in the battle retaking Aden from the Houthis in July 2015 (Al-Ain, June 2).

Securing Aden after its liberation was important. Bin Burayk formed the Security Belt, the militia that would prove itself to be so effective, which led the UAE to form similar regional militias in other parts of southern Yemen. In January 2016, Bin Burayk became a member of the Aden-based government’s cabinet along with other UAE-backed members of the secessionist movement (Aden-Time, January 9, 2016).

Assassinations of Salafists

As he consolidated his position in Aden, Bin Burayk needed full control of religious affairs in the city. The main obstacle, however, was apparently his own people. His ascendancy had already earned him the anger and condemnation of Salafist clerics, who issued a statement condemning him, his involvement in politics and his service to the enemies of Islam (Hunaaden, October 29, 2017).

While that did not weaken Bin Burayk’s authority, the enmity of other Salafists towards him grew stronger, as he was accused of ordering the assassinations of prominent Salafist clerics. After a series of assassinations and despite the criticisms, he gained control of the network of Salafist Imams in Aden (Al-Jazeera, July 19).

As the power of the Security Belt grew, it also gained control of the strategic positions of Aden. Bin Burayk was a member of the powerful secessionist group within the government. He formed an alliance with General Aidarous al-Zubeidi, the governor of Aden and Shalal al-Shaya’a, and together they were the real power on the ground in Aden. This lasted until April 2017, when Hadi removed both men from their positions, along with other secessionist senior officials (Yemen Press, April 28, 2017).

The Formation of the STC

As a direct response to President Hadi’s decision, Bin Burayk and al-Zubeidi formed the STC on May 4, 2017. Al-Zubeidi became head of the STC and Bin Burayk his deputy (Almawqea Post, May 11, 2017). With significant UAE backing, the STC became the most powerful secessionist group. However, the STC has not yet fulfilled its goal of being the sole body that represents the secessionist movement. There are other secessionist groups and there are also many southern Yemenis who do not support secession.

It was always clear that the UAE had a different strategy in Yemen than Saudi Arabia. The UAE has always put its confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood, not only in Yemen but across the region, as a top priority. The UAE was never comfortable with the Islah party dominating President Hadi’s government (See Terrorism Monitor, April 23, 2018). That led to an important role for Bin Burayk in the UAE’s strategy in Yemen. He has power and influence in the Salafist movement, which could be employed against jihadists and Muslim Brotherhood. He also has the power of his position in the southern secessionist  movement, which represents the aspiration of many southern Yemenis to reclaim the sovereignty of the PDRY. Bin Burayk and al-Zubeidi became friends of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the minister of defense, frequently visiting him.

The STC control of Aden came as a strategic move in the period following the UAE withdrawal. But it is also important to note that Bin Burayk plays a role in setting the timing of events. Only a few days before he started the escalation in Aden, there were calls to hold him accountable for human rights abuses. His recent advances will make him more immune to accountability. (Mareb Press, July 18).

Bin Burayk and al-Qaeda

Both AQAP and IS remain a threat. IS played a major role in inciting the recent events when, on August 2, it launched one of its most daring attacks on a police station, which killed 13 Aden police officers. This attack came the day after a Houthi missile strike killed 36 members of the Security Belt (Al-Arabiya, August 2).

The coincidence of the two attacks was a reminder of how different conflicts in Yemen could correlate to cause greater crises. Just as Bin Burayk accuses his enemies of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood or jihadists, in their eyes he is a secret member of AQAP or IS. The rift between various groups in Yemen—including President Hadi’s loyalists, al-Islah, and Bin Burayk’s STC—will only give IS and AQAP more space to operate and possibly more opportunities to strike. The UAE strategy in Yemen was praised for working closely with local groups such as Bin Burayk’s. However, there were reports in local and international media suggesting that some of the main battles against AQAP were never actually fought, but rather the UAE paid money and arranged tribal mediation to facilitate jihadist withdrawals and arrange local militia control (Al-Araby, August 6, 2018).

Bin Burayk’s recent victory in Aden was neither a move towards focusing attention on the jihadists nor a blow to the Houthis. The latter signaled that they would accept the STC as a partner in future national dialogue, a series of negotiations mediated by the UN. It is helpful for the Houthis not to appear as the sole rebel movement challenging an internationally recognized government (Masrawy, August 10).

Conclusion

Bin Burayk’s relationship with the UAE will be very important too. In the past he managed to switch sides and change convictions, which led to his current position. In an environment like Yemen’s, the UAE will need him in the future. But the UAE has its own agenda in Yemen, which includes dominating the port of Aden, the Socotra archipelago, and the maritime routes. If Bin Burayk does not deliver a continued containment of jihadists and continued confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood on behalf of the UAE, his power will be questioned.

The capture of Aden did not lead to immediate secession, and Bin Burayk said in his speech that they would wait and be part of the transitional period until a settlement of the conflict is reached. The STC will now be under pressure to deliver something to the people of southern Yemen, who were promised that their land would prosper as a result of relations with the UAE.

The UAE will unlikely back full independence for the south. The current situation ensures that it has significant influence over the STC, but that could change if the south becomes a sovereign independent state. Bin Burayk has now recaptured his city twice in the war, once from the Iran-backed Houthis in 2015 and now from the Hadi government and its Islah partner. Bin Burayk and his STC are now the government, and delivering services and stability could well prove to be more difficult than defeating armies.

Notes

[1] The PDRY was formed in 1967 after the end of the British colonial rule of Aden and neighboring protectorates in southern Arabian Peninsula. The PDRY was ruled by the Marxist Yemeni Socialist Party, which was backed by the Soviet Union. In May 1990, Yemeni unification was declared and the PDRY joined The Arab Republic of Yemen, or North Yemen, and Yemen thereby became one country under the rule of the north’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In 1994, an attempt by the south to secede led to a civil war that Saleh won overwhelmingly with the help of al-Islah party.

[2] Bin Burayk forces captured Aden on the eve of Eid al-Adha festival , which is one of the most prominent occasions on the Muslim calendar. He dedicated the Eid al-Adha prayer and the speech traditionally attached to it to talk about the victory in Aden.

[3] The STC and southern Yemenis frequently stress that there was bad blood between them and al-Islah from the days of the 1994 civil war, when al-Islah forces, along with president Salhe’s, invaded the south and reportedly committed atrocities.

[4] The Houthis, in their early stage as a merely Zaidi traditional religious group, enjoyed support from Saleh. But they launched an insurrection between 2004 and the end of Saleh’s rein. Some historic accounts cite the Sunni Salafist institute in Saada as one of the reasons behind the rise of the Houthis and their militant brand of Zaidi Shia Islam.