AQAP’s New Emir: Who is Khalid Batarfi?

AQAP’s New Emir: Who is Khalid Batarfi?

On February 23, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a video message from its prominent scholar Hamid al-Tamimi confirming the death of the group’s leader, Qasim al-Raymi, from a U.S. drone strike in Yemen (NewsYemen, February 23; al-Arabiya, February 23). In the same message, al-Tamimi announced the appointment of a new emir, Saudi national Khalid Batarfi, who has been on the rise within the organization since 2015. What follows is a profile of Batarfi and an assessment of the future direction the group might take under Batarfi’s leadership.

Background Details on Batarfi

The most detailed information about the life of the new AQAP’s emir is found in an anonymous biography of him that emerged sometime in 2006, when it was uploaded on an Islamist extremist online platform by a pro-jihadist chat user. [1] According to this biography, Khalid Omar Saeed Batarfi al-Kindi was born in 1979 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, although local media suggested he is of Yemeni origin, likely from the southern Hadramawt region (Nashwan News, September 5, 2010; al-Shibami.net, May 10, 2013; al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 5).

Batarfi attended a public school in Jeddah, although no mention is made about what he studied. He graduated in 1997, and his process of radicalization likely was prompted by the study of jihadist literature. At that time, the extremist community was largely influenced by the mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan, and so it is not surprising that Batarfi was heavily influenced by well-known jihadist ideologues. The biography mentions that his early mentors were Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, and Abdullah Azzam, who were all involved in the promotion of jihad in Afghanistan. The radicalization process was demonstrably effective on Batarfi, as in 1999 he went to Afghanistan to receive training at the infamous al-Farouk camp near Kandahar. He joined the mujahideen and the Taliban on the frontlines, fighting against the Northern Alliance for eight months (Elwahabiya, July 8, 2018).

In 2000, Batarfi returned to Saudi Arabia, where he continued his religious training and began to work with other local figures to recruit fighters for al-Qaeda, suggesting that while in Afghanistan he formed relationships with the group’s leadership. In 2001, Batarfi went back to Afghanistan, where he met al-Qaeda’s late leader Osama Bin Laden (Masrawy, February 23). Following the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, Batarfi fled to Pakistan and then, due to the severe restrictions he found there, to Iran, where he was arrested alongside a group of al-Qaeda militants (Tahdeeth, February 26). It was in this country that Batarfi met Abu Basir Nasser al-Wahishi, the future founding AQAP leader (Elwahabiya, July 8, 2018). Released from prison in 2002, Batarfi traveled with him to Yemen, where they were arrested again in 2004, being freed in 2006. In Yemen, Batarfi continued his recruiting efforts, facilitating the transfer of jihadists to fight in Iraq (Tahdeeth, February 26). In 2008, he ultimately joined the original nucleus of al-Qaeda in Yemen, led by Hamza al-Kuwaiti. After Kuwaiti’s death in 2009, Batarfi was appointed as a member of the group’s Sharia committee. The biography concludes with Batarfi in detention, yet again, in Taiz, central Yemen, in 2011 (26Sep, March 17, 2011). Local media indicates that at the time, Batarfi had already taken part in several AQAP operations across the Abyan province as AQAP’s chief military commander. The group was attempting to seize territory and declare an emirate in the region (Masrawy, February 23; Tahdeeth, February 26). When he was arrested in Taiz, he had just been appointed to supervise AQAP’s media network in Yemen.

Batarfi’s Rise

Batarfi spent three years in the Sanaa political prison, during which he was sentenced to an additional eight-year prison term (Masrawy, February 23). In 2014, he was transferred to Mukalla central prison in southern Yemen, where he remained until April 2015, when AQAP militants seized the city and assaulted the local prison (al-Arabiya, April 2, 2015). During the attack, the militants managed to free approximately 300 inmates, half of whom were former members of the group, including Batarfi (Gulf News, April 3, 2015). Shortly after the prison escape, Batarfi became AQAP’s public face when pictures of him defiantly posing inside the local provincial governor’s palace in al-Mukalla were published in local newspapers (National Yemen, April 4). Despite their highly symbolic nature, the pictures were the first indication of the new leading position in the city entrusted to Batarfi , who was appointed the new “governor of al-Mukalla” by the group (al-Jazeera, May 6, 2015).

The 2015 prison break marked the beginning of Batarfi’s ascendancy within AQAP, with the Saudi militant beginning to be featured in almost all of the group’s major media releases. In May and June 2015, he announced the death of key AQAP official Nasr al-Anisi and AQAP’s former leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, both killed in a U.S. drone strike. These appearances, delivering key messages on behalf of AQAP at a time when its leadership was decimated by counter-terrorism operations, highlighted Batarfi’s growing importance within the organization and his steady ascendancy toward a leadership position.

Batarfi’s media appearances can be divided into three thematic subjects: statements related to key global issues directly or indirectly affecting the larger Muslim community; sermons and video statements concerning religious issues and jihadist ideology; and statements regarding key developments on the Yemeni battlefield. The combination of these subjects has been key to his projection of the image of a charismatic religious ideologue attentive not only to local dynamics in Yemen, but also to larger trends in the jihadist movement. Batarfi’s public role, coupled with his experience in the battlefield in Afghanistan and Yemen, has created the image of an “old-generation” jihadist opposed to the younger generation of Islamic State militants. A video from December 2016 video featured Taliban militants and Batarfi in a video together, celebrating their alliance with al-Qaeda, further confirming this trend. [2]

In September 2017, Batarfi appeared in a video calling on Muslims in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia to carry out attacks on Myanmar authorities in support of minority Rohingya Muslims. This was at a time when the Rohingya crisis was dominating the international news (Adengd.net, September 2, 2017). Similarly, on January 22, 2018, Batarfi appeared in another AQAP video released in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In it, he stated that every Muslim has a duty to “liberate the holy city,” called on Muslims to “attack the Jews and the Americans everywhere” and portrayed Trump’s decision as a “declaration of a new Jewish-Crusader war” (al-Akhbar, January 22, 2018; al-Khaleejonline, January 23, 2018).

Examples of religious messaging included a lecture series launched in December 2015 called “Toward Correct Awareness,” in which Batarfi said he aimed to develop “a proper understanding and awareness of Islam.” Another video lecture series on “the importance of repentance,” titled “Reflections on the Stories of Prophets,” started in June 2017. [3] These messages gradually cemented Batarfi’s position as AQAP’s chief voice and firmly established his religious expertise within the global jihadist movement.

Batarfi has spoken several times in detail about AQAP’s position on various aspects of the Yemeni conflict, as well as on the group’s future plans. He has addressed these issues through question and answer sessions conducted by the group via AQAP’s media outlet on the messaging app Telegram. In June 2018, Batarfi heavily criticized the UAE role in the Yemeni conflict, saying the country had an agenda to promote a false version of Islam and to “spread immorality to please the United States.” Asked about the decline in AQAP operations, Batarfi used a common AQAP argument, saying that the jihadists had “refrained from carrying out many attacks in order to avoid harming Muslims.” Additionally, he said that jihadist attacks under certain circumstances would benefit the group’s enemies. “We put the interests of Muslims before our interests as a group,” he explained, promising that al-Qaeda would strike hard when the time was right. [4]

AQAP never publicly presented Batarfi as the group’s deputy, but there is evidence that this was the position he held before his recent rise to leadership. A report published by the UN panel of experts on Yemen in January 2020 indicated that Batarfi was appointed commander of AQAP external operations in 2017 following the death of Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri. [5]

AQAP’s Future Trajectory Under Batarfi

The killing of al-Raymi and the appointment of Batarfi comes in the context of increasing difficulties for AQAP, as the group continues to suffer from U.S. precision strikes that have decimated its leadership in recent years. The group’s operational tempo seems to have declined in recent months despite the fact that the Yemeni civil war is still raging. Batarfi, who was added to the list of specially designated global terrorists by the United States in January 2018, will likely become a top-priority target over the coming weeks and months as Washington continues its efforts to decimate the organization.

In early March, local media reported that aircraft believed to belong to the United States dropped leaflets in several Yemeni districts urging people to provide information on senior AQAP leaders, including Batarfi, Saeed Atif, and Ammar al-Sanani. Rewards of up to $6 million were offered (Alarabya, March 5; AkhbarAlaan, March 9).

AQAP is at its weakest point in a decade. For the past year and a half, it has been dragged into a local battle with Islamic State in the central province of al-Bayda, and it has reduced its media operations. Meanwhile, splinter factions and internal disagreements have continued to emerge. This was also the case regarding Batarfi’s appointment. According to local media, the killing of al-Raymi triggered a fracture within AQAP, with part of the Shura Council wanting to select Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, who was close to the late AQAP preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (AlYoum.net, 26 February). Those opposing Batarfi’s appointment, local media suggested, even accused the Saudi militant of having passed information of al-Raymi’s whereabout to facilitate his elimination (YemenNow, February 25).

Given his background, Batarfi might have the religious appeal, the fighting experience, and the strong relationship with core al-Qaeda required to navigate the organization through a new phase. Batarfi will possibly alter the group’s strategy, which has focused almost exclusively on domestic Yemeni operations in recent years. It is unclear, however, whether Batarfi has the necessary charisma to keep the organization together.

Notes

https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf