Caucasian Foreign Fighters Confirmed in ISWAP’s Ranks in Nigeria

Caucasian Foreign Fighters Confirmed in ISWAP’s Ranks in Nigeria

Executive Summary:

• Recent visual data from an Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) photoset suggests the presence of Caucasian fighters in the group, further evidenced by the recent arrest of another Caucasian militant by Cameroonian forces.
• The expanding tactical exchanges between ISWAP and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) enable the cross-border flow of foreign combatants, including Westerners and Nigerians.
• While ISWAP’s insurgency was never “local” and always featured international allegiances, the recent exchanges of foreign fighters and the growing U.S. military interest in Nigeria add a new dimension to the trajectory of the conflict.

In March 2015, Islamic State (IS)’s then-spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani confirmed the pledge of allegiance from Abubakar Shekau to IS’s caliph and called on foreign fighters to join Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Ever since, questions have lingered over how many IS supporters would heed al-Adnani’s call (X/@aljanub15, March 12, 2015). Over the ensuing decade, according to international media, jihadist propaganda, and academic research sources, Senegalese, Sudanese, and Libyans all joined ISWAP’s ranks, which are otherwise dominated by Nigerians and, to a lesser extent, Cameroonians, Nigeriens, and Chadians (see Terrorism Monitor, May 4, 2018).

Visual evidence of foreign fighters from outside the Lake Chad region in ISWAP’s ranks has, however, been sparse. In one 2019 ISWAP battlefield video, a bearded fighter appeared in uniform among ISWAP fighters, aiming his rifle towards Nigerian soldiers (al-Furqan, January 15, 2019). The video seemed to confirm the presence of a Caucasian fighter in the group’s ranks. The rapid glimpse of the fighter and the possibility that shadows and his gloves obscured his physique and complexion, however, made it difficult to conclusively determine the fighter’s origin. 

IS published a warning to U.S. President Donald Trump in its weekly newsletter, al-Naba, in November 2025, after his threat on Truth Social that he is “instructing our Department of War to prepare for possible action” in Nigeria if the government fails to protect Nigerian Christians (Politico, November 1, 2025). Although the newsletter is distributed on jihadist social media platforms, an ISWAP photoset, also released online, showed ISWAP fighters in the northeastern Nigerian countryside reading a printed physical version of it. At least two fighters who were reading the newsletter had Caucasian complexions, despite their faces being blurred (X/@Sazedek, November 12, 2025). This visually confirmed that foreign fighters from outside the Lake Chad region were in ISWAP’s ranks for the first time.

Several months later, Nigerian Hausa and Kanuri accents were heard among Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) fighters, who attacked the airbase in Niamey, Niger (X/@bulamabukarti, February 1). The exchange of fighters, in addition to tactics, among ISWAP and its ISGS partners enables the flow of foreign fighters into ISWAP’s heartland in predominantly Kanuri-speaking parts of northeastern Nigeria, as well as from there into the Sahel. This is why not only Arab or Turkish fighters are now found in ISGS ranks, as in previous years, but also Nigerians and even Westerners, such as a Frenchman arrested by Nigerien security forces after the airbase attacks (memri.org, January 2, 2020; X/@Azizhassoum, February 4, 2026).

The start of 2026 has seen an increase in foreign fighters in ISWAP’s ranks, including in Cameroon. In February—one month after the attack in Niamey—another ISWAP fighter with a Caucasian complexion was arrested by Cameroonian security forces (X/@Oeil_du_Sahel, February 19). Moreover, in February, IS social media accounts announced the death of the Lebanese Omar al-Lubani in ISWAP’s ranks and showed a photo of him in a mosque some time before his death (X/@B_B_Rod, February 5).

ISWAP fighters are sharing battlefield experience with fighters who have traveled from other theaters and learned lessons there (dailytrust.com, May 21, 2021). Foreign expertise is now reshaping battlefield dynamics not only in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, but also in the Sahel and, increasingly, in northwestern Nigeria (gga.org, May 20, 2025). While ISWAP’s insurgency was never “local” and always featured international allegiances, training, and funding transfers, the recent exchanges of foreign fighters and the growing U.S. military interest in Nigeria add a new dimension to the trajectory of the conflict.