Corneille Nangaa Lobeluo: The Rebel Leader Left Out of President Trump’s Congo–Rwanda Peace Agreement

Corneille Nangaa Lobeluo: The Rebel Leader Left Out of President Trump’s Congo–Rwanda Peace Agreement

Executive Summary:

• Corneille Nangaa Lobeluo leads the political-military Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While Nangaa has not been involved in the June 27 peace agreement between Rwanda and the DRC brokered by the United States and Qatar, he has historically proven himself adept at taking advantage of international rivalries in eastern Africa for his own ends.
• Nangaa is opposed to American involvement in the peace process in the eastern Congo, likely the reason he was excluded from peace talks. An agreement will have to be reached in a separate set of peace talks that do involve the AFC, however, before part of the U.S.-backed peace accords can be implemented.
• Nangaa worked as an electoral specialist with the government before a scandal led him to turn toward politics and militancy. Nangaa worked with Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to form the AFC, and the former group has recently seen numerous victories. He lacks much independent power, making his position largely dependent on M23’s willingness to continue backing him.

The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a peace agreement brokered by the United States and Qatar on June 27 to resolve their long-standing conflict over the mineral-rich Congo provinces of Nord and Sud Kivu (Eastleighvoice [Nairobi], June 28). One man, however, was missing from the table: Corneille Nangaa Lobeluo. He is the leader of the rebel Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC, or Congo River Alliance) that actually controls the two province and their riches.

A former electoral specialist turned rebel, Nangaa leads a coalition that lays claim to 34,000 square kilometers (roughly 13,000 square miles) of the DRC. This area, known for its strategically important critical minerals and rare earths, has been consumed by political and ethnic violence dating back to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. U.S. President Donald Trump believes that Nangaa’s participation in the peace agreement is unnecessary to enable American access to these critical minerals: “We’re getting, for the United States, a lot of the mineral rights from the Congo as part of it” (Eastleighvoice [Nairobi], July 1).

The events of recent years, however, have shown that, greater than Nangaa’s own political or military significance, is his ability to insert himself into the middle of international rivalries in eastern Africa.

Background on the Eastern Congo Rebellion

The eastern provinces of the DRC, Ituri, Nord Kivu, and Sud Kivu, are plagued by violence created by a host of actors. These include the Congo’s own national army, the FARDC (Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo), the AFC, the M23 Movement, Islamists of the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP), Hutu militants, and a variety of pro- and anti-government militias and armed bandits. Incursions by Rwandan and Ugandan troops contribute to the violence. The M23 rebel movement, part of the AFC, is the most dangerous of the armed opposition groups active in the eastern Congo, inflicting serious defeats on the Congolese military in 2012 and even taking the eastern city of Goma before being driven out in 2013. After taking refuge in Rwanda and Uganda, they rebuilt and returned to the DRC with backing from the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF).

M23’s political leader, Bertrand Bisimwa, and its military leader, General Sultan Makenga, [1] resumed M23’s armed revolt against Kinshasa in March 2022. They cited corruption and ethnic discrimination on the part of the government of President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo as their main grievances. Their campaign to control the east and eventually seize Kinshasa has been marked by looting, rape, human rights abuses, and the displacement of some 1.5 million people.

Tshisikedi was re-elected on December 31, 2023, in a contested election. On May 19, 2024, he survived an armed coup attempt by Christian Malanga Musumari, a former U.S. resident (1998–2006) and leader of the self-proclaimed and Brussels-based “New Zaire Government in Exile.” Malanga was killed in the attempt, while his son and three American mercenaries in his service were captured. The latter were among 37 coup suspects sentenced to death on September 13, 2024 (France 24, September 13, 2024).

Nangaa’s Early Career

Corneille Nangaa was born in 1970 in the DRC’s Orientale Province. After receiving a bachelor’s degree in economics at the University of Kinshasa, he began his career as a specialist in electoral procedures by taking a position with the DRC’s Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI, or Independent National Electoral Commission). His growing expertise in this field led to engagements providing electoral technical assistance in ten sub-Saharan African nations. By 2015, he was president of CENI (Radio Okapi, October 22, 2015).

Nangaa’s professional reputation was tarnished in March 2019, when he, his son, and a number of other CENI officials were accused of embezzlement during the 2018 presidential campaign. Nangaa was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for “his participation in actions or policies undermining democratic processes or institutions in the DRC” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 21, 2019). Nangaa would later challenge the sanctions unsuccessfully in a Washington, D.C. court (Jeune Afrique, August 8, 2022).

Nangaa remained CENI president until October 2021, when he turned to politics, founding his own party, Action pour la Dignité du Congo et de son Peuple (ADCP), in February 2023. After proclaiming his candidacy in the December 2024 presidential elections, Nangaa decided his life was in danger in the Congo and fled the country for Kenya (Africa Report, December 18, 2023).

Formation of the River Congo Alliance

In mid-December 2023, Nangaa joined M23 political leader Bertrand Bisimwa and the leaders of several other Congolese armed opposition groups in a Nairobi hotel to announce the creation of a new political-military alliance—the AFC. Under Nangaa’s leadership, the movement is dedicated to expanding the current conflict beyond Nord Kivu into the rest of the DRC. The ultimate goal of the movement is to overthrow the Tshisekedi regime in Kinshasa.

Issues creating resentment of President Tshisekedi’s government include allegations of institutional corruption, tribalism, fraudulent taxation, and the use of foreign military forces (both legitimate and mercenary) to provide national security. Nangaa accused Tshisekedi of all these transgressions and more when he proclaimed the AFC. Personal grievances may also have played a factor; there were reports that Tshisekedi’s administration planned to kill Nangaa in late 2023 (Africa Intelligence, April 25, 2024).

Accusing the Congolese president of having carried out an “electoral coup d’état” in the 2023 election, Nangaa justified the AFC’s rebellion by citing article 64 of the DRC’s constitution. The article states: “all Congolese have the duty to oppose any individual or group of individuals who take power by force or who exercise it in violation of the provisions of the present Constitution” (Africa Report, December 18, 2023). Diplomatic reaction to the announcement was immediate, with the DRC recalling its representatives from Kenya and Tanzania and announcing a ban on East African Community (EAC) election observers. [2] Tshisekedi warned Kenya of consequences for its unwelcome accommodation of Congolese rebels.

The East African Role in the Congo

An EAC military force (the East African Community Regional Force, or EACRF) consisting of troops from Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, and South Sudan was deployed to Nord Kivu in November 2022. Failing to restore order, the task force lasted only 11 months before Tshisekedi ordered its withdrawal for lack of effectiveness and a perceived failure to engage in direct combat against rebel forces (East African [Nairobi], December 21, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024). The move created friction between the governments of the DRC and Kenya, which provided the leadership for the EACRF.

Kenya continues to refuse to arrest Nangaa or other AFC leaders residing in Nord Kivu (many of whom have also been sentenced to death) on the grounds that it would be “undemocratic.” Kenyan president William Ruto responded to Tshisekedi’s warning of “consequences” for hosting Nangaa and other opposition leaders by declaring: “Kenya is a democracy. We cannot arrest anybody who has issued a statement. We do not arrest people for making statements, we arrest criminals” (BBC, December 19, 2023).

Unlike his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, President Ruto of Kenya does not have warm relations with Tshisekedi. Though no longer in power, Kenyatta continues to condemn Kenya’s hosting of DRC rebel leaders who use violence to achieve their ends (BBC, December 19, 2023).

A Creature of Rwanda?

According to FARDC Major General Sylvain Ekenge, Nangaa merely provides cover for Rwandan president Paul Kagame: “It is Rwanda that is attacking us. We are doing everything possible to bring the war back to where it came from” (Radio Okapi, August 2, 2024). The Rwandan government vigorously denied allegations that it had provided military support to M23 or the AFC until it later admitted having done so at the D.C. peace agreement.

The military governor of the eastern province of Ituri, Lieutenant General Luboya N’kashama Johnny, followed the DRC government’s line of portraying Nangaa as a traitor in the service of Rwanda: “[Nangaa] said: ‘my Iturian brothers, wait for me, I’m coming to you.’ Nangaa, you have no brothers here… You come with foreigners and you say: ‘my brothers.’ You have no brothers here…” (Bunia Actualité, September 6, 2024).

In May 2024, President Ruto was interviewed on the question of M23’s alleged ties to Rwanda and the appropriateness of Kenya hosting Congolese dissidents: “As heads of state, during a meeting, we asked: ‘The M23, are the members of this group Rwandans or Congolese?’ And the DRC told us: ‘They are Congolese.’ End of debate. If they are Congolese, how does this become a Rwandan problem? How does this become a Kagame problem?” (Jeune Afrique, May 22, 2024).   

Bisimwa rejected consistent accusations from Kinshasa that his M23 movement is supported by Rwanda and Uganda. He suggested that, if this was the case, M23 would be able to take the DRC capital of Kinshasa in just two months (The Independent [Kampala], November 22, 2023). A loosely observed July 2024 ceasefire agreement helped to temporarily draw the wind from the rebels’ sails. President Tshisekedi remained puzzled as to why the international community did not discipline Rwanda with sanctions for its military interference in the DRC, due in part to the fact that the struggle lost the battle to attract international attention long ago.

A Death Sentence

For his efforts to overthrow Tshisekede, Nangaa found himself being tried in absentia along with 25 others at N’dolo prison by the Kinshasa/Gombe Military Court in July 2024. After an expeditious trial of 15 days, the defendants were found guilty of war crimes, insurrection, and treason. A guilty verdict on August 8 was followed by immediate sentencing—all defendants were sentenced to death (Le Quotidien [Kinshasa], August 10, 2024). The DRC’s then-minister of justice, Constant Mutamba, expressed “pride and joy” in the military justice system for being able to bring judgment down on so many defendants “in record time” (Radio Okapi, August 8, 2024; Congo-press, August 8, 2024). The DRC’s moratorium on the death penalty was lifted in March 2024—a matter of more distress for the five of the condemned who were actually present for the trial than for Nangaa, who remained safely in Nairobi.

Before his conviction, Nangaa described the charges as “a big joke,” blaming his prosecution on “the ignorance, populism, and thoughtlessness of a regime at bay” (Congo-press, July 26, 2024). After the sentence was imposed, Nangaa called it the product of “a sick justice system at the service of Mr. Tshisekedi in a rotten democracy” (Media Congo, August 8, 2024).

Concurrent with the trial, Nangaa (again) and the AFC (for the first time) became the subject of U.S. sanctions on July 25, 2024, for “driving political instability, violent conflict, and civilian displacement” (U.S. Treasury Department, July 25, 2024). Days after the sanctions were imposed, prominent Congolese human rights advocate Christopher Ngoyi Mutamba described Nangaa as “a criminal, a puppet recruited by Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda…” (Tempête des Tropiques [Kinshasa], July 31, 2024).

Nangaa described the sanctions as “unfair” and denounced “the use of unilateral foreign policy tools decried by the entire Global South, which represents the world majority…” (Congo-press, July 26, 2024). [3]

The AFC/M23 Offensive and Peace Agreement

Nangaa’s M23 military allies launched an offensive in Nord Kivu in late 2024. By late January 2025, General Sultani Makenga’s troops, with the alleged support of several thousand Rwandan regulars, broke through Goma’s defenses. As they took control of the Nord Kivu capital on January 30, other AFC/M23 fighters began to spread into mineral-rich areas of neighboring Sud Kivu. By February 18, they had taken that province’s capital, Bukavu (Al Jazeera, February 16). As the AFC and M23 consolidated military and administrative control of the region and its resources, the DRC government offered a five-million-dollar bounty in March for aid in the arrest of Nangaa, Sultani Makenga, and Bertrand Bisimwa.

In an interview with the Associated Press, Nangaa rejected American involvement (and its interest in the Congo’s mineral riches) in resolving the crisis in the eastern Congo: “This problem can be better resolved by the concerned Congolese, not foreigners with different geopolitical agendas… Trying to bribe the United States with mines can undermine U.S. credibility.” Negotiations without the participation of the AFC would also fail: “Anything regarding us which is done without us, it’s against us” (AP, March 25). The peace agreement calls for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Kivu in 90 days and the disarmament of “non-state armed groups,” despite the exclusion of the latter from the peace process (Eastleighvoice [Nairobi], June 28).

Parallel peace talks in Doha that do involve the AFC/M23 have stalled, though a successful outcome is necessary before the economic part of the D.C. accord can be implemented. Tshisekedi continues to be inclined to work through the international community while ignoring the AFC and M23. In a speech in Goma on the 65^th anniversary of the Congo’s independence, Nangaa insisted: “To lie to both the national and international public that there is no crisis in the DRC and that it is merely a conflict between Kigali and Kinshasa is an unacceptable deception” (Nile Post [Kampala], June 30).

Conclusion

Like many rebel leaders in the past, Corneille Nangaa finds himself subject to the political whims of the external forces that support his rebellion. Any improvement in relations between the DRC and Kenya or Rwanda has the potential to render Nangaa irrelevant and subject to abandonment by his hosts. To make matters worse, Nangaa has no military experience and no armed men under his direct control, making it difficult to assert the independence needed to carry on by himself. M23 is the strongest element in his AFC coalition; by that measure, its support or lack thereof can determine the future of Nangaa, who, after being left out of the American-sponsored peace talks, could easily find himself squeezed out of the Congolese political equation entirely.

Notes:

[1] For background on Makenga, see the AIS Special Report titled “General Sultani Makenga, Donald Trump and the Battle for Tantalum in the Congo” (Aberfoyle International Security, June 2).

[2] The “Global South” is, in its broadest sense, a reference to the developing world, but also a replacement term for “Third World,” which has come to be regarded in certain quarters as a pejorative (see Carnegie Endowment, August 15, 2023).

[3] The EAC was founded in 1967 and consists of eight states: the DRC, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan. Its headquarters is located in Tanzania.