Dual-Use Shijian Satellite Program Ramps up in 2025
Executive Summary:
- A secretive program of experimental dual-use satellites has accelerated its launch cadence in 2025, sending six satellites into orbit—more than in the last four years combined.
- Shijian satellites have displayed impressive capabilities, including towing and refuelling other satellites, and even deploying additional, smaller satellites.
- The lack of data released about their operations indicates their dual-use potential, as does the apparent alignment of the program with military strategy documents that call for dominating control of space.
- The upcoming five-year plan is set to increase investment and support for space development, which the Party leadership identifies as a strategic emerging industry.
The year 2025 has been a successful one for the Shijian (实践) satellite program. Things kicked off on January 6 with the launch of the Shijian-25 satellite, which state media hailed as a “bright start to China’s space program in 2025” (国航天2025年开门红) (Xinhua, January 7). Since then, a Shijian-26 satellite was sent into orbit in late May, followed by three Shijian-30 satellites in mid-November, and a final Shijian-28 satellite on November 30 (Xinhua, May 29, November 19, November 30). These six launches mark an uptick in cadence for the program, with just one launch in each of the two previous years and none in 2022. A total of 50 Shijian-series satellites have been launched since the program began in 1971, of which 38 remain operational (Wikipedia/实践系列卫星, accessed December 5). [1]
The Shijian series is just one among as many as 100 satellite programs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today (Hello Space, April 18). What makes it unusual is that it is used to “put into practice” or “establish best practices for”—the literal meanings of shijian (实践)—novel satellite technologies (CASI, March 28, 2022). It also stands out because of the paucity of publicly available data about its goals and activities compared to other programs. The coverage of Shijian satellites that does exist indicates that they are primarily used for scientific exploration and technological verification and testing. But omissions from the PRC side, coupled with observations and reporting from analysts in the United States and elsewhere, suggest that they likely are involved in much more sensitive operations.
Beijing Seeks Space Control Capabilities
Understanding Beijing’s approach to space can help contextualize the potential use cases of many Shijian satellites. Military strategy documents and resources have repeatedly described space as a critical domain for national security and control of space as a prerequisite for successful military operations in the 21st century. The 2013 Lectures on the Science of Space Operations (空间作战学教程), for example, argues that “whoever seizes command of space will be able to look down on and control the other battlefields” and that “command of space … has become crucial in seizing and holding the initiative in warfare” (Jiang, 2013). [2] Subsequent documents have built on this logic. The 2020 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (战略学), the PLA’s most authoritative source on military strategy, similarly describes space as “a new strategic commanding height for international military competition.” In the view of the authors, “it is necessary to build a powerful military space force” to “meet the challenges of the world’s new military revolution and win information warfare” (Xiao, 2020). [3]
Beijing’s broader defense industrial and national development plans reinforce this trajectory. The recent “Recommendations” (建议) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee for the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan call for the PRC to “accelerate the building of … a strong space country” (加快建设制造 … 航天强国). This comes in the very first sentence of the document’s section on building a modernized industrial system and consolidate the foundation of the real economy. It is reinforced by later calls for supporting “strategic emerging industries” (战略性新兴产业), including aerospace. The document also doubles down on the national strategy of military-civil fusion. It calls for “deepening reforms that straddle military and civil domains” (深化跨军地改革) and for “accelerating strategic capability development in emerging domains” (加快新兴领域战略能力建设), promoting the “mutual reinforcement of new productive forces and new combat capabilities” (新质生产力同新质战斗力高效融合、双向拉动) (Xinhua, October 28).
Shijian Satellites Exhibit Impressive Technologies
Evidence of impressive progress in the Shijian program, along with the rest of the PRC’s space industry, is abundant. For example, Shijian-25, launched in January 2025, reportedly is “mainly used for technology verification of satellite refuelling and life extension services” (主要用于卫星燃料补加与延寿服务技术验证) (Xinhua, January 7). Commercial analysts have noted that it appears to be equipped with some kind of grappling arm (CSM, January 18). In July, the satellite apparently successfully refueled a Beidou satellite with 142 kilograms of fuel. One commentary claims that it can refuel up to 20 different satellites, and states that it is known as a “super-space refuelling station” (超级太空加油站) (BJS, November 30).
This is not the first time a satellite has used robotic arms of various kinds in space. U.S. government reports have said that the PRC has used such devices powered by artificial intelligence (AI) for satellite maintenance, refueling, and removal of space debris (USCC, November 2025). Most famously, a Shijian-21 satellite in January 2022 docked with the defunct Beidou navigation satellite before towing it to a higher “graveyard orbit,” where it would pose no risk of collision with other satellites (BJS, November 30; U.S. House of Representatives, December 4). The Xinhua announcement of its launch simply described the satellite as “mainly used for testing and verifying space debris mitigation technologies” (主要用于空间碎片减缓技术试验验证) (Xinhua, October 24, 2021).
The Shijian program also appears to be expanding into working with a wider set of technologies. The commercial analyst Blaine Curcio noted in June that the Shijian-26 that was launched in May was built by a consortium of CAST, the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), and the CAS Changchun Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics (CIOPM), in a “noteworthy” departure from previous satellites (CSM, June 8). The launch also underscores the potential dual-use nature of Shjian satellites. HIT is sanctioned by the U.S. government for its work on military technologies, while the Chang Guang Satellite Technology Corporation, a commercial offshoot of CIOPM, is also sanctioned for allegedly providing geospatial intelligence to the Houthis to target U.S. warships in the Red Sea crisis, as well as to the Wagner Group in Ukraine (Reuters, April 17; Open Sanctions, accessed December 5 [1], [2]).
Conclusion
The lack of information about the Shijian program feeds into the PRC’s space deterrence (威慑) strategy (Rice, August 2025). [4] As the Lectures on the Science of Space Operations Foreign Military Thought point out, strengthening deception, feints, and concealment in space operations is crucial “to achieve the goals of confusing and out-maneuvering the enemy and of creating errors in the enemy’s judgment and decision-making.” It can also enhance the prestige of the PRC space program. By restricting releases to emphasize civilian functionalities and successful successful maneuvers, Beijing can build partnerships with other countries to enhance its own role as a space power (China Brief, March 1, 2024, November 5, 2024).
The precise goals of the four satellites deployed in November remain to be seen. It is unlikely that the PRC will release additional information about them, but their maneuvers can be tracked. But the apparent expansion of the program over the course of this year could indicate a ramping up of PRC deployments of new satellite technologies, including those with dual-use applications, that pose a risk to those Beijing views as adversaries. Given the sector’s explicit backing in authoritative planning documents, the country’s space capabilities are set to further take off over the next five years. By that point, Chinese taikonauts may have already beaten their U.S. counterparts in an ambition both countries have set for themselves—to once again set foot on the Moon.
Notes
[1] The Wikipedia data is compiled from NORAD, NASA, USSPACECOM, Celestrak, and Gunter’s Space Page.
[2] Jiang Lianju [姜连举] and Wang Liwen [王立文] ed. Lectures on the Science of Space Operations Foreign Military Thought [空间作战学教程], trans. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Military Science Press, January 2013.
[3] Xiao Tianliang, ed. The Science of Military Strategy, trans. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Military Science Press, 2020.
[4] Daniel C. Rice. “Understanding Weishe, China’s System of Strategic Coercion” China Military Studies Review 1, No. 1. 21 August 2025.
