General Ali Kanna: The GNA’s Last and Best Hope in Southern Libya
General Ali Kanna: The GNA’s Last and Best Hope in Southern Libya
Libyan National Army (LNA) forces loyal to the House of Representatives (HoR) government under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar have been waging a concerted campaign to seize, hold, and control the oil resource-rich Fezzan province in Libya’s south-central region in order to prevent the United Nations-backed, Government of National Accord (GNA) from entering the province (al-Araby al-Jadid, July 17; al-Quds al-Arabi, June 13; al-Ghad, March 7). The LNA campaign—ongoing since February—intends to bring the major trans-Sahara entry and transit point for sub-Saharan migrants under the control of the HoR government. The route is used by migrants seeking to enter Europe via the Mediterranean traveling from Libya. By controlling Fezzan province, Haftar hopes to further legitimize his forces by establishing dominance over strategic energy resources that are being exploited by European countries and to hold power over the transit routes for African mass migration toward Europe that is of great concern to European countries (al-Araby al-Jadid, July 17; al-Quds al-Arabi, June 13; Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25). The GNA has sought to counter Haftar by installing one of his former colleagues, General Ali Muhammad Sulayman Kanna, one of the most powerful leaders from Fezzan, as the commander of its forces in the strategic southern Libyan region (al-Jazeera [Doha], February 7; al-Araby al-Jadid, February 6).
General Kanna is one of Libya’s most prominent professional soldiers, and he was a leading officer in the former Gadhafi regime who remained loyal to Muammar Gadhafi throughout the Libyan civil war that began in 2011 (La Voix de la Libye [Ubari], August 20, 2016; Liberation [Paris], January 15, 2014). A long-time powerbroker in Fezzan province, Kanna, 74, is an ethnic Tuareg leader who is a native of the village of Tigrawatayn, which is an important market town for trans-Saharan traffic moving through the district of Murzuq. This district is near the important and strategic city of Ubari, one of the major settlements in Fezzan province (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25). He is a member of the Imamghassatan tribe, an important subgroup within the Tuaregs that have established a tribal network across the trans-Sahara region in states including Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. Kanna’s membership in the Imamghassatan tribe is a key reason why he has a great degree of prominence in Fezzan. This branch of the Tuaregs has built a reputation for being committed fighters with the ability to draw strength from a network that exists beyond Libya’s borders (al-Jazeera [Doha], June 22, 2015; Dar Al-Akhbar [Ubari], February 14, 2013).
Kanna was one of the most important Libyan army officers to support Gadhafi during the 1969 revolution against the monarchy that was then in power in Libya, and he was committed to the so-called “Green Revolution” that Gadhafi promoted in the aftermath of the military coup (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], February 5). During the Gadhafi era, Kanna served in a number of senior command positions in the Libyan army, including in artillery, special forces, and in overseeing Libya’s border security in the vast, Sahara Desert region that is the prominent feature of Fezzan province (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], February 5; Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25). In particular, during the 1980s, Kanna participated in the Libyan-Chadian conflict that occurred throughout the desert border regions between Libya and Chad (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], February 5; Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25). During the Libyan-Chadian war, Kanna was charged with mobilizing ethnic Tuareg support across the trans-Sahara region on behalf of Libya (Small Arms Survey, February 1, 2014).
Kanna was made the commander of the “Sabha Military Zone,” which is based in the major Fezzan city of Sabha, as a result of his origins in the province, his leading role in the security state that supported Gadhafi, and his past participation in the conflict against Chad. Kanna, as the chief officer overseeing the Sabha Military Zone, was responsible for the security of all of southern Libya. This region included the border areas with Niger, Chad, Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt, which is both vast in size and dominated by the Sahara Desert (African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples, November 29, 2006). He built his reputation on being an effective commander in desert environments and for conducting warfare in the Sahara against highly mobile opponents. To belie this reputation, Kanna was personally responsible for one of the most elite forces within the Gadhafi-era Libyan military, the Mughawir Brigade, which was responsible for being the rapid reaction force that was used to patrol Libya’s trans-Sahara region. Under Kanna’s leadership, the Mughawir Brigade engaged in limited combat against anti-Gadhafi, revolutionary forces in Fezzan during the 2011 Libyan civil war (Small Arms Survey, February 1, 2014). When the Gadhafi government began to collapse in September 2011, Kana and fourteen other military commanders who remained loyal to Gadhafi during the civil war left Libya and sought asylum in Niger (La Voix de la Libye [Ubari], August 20, 2016; Liberation [Paris], January 15, 2014).
While in exile in Niger, Kana was continually linked to rumors that he was working with other regime loyalists to bring about the return of the Gaddafi-era government, utilizing the local network he built while commander of the southern region of Libya and through his position as a notable member of the Tuareg community (Liberation [Paris], January 15, 2014). Also while in Niger, Kana was an outspoken supporter of Fezzan province becoming a federal region (currently the province is split among several smaller districts), which would allow Fezzan to maintain control over the exploitation of its significant oil resources (YouTube, May 18; YouTube, February 14, 2013). However, Kanna was also an outspoken advocate for the unit of the local forces in Fezzan—regardless of the ethnic origin of those forces—and it was this effort that put him on the radar of international actors involved in Libya, such as Italy (Paris Match [Ubari], May 23, 2016).
Despite his past political activism on behalf of Fezzan, Kanna is also an outspoken proponent of the continued unity of Libya’s provinces, and the need for a unified command and control structure for the Libyan security forces under a single, central government (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25; al-Wasat [Tripoli], October 6, 2016). Kanna was not generally linked to the GNA until his appointment by that faction, and was considered a relatively neutral actor in the GNA-versus-HoR conflict, having maintained an independent military command that was charged with Libya’s border security in Fezzan province (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25; Ewan Libya [Tripoli], January 18; al-Wasat [Tripoli], May 24, 2017). Kanna was in fact considered to be a “Gadhafist” who was more comfortable working with Haftar than with any other prominent, Libyan commander (Libya Akhbar [Tripoli], January 25; Al-Araby Al-Jadid [Tripoli], May 20, 2016; Africa Gate News [Sirte], May 6, 2016). The GNA reportedly sought out Kana because of his well-established understanding of the socio-politics in Fezzan province, its trans-Saharan networks that cross borders, all of which is an area where the GNA is in a weaker position than the LNA (al-Araby al-Jadid, October 23, 2018).
The GNA is making a big bet that Kanna has enough of a forceful presence in Fezzan that he will be able to build a base of support for the Tripoli-based government in this strategic region. Kanna may be required to act against his stated inclination to reduce ethnic tensions in Fezzan, and instead attempt to activate his network of Tuareg fighters to support GNA efforts against Haftar’s forces, which could significantly reduce his national stature. The GNA needs Kanna because it requires the continued support of international actors, such as Italy, who are growing skeptical that the Tripoli-based government can stem the flow of illicit goods, migrants, and trans-national jihadists across the Sahara through Libya into Europe. Kanna, as the most prominent military leader from Fezzan, and an important Tuareg commander with ties throughout the Sahara, seems to be the last, best hope for the GNA to maintain its relevancy in southern Libya, and therefore to European nations.
