General Tariq Saleh: A Thorn in the Side of the Houthis
General Tariq Saleh: A Thorn in the Side of the Houthis
Executive Summary:- In Yemen, the internationally recognized government-aligned National Resistance Forces (NRF) are led by General Tariq Saleh, the nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
- Saleh’s faction holds a critical chokepoint, which prevents the Houthis from seizing the rest of the country’s Red Sea coastline.
- Saleh leads the most professional faction in Yemen’s civil war, being composed primarily of the country’s elite Republican Guard and Presidential Guard, the latter of which he personally commanded.
- Despite early stumbles, Saleh has proved a successful coalition builder and a popular leader in the territory he controls, largely due to his backing of local infrastructure projects.
- The money that Saleh uses to fund local projects, pay his troops better than other Yemeni factions, and arm his forces largely comes from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Should Saleh lose the support of the UAE or other allies, his faction’s bulwark against Houthi control over all of Yemen’s Red Sea coast could fall.
General Tariq Saleh leads the National Resistance Forces (NRF), which control much of Yemen’s southern Red Sea coast, including the port of Mocha. The NRF, sometimes referred to as the Guardians of the Republic, are allied with Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Numbering at least 10,000 soldiers, the NRF is critical to preventing Houthi offensives in the southern reaches of the governorate of Hodeidah and the contested governorate of Taiz. Without the NRF and Saleh’s leadership of the organization, the Houthis would face few obstacles and would likely seize control of all of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The NRF Under Saleh’s Leadership Saleh is former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew and previously commanded the elite Presidential Guard. After his uncle was assassinated in December 2017, Saleh escaped from the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and subsequently formed the NRF (The National, January 12, 2018). Unlike most other members of the Saleh family, Tariq Saleh has remained in Yemen and has vowed to both avenge his uncle’s death and retake Sana’a from the Houthis. Many former members of Yemen’s elite Republican Guard and Presidential Guard who fled Houthi-controlled areas joined the NRF. This includes many officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with years of experience fighting the Houthis. Since its formation in early 2018, the NRF, under Saleh’s leadership, has broadened its support base. The NRF draws heavily on fighters from the Tihama, the region facing the Red Sea, to fill its ranks. In addition to incorporating many Tihamis into its forces, the NRF also works closely with the Tihama Resistance Forces (TRF), which formed in the wake of the Houthi takeover of Hodeidah in 2014. The TRF is separate, but many commanders are still integrated into the NRF chain of command. The TRF also provides vital intelligence to the NRF. [1] NRF-linked forces played critical roles in the 2018 battle to control the city and port of Hodeidah (Al Jazeera, September 18, 2018). While the Houthis ultimately prevailed following the strategic withdrawal of the NRF and allied forces from the outskirts of the city in 2021, the NRF stymied Houthi efforts to expand their control in vitally important parts of the governorates of Taiz and Hodeidah (Middle East Eye, November 17, 2021). Since 2021, Saleh has focused on consolidating the NRF's positions while expanding his forces and enhancing their capabilities. Building an Army One primary advantage of the NRF over many of the other anti-Houthi forces is that many of its core fighters were formerly members of elite forces. These experienced and well-trained officers and NCOs allowed Saleh to build a potent fighting force rapidly. Many of these men continue to hold senior positions within the NRF and oversee the recruitment and training of new members. However, Saleh and his senior advisers have also worked to expand the pool of officers and enlisted men, including from a broad range of coastal and highland tribes. [2] Coalition building is critical in Yemen, as tribes remain the locus of power in most areas. Saleh and the NRF have suffered from the perception that Saleh and those closest to him are outsiders from the capital, as most of the other key players are fighters from northwest Yemen. Ties with the former Saleh government—which often neglected development in the Tihama, one of Yemen’s poorest regions—have also cost Saleh some support. Saleh has overcome many of these issues through coalition building, allowing him to field a capable armed force representing many of the tribes and communities from Hodeidah and Taiz. The NRF has recruited heavily for its armed forces for much of the last two years. Compared with many other anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, the NRF’s recruitment standards are relatively high and well-organized. Men with particular aptitudes, abilities, and community connections are sought out and often trained for specialized roles. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which maintains a close relationship with the NRF and Saleh, helps with training and provides critical financial and material assistance (Newsyemen, April 10, 2021). The NRF also benefits from its soldiers being well and regularly paid. This contrasts with other IRG-aligned forces, which suffer from inadequate and irregular pay—often months past due. The NRF’s pay scales mean that it frequently has to turn away prospective recruits and can choose from the best men. [3] The NRF’s superior organization stems from a clear chain of command. This, too, contrasts with other anti-Houthi forces operating across Yemen. Many of these forces, and even units within the forces, operate outside any clear chain of command. The officers in charge of many of these forces and units run them as if they were private armies—which, in many cases, they are. For example, the Chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi, has little or no effective control over the armed forces (Arab News, January 20, 2023). Any order given by al-Alimi would be subject to negotiation between him and the various commanders of armed forces allied with the PLC. Similarly, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), technically has supreme authority over multiple armed units. However, except for a few militias operating in Aden, most armed units are first loyal to their commanders. Saleh’s NRF has worked to overcome this tendency by centralizing command and control over all of the forces deployed within the areas the NRF oversees. All of the NRF units ultimately answer to Tariq Saleh. Countering the Houthis The NRF’s proximity to some of the most experienced and well-trained Houthi forces demands the efficiency that Saleh and his advisers have built into the NRF. The NRF and the allied TRF occupy territory in western Taiz and southern Hodiedah, which is critical to preventing a Houthi takeover of the city of Taiz as a precursor to all of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The NRF’s primary base of operations at the town and port of Mocha on the Red Sea is a vital node for the NRF and allied anti-Houthi forces (Asharq al-Awsat, February 7, 2023). In September 2022, the NRF, with Emirati assistance, completed the construction of an airport at Mocha (Newsyemen, November 24, 2022). The airport serves military and commercial flights, while the port is an essential alternative entry point for supplies and materiel. Both the port and airport are vulnerable to attack by the Houthis missiles and drones. However, the NRF has deployed some anti-drone and low-tech air defense systems. These measures provide some defense but could be easily overwhelmed. The construction of the airport and other vital civilian infrastructure by the NRF and local authorities is also a crucial part of Saleh’s efforts to counter the Houthis by bolstering local support. The NRF and its political bureau have overseen and supported the construction of new port facilities, civilian housing, as well as water infrastructure and power generation plants (Sabanews, July 2, 2024). The NRF and its civilian partners have also helped construct and repair roads across the areas that they control. These efforts and the relatively high level of security have helped ensure rising levels of local support for the civilian government and the NRF in the territory they control. This support is essential to countering the Houthis, which possess a sophisticated intelligence apparatus that engages local authorities and elders. Since 2023, the NRF has steadily added to its forces and developed a range of units with more specialized capabilities. The NRF’s frontline positions, especially in the southern part of the governorate of Hodeidah, have been reinforced and are prepared for a layered defense. The NRF now field artillery and, most critically, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). However, the NRF forces and positions are all vulnerable to attack by Houthi-launched missiles and drones. To defend against this threat, the NRF’s units are highly mobile and increasingly deploy their own surveillance and armed drones. [4] The NRF also benefits from extensive assistance with intelligence and threat detection from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Outlook General Tariq Saleh’s NRF are all that stop the Houthis from taking control of the entirety of Yemen’s strategic Red Sea coast and most of the governorate of Taiz. The Houthis routinely test NRF defenses across multiple frontlines with sniper and artillery fire as well as drone over-flights. They have also made numerous offers in an attempt to buy off NRF commanders, all of which have been refused. Further, the Houthis devote considerable military and financial resources to engaging with the NRF. They view the NRF as a potent threat. The NRF’s relative professionalism and the increasing focus on community development efforts should continue to bolster recruitment and local support for the NRF and its political bureau. However, without continued support from the UAE and other allies, the NRF’s efforts to build martial and civilian capabilities could falter. As the NRF’s founder and commander, Tariq Saleh’s fate is directly linked with the success or failure of the NRF. Notes: [1] Multiple interviews with Yemen-based analysts (September 2024). [2] Interview with UAE-based security analyst (September 2024). [3] Interview with Tihama-based analyst (September 2024). [4] Interview with Yemen-based analysts (September 2024).
