Hikmat al-Hijri: Druze Cleric Struggles Against Syrian Government
Hikmat al-Hijri: Druze Cleric Struggles Against Syrian Government
Executive Summary:
- In July 2025, heavy communal violence in Suwayda between Druze and Bedouin tribes escalated into open battles with Syrian government forces, leaving hundreds dead. The clashes marked the most serious confrontation yet between Druze fighters and the new regime under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. At the center of the conflict is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, a key Druze cleric, who rejected compromise and labeled Damascus’ security forces “armed gangs.” His leadership consolidated Druze resistance and positioned him as the main obstacle to al-Sharaa’s authority in southern Syria.
- Once a staunch ally to al-Assad, al-Hijri has reinvented himself as a symbol of Druze defiance—leveraging both autonomy demands and external support. His pro-Israel alignment breaks with the Druze tradition of host-state loyalty and now defines the geopolitical stakes of Suwayda’s confrontation with Damascus.
- Al-Hijri made an unprecedented public appeal for international protection, explicitly welcoming Israeli intervention. Israel responded with airstrikes on Syrian Army sites near Damascus, signaling both its readiness to shield the Druze and the extent of al-Hijri’s international support.
Once a staunch ally of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, prominent Druze cleric Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has reinvented himself as a symbol of Druze defiance against the new regime. Al-Hijri has consistently advocated for the establishment of a secular and inclusive government in Syria, more rights for the Druze, and recognition from the government of the special status of southwest Syria’s predominantly Druze Suwayda province. Al-Hijri is well known for his uncompromising positions against the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, and his pro-Israel alignment breaks with Druze tradition, defining the geopolitical stakes of Suwayda’s confrontation with Damascus.
Hundreds of Syrians were killed in communal violence in Suwayda province in mid-July. The violence reportedly began with kidnappings and public humiliation of individuals from the local Druze and Bedouin communities and expanded quickly, developing into full-scale armed engagement between the two groups. When the government of al-Sharaa sent in its security and paramilitary forces, they faced resistance from Druze fighters who viewed the government forces as being allied to the Bedouins (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 6).
Al-Hijri’s demands, including his opposition to government forces deployed to Suwayda, have been perceived by the transitional government and its supporters as al-Hijri seeking de facto self-rule (Al Watan, July 27).
Al-Hijri’s Handling of the Clashes
During and since the July clashes, some Druze leaders expressed support for the transitional government in an attempt to calm unrest, such as Sheikh Laith Balous (Alikhabriya Syria, August 1). Al-Hijri rejects this approach, instead vowing to continue fighting, calling the General Security Service “armed gangs that falsely call themselves a government” (Sky News Arabia, July 16). [1]
Al-Hijri made a rare public plea calling upon the international community to save the Druze in Syria from a massacre, in which he specifically named U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Even before Netanyahu took action on behalf of al-Hijri, the Syrian government and its supporters accused al-Hijri of being a separatist and traitor (Elnashra, July 16).
Al-Hijri’s History
The Druze religion is an offshoot of Shi’a Islam. Its followers have historically lived in mountainous areas between Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. They have historically faced persecution by “orthodox” Muslims who view them as heretics. The Druze faith is passed down solely by birth with no conversions permitted, making its members a distinct ethnoreligious group (Independent Arabia, March 11).
Al-Hijri carries the title of Shaykh al-‘Aql (in Arabic: شيخ العقل, literally “Elder of Reason”), the senior-most clerical position within the Druze faith. He is also the latest member of the al-Hijri family to inherit the title, which has been passed down since the 19th century. Two other families in Suwayda, al-Jarbou and al-Hinnawi, boast members holding the same title. Among their peers, the al-Hijri family holds the largest influence, owing to their place in the village of Qanawat, the historic seat of the Syrian Druzes’ spiritual leadership.
Hikmat al-Hijri was born in 1965 in Venezuela, where his father had immigrated for business. Soon, the family returned to Syria. Al-Hijri grew up in Suwayda, studied law at the University of Damascus in the late 1980s, and for the following two decades lived between Syria and Venezuela. He was still in Venezuela when the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, but returned to Syria to succeed his brother, Ahmad al-Hijri, who died in a car accident (Roaya News, July 16).
Al-Hijri and the Syrian Uprising
The Syrian Druze were cautious to join the uprising that broke out against the al-Assad regime in 2011, fearful of the predominantly Islamist nature of the opposition to the Assad regime. Syria’s minorities had been broadly supportive of the al-Assad government as bulwarks against Sunni persecution, regardless of other grievances they may have had with the family’s authoritarian leaders over the years (Al Jazeera, September 19, 2012).
When al-Hijri became “Shaykh al-‘Aql,” he fully aligned himself with the al-Assad regime. With Islamists dominating the ranks of the opposition, al-Hijri urged the Druze community to join the Syrian Army and fight the rebels. As such, Suwayda sustained far less damage than most other regions of Syria during the nation’s bloody 13-year-long civil war, although it did see Druze militias successfully defending against Islamic State fighters in 2018 (Diyaruna, July 26, 2018; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 17).
Insulting Al-Hijri
In 2021, al-Hijri was seriously insulted in a phone call with the Head of Military Intelligence in Suwayda, in what would cause a fundamental break in Druze–regime relations. Al-Hijri was reportedly inquiring about an arrested Druze in custody, likely attempting to intercede, when the Head of Military Intelligence, Luay al-‘Ali, verbally accosted him and the Druze community writ large (Arabic Post, July 17).
The slight, which occurred amid rising discontent around Syria’s economic conditions, sparked public protest across Suwayda. Al-Hijri turned wholeheartedly against the regime and led the Suwayda uprising, which was unprecedented in its nature and scale among the Druze, extending even into Suwayda’s rural regions outside the provincial capital.
Changing Conflict Dynamics
Al-Hijri’s stoking of dissent challenged the dynamics of the Syrian conflict at that stage. The Suwayda protests reinvigorated the opposition against al-Assad. This was due to the fact that al-Hijri positioned the Druze protests not as a sectarian issue, but as a response to the mounting resentment of the Syrian people toward the country’s deteriorating economic situation as a result of the war (North Press Agency, September 13, 2023).
By the end of 2024, al-Hijri consolidated his position not only as the most influential leader of the Druze community but as a symbol of Druze rejection of al-Assad’s rule. As the al-Assad regime was toppled going into December 2024, al-Hijri and his followers again played a role in accelerating the end of the regime, supporting the opposition’s military campaign in Aleppo and Damascus. Al-Hijri welcomed al-Assad’s fall, but his celebration of the new government was cautious. Al-Hijri hoped the new al-Sharaa government would recognize the special status of the province and create a Syria unmarred by religious sectarianism or extremism (Deutsche Welle, January 7).
Many in the Sunni opposition to al-Assad suggested that al-Hijri’s stance against al-Assad was driven by personal and sectarian grievances, rather than genuine conviction. This opinion was widely held, even as the Druze were celebrated for helping depose al-Assad. Nonetheless, this newfound respect did not diminish the mutual skepticism between al-Hijri and the new Islamist government of al-Sharaa, and resentment between the transitional government and al-Hijri mounted in the following months. Al-Hijri refused to disarm the Druze militia and hand Suwayda province to the new government, insisting instead on partial autonomy (Shaam, February 18).
Spiraling Into Conflict in Suwayda
No major confrontation took place in the first couple of months after al-Assad’s fall. Still, sporadic altercations occurred in Druze areas outside Suwayda. The security situation deteriorated in April, when a recording of a Druze person allegedly disrespecting the Prophet Muhammad drove Sunnis to attack Druze neighborhoods in Damascus. Dozens were killed in the clashes between Sunni Syrians (including security forces) and Druze (Sky News Arabia, April 29).
The situation escalated further when Israel came to the assistance of the Druze, responding to the Israeli Druzes’ fear for their coreligionists in Syria. Israel accordingly extended the strong ties between Jews and Druze in Israel to include the Druze in Syria, and launched strikes on high-level Syrian Army sites outside of Damascus. This was intended as a demonstration of Israel’s commitment to protect and support the Syrian Druze and deter further operations by the Syrian government against them (Al Arabiya, July 16).
The sectarian crisis shook the fragile relations between the Druze and the new Syrian government. Druze–Sunni or Druze–government violence was contextualized by many in relation to the February violence against the Alawites by various militias, including those associated with the new regime, showing the transitional government’s tendency to victimize ethnoreligious minorities (Middle East Online, March 8). Al-Hijri publicly called for “international protection” for the Druze and welcomed Israeli support.
Under President al-Sharaa, Syria had appeared to slightly soften its position toward Israel, in spite of Syria’s historic rivalry with its southwestern neighbor. However, al-Hijri’s demand for Israeli intervention clearly crossed a red line in Damascus, which saw the move as a sign of a new separatist threat (Ultra Syria, May 10).
Conclusion
Despite the early clashes between the Druze and the new Syrian government after the fall of al-Assad, the violence in July shocked spectators with their scale and intensity, with death counts in the hundreds. The Israeli intervention into Suwayda did not immediately provide protection for the Druze, and neither Israel nor the Druze seemed to expect the extent and impact of Sunni tribal mobilization from other parts of Syria into Suwayda. Eventually, al-Hijri was forced to accept an agreement that let the government forces operate among the province’s tribes (Alquds Alarabi, July 26).
Tensions remain high in Suwayda, although violence seems to have ebbed. Al-Hijri’s role in this phase of the conflict has enshrined him as a symbol of Druze resistance to al-Sharaa’s authority and as the most influential spiritual leader of the Syrian Druze. His challenge to the authority of the new Syrian government and his embrace of Israel represent a bold strategic shift from traditional Druze loyalty to their country of residence.
The issue of political-religious fragmentation remains a crucial matter dividing the Syrian Druze community. Al-Hijri is only one of three senior clerics in Suwayda (known collectively as the Mashāʾikh al-‘Aql (Arabic: مشائخ العقل, literally “Sheikhs of Reason”). The other two, Yusuf al-Jarbou and Hammoud al-Hinnawi, have taken more moderate stances, although the Druze have remained overwhelmingly united in their position against the Bedouin tribes and government (Enab Baladi English, August 10). The condemnation al-Hijri has received from the Sunni majority is to be expected in a divided country like Syria. The Druze may have suffered losses from the July clashes, but appear far more likely to follow the decisive strategies of al-Hijri than submit to the transitional government in Damascus as it continues to erode their trust.
Notes:
[1] See also a video by the prominent pro-government propagandist Hadi Abdullah that condemned al-Hijri, which was published on July 15: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrB7HlhIeFw
