Hungary Shifts West Under Magyar  

Hungary Shifts West Under Magyar  

Executive Summary:

• Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar, who took office in May, is rebuilding trust with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Hungarian Foreign Ministry expelled ten Russian diplomats for “unacceptable” activities under the Vienna Convention on September 8. 
• Budapest has unblocked EU support for Ukraine and has dropped EU vetoes on sanctions against Russia. It maintains measured communications toward the Kremlin and is avoiding a complete break with Moscow.
• Future Hungary–Russia relations depend on balancing pro-Western alignment against deep economic dependencies on Russia. Hungary remains heavily reliant on Russian pipeline gas, oil, and the completion of a Russian-built nuclear power plant expansion. 

The Hungarian Foreign Ministry expelled ten Russian diplomats on September 8 for “unacceptable” activities under the Vienna Convention. Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar explained the expulsions in the country’s National Assembly, saying that the government will protect Hungary’s security and sovereignty (24.hu, September 10). While the government did not specify what specific actions caused the diplomats’ expulsion, some Hungarian and foreign media outlets regard the Vienna Convention reference as an indication that Budapest suspects all ten diplomats of espionage (Telex; Euronews, September 8). 

The expulsion of these Russian diplomats is the latest episode in Hungary’s new government redefining its relations with Moscow. In May, Magyar’s pro-European Respect and Freedom Party, Tisza, ended 16 years of Fidesz–Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) rule under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (see EDM, April 15). Magyar has vowed to investigate Russian influence over the Hungarian state and strengthen ties with the European Union, in sharp contrast with Orbán’s consecutive governments between 2010 and 2026. 

Since May, Budapest took several steps that broke with Russia in favor of the European Union. Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Orbán stressed that the new government will no longer use EU veto threats for political leverage and acknowledged Russian policies as a security challenge (Telex, May 11). In June, the government ended a veto Hungary had previously held on EU reimbursements for European countries sending weapons to Ukraine, reversing a two-year Orbán-era policy (Portfolio, June 2). Hungary also struck an agreement with Ukraine that would protect and expand the rights of ethnic Hungarians in the Hungarian-populated Zakarpattia region in Ukraine’s northwest in June. In exchange, Hungary dropped its veto on opening the first negotiating cluster in Ukraine’s EU accession talks, which began on June 15. Budapest, however, blocked Ukraine’s EU accession progress in September, arguing that Kyiv had not adequately implemented its commitments on ethnic Hungarian minority rights (444, June 12; Index, September 2). 

Hungary–Russia relations came into the spotlight just a few days after the new government’s appointment. The Hungarian foreign minister summoned Russia’s ambassador over a series of drone strikes against the Zakarpattia region and called on the Kremlin to end its war against Ukraine (Portfolio, May 14). The summoning of the Russian ambassador is a stark policy change from the previous administration. The previous cabinet never did so, even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while summoning several European and allied ambassadors over smaller bilateral political and ideological disputes (Telex, May 13). 

This foreign policy change has deteriorated Hungarian ties with Russia. The Kremlin initially expressed hopes that the “pragmatic” bilateral relationship would continue after the change of government in Budapest, despite refusing to congratulate Magyar on his victory. Months later, however, Russia’s official approach to Hungary has shifted dramatically. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Russia’s response to the diplomats’ expulsion would be “tough and painful,” blaming it on the “Russophobic lobby in Budapest” (Interfax, September 8). Some Russian politicians, including Vladimir Dzhabarov, first deputy chairman of the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed that Hungary could face a reduction or cessation of Russian gas supplies (Index, September 8; Hungary Today, September 9). 

Hungary’s policy changes toward Russia under Magyar are primarily aimed at rebuilding the country’s ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, namely the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In recent years, trust within NATO toward Budapest decreased significantly in response to Orbán’s efforts to maintain close ties with the Kremlin despite its war against Ukraine (Politico, March 22). Magyar’s Russia policy intends to rebuild trust with NATO and the European Union. 

Hungary’s new Russia policy is not a complete reversal. As articulated by Anita Orbán during her parliamentary confirmation hearing for foreign minister, Hungary considers Russia’s current foreign policy a risk, but will seek to establish a transparent bilateral relationship based on mutual interests (Telex, May 11). This strategy is evidenced by Hungary’s measured communications about Russia, as well as by the government’s choice not to penalize the rest of the Russian embassy. Russia’s embassy in Hungary still employs more diplomats than the Russian embassies in Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia combined (Facebook/Szabolcs Panyi, September 9). 

Whether Hungary’s energy ties with Russia decrease in response to the diplomatic rift is yet to be seen. While Magyar’s government is open to new EU sanctions against Russia, it is also expected to consider its economic and energy interests when making decisions on future sanctions. It is also yet to be seen whether the government will continue or scrap the ongoing, Russian-built expansion of Hungary’s sole nuclear power plant (NPP) in the city of Paks.

The Hungarian Economy and Energy Ministry ordered a financial review of the Paks NPP expansion in May, The government, however, recently suggested doubling the project’s state financing for 2026. This suggestion came amid a summer electricity-supply crisis after record-low Danube water levels forced the Paks plant to curtail energy generation because there was insufficient water available for the plant’s cooling system (Népszava, August 27). The NPP is responsible for an estimated 40 percent of Hungary’s domestic electricity production.  

Hungary’s new foreign policy strategy is currently being drafted by the Foreign Ministry. While consecutive Orbán governments gradually shifted away from the Western orientation of the strategy published in 2011, the new strategy will set Hungary’s overall position on Russia in a completely changed foreign policy environment. Magyar’s government may diverge from the new pro-Western direction if Hungary’s energy interests require. Hungary remains the single largest importer of Russian pipeline gas in the European Union and one of only three EU countries still buying Russian oil. The European Union is preparing to phase out Russian oil and gas by the end of 2027, but Hungary’s phase-out may require more time because of the scale of its dependence and high global energy prices.