Iraq’s Kurdistan Region Rattled by Iranian Drones as Militant Dispute Resumes

Iraq’s Kurdistan Region Rattled by Iranian Drones as Militant Dispute Resumes

Executive Summary:

• Iran and its allied factions have launched over 1,000 attacks on Iraq’s Kurdistan Region since February 28, targeting Kurdish opposition groups and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leadership.
• The September 30 withdrawal of U.S.-led Coalition forces and the removal of Patriot missile systems leave the Kurdistan Region highly vulnerable to continued strikes. 
• Drone attacks will likely persist unless the KRG procures its own air-defense systems or mediates an agreement addressing Iran’s demands regarding Kurdish militants.

Since the U.S.–Iran conflict began on February 28, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been targeted by at least 1,000 drone and missile attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed factions, resulting in at least 32 deaths (Al Jazeera, August 11). In mid-July, Iran stepped up such drone attacks after the U.S.–Iran ceasefire broke down (ABC, July 10). For example, on July 17, at least 19 members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties were killed, including 10 members of Komala, an Iranian Kurdish opposition group with armed Peshmerga forces based in Iraqi Kurdistan (Hengaw, July 21; Rudaw, August 31).

On August 17, Iranian drones also targeted the office of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the residence of the KRG Director of the Intelligence Agency (INA, August 17). Iranian officials denied being responsible for the attack, claiming it was a false-flag operation (Anadolu, August 17). On September 2, 10 drones were intercepted in Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, Erbil. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed responsibility, alleging that a repair center, warehouses, and the guidance system of the U.S. surveillance balloon had been destroyed at Erbil Airport, a claim later confirmed by Rudaw (The New Region; Rudaw, September 2).

These attacks come amid the September 30 withdrawal of the U.S.-led Coalition forces from the Kurdistan Region, which is part of a 2024 Iraqi–U.S. agreement. Patriot systems at Erbil Airport were already removed in July (Al Monitor, July 31). This leaves the Kurdistan Region vulnerable to attacks.

Iran’s Attacks May Continue

The removal of U.S. troops from Erbil might decrease the number of Iranian attacks, since Iran has pointed to the presence of U.S. bases as a reason for attacks on Iraq (Al Jazeera, August 9). In the past, however, Iran has also targeted non-U.S. military targets, such as the Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee, who was killed on January 15, 2024 (Anadolu, January 16, 2024). Iran-backed factions have also targeted Kurdish energy infrastructure in Iraq (Washington Kurdish Institute, November 2, 2023). Moreover, Iran could also continue to target the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil, despite the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces.

Iran has become increasingly frustrated with the continued presence of Iranian Kurdish armed groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, despite the KRG’s claim to neutrality in the conflict (Peshawa X/@Hawramani, September 3). These attacks come amid reports that U.S. President Donald Trump was considering a plan to arm such Iranian Kurdish militant groups (Tabnak, May 13). Israel was also reportedly planning to create the conditions for regime change through a ‘Kurdish invasion’ (Ynet, March 8).

In March 2023, Iraq and Iran signed a security agreement to disarm Iranian Kurdish militant groups (The New Region, August 15). In July 2023, furthermore, then-Chief of the Iranian General Staff Mohammad Bagheri warned Iraq that the Kurdish militant groups had to be disarmed or expelled (ISNA, July 25, 2023). While Kurdish armed groups were moved to new camps and removed from the border after 2023, Iran still demands their complete removal from the country (The New Region, September 6, 2024).

Iran’s Pressure Campaign

Iran’s Press TV has reported that Tehran delivered a message to Baghdad to either extradite or expel Iranian Kurdish militant groups (Press TV, June 26; The New Region, June 29). The attack on the KRG prime minister’s office might be a pressure tactic by Iran. The KRG does not favor expelling these groups, but under such pressure it could succumb to Iranian demands.

KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani told Al Jazeera that the Iranian Kurdish militants came to the area as refugees with their families before the Kurdistan Region was established in 1991. He therefore asserted that the Kurdish issue in Iran should be resolved peacefully through dialogue (Al Jazeera, August 9). 

Iran also submitted Interpol Red Notice requests in July for 36 Kurdish opposition figures and activists (Iran Wire, July 22). Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi further confirmed that he contacted Iraqi, Turkish, and Kurdish leaders after reports suggested that Trump reached out to regional leaders to call for the fragmentation of Iran, most likely referring to an Axios report that Trump spoke to Iraqi Kurdish leaders in early March (Axios, March 3; Al Monitor, July 20). Trump also reportedly spoke to Mustafa Hijri, leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDK-I) (Washington Post, March 5). This Israeli–U.S. plan to use Iranian Kurds to break up Iran was, however, reportedly later abandoned (Daily Sabah, June 6).

Conclusion

If no final agreement is reached between the United States and Iran, Iran will likely continue attacks on the Kurdistan Region. Even if there is an agreement, however, it is still possible that Iran or Iranian-backed Iraqi factions will continue attacks on the Kurdistan Region, including attacks on energy infrastructure, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, or KRG institutions. Without its own defense systems, the KRG will remain vulnerable to such attacks. The KRG’s main options are to lobby for an air-defense system or mediate a deal that secures Iran’s acceptance of the presence of Iranian Kurdish militant groups on its soil, which at this point seems increasingly unlikely. Drone attacks will therefore likely persist.