Laith al-Balous: Damascus’s Man in Suweida

Executive Summary

• Damascus has sought to promote Sheikh Laith al-Balous as a counterweight to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, whose leadership of Suweida’s Druze calls for autonomy and eventual independence from the Syrian transitional government.
• In practice, al-Balous functions more as a political prop than a genuine rival: despite regime backing and outreach abroad, he commands little grassroots legitimacy and is widely viewed by Suweida’s Druze as a front for Damascus.
• The unification of local Druze factions under al-Hijri’s National Guard and the broad public support for self-determination underscore Damascus’s waning influence in the south and the potential emergence of a semi-autonomous Druze enclave in post-war Syria.

Infighting between Druze factions in Syria’s southwestern province of Suweida (Arabic: السويداء) is intensifying, adding a new element to the violent tensions between Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government and Suweida’s Druze community. While Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri (Arabic: حكمت الهجري) rejects Damascus’s authority and opts for sovereignty, his supposed chief opponent, Sheikh Laith al-Balous (Arabic: ليث البلعوس), is attempting to tie Suweida’s Druze to Damascus in policy and narrative. While his legitimacy is tenuous compared to al-Hijri, al-Balous remains an important figure to follow in the local militant political landscape, which, through its effect on Syria’s actions and reputation, carries international implications.

Divisions in Druze Leadership

Hikmat al-Hijri has emerged as the dominant figure in Suweida. Following the bloody events in Suweida between Bedouin forces backed by the Syrian government and the Druze community, al-Hijri—one of the senior Shuyukh al-Aql (Arabic: شيوخ العقل, plural of Shaykh al-Aql, the highest rank of Druze religious figure) and a leading figure in the Druze opposition to Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government—insists on a definitive separation between Damascus and Suweida (for more on clashes between Syrian security forces, Druze militias, and their consequences, see Terrorism Monitor: July 30; September 10). He has called for self-administration and later went as far as demanding full independence for the province (see Militant Leadership Monitor, September 10), doubting the possibility of coexistence for Druze under a government that evolved directly from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Arabic: هيئه تحرير الشام, “Levant Liberation Committee,” commonly known as HTS) —a faction with jihadist origins linked to al-Qaeda (for more on HTS and the Syrian transitional government, see Terrorism Monitor, March 25).

Al-Hijri claims that his demand for independence is supported by the majority of Suweida’s residents, as reflected in protests attended by hundreds and a preliminary referendum in which 124,400 people signed in support of independence (Asharq al-Awsat, September 2025). Suweida’s total population stands at around 375,000, of which 90 percent is Druze (Washington Institute, October 20, 2016).

Al-Hijri is the primary spiritual reference for the Druze in most areas of Suweida. The al-Hijri family held uncontested religious dominance before the 19^th century—but in 1849, the Druze chose two additional families: al-Jarbou (Arabic: الجربوع) from Suweida City and al-Hinnawi (Arabic: الحناوي) from Sahwet Blatah (Arabic: سهوة بلاطة) to minister alongside the al-Hijri family. Due to leadership disputes, the Druze religious authority in Suweida became divided between two main blocs: the al-Hijri family in Qanawat (Arabic: قنوات) and the al-Hinnawi and al-Jarbou families in Ain al-Zaman (Arabic: عين الزمان).

Syrian Druze, most concentrated in Suweida Province, historically displayed a spectrum of attitudes ranging from neutrality to support toward the Syrian government. These divisions have deepened and intensified during the transitional al-Sharaa government’s term. While al-Hijri emerged as its chief opponent, Sheikh Hamoud al-Hinnawi (Arabic: حمود الحناوي) accepted the new authority temporarily while calling for reforms and inclusion, and Sheikh Yusuf al-Jarbou (Arabic: يوسف الجربوع) attempted to reach understandings with Damascus, emphasizing unity (YouTube/قناة الإخبارية السورية, July 25).

Notably, the Syrian Civil War produced new actors among Suweida’s Druze. Among them, the al-Balous family—formerly led by Sheikh Wahid al-Balous (Arabic: وحيد البلعوس) and succeeded by his sons, particularly Laith—became prominent opponents of the al-Assad regime, and are now cooperating with the new government of Ahmed al-Sharaa (Enab Baladi, September 4, 2019).

Laith al-Balous and Suleiman Abdulbaqi alongside Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Suleiman Abdulbaqi was recently appointed as head of public security in Suweida, but he has been unable to enter the province, as Druze factions opposing Damascus refuse to allow Syrian government forces to reassert control there.

Wahid al-Balous and Men of Dignity

Laith’s father, Wahid al-Balous, founded the Men of Dignity (Arabic: رجال الكرامة) militia in 2013, once considered the largest and most prominent local armed faction in Suweida Governorate. Al-Balous clearly and publicly declared its goals as “protecting Suweida and its people from all threats and dangers during the civil war.” The main reason behind the movement’s establishment was its opposition to conscripting Suweida’s men into the Syrian Army fighting for Assad, which was being sent to kill Sunni Arab civilians in various Syrian cities. Given the Druze’s tenuous position surrounded by Sunni Arab tribes, al-Balous feared this would prove an excuse for sectarian attacks against the Druze population by local Bedouin (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 15).

The elder Sheikh al-Balous was later assassinated in a car bombing in Suweida on September 4, 2015. After he and others were killed, the hospital where the victims were taken was attacked with a second blast. These attacks were widely attributed to the Assad regime and its allies (Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution, September 4, 2015).

After the recent attacks on Suweida, Men of Dignity expelled Laith and his brother from their leadership and organization, marking a rift (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 2025).

Al-Balous’s Positions

 Damascus has recently facilitated Laith’s meetings with President al-Sharaa and ensured his presence in official gatherings. Pro-Damascus Syrian-American lobbying organization Citizens for a Secure and Safe America helped facilitate Laith’s contact with U.S. Congress members and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Al-Balous positions himself as al-Hijri’s grassroots rival, rejects calls for Suweida’s independence, and denounces Israeli support for Suweida, which he describes as exploitation of the Druze to secure its interests in Syria (Shaam Network, July 29). Laith insists that if not for the militant pressure of al-Hijri’s factions, many in Suweida would align with Damascus. [1]

His rhetoric draws on his father’s connections with Sunni opposition groups and his conviction that relying on Israel does not guarantee Druze survival. He cites the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s, when Israel’s poorly coordinated withdrawal left its dependent Christian allies vulnerable to their local enemies. In his view, reliance on Israel risks massacres against Druze and ignores Suweida’s geographic reality—lacking direct borders with Israel and instead surrounded by Sunni-majority tribes often hostile to the Druze. [2]

For Laith, Damascus remains “the winning horse” among the different factions that could impact Druze safety, enjoying acceptance from the United States, most of the Arab world, Turkey, and other key players. Al-Balous argues that Israel could even strike a deal with Damascus and abandon the Druze. 

Lack of Influence

After the recent Suweida massacres, the Men of Dignity movement founded by Laith’s further distanced itself from the younger al-Balous. The group denied that Laith was among its ranks and accused Syrian state media of falsely presenting him as its leader. Instead, the movement aligned itself with al-Hijri’s camp, resisting both government forces and Arab tribes attacking Suweida (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 2025).

Despite Laith’s claims of wide support, tangible evidence remains scarce. Aside from Laith himself, militia figure Suleiman Abdulbaqi (Arabic: سليمان عبد الباقي), and a handful of activists such as Rami Nakhleh (Arabic: رامي نخلة), few Druze figures openly back his position. Most Druze activists—including Maher Sharaf al-Din, Alice Mufrej, and Rima Fleihan (names in Arabic: ماهر شرف الدين; أليس مفرج; ريما فليحان )—support al-Hijri’s opposition to Damascus.

Laith’s bid for legitimacy as the Druze’s spokesman is weak. Laith’s family lacks the deep spiritual and historical legitimacy of the al-Hijri, al-Jarbou, or al-Hinnawi families. The al-Balous’ roots in Suweida date only to the 1970s, when Laith’s grandfather settled in al-Mazraa (Arabic: المزرعة). [3] According to local accounts, Druze traditions consider Laith to be “without honor” (Arabic: “فاقد للشرف” ), a social ostracism that leaves him profoundly without influence in religious or communal settings.

Reports further allege that residents who sought refuge in Laith’s guesthouse disappeared under suspicious circumstances, fueling distrust. Local leaders argue that despite government backing, Laith has no genuine grassroots authority in Suweida. [4]

Suweida’s National Guard

On August 23, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri announced the unification of Druze armed factions in Suweida under his National Guard (Arabic: الحرس الوطني) organization. This force pledged loyalty to him as the legitimate representative of the Druze in Jabal al-Druze (Arabic: جبل الدروز). None of the other Shuyukh al-Aql publicly opposed the move, implying tacit support.

The preliminary referendum soon followed, in which more than a third of Suweida’s residents signed a petition for self-determination, underscoring the widespread support for al-Hijri’s vision of independence as opposed to al-Balous’s hope of alignment with Damascus.

Most recently, the Men of Dignity movement created by Wahid al-Balous—which gave the al-Balous family its political legitimacy—announced its addition to the National Guard—placing it firmly in al-Hijri’s influence and opposing its founder’s son (ANHA, September 30).

Conclusion

The case of Laith al-Balous illustrates the complexities of Druze leadership in Suweida. While Damascus promotes him as an alternative to al-Hijri, evidence on the ground indicates that Laith possesses neither historical legitimacy nor popular support, and is even something of a front for the transitional government to undermine al-Hijri’s reputation in the diplomatic sphere. The consolidation of Druze armed factions under al-Hijri’s leadership and the overwhelming turnout in the referendum for independence highlight that Suweida’s community aligns far more strongly with the separatist vision of al-Hijri than with the pro-Damascus stance of Laith al-Balous, who has no force to back him and has said he is even hiding in fear of al-Hijri’s men, who see him as a traitor (YouTube/Syria TV, August 17).

[1] [2]  Sourced through an author interview with Laith al-Balous.

[3] [4] Sourced through author interviews with several locals from al-Mazraa. One of them is Oussama Halabi (Arabic: أسامة حلبي), who recently fought the Sharaa forces in Suweida.