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BLA Bomber

Mahikhan Baloch: Fourth Female Baloch Suicide Bomber Amid Factional Friction

Military & Security Publication Militant Leadership Monitor Pakistan Volume 15 Issue 11

06.30.2025 Imtiaz Baloch

Mahikhan Baloch: Fourth Female Baloch Suicide Bomber Amid Factional Friction

Executive Summary:
  • On March 3, the separatist Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) conducted its fourth attack using a female suicide bomber. This suggests that the trend is likely to continue, with the women acting as powerful symbols for the BLA in its claim to represent the whole of Baloch society.
  • The most recent bombing was carried out more specifically by BLA Azad, a sub-faction in conflict with BLA Jeeyand for influence and resources. The former appears to be on the rise, while the latter is striving to maintain its power and influence within the organization.

Mahikhan Baloch’s March 3 attack marked the fourth time Baloch separatists used a female suicide bomber. This once unheard-of practice among Baloch separatists has become an increasingly common trend in the region’s insurgency. The young woman from Gwadar targeted a Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) convoy, striking a vehicle in Kalat, Balochistan, in an attack which killed at least one person and injured three more (Dawn, March 3; The Express Tribune [Pakistan], March 4). The continued employment of female suicide bombers represents a striking trend in global militancy, considering the comparative rarity of female suicide bombers in other conflicts. The attack was claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) Azad faction, a lesser-known faction seeking relevance within an increasingly violent insurgency. Its competitor, BLA Jeeyand, is a splinter group that emerged following a rift in 2018. BLA Jeeyand has been implicated in major attacks, including suicide bombings against Pakistani security forces and Chinese nationals in Balochistan and Sindh provinces (Deutsche Welle Urdu, March 4). More recently, BLA Jeeyand carried out the hijacking of the Jaffer Express on March 1, in which more than 400 people, most of whom were off-duty personnel of the Pakistani security forces, were taken hostage. During the rescue operation, 26 security personnel and 31 militants were killed, according to Pakistan’s military media, with BLA Jeeyand only identifying 14 of these militants as its own fighters (The Balochistan Post, March 19). Mahikhan Baloch’s attack marks a definitive attempt by BLA Azad to assert itself. Until this year, BLA Azad had primarily conducted occasional low-profile attacks. However, this attack indicates the group's intent to gain more attention amid growing violence in Balochistan in a likely attempt to outbid BLA Jeeyand for interest, support, and resources (Voice of America Urdu, February 3). Who Was Mahikhan Baloch? Mahikhan Baloch fits the profile of previous Baloch female suicide bombers, but her lack of activism prior to joining the BLA’s militant movement makes her case unusual. Mahikhan was a resident of Gwadar District in Balochistan, just as the third Baloch female suicide bomber, Mahal Baloch, had been. Mahal carried out her attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at the entry gate of the Bela FC headquarters in August 2024 (The Balochistan Post, August 26, 2024). Mahikhan Baloch, for her part, joined the BLA Azad’s suicide squad, called the Majeed Brigade, in 2015. Like several other Baloch female suicide bombers (Shari Baloch, Summiya Qalandarani, and Mahal Baloch), she was college-educated, holding a Bachelor of Science degree. In addition to her academic background, she also held a keen interest in Balochi literature, traditions, and culture (Humgaam News, April 26). Unlike past female bombers, she had not been involved in student activist organizations, nor had her family been politically active prior to the attack, making her subsequent decision to become a suicide bomber all the more surprising. Female suicide bombers in Balochistan serve not only as combatants but also as potent symbols of the insurgency. Past female bombers allegedly sought to inspire other Baloch women to take part in the insurgency. While Baloch women have long existed in supporting roles around the BLA and other Baloch groups in Pakistan, their participation in full-scale militancy in the past few years is likely a deliberate trend (New Lines Magazine, December 14, 2023). Female bombers, in addition to their enhanced ability to bypass security measures, draw more attention to the Baloch cause than their male counterparts. The use of female suicide bombers also signals (perhaps as part of BLA messaging) that the anti-Pakistani BLA-led insurgency enjoys a wide base of support. More specifically, the BLA appears to be trying to push a narrative that even women not immediately exposed to militarism (as opposed to those with a prior history of activism, or BLA-insurgency-connected family members) are committed to giving their lives in order to achieve the BLA’s objectives of a free Balochistan. The presence of educated, middle-class women like Mahikhan Baloch participating in suicide attacks further evokes the idea that the appeal of suicide attacks and other lethal violence is becoming more attractive across classes, drawing in individuals engaged with cultural activism rather than purely the most marginalized and/or impoverished within Pakistan’s Baloch minority. Intra-BLA Rivalries The rivalry between BLA Azad and BLA Jeeyand reflects deeper ideological, strategic, and symbolic divides within the Baloch insurgency. BLA Azad has reasserted its influence in Balochistan's insurgency, highlighting the difference between its own ideology and that of BAL Jeeyand. BLA Azad focuses on achieving a "Greater Balochistan," which includes southeastern Iran and parts of Afghanistan. This shift was highlighted in Mahikhan Baloch's propaganda message released by the group after her suicide bombing. She outlined the group’s cross-border intentions by detailing the economic, political, and religious oppression faced by the Baloch community under the Iranian clerical regime, which may gain increasing resonance if the Iranian regime falters under Israeli and U.S. military pressure (Humgaam News, March 25). Each faction presents its suicide bombers in distinct rhetorical and strategic frames. BLA Azad claims to be the legitimate faction and has accused the Bashir Zaib-led BLA Jeeyand group of being comprised of expelled members of the larger organization. Since then, BLA Azad and BLA Jeeyand have each leveled accusations at each other for trying to lead the Baloch national movement astray (The Balochistan Post, December 23, 2017; Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, February 2). BLA Azad emphasizes local identity and cultural resonance by using the term "watan nadreeg" to describe the suicide bombing, which signifies a selfless mission for the homeland and a more regional perspective. In contrast, despite the broader organization's purported secularism, BLA Jeeyand adopts the term fidiyee to describe suicide bombers, which aligns it more with jihadist rhetoric and may appeal to a different ideological base (Humgaam News, March 3). Additionally, BLA Azad was cautious in releasing Mahikhan Baloch’s name and publishing her picture. This was an attempt to sabotage any investigations into her accomplices and avoid losses to the Pakistani security forces. In contrast, BLA Jeeyand promptly releases the names and faces of their fighters to gain maximum media attention (Humgaam News, March 5). It remains unconfirmed, but the Pakistani security may have still detained Mahikhan Baloch’s relatives in Gwadar after her operation. Conclusion  The emergence of female suicide bombers like Mahikhan Baloch reflects both the deepening intensity of the Baloch insurgency and its internal rivalries. Competition between two of the BLA factions and their strategies to portray themselves as more legitimate than the other is likely to continue, with female operatives symbolically leading the way. As the BLA Jeeyand faction continues to carry out high-profile attacks to compete with the rise of BLA Azad, the latter is shifting from low-profile attacks to more impactful operations aimed at maximizing casualties, ensuring greater media visibility and engagement of fighters on the battlefield, making it easier to recruit and compete for limited resources from supportive members of the local population.

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