May 2014 Briefs

May 2014 Briefs

SKETCHES OF SHAYKH SHA’BAN MAD’OUD KHALIFA HADIA AND UTHMAN MLIQTA, RIVAL LIBYAN MILITIA COMMANDERS

Nicholas A. Heras 

Militias operating under the name of the Libyan National Army, and loyal to the Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, moved into Tripoli on May 18. These militias are trying to force the country’s parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), to dissolve and hand its power over to a 60-member assembly that would replace the GNC and draft a new constitution (AP, May 18). General Haftar’s move followed a series of operations by the Libyan National Army in the eastern coastal city of Benghazi, nominally targeting the Salafist militia Ansar al-Shari’a, which is prominent in the surrounding areas. Libyan National Army operations in Benghazi and eastern Libya have expanded to include air strikes conducted by elements of the Libyan Air Force loyal to General Haftar and are reported to have killed 79 and wounded 141 people in Benghazi (al-Arabiya [Dubai], May 28; AFP, May 20; Reuters, May 17).

Militias cooperating with General Haftar, including the powerful Liwa al-Qa’qa, are reported to have stormed the GNC building and seized 20 parliamentarians associated with parties that oppose the National Forces Alliance such as the politically powerful, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Justice and Construction Party and the Salafist political bloc “Loyalty to the Martyrs’ Movement,” led by GNC president and commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces Nuri Abu Sahmein (Anadolu Agency [Ankara], May 19; AP, May 18). The National Forces Alliance is a political coalition of secular and liberal political parties and is an ally of former prime minister Ali Zeidan (al-Ahram [Cairo], March 13). Armed groups loyal to the current GNC, including the Operations Room for Libya’s Revolutionaries (ORLR), are reported to have resisted General Haftar’s operations against the country’s ruling government (AP, May 18). Haftar has stated that he will not stop the ongoing operations of the forces loyal to or cooperating with him until they “eradicate terrorism and extremist groups” (Bloomberg, May 22).

Liwa al-Qa’qa and the Operations Room for Libya’s Revolutionaries are two of the country’s most powerful militia groups that are on opposing sides of the recent Libyan conflict. Both of these militias consider themselves to be legitimate components of the Libyan state security forces and are separated by their political and ideological disagreements. Liwa al-Qa’qa, which was organized in the northwestern mountain city of Zintan and is a prominent militia that fought in the 2011 revolution against the Qaddafi government, is alleged to be the military wing of the secularist National Forces Alliance. It is led by prominent Libyan politician Mahmoud Jibril. ORLR is reported to have been formed by the order of Abu Sahmein, the GNC president (Reuters, March 30). The ORLR is also believed to be closely tied to the Justice and Construction Party and its political opponents allege that ORLR is the military wing of the Justice and Construction Party (al-Ahram [Cairo], March 13; AP, October 22, 2013).

Shaykh Sha’ban Mas’oud Khalifa Hadia

Day-to-day operations of ORLR are commanded by Shaykh Sha’ban Mas’oud Khalifa Hadia (a.k.a. Abu Ubaida al-Zawi), a popular militant Salafist preacher and anti-Qaddafi revolutionary fighter from the Tripoli suburb of Zawiya, who was appointed to his position over the ORLR by Abu Sahmein (al-Arabiya [Dubai], January 30; AP, October 22, 2013). Shaykh Hadia is reported to have had close ties with the al-Qaeda affiliated, Salafist militant Abu Anas al-Libi, who was seized by U.S. special forces in Libya on October 5, 2013 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 11, 2013; al-Nahar [Beirut], October 10, 2013).

A coalition of constituent militias with an Islamist ideological orientation from in and around Tripoli, particularly from Zawiya, ORLR was given a mandate by the GNC in July 2013 to provide police and internal security services in Tripoli under the auspices of the General Staff of the Libyan Army (al-Arabiya [Dubai], January 30; al-Wafid [Cairo], January 25; AP, October 22, 2013). It is believed to be one of the most powerful militia groups active in Libya and to maintain a strong relationship with Ansar al-Shari’a, including fighting alongside the militia during a November 2013 Libyan Army operation in Benghazi ordered by former prime minister Ali Zeidan (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 26, 2013). ORLR fighters were accused by the Libyan government of orchestrating the brief kidnapping of Zeidan on October 10, 2013, due to political disagreements between ORLR and its allies and Zeidan and his political allies in the National Forces Alliance (Reuters, February 3). Members of ORLR seized five Egyptian diplomats in Tripoli in January in retaliation for the arrest of Shaykh Hadia in Egypt’s Alexandria province (Reuters, February 27; al-Arabiya [Dubai], January 27).

Hadia, who reportedly earned a master’s degree in Arabic and is currently pursuing a doctorate in Shari’a at the University of Alexandria, is believed to have lived for over ten years in Yemen. He studied Shari’a there under the powerful Yemeni Salafist shaykh Muqbil al-Wadi’I and became a teacher at al-Wadi’i’s popular Institute for Salafist Preaching in the northern Yemeni village of Dammaj (al-Arabiya [Dubai], January 30). Hadia is believed to have returned to Libya from Yemen shortly after the beginning of the February 17, 2011 revolution against the Qaddafi government and to have quickly risen to a position of command among Zawiya-based rebels (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 11, 2013).

The January 24 arrest of Hadia in Egypt and the conflicting reports over the reason for his arrest are indicative of the confusion surrounding ORLR’s ultimate objectives. ORLR officials stated that Hadia was traveling to Egypt for medical treatment, while Egyptian officials stated that he had been arrested for over-staying his Egyptian residency permit (Reuters, January 27; January 24). Egyptian media reported that he was believed to be in Egypt at the time of his arrest in order to coordinate with terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, that have been conducting ongoing bombing attacks in Cairo (al-Ahram [Cairo], January 30; Anadolu Agency [Ankara], January 26). It was also alleged that Hadia was coordinating with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to bomb public sites in Cairo on the anniversary of the January 25th Egyptian revolution (al-Aan [Dubai], January 26; Libya TV [Tripoli], January 25). Hadia was released by the Egyptian authorities after it was found that he had not violated his residency permit (Reuters, February 3).

Shaykh Hadia, as one of the most important and popular Islamist militia leaders in Libya, will likely have a prominent role in the ongoing conflict there. As the most powerful militia on the side of the current GNC that is based in Tripoli but operates across Libya, the ORLR will have a say in determining whether or not the current government maintains its power against the forces under the control of or allied with General Haftar. These circumstances are likely to increase the importance of Hadia within the pro-government forces if the conflict in Libya escalates and to potentially drive the ORLR toward greater cooperation with militant Salafist groups including Ansar al-Shari’a.

Uthman Mliqta

Uthman Mliqta is the commander of Liwa al-Qa’qa. The group was incorporated into the Libyan security forces and is one of the major militias assigned by the GNC to maintain security in Tripoli (BBC, May 20; al-Safir [Beirut], December 2, 2013; al-Ahram [Cairo], April 15, 2012). Liwa al-Qa’qa is believed to have led the operation that freed Ali Zeidan from ORLR captors in Tripoli on October 10, 2013 (AP, October 22, 2013). Following popular protests against the presence of armed militias in Tripoli, the November 2013 withdrawal of Liwa al-Qa’qa forces from the city was ordered by Mliqta as a demonstration that he was following the popular will and that Liwa al-Qa’qa supported the security of the Libyan state and was simply a component of the Libyan military and security forces (Ennahar [Algiers], November 21, 2013).

A native of Zintan who defected from the Libyan military after the start of the February 17, 2011 rebellion, Mliqta was given the rank of major general in the “Libyan Revolutionary Army” (Elyoum7 [Giza], March 26, 2012). In addition to commanding Liwa al-Qa’qa, Mliqta held the rank of colonel in the Libyan internal security forces, particularly the country’s Border and Coast Guards, although he is himself not believed to be an active combatant in the organization’s military operations (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 20; al-Watan Libya [Tripoli], February 20; al-Ahram [Cairo], April 15, 2012). He is also the brother of Abd al-Majid Mliqta, the chairman of the Steering Committee and Political Bureau of the National Forces Alliance (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 20).

Mliqta is reported to have a strong personal rivalry with Nuri Abu Sahmein, which is believed to have contributed to Mliqta’s decision to deploy Liwa al-Qa’qa fighters to threaten the GNC in February and demand that the GNC organize new elections and hand over its powers to the Libyan Constitutional Court (Reuters, February 18; Libya News Network [Tripoli], February 4). Shortly after Liwa al-Qa’qa threatened the GNC, Mliqta was targeted by gunmen in an assassination attempt in Tripoli that failed, although he was badly wounded (al-Raseef [Tripoli], February 20). 

Uthman Mliqta has been and is currently one of the most important militia leaders within Libya and his power is likely to grow should forces working with General Haftar succeed in forcing the current GNC to resign. If the GNC resigns, the Zintan-based militias, prominently Liwa al-Qa’qa, would supplant groups such as ORLR from Tripoli, consolidating control over the capital for National Forces Alliance-supporting groups such as Liwa al-Qa’qa.