Orbán Doubles Down On Anti-Ukrainian Campaign To Secure Reelection

Orbán Doubles Down On Anti-Ukrainian Campaign To Secure Reelection

Executive Summary:

• Hungary’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance is doubling down on its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in a desperate move to win Hungary’s most competitive parliamentary election in 16 years.
• Fidesz has exploited a series of recent events, including the disruption of the vital Druzhba pipeline, to label the main opposition Tisza party as a “Ukrainian agent,” pushing bilateral relations with Kyiv to a historic low.
• The outcome of the April 12 election remains uncertain, as shown by polling inconsistencies, with long-running anti-Ukrainian sentiment likely to play a key role in the final result.  

Hungary’s relations with Ukraine have reached a historic low amid a series of recent events. Budapest is heading into its most competitive parliamentary election in 16 years. On February 23, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vetoed a critical, 90 billion euro ($104 billion) EU package for Ukraine and the European bloc’s 20th sanctions package against Russia. Reinforced during the March 19-20 EU Council meeting, this follows the recent disruption of Russia’s Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Hungary with Russian oil via Ukraine. Orbán justified his veto by citing Ukraine’s alleged unwillingness to reopen oil flows, accusing Kyiv of creating an “oil blockade” and even of deploying the military to protect Hungarian energy infrastructure (Prime Minister of Hungary, February 27). Ukraine first attributed the disruption to prior Russian attacks, then to ongoing repair work, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy now expects the pipeline to reopen by the end of April. 

The Druzhba dispute became the starting point for a series of events that further strained Ukraine–Hungary relations. This included Zelenskyy’s initial response, who suggested that if Hungary does not lift its veto on EU aid, he may “simply give the address of that person [Orbán] to our Armed Forces—our guys can call him and speak to him in their own language” (The Kyiv Independent, March 5) Despite being taken out of context, the Ukrainian President’s poorly chosen words were quickly interpreted as a threat against Orbán, while his expressed hope for a change of government in Budapest also added fuel to the fire. 

In parallel, Hungary’s pro-government media started alleging that “the Ukrainians have threatened Orbán’s children and grandchildren” (Magyar Nemzet, March 12). The allegation came after Hryhoriy Omelchenko, a controversial Ukrainian political figure who retired as a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) general 30 years ago and is not part of Ukraine’s leadership, referred to Orbán’s family during an interview. While his actual words did not constitute an explicit threat but a call on the Hungarian prime minister to sympathize with Ukraine’s war-torn children, a whole social media campaign was built on reinforcing the narrative about the alleged threat (444.hu, March 12). 

Further raising tensions, Hungary’s Counter-Terrorism Center seized two armored vehicles from Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank carrying $80 million in cash and gold while en route from Austria on March 5, detaining the bank’s employees for alleged money-laundering. While the employees were quickly released, indicating no crime, the Hungarian government has continued to promote unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine may have wanted to use the money to secretly fund the Hungarian opposition (Origo, March 7). 

This situation is developing as Hungary is scheduled to hold much-anticipated parliamentary elections on April 12 that threaten to end Orbán’s rule. Led by former ruling party insider Péter Magyar, the main opposition Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) has become the first individual formation in 16 years polling higher than the ruling bloc, injecting genuine uncertainty into the election. Opposition-linked and independent Hungarian pollsters have been consistently showing a decisive Tisza advantage since late 2024, while pro-government pollsters continue to anticipate a Fidesz victory (2026-valasztas.hu, March 18). 

Tisza’s rise in popularity consolidated despite multiple failed efforts from Fidesz to counter the new challenger through various tactics. These include a since debunked artificial intelligence-generated document promoted as Tisza’s “secret austerity program,” personal attacks against Magyar over his private life, and labeling him as a Ukrainian agent (Telex, March 6). A likely reason for this escalation is that Fidesz is increasingly uncertain about the election outcome, which has pushed the ruling bloc to exploit geopolitical fears of Hungarians, a third of whom are critical of  Ukraine and receptive to pro-Kremlin disinformation (DRI Hungary Chapter 2024, November 21, 2024). 

Widely seen as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s top EU ally, Orbán is well known for representing anti-Ukrainian positions both at home and abroad. He notably framed Hungary’s 2022 election as a choice between war and peace, arguing that the then- (and since disbanded) opposition alliance would drag Hungary into the war on Ukraine’s side. Fueled by disinformation, his “pro-peace messaging” was key in securing Fidesz’s two-thirds victory in April 2022 (see EDM, May 16, 2025). 

Orbán was widely expected to use his “pro-peace” narrative to boost Fidesz’s reelection bid. He has openly doubled down on his anti-Ukraine rhetoric, however, shifting his message from the need to stay out of the neighboring war to openly fearing an alleged Ukrainian attack on Hungary. Employing the same propaganda narratives, Fidesz has accordingly orchestrated all recent events in Ukraine–Hungary relations to claim that Kyiv secretly funds Tisza and wants Hungary to join the war on Ukraine’s side. These recent events also include an alleged Hungarian secret service operation targeting Tisza’s IT experts, which the government claims was an investigation to reveal the opposition’s hidden connections to Ukraine (Híradó, March 24).  

Ever since entering politics in early 2024, Tisza’s leader notably chose not to discuss Ukraine—and foreign policy, in general—understanding that not only Fidesz voters are overwhelmingly anti-Ukrainian but that the majority of opposition voters is also against providing Kyiv with military aid, despite acknowledging that Russia is the aggressor (Népszava, December 19, 2025). While Tisza organized an advisory referendum in which 60 percent of the 1.1 million respondents voted in favor of Ukraine’s EU membership, the party opposes fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership and providing Kyiv with military assistance (see EDM, May 16, 2025). Consequently, Tisza’s strategy has largely been to counter Orbán based on his domestic track record, including state capture and institutional corruption, the poor state of the healthcare system, and the country’s cost-of-living and housing crisis, among others.      

Disrupting Tisza’s election strategy, the recent escalation with Ukraine has forced Magyar to respond. Reacting to Zelenskyy’s controversial remarks, he stressed that no foreign leader can threaten Orbán, whoever they may be (HVG, March 5). At the same time, Magyar—unlike Orbán—criticized Putin. The Russian leader, while in a meeting with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Péter Szijjártó on March 4, claimed that “Russia remains ready to supply natural gas to … Hungary provided that they continue to follow the same policy as today,” indirectly threatening Hungary with a gas blockade if Fidesz loses the election (Portfolio, March 5). Unlike most EU states, Hungary remains reliant on Russia through a long-term gas contract with Moscow.

Orbán’s anti-Ukrainian messaging culminated on March 15. During a Fidesz campaign rally, he claimed that “either him or Zelenskyy will form the next [Hungarian] government” (Prime Minister of Hungary, March 15). In addition to actively using all aforementioned events to portray Fidesz as the defender of Hungary’s sovereignty, a Fidesz-linked group even planted a large Ukrainian flag in the rival Tisza rally to double down on the foreign agent claims against the opposition, which was later promoted via a coordinated campaign (HVG, March 18). On the rival Tisza rally on the same day, Magyar rejected Orbán’s fearmongering rhetoric, while warning Russia to stay out of the election following reports of alleged Russian interference (VSquare, March 6).

The current tensions with Ukraine are certain to disrupt Tisza’s campaign in its most critical phase, giving Fidesz much-needed momentum as the ruling bloc visibly lacks trust in its own public policy track record. It is yet to be seen whether Fidesz’s fearmongering will be successful, especially given the polling inconsistencies. Orbán has fully subordinated foreign policy to serve domestic campaign interests, as evidenced by his multiple aggressive statements against Ukraine, rather than seeking a diplomatic solution to the oil pipeline disruption, in which Moscow also played a key role.